Yes buddy. I've joined as I'm in the middle of the course. I'd suggest everyone reading this, irregardless of their optional combination, it'd be helpful in Pakistan Studies, Current Affairs as well as in Essay. It's coming from a reliable source whose core purpose is building the understanding of the people of Subcontinent pertaining to Nuclear arms both India and Pakistan possess and their repercussions in case there's any nuclear stand off between the countries.

Read the following to build your understanding off the topic. Do join the course, Its free and you will be able to cover in a week or so.


957 – Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

The IAEA was established in 1957 following U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech, in which he proposed the establishment of an international atomic regulatory body (IAEA). The overarching mission of the organization would be to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Both India and Pakistan joined the IAEA the year it was established (IAEA).


1968 – Establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):

The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The treaty was established with the goals of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, furthering nuclear disarmament, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy (UNODA). The treaty divided the world into two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) (U.S. Department of State). The NWS are those that had nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967, a group that includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. All other states, regardless of whether they possess nuclear weapons, are considered NNWS under the NPT.

Neither India nor Pakistan joined the NPT. The Indian establishment was divided on the matter. New Delhi was committed to disarmament objectives, but there was concern that the absence of security guarantees would make India vulnerable to attack (Perkovich, 134). Many also saw the treaty as discriminatory (Ibid). In the end, the Indian government chose not to accede to the NPT (Ibid, 145). Pakistan initially supported the treaty, but opted out when India did. In short, Pakistan wanted to retain the option to go nuclear if India attained nuclear weapons (Chakma, 270). As in India, many in Pakistan viewed the treaty as discriminatory. India and Pakistan therefore remain de facto, rather than de jure, nuclear-weapon states.


1974 – India’s “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion:”

On May 18, 1974, India detonated its first nuclear device in what it termed a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” or PNE. The test took place in Pokhran, Rajasthan, and reportedly had a yield of 12 kilotons (FAS). In the wake of the Indian PNE, the international community established the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which set strict guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports (NSG). Domestic regulatory instruments, such as the 1978 U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, were also promulgated (Squassoni). Pakistan had initiated its nuclear-weapons program in response to its 1971 war with India (Perkovich, 165). Yet, Pakistan used the occasion of the Indian PNE to reiterate its commitment to nuclear energy’s “peaceful purposes and to chastise New Delhi for attempting to distinguish between military and non-military applications of a nuclear test (Ibid, 185-6).


1974 – Establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG):

The NSG was established in November 1974 in response to India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” earlier that year (NSG). India’s nuclear test demonstrated to the international community that non-nuclear-weapon states, as designated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), were using imported nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes for their weapons programs. The NSG set strict guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports to curb proliferation (NSG). Because compliance with the NPT or an equivalent nuclear nonproliferation agreement is a key component of NSG membership, neither India nor Pakistan has become a member (NTI).


1996 – Adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):

The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as a Resolution on September 10, 1996, and opened for signature 14 days later (NTI). The treaty is a legally binding prohibition on nuclear explosions. However, it has not yet entered into force. The treaty required the 44 “Annex 2” states—including the United States, India, Pakistan, and China—to sign and ratify it as precursors to its entry into force (CTBTO).

While India was heavily involved in the treaty negotiations, it backed away from the CTBT once the text was finalized (Tellis, 202). India viewed the entry-into-force provision as an attempt to undermine its sovereignty. New Delhi further contended that the treaty fell short in terms of global nuclear disarmament by allowing for the maintenance and enhancement of existing arsenals (Ibid, 280). New Delhi also condemned the treaty as discriminatory because the Indian program needed to conduct further tests while countries such as the United States and Soviet Union no longer had to test to ensure the reliability of their arsenals (Ibid, 201).

Pakistan distanced itself from the final text of the CTBT as well. While it voted in favor of the treaty in 1996, Pakistan later revealed that it would not accede to the treaty unless India did, repeating a well-established pattern in international arms-control negotiations (CTBTO). Pakistan also said it was concerned that the treaty did not do enough in terms of global nuclear disarmament (Chakma, 276).


1998 – Nuclear Tests:

In May of 1998, India and Pakistan officially joined the nuclear club when they each tested nuclear weapons. On May 11 and 13, under the newly-elected BJP government led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests in Pokhran, Rajasthan (Perkovich, 404). Pakistan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, followed suit on May 28, just 17 days after the Indian tests (Khan, 1). The international community, including the United States, strongly condemned the tests and imposed sanctions on both nations (Krepon). Global events and strategic imperatives soon prompted Washington to relax American sanctions. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States needed Pakistan’s counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and gradually eased the sanctions to foster this relationship (Wagner). In the case of India, U.S. skepticism about the efficacy of the sanctions, combined with an overarching desire to overcome past nonproliferation disputes and cultivate a strategic partnership, led to the lifting of the sanctions in 2001 (Talbott, 180).


2004 – Discovery of the A.Q. Khan Network:

A.Q. Khan is a Pakistani nuclear physicist and metallurgist who is considered the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Throughout the 1970s, he worked for a European centrifuge manufacturer (Clary, 22). It was discovered in 2004 that Khan had exploited his European contacts to supply Iran, North Korea, and Libya with nuclear technology and know-how throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Lodhi, ed., 270). These revelations damaged Pakistan’s nonproliferation reputation. Rawalpindi failed to hold Khan accountable for his activities and did not let foreign intelligence services debrief the proliferation mastermind (Kimball), leading to informed speculation that the government may have been complicit in the Khan network (NTI). The Khan fiasco is considered the biggest proliferation disaster to date, and led to the tightening of export controls worldwide (Salik, 241). In the wake of the scandal, Pakistan sought to rectify its own export control deficiencies by enacting the Export Control Act, which strengthened regulations on the transfer of sensitive technologies (Fitzpatrick, 115).


2008 – Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal:

The Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal was finalized on October 1, 2008 (CFR). The deal meant India could engage in nuclear commerce with the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Ibid). New Delhi and Washington had to surmount several obstacles to secure an NSG waiver, which was required because India did not belong to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and there were ongoing concerns about India’s nuclear ambitions (Chari, 2). India agreed to allow more intrusive IAEA inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities, continue its moratorium on testing, and work towards negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). It also committed to let U.S. companies build nuclear reactors in India in exchange for access to U.S. dual-use nuclear technology (Ibid). Pakistan was critical of the deal, arguing that it gave special treatment to India and that Pakistan also deserved an NSG waiver (Squassoni). In response to the deal, Pakistan accelerated its production of fissile material (Ibid).

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson