What is nuclear policy?

Nuclear policy, posture, or doctrine reflects how leaders in states that possess nuclear weapons view the utility of these weapons and the plausible conditions under which their use might be envisioned (Tellis, 260). Nuclear doctrine therefore combines theories of deterrence with declaratory statements and operational strategies that collectively suggest what leaders hope will deter other nuclear-armed states, how nuclear weapons might help leverage national goals, and, if necessary, how nuclear weapons might be used in warfare (Narang, 4).

Do nuclear weapons have political utility?

Some view nuclear weapons as having political utility. The Bomb could, for example, confer status and prestige—although states seeking the Bomb could also face diplomatic and economic penalties. The possession of nuclear weapons also lends itself to deterrence in extreme cases. That is, by having the Bomb, a state could deter the use of nuclear weapons against it, or deter a full-scale conventional war. However, having the Bomb does not necessarily deter limited conventional or sub-conventional war. It does not require many nuclear weapons to confer presumed political utility—just enough to prevent worst cases from occurring. A nuclear posture that suggests political utility has defensive connotations.

Do nuclear weapons have military utility?

Some view nuclear weapons as having both political and military utility. In this view, political utility is either insufficient or in need of reinforcement. Those who confer military utility to nuclear weapons believe that the nuclear threshold might be crossed, in which case capabilities for use and targeting strategies are required. If advantages can be gained, they are worth seeking or, at a minimum, a state can deny an adversary from gaining advantages. Belief in the military utility of nuclear weapons will be backed up by qualitative and quantitative means. How much is enough depends on what an adversary is presumed to have. A nuclear posture that suggests military utility has offensive suggestions.

What is countervalue targeting?

Under this posture, deterrence is sought by clarifying an ability to retaliate against cities. This is called “countervalue” targeting (Kristensen and Norris, 29). Leaders in states that rely on countervalue targeting believe that nuclear weapons have political, but not military, value. The essential value of nuclear weapons, in this view, is their ability to punish—and hence, to deter an adversary.

What is counterforce targeting?

An offense-oriented kind of deterrence is characterized by having many nuclear weapons of varied ranges, including weapons with high accuracy. The ability to strike military targets as well as cities is called a “counterforce” targeting posture (Krepon, Wheeler, and Mason, eds., 19). By adopting offense-oriented deterrence, national leaders seek to underscore the risks to an adversary of crossing the nuclear threshold, as well as a belief that, once this threshold is crossed, nuclear weapons can have military utility. The essential value of nuclear weapons, in this view, is their ability to deny an adversary’s ability to punish by targeting opposing nuclear forces. In this view, although grievous punishment cannot be avoided in nuclear exchanges, nuclear wars, like other kind of wars, might have winners and losers. In this view, comparative advantage can help deter and determine the outcome of warfare.

What are the primary components of nuclear policy?

Declaratory statements help leaders to characterize their nuclear doctrine to external audiences. These statements are important, but they may not be entirely accurate (Sagan, 227). For example, leaders may declare that they seek minimal deterrence, but they pursue capabilities that do not appear to be minimal (Ibid, 219-220). The use of adjectives, such as credible minimum deterrence, or minimum credible deterrence, suggests upwardly adjustable requirements. The term limited deterrence connotes a defensive posture. The term existential deterrence connotes that a small number of nuclear weapons capable of destroying a few cities will be sufficient to deter (Freedman, 184). Put another way, the mere existence of nuclear weapons—and not war-fighting capabilities—would have a desired deterrent effect (Ibid, 18). The term full-spectrum deterrence connotes war-fighting capabilities at different levels of conflict, including short-range weapons and long-range means of delivery (Salik).

A no-first-use (NFU) posture is self-explanatory. Leaders in states that view nuclear weapons as having political, but not military utility, might adopt this posture. Leaders in states that enjoy conventional military advantages might do so, as well—but not in all cases (Sagan, 222). NFU postures, as with nuclear postures that leave open the option of first use, may not be credible to adversaries. Leaders may not wish to resort to the first use of nuclear weapons, even though they advertise their willingness to do so (Ibid, 227). And leaders may not believe the NFU pledges of an adversary.

The possession of nuclear weapons requires employment concepts. Employment strategies reflect the objectives leaders have in crossing the nuclear threshold (Narang, 4). If the purpose of crossing the nuclear threshold first is to signal an adversary to halt a conventional advance, then a single demonstration shot might be employed (Waltz, 733). But there is no way to guarantee how an adversary might interpret this act. Was the detonation purposeful or accidental? Will command-and-control arrangements hold once a mushroom cloud appears? A single demonstration shot could open Pandora’s box.

If more than a single detonation is planned or anticipated, this requires a targeting strategy (countervalue or counterforce). Whatever strategy is adopted, escalation control is likely to be extremely difficult (Freedman, 34). There is no precedent in warfare for conflict between nuclear-armed foes. Command-and-control arrangements would be extremely stressed. Assessing the battlefield would be a severe challenge. Widespread chaos away from battlefields could be anticipated. Channels of communication between the adversaries might be irretrievably broken, as well as channels of communication in search of diplomatic intervention. Foreign leaders will avoid a radioactive war zone.

What postures might regional nuclear powers adopt?

Vipin Narang contends that regional nuclear powers have adopted three identifiable nuclear postures (Narang, 8):

A catalytic posture, in which a state threatens to use nuclear weapons to prompt a powerful third-party to intervene on its behalf;
An assured retaliation posture, in which a state seeks assured second-strike capabilities to deter an adversary’s first use of nuclear weapons; and
An asymmetric escalation posture, in which a state seeks to deter conventional military operations by threatening to cross the nuclear threshold first.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson