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Default The 1986-87 Brasstacks Crisis

The Crisis

Exercise Brasstacks was a multi-phase exercise conducted by the Indian military in 1986 and 1987. Brasstacks’ purpose remains a matter of debate. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi appears to have favored a major exercise out of a desire to showcase India’s increasing military prowess. The Indian Army viewed Brasstacks as an opportunity to assess military readiness as well as the effectiveness of the army’s new, mobile Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPID) formations (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 44). Some contend Prime Minister Gandhi and Indian Army Chief of Staff General K. Sundarji wanted to signal to Pakistan the costs the latter might incur if it continued to support Sikh separatists in Indian Punjab (Narang, 63). Others have surmised that Gen. Sundarji wished to prompt a war with Pakistan prior to its acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The exercise’s final phase, which began in November 1986, took place along 100-mile front in Rajasthan, which bordered Pakistan’s Sindh Province. This phase may have involved as many as 250,000 Indian soldiers, including armored, infantry, and mechanized divisions—some of which had been converted to RAPID formations. (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 44 and 46). Some Indian officials failed to anticipate that Pakistan would respond in dramatic fashion to a large-scale exercise because Rawalpindi’s response to Exercise Digvijay, a similar exercise that took place in Rajasthan three years prior to Brasstacks, was muted (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 30). This time, however, Pakistan chose to respond with troop movements of its own.


Pakistan’s Army Reserve North (ARN) and Army Reserve South (ARS) were engaged in military exercises at the time of the crisis. Since Indian intentions were uncertain, Pakistani commanders decided to keep these corps deployed in their exercise areas until the crisis subsided (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 52). New Delhi perceived these initial actions as defensive maneuvers that neither threatened India nor foreshadowed war. This sense of relaxation shifted to concern when the ARS crossed the Sutlej River and assumed positions near two Indian cities. New Delhi worried that Pakistani forces were positioned to either intervene on behalf of Sikh separatists in Punjab or cut off Indian access to Jammu and Kashmir (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 54). These fears prompted India to reinforce its positions in Punjab on January 23, 1987 (Narang, 63). For a brief period, war seemed likely.

The spiral to war was stopped when Prime Minister Gandhi apparently became cognizant of rising dangers and intervened decisively to re-impose civilian control over defense matters. India and Pakistan agreed in late January 1987 to enter secretary-level negotiations to de-escalate tensions at the border. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar and Indian Secretary (East) Alfred Gonsalves concluded an agreement on February 4, 1987. The Sattar-Gonsalves Accord stipulated a step-by-step withdrawal to peacetime positions and included a pledge not to attack one another (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 58).
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