8. According to Jayita Sarkar, what was the main justification behind India’s nuclear energy program in the 1950s?

Jayita Sarkar argues that Indian leaders were motivated to pursue nuclear energy in order to facilitate large-scale industrialization, which would in turn speed up economic development (Sarkar, 23). While leaders in India were aware of the dual-use nature of nuclear energy, it was the development-based justification that made the nuclear energy program widely acceptable in the domestic political sphere.

9. According to Zia Mian, how did ideas about nuclear war-fighting reach Pakistan?

In the early 1950s, the United States and Pakistan signed a number of agreements making Pakistan a U.S. ally against the Soviet Union (Mian, 5). During this period, the United States gave economic aid and military advice to Pakistan, including nuclear-energy technology and, Mian argues, ideas about the future nuclear warfighting, i.e., the use of nuclear weapons to achieve one’s war aims during a conflict. This Cold War-era alliance, in conjunction with the “Atoms for Peace” Program, opened the door to nuclear research and development in Pakistan (Lavoy). However, it was not until after Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war with India that then-Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto pushed for a nuclear-weapons program (FAS).

10. According to Feroz Khan, which of the following interest groups had concerns about Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear-weapons program in the mid-1960s?

The mid-1960s were a turning point in Pakistan’s nuclear program. India was starting to pursue nuclear weapons and an internal debate emerged in Pakistan as to whether it should follow suit (Khan, 60). Feroz Khan explains that two lobbies emerged: the nuclear enthusiasts and the nuclear cautionists (Ibid). The nuclear enthusiasts, led by then-Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his associates in the Foreign Ministry, argued that Pakistan needed to offset the growing asymmetry between itself and India, which would increase exponentially with the advent of an Indian nuclear weapon capability (Ibid). The response needed to be hasty, they argued, because the global nonproliferation debate was heating up (Ibid). This group further argued that Pakistan’s waning relationship with the United States meant that it needed to develop a durable internal source of security (Ibid).

The nuclear cautionist lobby was led by Pakistani President Ayub Khan and included three main interest groups: the military leadership, the financial bureaucracy, and the scientific community (Ibid, 62). The military leadership was concerned that a nuclear-weapons program would undermine Pakistan’s conventional weapons capabilities by disrupting international transfers of military aid and supplies (Ibid). The financial bureaucracy was concerned that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) would cease cooperation with Pakistan, causing it to lose out on vital economic benefits (Ibid). The scientific community was worried that a nuclear-weapons program would jeopardize their ability to acquire important, peaceful-purpose technology from abroad through the “Atoms for Peace” program (Ibid).

11. According to Scott Sagan, why did India conduct a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974?

Scott Sagan argues that the main reason India conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” or PNE, in 1974 was to satisfy domestic and bureaucratic interests. During the 1970s, a cycle of domestic political turmoil and government crackdowns was causing Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s approval ratings to suffer, threatening the longevity of her rule (Perkovich, 175). Many argue that the PM authorized the nuclear explosion primarily to enhance domestic approval by stirring up nationalist sentiment (Ibid, 176). The test was also an appeal to the scientific community. The scientists were key advocates of the PNE, anxious to demonstrate their technological capabilities (Ibid, 177). Other analysts speculate that a key rationale for India’s 1974 PNE was to send a message of strategic autonomy to the Soviet Union (Ibid). A nuclear test could signal to the international community, particularly the Soviet Union, that India was an independent, major player that should be taken seriously. Nonetheless, Perkovich argues that the ultimate decision to conduct a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 was not preceded by a great deal of informed debate. The decision was made on relatively short notice, lacked a robust cost-benefit analysis, and excluded key actors, including the military (Ibid).

12. According to Robert Einhorn, which of the following was a consequence of India’s 1974 nuclear test?

On May 18, 1974, India conducted its first explosion of a nuclear device, code named “Smiling Buddha.” The Indian government claimed that the test was for peaceful purposes (Tellis, 170). However, the test demonstrated to the international community that non-nuclear-weapon states (as designated by the NPT) were using imported nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes to advance their weapons programs (CTBTO). This triggered the creation of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), which set strict guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports to curb the weaponization of peaceful nuclear technology (NSG).

13. According to Rabia Akhtar, what did the Pressler Amendment of 1985 stipulate?

The Pressler Amendment stated that both economic and military aid to Pakistan would be cut off if Pakistan were found to possess a nuclear device (Foreign Assistance Act, 315). The amendment required the U.S. President to certify annually that Pakistan had not crossed this threshold. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush had no choice but to withhold this certification, as U.S. intelligence analysts had reached the definitive conclusion that Pakistan had obtained a nuclear weapon (Kux, 308). Thus, in 1990 the Pressler Amendment was invoked, suspending $300 million in annual military aid to Pakistan as well as the transfer of American-made F-16s (Ibid, 309).

14. According to George Perkovich, why was the scientific establishment in India eager to test a nuclear weapon in the mid-1990s?

George Perkovich outlines three reasons for the Indian “near-test” in the mid-1990s. First, the Indian scientific establishment was frustrated because they had wanted to test a nuclear weapon since the “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 (Perkovich, 365). Second, the scientists who had designed and tested the nuclear device in 1974 were aging. These scientists believed another test would help them recruit and train a new cadre of scientific talent (Ibid, 365). Finally, the strategic enclave worried that the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) combined with the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would put India under enormous pressure not to test (Ibid, 371). Therefore, they reached the conclusion that India should test before a test-ban agreement negotiated. Nevertheless, the political leadership decided a nuclear test was not worth the risk of international sanctions and isolation (Ibid, 375). India refrained from testing another nuclear device until 1998.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson