Why raise private armies?
Sunday, 02 Nov, 2008
By Tasneem Noorani
IT seems that we have failed to learn anything from our past which includes botched strategies of helping the Taliban conquer Afghanistan and our ‘slow boil’ strategy in Kashmir.
According to a report in this newspaper filed from Washington: “Pakistan plans to arm tens of thousand of tribals in Fata, to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants”. It further states that “the US military, which used Iraqi tribesmen to fight Al Qaeda, supports this plan, hoping to replicate its success in Iraq”.
To me this is almost a conspiracy to kill the spontaneous uprisings of the tribals against foreigners and the misguided locals. The welcome movement of locals raising lashkars against the Taliban and foreigners started this summer. It indicated the end of the patience of the vast majority of tribals, who did not agree with what was happening. The consistent policy of the armed forces, where they have taken on the miscreants firmly, must have encouraged the silent majority to stand up and be counted. But it was obviously a spontaneous movement in line with the tradition of collective responsibility, a part of their riwaj.
Why are we trying to give it the look of a foreign-sponsored move? This will surely make it suspect in the eyes of the locals and make them look like the agents of the US, a perception which can make anyone the No 1 target in the tribal areas. The US military was not even aware of the existence of the tribal areas of Pakistan when the tradition of raising a lashkar to fight a common cause of a tribe became part of local custom. How could it have followed the policy in Iraq, which it was supposed to be replicating in Pakistan’s tribal areas?
Assuming the news report from Washington is correct, there will be two serious consequences. First, as mentioned above, the identification of a perfectly indigenous move, as per local traditions, with the US will make it highly suspect in the eyes of the locals and all those associated with it will be branded American agents, which will immediately kill the movement and make the task of the Taliban easier.
Secondly, there will be repercussions of officially arming a civil population. Have we not seen the effects of our past strategies of arming and training a civilian population, both on our eastern as well as western borders? According to the news report, we are going to supply the tribesmen with arms again, reportedly purchased from China, even though that is a commodity which is not in short supply in the area.
Supply of arms will be followed by weapons and some tactical training. We will perhaps even concede to the tribals’ request for more lethal weapons. After all, the idea is to make these people match the enemy they are trying to defeat.
In the process we will have a few scores of tribal armies, who will be battle hardened at the end of this phase. Assuming that the current enemy is annihilated, the battle-hardened tribals will turn in unpredictable ways on new ‘enemies’.
A majority of the tribals are caught in the crossfire of a war that has been thrust upon them. They are poor people, living in primitive conditions, trying to eke out a living. Because of lack of economic opportunities of any kind, including agriculture, they have traditionally indulged in trade which is perceived to be illegal by usually accepted norms. Their business is to smuggle luxury goods into the country.
Growing poppy and extracting heroin is the most financially rewarding occupation for some, considering the limitations of land, but it means being involved in the drug business. Kidnapping for ransom (they usually do not kill) is another ‘business’ they find profitable for their financial survival. All this cannot be condoned by a civilised society; then again society should reflect on what it has done for the tribesmen to enable them make an honest living.
Even in this conflict, while the US is willing to send arms and experts for capacity building, can we think of a scheme to help put money in the pockets of these people? Infrastructure is fine, but the economic impact of that takes time to trickle down. We have been hearing of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) for the last two years and will probably continue to only hear about them for the next few years.
Even if 10 per cent of the money spent by the US in the tribal areas was put into schemes which would have directly benefited the tribals, we would have had the Taliban on the run much earlier.
Arming lashkars with US money will enable some general in the US to claim credit for his innovative policy, but will discredit and kill the only hope that the area has to fight Talibanisation.
The local political administration system, which may be weakened because of the blun
ders of the Musharraf era, still exists. I understand that the current government is trying to reinforce the old system. These are the right people to interact with the lashkars. They have their own riwaj and locally accepted ways of helping anyone they choose to. The political agent and his team are the most appropriate people to be strengthened and provided resources to nurture and support the popular uprising.
The tribals are risking their lives confronting the extremists because they are aware that their riwaj is under threat. Let them do it their way. Let us keep our smart alec strategies to ourselves.
A difficult period
Sunday, 02 Nov, 2008
THE Foreign Office broke no new ground when it said on Friday that Pakistan’s relations with the United States were passing through “a difficult period”. The FO’s recognition of the strained relationship between the two came the day America launched two more attacks in Waziristan, killing at least 21 people, including an Al Qaeda operative. The raids will continue — let us accept it. The outgoing American president signed a secret order in July authorising attacks in Fata. Until there is a change of policy, Pakistan should be prepared for this frequency and scope of American attacks. On Thursday, the American Homeland Security chief said that a country should have the right to attack another if it harboured potential terrorists. He thus reaffirmed what President George Bush and other Republican administration officials have said several times in the wake of 9/11, namely the US had the right to make ‘pre-emptive’ strikes in such cases. The most ‘original’ piece of foreign policy declaration came from Paul Wolfowitz, a former deputy defence secretary, when he talked of ‘ending states’ to ensure America’s security.
While the drone attacks and the often negative statements coming from America constitute a serious commentary on our diplomatic endeavours — for we have failed to convey our viewpoint adequately to the US and the world — they also betray a lack of America’s trust in Pakistan. Although the war on terror is supposed to be a joint US-Pakistan endeavour — both regard the terrorists to be their enemy — the two sides have failed to coordinate their strategy. Pakistan has mobilised over 100,000 soldiers and suffered countless casualties but the coalition forces across the border are not certain if their war aims are being achieved. They suspect the ISI of continuing to follow a “strategy of double-think”, so to say, that is fight the militants at home and use them abroad. This lack of confidence between the two sides has created bad blood between them.
Friday’s attacks come at a time when peace moves are afoot, and American officials too have been speaking of negotiating with the Taliban if they distance themselves from Al Qaeda. The foreign office statement reiterated what the prime minister had declared some time back — that Pakistan would tackle America’s violations of its sovereignty by diplomatic means. There is no other choice. With our growing dependence on American military power and the government’s desire to seek economic support from the IMF that looks for the proverbial nod from Washington to release funds to Islamabad, it would be counter-productive to overreact and succumb to pro-Taliban lobbies to challenge the US. In the long run, however, Pakis- tan must reduce its dependence on America and learn to stand on its own feet economically if it wants to conduct an independent foreign policy.