By Erol yayBökE

The miliTary is undeniably the most popular institu-
tion in Turkey. Seen as the protectors of Atatürk’s legacy and
famously non-corrupt, the Turkish military challenges the
belief that people enjoy less democratic freedoms in countries where
militaries are strong. Decades of harsh military dictatorships in coun-
tries such as Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina have given politically
involved militaries worldwide a well-deserved negative image. The
Turkish military is a rare exception to this norm. For over 80 years,
it has established a reputation as the protector of secularism and an
advocate for democracy. It has never wished to govern the country,
but rather to “guide Turkey on a steady course toward social progress
and the embrace of universal ideals.”
Ironically, this goal requires
that it play an intricate role in Turkish public life, in effect meaning
that Turkey is not yet a true democracy.
The military currently faces a dilemma. Accession to the European
Union (EU) would be the culmination of Kemalism and high-ranking
military offcials have shown undeniable commitment towards that
goal. The public will undoubtedly rely on the military for stability
and perseverance in this time of transformation. According to Bilkent
University professor Ersel Aydınlı, the military knows that it has a
“unique responsibility to carry the country to the end of this road.”

If Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the military will most likely
become a European-style military with little involvement in politics,
because at that point EU institutions will be responsible for holding
Turkish politicians accountable for their actions. But, as Aydınlı notes,
the military will not scale back its duties without the perception that
the EU is completely committed to Turkish membership.
Few, if
any, military leaders believe this commitment currently exists. Un-
derstanding the short-term threats posed by Islamic radicalism and
Kurdish separatism, among other things, the military is unwilling to
risk instability without a stronger signal of EU support.
Turkey still faces many threats, not the least of which is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism within its borders. In
addition, Kurdish militants threaten territorial
sovereignty and are gaining political strength in
neighboring Iraq. Tension with Greece continues—
over its support of Kurdish terrorists, the division
of Cyprus and disputes over the Greek Islands off
the Turkish coast, to name a few. Syria, Iraq, and
Iran, historically volatile Islamic countries, line the
southern border and pose the threat of supporting
terrorism and harboring violent Kurdish separat-
ists. Additionally, some Armenian radicals seek to
avenge past horrors. Former Turkish Foreign Minis-
ter Ismail Cem points out that “due to its geography
and strategic importance, Turkey is a country that
will almost always have security issues.”
For the
Turkish military today, weakness is not an option.

a miliTary unlikE any oThEr

Political influence
Turkish children are chosen at a young age for
military school and are educated in
modern facilities with highly skilled teachers.

Often these schools are
better equipped than their public
counterparts. Young officers-to-
be train tirelessly, not only in the
principles of battle, but also on the
teachings of Atatürk, the founder of
modern Turkey. It is an honor for
almost all of them to serve as protec-
tors of Atatürk’s legacy, a duty that is not taken lightly. Many soldiers feel that withou
their service a modern, secular Turkey would ceas
to exist. These patriotic attitudes reinforce positiv
public opinion of the military and have allowed th
military to enhance its infuence.
Military service is required of all Turkish men,
giving Turkey one of the largest standing armies in
he world. Although some, including author Ste-
phen Kinzer, argue that conscription is detrimental
o the development of the country and that young
Turks would be better served in higher education
nd/or work,

the size of the military is deliberately
ntimidating. Unlike its European counterparts
oday, the military also plays an active role in de-
iding Turkey’s future. After Atatürk’s death and
he unsuccessful Democratic Party government of
he 1950s, the military stepped in for the frst time
o overthrow a democratically elected government
o ensure the continuity of Kemalist practices. The
military would seize power again in 1971 and 1980,
ach time returning it to civilian hands—although not before modifying the constitution to guarantee
its ability to infuence politics.

In order to understand the institutional reforms
requested by the EU, we must frst examine how
and why the military gained signifcant infuence
over the civilian government. Only then can we
evaluate the potential impact of reform on the mili-
tary and Turkish society as a whole.
Realizing the need for order within the ranks,
early Kemalist military commanders centralized
power “by maintaining a strong hierarchy and lim-
iting the channels of civilian-military interaction.”
Their goal was a strong force that would maintain
composure even as civilian leaders foundered. This
was accomplished with the help of the High Mili-
tary Council (HMC), an advisory body of generals
that still regularly presents the National Military
Strategic Concept to the government.

The hmC
speaks as a unifed and rational voice to the often
politically divided civilian government. Established in the “post-coup constitution of
1961,” the National Security Council (NSC) is the most obvious way the military
keeps “footholds in institutions
that in most democratic countries
would be entirely run by civil-
ians.”
For example, the United
states national security Council
consists solely of civilians and is
only advised by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of staff. after 1961,
its Turkish counterpart, however,
had seven civilian and four military members, a combination that was tweaked after
subsequent coups and constitutional changes. The
1982 constitution allowed for fve civilian and fve
military members, with the civilian president most
often siding with the military, meaning that this
“civilian” institution was heavily influenced by
the military.
The 1970s were turbulent years for Turkey. Rising
leftist radicalism and ideological battles by Turkish
youth against the government almost caused a civil
war and eventually resulted in the coup of 1980.

in response to these concerns, the military closely
supervised education, radio, and television. The
result, as is often the case in Turkey, was stability
and peace at the expense of full democracy.
The military has historically intervened in
Turkish politics to address gaps left by corruption,
inadequacy, or a perceived threat to the Kemalist
order. In fact, I would argue that it does not enjoy
its role as government “watchdog,” and is willing
to step aside in the presence of strong, secular civil-ian leadership. This became evident following the
military coup of 1980 and the rise of Turgut Özal.
When Özal, of Kurdish descent, was elected prime
minister in 1983, the military immediately tried to
exert its power over his new Anavatan (Motherland)
Party.

A staunch secularist, Özal transformed the
Turkish economy and fostered good relations with
the United States without the guidance of gener-
als. He also actively supported the coalition forces,
against the will of the military, in the Gulf War of
the early 1990s.

With vast public support as prime
minister and later as Turkey’s eighth president,
he listened to, but was not overly infuenced by,
the opinions of military leaders. Rather than being
angry about its loss of power, the military seemed
content to let Özal govern with little intervention
until his death in 1993.
Turkey became unstable once again following
Özal’s death. A series of short-lived governments, Turkey became unstable once again following
Özal’s death. A series of short-lived governments,characterized by shaky coali-
tions and rampant corruption,
finally culminated with the
election of necmettin erbakan
as prime minister. A radical
Islamist, Erbakan began con-
solidating his power almost im-
mediately and made no secret
of his fundamentalist agenda,
giving the military an incentive
to intervene.

It had mistakenly
supported secularist Tansu Çiller, the politician who
ultimately made a deal with Erbakan that allowed
him to become Prime minister. in return, erbakan
quieted corruption charges against Çiller.

Eager to
correct this mistake, the generals used the NSC to
force Erbakan and Çiller out of power in 1998, banning
Erbakan’s Refah (Welfare) Party and banishing them
both to political obscurity.


This action was welcomed
by Kemalists and many of Erbakan’s former sup-
porters who had become wary of his extreme Islamic
views. Although the methods used to oust him have
been criticized, once again, the military had stepped
in when civilian rule had failed.

Interestingly, this continual dependence on the
military for stability has bred complacency and al-
lowed voters to take risks on Islamic parties. Turks
tend to vote for Islamic parties on the basis of their
social agendas even though they may not necessar-
ily agree with their fundamentalism, as was the case
with Refah. The public knows that if such a radically
Islamic political entity gets too powerful, the mili-
tary will step in and ensure that the secular order
reigns supreme. Turkish voters have traditionally
relied on the military for support and stability that could vanish, if accession is still uncertain, with the
fulfllment of EU reforms.

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The color of blood in my veins is green,I am a proud Pakistani.