by Yayböke, Erol

conclusions
The troubling reality of Turkish politics is that vot-
ers, secular and religious conservative alike, lost
faith in politicians some time ago. Constant bicker-
ing, internal feuds, and corruption scandals plagued
the secular political arena during the 1990s. By the
time the AKP came to power Turks had identifed
the prospect of Islamic fundamentalism as the lesser
of two evils. “Right now, there is no viable option
other than AKP,” commented Philip Kaplan of
the US Embassy in Ankara who follows the cur-
rent administration closely.

Erdoğan knows that
the military will not intervene as long as he stays
focused on the EU, so that is what he has done; he
also realizes that there may come a point when the
military will be unwilling to sacrifce stability in
the name of accession. He walks a fne, albeit very
blurry, line.
With the presidential elect secular parties have precious little time to come up
with a solution. Erdoğan has stated his intention
of running for the six-year post and is currently
one of the frontrunners, a predicament that has the
fragmented secular parties scrambling. “We need a
single party with 50 percent support, not fve parties
with 10 percent support each,” former Prime Minis-
ter and leader of ANAP , Mesut Yılmaz commented
following his decision to reenter politics.

Rahşan
Ecevit, wife of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit,
recently stated that she intends to spearhead a cam-
paign to unite at least six secular political parties to
“form an election block against the AKP.”
despite
undoubtedly pure motives, it is unlikely the parties,
more importantly their leaders, will be able to unite
in such a way given their histories. Hope remains
for them, however, because Erdoğan did not rise
to power by gaining a majority of votes. It was the
fragmentation of secular parties that opened the
door to him and it is the same door that, under a
unifed secular platform, has the ability to curb his
presidential aspirations.ion in May 2007, Whatever the outcome of the 2007 election, it
is my frm belief that an overwhelming majority
of Turkish voters prefer secularism to Islamism.
Erdoğan was elected on the basis of his social
policy and stated allegiance to the West, but if he
steps over the line he can expect action, and not
just from the military. On May 17, 2006, a radical
Islamic lawyer burst into a Council of State chamber
and shot fve judges, one of whom died.

He was
protesting a court ruling, also criticized by Erdoğan,
to uphold the secular headscarf law. The violence
incited stern comments from President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer who warned that “no one will be
able to overthrow the secular regime,” saying that
the shooting was “indeed an attack on the secular
republic.”
Over 40,000 people gathered the next
day to show support for the secular establishment,
some even calling the tragedy “the September 11
of the Turkish Republic.”
Whatever the outcome,
the shooting and resulting public outrage sent an
important message of secular unity and discontent
to Erdoğan and the AKP. in contrast to Western beliefs, not all islam in
Turkey is radical. In fact, most Muslim sects try to
distance themselves from violence, a task made dif-
fcult by media portrayals of Islamic extremism in
the greater Middle East. Extremism must be differ-
entiated from moderation, the latter predominating
amongst Turkey’s Muslims. Secularism, and Kemal-
ism for that matter, is not inherently incompatible
with Islam. Turkish secularism is designed to limit
the existence of radical fundamentalists in politics.
Many Kemalists are Muslims just as many EU poli-
ticians are Christians and are offended when their
religion is associated with extremism and terrorism.
Most are culturally Muslim, preferring to align
themselves with Islam out of tradition and family
heritage.

Turks use their beliefs as the foundation
of a value system, not as the only law with which
to govern society.
Accession to the EU is undoubtedly the culmina-
tion of Atatürk’s dream of a Westernized Turkey,
but would he have been willing to risk the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism in pursuit of this goal?
Westernization was his prize, a principle inherently
incompatible with the ideals of a fundamentalist Islamic state. The only institution that will ensure
the perpetuation of secularism is the military, and it
must stay actively involved in the accession process
until the end, at which point it can fnally loosen
the reigns. The EU must commit fully to Turkey’s
membership or be satisfied with the military’s
involvement in the transition process. Without
that commitment, further reform of the military in pursuit of the long-term goal of EU accession will
only result in the short-term rise of fundamentalism
and be detrimental to the secularism and stability
that Turkey enjoys today.
Ultimately, the decision lies to some extent with
Prime Minister Erdoğan. If he chooses to play both
sides, claiming to be completely focused on the EU
accession process while trying to implement fun-
damentalist Islamic policies to appease his radical
constituency, he will fail. The two ideals are inher-
ently incompatible with one another and if he wants
to avoid massive public protests and the possibility
of military involvement, he must choose to align
himself solely with the principles of the modern,
and secular, republic.

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The color of blood in my veins is green,I am a proud Pakistani.