1- First, is the Parliamentary committee particularly the Public Accounts Committee. Bipartisan committees chaired by respected and qualified MNAs or Senators and staffed by full-time professional and technical personnel should hold regular hearings, confirm the appointments of those heading these institutions, receive annual reports of performance, question the reported irregularities and recommend action against those found prima facie responsible for wrong doings. The recent work by the PAC shows that timely deliberation and follow-up are of essence if the Committee has to acquire the biting teeth.
All procurement contracts above a certain financial limit, all fiscal exemptions and concessions, modifications to the SROs should be placed before the PAC. The proceedings of these Committees should be open to public and the media. The temptation for the members of these committees to harass or intimidate the concerned officials or get involved in micro-management is very strong under the political culture of Pakistan. If this happens these committees will be more of a nuisance than an agent of good governance.
2- Second, is the State Bank of Pakistan. An independent and autonomous State Bank provides a guarantee against the excessive and irresponsible actions of the politicians and the bureaucrats in economic management. The federal and provincial governments will be guarded in their spending decisions if the State Bank refuses to honour their cheques beyond the given Ways and Means limits. At the same time the regulatory and supervision functions of the State Bank act as a safeguard against the possible malpractices in the award of credit and recovery of loans. It must be recognized that there has already been significant improvement in the working of the State Bank since it was granted autonomy.
3- Third, is the Auditor General of Pakistan. The constitutional protection given to the office of the AG has not been fully utilized in Pakistan to unearth and detect financial bungling rampant in the public sector agencies. The extended time lapse between the occurrence of the financial irregularity and the actual detection and reporting by the auditors, the lack of professional expertise and lack of prioritization among core and peripheral cases have muted the efficacy of this office. The AG should commission third party audits by professional firms of repute, use the broader 'value for money' concept and enlarge its scope of activities to cover all major public sector commercial and industrial enterprises.
4- Fourth, is the Pakistan Revenue Service. Tax collection in Pakistan has caused a lot of grief to the economic managers in pursuing a prudent fiscal policy. The renaming of the Central Board of Revenue will be purely cosmetic unless there is major reorientation and restructuring of the incentives, pay, recruitment, promotion, training, performance evaluation, procedures and processes. The new goal-oriented, result-based organization can generate higher tax yields if the basic compensation package and reward structure for the tax officials are such as to inhibit temptations for side deals with unscrupulous tax payers. At the same time there should be enough flexibility to penalize those who continue to indulge in these deals.
5- Fifth is the Federal/Provincial Public Service Commissions. Most of the current difficulties in governance have arisen due to the politicization of the higher services in the post-1973 period. There is a general recognition that the merit-based system of recruitment, appointments and promotions, despite many shortcomings had served the nation better than the present sifarish based and buy-the-post system. The responsibilities for all recruitment and promotions should be reverted to the Commissions without any exception but only men and women of proven integrity and impeccable credentials should be appointed as chairman and members of the Commission. There is no harm in appointing retired officials or judges but these appointments should not be a reward for loyalty to the party in power or for favours shown to the authorities. The Police Commissions should also be set up on the same lines.
6- Sixth, is the Federal/Provincial Ombudsman. The fanfare with which these offices were established under the Zia government died down fairly quickly. They are now perceived to be grinding the same millstone as the rest of the bureaucracy. In fact, they can become an effective instrument for quick, fair and judicious redress of the grievances of the common citizens against the arbitrary harassment of the overzealous or corrupt officials. There are very few people who are aware of the scope and mandate of this office and who have trust in the organization. A proactive educational role, a demonstration effect of its reach accompanied by selection of the right persons to the job can make it work.
7- Seventh is the Federal Election Commission. A powerful, independent and assertive FEC can play a preventive role by careful screening, scrutiny and investigation of the candidates for all tiers of elected offices and disqualifying those who are ill-reputed and of dubious character. They should forcefully enforce the criteria prescribed under the Constitution augmented by appropriate rules and regulations. This fundamental shift in the quality of our elected public officials would bring about a significant change in the overall structure of governance in the country.
Together, these seven pillars, if allowed to work effectively, will be able to plug in some of the conduits that lead to corrupt practices
