Learning from Iraq
By Shahid Javed Burki
Tuesday, 19 May, 2009
A GREAT deal has been learnt about insurgency and counterinsurgency from America’s seven-year involvement in Iraq. More will now be learnt as the struggle between the forces representing the state and the Taliban intensifies.
Some of Iraq’s lessons will no doubt be applied to the conflict in Pakistan’s north and in the settled districts of the Malakand division. Let us start with what Iraq has taught us.
The first lesson concerns the use of force. The Americans went in convinced that the use of disproportionate force would deter opposition to their occupation of the country. They called it “shock and awe”. This involved the use of an extraordinary amount of firepower to impress not only the Iraqi armed forces. There was also the expectation that what America could throw at the opposition in terms of bombs and bullets would scare the people into submission. But the strategy didn’t work.
It was only in 2007 that Gen David Petraeus was able to change course and adopt an approach that was to reduce significantly the level of violence and bring relative peace to the country. Iraq has reached a point where the Americans have begun to disengage, political processes have begun to work, and the economy has begun to revive. What was the main difference between the earlier American way of dealing with the insurgency and the approach that has produced a degree of normalcy?
The main difference was that the Americans recognised that it is not fear but hope that would pacify an unhappy populace. The use of force had to be combined with investment in development and institution-building that gave hope to the people that they could expect something better for themselves and for their children.
Initially averse to nation-building, the latter was precisely what the Americans began to do in 2007. They began with what Gen Petraeus called the “surge”. This involved the dispatch of an additional fighting force to the country to add strength to the already large American presence in Iraq. Once the commanders were sure that they would have enough soldiers available to them, they would be able to give confidence to the local leaders that after their areas were cleared of insurgents, there would be a strong enough American presence to ensure that the miscreants did not return. This was the area in which the Americans had failed earlier.
They had earlier used a great deal of force to push back the insurgents from the province of Fallujah, one of the most troubled areas in Iraq. Dominated by fiercely independent Sunni tribes who resented the rise of the Shia leadership in the country, the tribal leaders looked the other way as the insurgents established their control in the area. However, the insurgents brought with them a culture and social norms that were alien to the people of the area and resentment built up as they introduced their values in the system of governance.
When the American push came, the locals watched the developing situation without taking sides. But the US left after scoring a victory over the insurgents. They said they couldn’t stay since they did not have the manpower to keep the place pacified. This was expected to be done by the Iraqis themselves. But Iraq was slow in developing its own security force. This is where the surge in the American presence made a difference.
Once the additional troops came, the locals developed confidence in the American willingness to do more than simply fight. The new troops came equipped with the training and the ability to provide the local population with the services and basic needs it needed. Once these came to be provided, the Americans were able to build alliances with the area’s tribal leaders who came over to the side of the government and lent their support to the counterinsurgency efforts.
The Pakistani Army has to learn the same lesson. It has not only to expel the insurgents who have been defying the state’s authority, it must also stay on in the area while local leaders re-establish control. As is now recognised by most people who have studied the situation in Swat, the Taliban initially won some support from the locals in connection with the legal system that replaced the one that operated before 1969 when the district along with Dir and Chitral were merged to form the administrative division of Malakand.
That was when the old princely states became a part of the province of the North West Frontier and adopted its governance system. With the merger came the established legal system, replacing the one that was based on the Sharia and tradition. The old system was quick in dispensing justice; the one that replaced it was slow, cumbersome and often corrupt.
The demand by some of the religious groups to reintroduce the old system resonated with the people and the Taliban climbed on the bandwagon. Once the state made the concession, the Taliban did not stop at that and they pressed forward putting in place other practices that had no tradition and were not sanctioned by the state or religion. They did not confine themselves to Swat; they began to push ahead and took over Buner and threatened other settled parts of the NWFP. The West became nervous. It was widely reported in the western press that the Taliban were only 60 miles from Islamabad; only the Margalla Hills were in their way before they took over the capital city. That, of course, was nonsense but it got Islamabad to take notice.
With the military operation now underway, those who are managing it must draw lessons from Iraq. Four of these are important. One, the military must go the entire way and rid the Pakistani territory of insurgency. Two, once the military has reoccupied the areas currently controlled by the insurgents it should only leave when the state has developed the capacity to provide security to the local people. Three, an intensive effort should then be launched to bring development to those areas, including programmes and projects aimed at improving women’s welfare. Women were targeted by the Taliban; the state must demonstrate that it has a different set of priorities. Four, a system of local government must then be developed based on tradition as well as the need to provide adequate representation to the people.
A great deal depends on how this phase of the conflict develops. The Taliban have posed an existential threat to the state of Pakistan. The state must respond fully and intelligently.