A leaf from Turkey’s book
By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 12 Mar, 2010
The discussion in Turkey on a botched coup attempt some years ago raised some hopes of Pakistan following a similar route. Operation Sledgehammer, as the attempted coup in Turkey was codenamed, involved senior military officers and aimed at creating internal chaos to allow for a military takeover.
The Turkish military is generally uncomfortable with an Islamic party in power. In April 2007 it had issued a general statement opposing the candidacy of the current president (Abdullah Gul) for the presidential elections, calling it a disaster for the country. However, Gul’s party still made it to power. Despite continued pressure from the armed forces, the Islamic AKP (Justice and Development Party) could not be dislodged due to popular support. Pakistan could have a similar experience but in a different context.
In Turkey’s case, the military was historically considered part of the nation-building process. It was Kemal Ataturk and his forces that got rid of the Ottoman empire and the system of khilafat to build a new republic based on secular principles. This meant that while people were allowed to pursue their faith, the state would not mix politics and religion.
Hence, the Turkish state never became a ‘faithless’ state. However, the military directly became the guarantor of the new socio-political system including the survival of secular politics and the establishment of more European social structures. The fact that the ruling elite built internal partnerships and supported the military began to create a wedge between the rulers and the ruled. Even leftist parties supported the military, which resulted in their losing some measure of popularity.
For society at large the only other option was offered by the Islamic parties that provided a different agenda to what was being offered by the elite, resulting in the AKP’s popularity. The debate on joining the European Union further strengthened the party’s position as it accepted the demand for democratisation laid down by the EU.
The AKP managed to outsmart the military, which was forced from the outside to accept the internal changes. The EU constantly challenged the power, perks and privileges of the Turkish armed forces, which had built their significance on the basis of being the guardians and guarantors of Turkey’s changing national narrative. The AKP did not talk about reinstating the khilafat; in fact, it benefited from the European demand for Turkey to become democratic.
Pakistan’s case is quite different. There are similarities but it is the differences which put Pakistan in a separate league. Firstly, its military was not part of the initial nation-building process. It was actually a post-colonial institution just like the civil bureaucracy. This means that the various stakeholders did not necessarily consider the military above board and an uncontested writer and guarantor of the social contract as in Turkey. Pakistan’s military was part of the state bureaucracy that gained power over time and began to dominate the state.
Each bout of military rule has extended the armed forces’ power even further. The power to extend the service of senior officers, which the current army chief has exercised, was never naturally his but was made so by Gen Ziaul Haq. As per the rules, the power to appoint, promote and extend service belongs to the appointing authority, which in the case of the federal government lies with the prime minister. Zia and later Musharraf were responsible for extending the military’s pervasive role in politics, society and the economy in order to wield power even though the armed forces were not in direct control.
Like Turkey, the ruling elite in Pakistan has also contributed to building the military’s power. In fact, in Pakistan’s case the civil-military divide is not simply linear but both horizontal and vertical. Eventually, all political leaders make strategic compromises with the military for short-term gains. The signing of illegal deals or hiding the military’s assets or trying to whitewash the defence establishment’s blunders is done because political leaders and significant members of civil society believe they can benefit from association with the generals.
If we were only to dig up and compare the statements of individuals regarding military rule it would be easy to see the somersaults made by so many to secure their financial and other interests. The short memory of the people helps some get away with murder.
But Pakistan does not have the convenience of foreign actors who would help with a fundamental change as in Turkey’s case. Islamabad’s international benefactors have happily rebuilt their links with GHQ, especially now that there seems to be some hope of making gains in Afghanistan. Foreign stakeholders like the US have always been shortsighted as far as Pakistan is concerned.
But it is also a fact that they want to keep the military on their side because it is not ideologically opposed to using religion as a tool. This is not to suggest there is something wrong with the idea, but it is a matter of a military not geared to apply western or even Islamic principles of secularism as done by Turkey. Therefore, the only gains the US and its allies can hope to make in the region are to get maximum support from the armed forces even though they do not hope to change the institution. The military has a radical outlook and is comfortable with some aspects of political Islam as an operational tool. The Islamists are integrated into the military machine as those who adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with external actors.
For instance, the military is keen for the US to stay but only deal through the GHQ both nationally and regionally. Policymakers in Washington are of the view that the idea of an American withdrawal from Afghanistan has deeply perturbed Pakistan’s military.
However, the issue with a multifaceted institution, which builds multilayered partnerships, is that it is difficult to push back. It can change clothes and reappear once a crisis is over. Thus the major difference between the Turkish and Pakistan’s military is that the latter has more than nine lives and has an open field since even the opponents are ultimately its partners.
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd@gmail.com