THE question of Pakistan’s constitutional make-up and power-sharing among the country’s four provinces and ethnic minorities is once again coming under intense debate. Given the demographic imbalance and sharp ethnic differences that exist among the country’s four provinces, Pakistan badly needs a constitutional formula that can satisfy all segments of society.

However, no serious effort has been made by any quarter to provide a viable solution to this fundamental question.

Pakistan’s rulers and political leaders have failed to even initiate a serious, academic and meaningful debate on an issue that is important to the populations of at least the smaller provinces. With continuing unrest in Balochistan and the northern parts of the country, and renewed calls from some quarters to declare Pakistan a ‘failed state’ it is essential to find a constitutional solution that has the unanimous approval of all ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the country.

Democracy and the principle of representation go hand in hand. Neither can function without the other. True representation is only possible under a genuine system of democracy whereas the stability of democracy is dependent on how content a country’s various ethnic and religious groups are with their representation in power.

In the latter part of the 18th century, the British failed to assess the level of resentment among their subjects in North America over the issues of unjust taxation and their inability to challenge arbitrary British decisions. They paid the price by losing their imperial control over North America.

The founding fathers of a newly liberated United States of America, on the other hand, were quick to learn from the mistakes of their former colonial masters and realised the importance of the principle of representation. Those who undertook the task to draft the first US constitution went to great lengths to resolve issues relating to the make-up of the constitution and every state’s representation in the federal and state legislature.

Given the vast disparity between various states’ population size, it was not easy to find a solution that could equally satisfy all the states. The states with bigger populations wanted larger representation causing fear to the smaller states of being perpetually subjugated — similar to the situation that Pakistan has been in since its inception. The situation was dire and could have easily resulted in the disintegration of the newly established American federation.

The framers of the US constitution, however, resolved the brewing crisis through a series of compromises which afforded constitutional safeguards to all small and large states and ensured their due rights.

The current US foreign policy may hardly be inspiring but the American constitutional experience is a classic example of how democracy is not necessarily, as often presumed, the rule of majority. Majoritarianism may be a good rule to follow in homogeneous societies where an overwhelming majority shares a common ethnic, linguistic and religious background.

Pakistan’s problems may be acute but the country is certainly not alone in this. In recent decades, a number of countries — Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Lebanon, South Africa, Cyprus, to name a few — with diverse populations have faced the challenge of reconciling the wishes of majority groups with the fears of minorities. But unlike Pakistan, these countries have not allowed this problem to obstruct the nation-building process and have various forms of power-sharing. The most common system of governance employed by such countries is what Arendt Lijphart, a Dutch-born American scholar, calls ‘consociational’ democracy — or to use the less polysyllabic synonym, power-sharing.

The fundamental argument for consociationalism is grounded in the assumption that democracy and majority rule may be incompatible under certain circumstances. The theory does not challenge prevailing democratic principles and, instead, focuses on societies where the population is divided along various lines. It argues that the seemingly innocuous application of majority rule in such conditions could lead to disastrous results — mainly due to the presence of influential minority groups who refuse to yield to majority rule.

The theory itself is fairly simple, and Arendt Lijphart defines it in terms of four basic characteristics:

— Joint decision-making by a grand coalition government in which all significant segments of an ethnically or religiously divided society are represented;

— A high degree of decentralisation and autonomy for the constituent communities;

— A rough proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments; and

— A mutual veto concerning the most vital and fundamental issues. The veto can be a formal rule and even be enshrined in the constitution but it is usually the outgrowth of the unwritten rule that most decisions, and certainly the most important ones, require not only the participation of the representatives of all groups but also their consent.

A critical analysis of the above clearly suggests that the whole theory of consociationalism is characterised by a series of checks and balances that remove the possibility of one group of population or one branch or government dominating the rest. By devolving power to the regional level, for instance, the system gives all groups sufficient autonomy to run their own affairs.

Similarly, by granting the power of veto in decision-making to all segments, the system effectively prevents any single group from imposing arbitrary decisions. This in turn effectively allays the minorities’ fear of perpetual majority domination. By incorporating proportional representation, consociational democracy ensures full demographic representation of all segments of society in the decision-making.

Interestingly, this power-sharing system is not entirely new to this region. In fact, it may come as a surprise to many that it was the Muslim political elite in pre-partition Punjab that was instrumental in introducing the power-sharing system that Arendt Lijphart has recently interpreted as a classical form of consociational democracy.

In British Punjab, the just over 50 per cent Muslim population, according to the majoritarian principle of democracy, had every right to form a provincial government on their own. However, roughly 18 per cent Sikhs and 30 per cent Hindus were no less influential. Thus any government without their representation would have led to disaster in the province.

Sir Fazl-i-Husain, arguably the most influential Muslim politician in the colonial setup until his death in 1936, was the first one to realise the peculiar sectarian make-up of Punjab and the perils of majority rule in the province. His brainchild, the Unionist Party of Punjab, may be criticised for its pro-British leanings, yet it would be an academic dishonesty not to credit the party for its amazing understanding of Punjab’s peculiar communal make-up and its attempts to establish an all-representative government, instead of insisting on the Muslim majority’s right to rule.

In the mid-1940s, however, the Muslim League’s politics of ‘Muslim nationalism’ brought an end to the Unionists’ consociationalism. When the League swept the 1946 elections and emerged as the single largest party in pre-partition Punjab, it was in a position, according to majoritarian rule, to demand the right to form its government in the province. But the problem was that the Muslim League, despite being the majority party, drew its support solely from Muslim electorates and was seen by non-Muslims as the representative of Muslim interests only.

The British, deeming majority rule inimical to such a religiously polarised region, denied the League the right to rule. Anyone interested in analogy can recall the political stalemate of 1971 when the Awami League, the single largest party, was denied the right to form the central government on the grounds that it lacked the mandate of the non-Bengalis. The ensuing crises were similar: Punjab was partitioned in 1947 and East Pakistan broke away in 1971.

The point to stress here is that majoritarianism is not the only form of democracy available nor is its application viable in all circumstances. It may be best suited to homogeneous countries but certainly lacks the ability to serve pluralistic societies.

Pakistani law-makers and politicians must admit that Pakistan is not a homogeneous country. They have to be mindful of the fact that Pakistan is inhabited by people who have been ethnically and culturally distinguished from each other for many, many centuries. The creation of Bangladesh was not the first example to reveal how deep such divisions run, nor is the Baloch uprising likely to be the last.

Religion and Pakistani nationalism may serve as a unifying force during external aggression and internal calamities — as witnessed during the recent earthquake. In normal circumstances, however, the apprehensions and fears of the minorities will continue to hamper the country’s efforts to achieve national unity and political stability. All previous attempts by Pakistani rulers to inculcate political or national unity through artificial means have only complicated the issue and continuing with such measures is only likely to aggravate the current predicament. What Pakistan now needs is a framework that could afford permanent constitutional safeguards to all sections of society.

As is the case with almost all other theories, consociationalism has been subject to some degree of criticism. But nothing has dampened its strength as it still remains the only system that offers an effective, and democratic way out of majoritarianism — the main source of restlessness among the country’s ethnic minorities. Pakistan’s political elite and scholars could explore the theory further and refine it as per Pakistan’s peculiar needs.

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