BATTLE OF BUTTAR DOGRANDI(16 - 17 Sep 1965)

SEPT 16 - Deployment of Troops

After having spent a night in the area of Chawinda Railway Station, where BHQ 3 FF was also located in a Bunker, two troops of C squadron moved out to occupy the battle locations. Khaliq's troop took up position in area 15R on the northern outskirts of Chawinda while my troops went accross the Railway line. Lance Dafadar Ghazanfar's tank was positioned at the northern outskirts of Buttar Dograndi. It had under observation area up to track chawinda - Jassoran in the north and area from Jassoran up to Mundeki Barian in the west. Lance Dafadar Mohammad Khan's tank was deployed in the western part of the village which effectively covered area from Jassoran to Mundeki Barian and Khurpa. Other two tanks were deployed in the area of hut about 100 yards from the Railway Station building in the west. The hut also had few trees around it. Aslam's tank was placed under the umbrella tree facing north . My tank was placed south of hut under another tree facing towards west. The hut was located between the two tanks and there was no visual contact between us although we were few yards apart. Between four of us only myself and Ghazanfar were in visual contact. All my tanks were so placed that our line of sight was clear up to 2000 yards and more in the north and west where from the enemy could approach. I may mention here that we seldom cared for camouflage and concealment. We normally positioned our tanks where we could have maximum field of fire without realizing that we were providing opportunity to the enemy to locate us through binocular much before they reached our killing range.

Activity

As the sun came up I saw the movement of enemy tanks at a distance of 3000 yards in the north in the direction of Kot-Izzat. The armour column was moving from east to west. I could count each tank when it negotiated a gap between two clumps. I counted two squadrons of tanks and reported to my Squadron Commander accordingly. The same tanks were also reported by Khaliq. My Squadron Commander Major Raza Khan asked me to direct artillery fire on tank column. I showed my inability to do that. I thought that it would be waste of ammunition because I could not have directed the fire accurately. if it was so easy to direct artillery fire there was no need to attach artillery officers as observer and earmark a tank for them in each squadron. I requested to send Major Chaudhry forward, who was the Battery Commander to engage the target. Eventually Major Raza Khan ordered Khaliq to direct artillery fire on enemy tanks. He did that to no avail. The shells were falling short of the target and he could not correct the fire. In fact these shells created a screen between myself and the enemy. The enemy tanks moved behind that screen. At about 0800 hours elements of 3 FF passed my tank. They were moving cross country towards Pasrur. They were shaken and demoralized. They told me that the whole company had been run over by enemy tanks. I must mention here that I had no knowledge of the extent up to which 3 FF was deployed.

At this time I also observed movement of tanks in Jassoran. I then observed that four tanks appeared from a clump located on the eastern side of Jassoran and started movement in extended line formation parallel to the track towards my position. I ordered my troop to engage the enemy tanks. Four tanks of my troop simultaneously fired at them. Smoke was produced from the enemy tanks and they stopped. My gunner Gulzar was too happy thinking that he had hit the target. In fact he said so on Intercom. When the smoke disappeared I could not see enemy tanks. They had gone back to the clump and behind cover. It was on 17th when we captured colonel Tarapur's tank that I came to know about centurions having smoke dischargers fitted on top of the turret. Range was too great to be accurate, more than 2000 yds and thus we missed the target. The enemy was too quick to notice our fire and immediately released smoke bombs to withdraw behind smoke screen. We should have allowed them to come closer. But there was every possibility of their locating and engaging us before we could do that because we had positioned. There after, one squadron took up position on the outskirts of Jassoran on either side of village mosque and fire fight ensued between opposing forces. The enemy called for Artillery and Air support. Enemy aircraft could not locate my tanks as they were parked under trees. All enemy tank gunners proved as inaccurate as my gunner. My tank fired 16 rounds from one location. I could not observe the fall of shot because no dust was raised due to ploughed field. Same was the case with enemy shots which were falling all around my tank. This battle continued up to 1200 hours without any significant losses on either Side.

I may mention here that in 90 percent cases of direct hit the tank does not catch fire. Driver mostly remains safe because normally upper portion of the tank is hit and turret gets damaged, crew in the fighting compartment gets injured and even killed. But the driver, if he is safe, should try to take disabled tank to safety. This had happened in our squadron several times. the only loss up to 1200 hours in my troop was that the turret of Mohammad Khan Ôs tank got locked due to direct hit. The shot hit the tank at turret ring and recochetted. He wanted to go back but I did not allow and ordered him to remain in position and fire when ever the enemy tank come in his line of fire. It was an unwise decision on my part and the squadron commander had picked up my transmission. He ordered me to move Mohammad Khan backwards and gave me two other tanks in return. One tank was commanded by LD Flaksher while other was commanded by LD Kamal Khan (Turnet No. 1 CO's tank). At one time Ghazanfar reported that he could see some enemy tanks but was not in a favourable position to engage them. I ordered him to leave the village and advance 200 yrds take up position under a tree and fire at the enemy. He did that, I saw him reaching under the tree I had indicated. As he took up position he was fired upon be a troop of tank from Jassoran. He flashed back the message that shots were being recochetted from his tank. I immediately realized that by sending Gazanfar 200 yrd up I had placed him within the effective range of enemy tank guns. He was lucky that Indians were no good and they missed the target. I ordered him to reverse and take up old position. Had Gazanfar been killed I would have repented all my life. L.D. Ghazanfar and Mohammad Khan occasionally reported to me that enemy tank had been hit. After some time they would again report that the damaged tank had been pulled back by another enemy tank in spite of heavy fire from their side.

Ghazanfar was deployed north of Buttar Dugrandi to cover the area in the North up to track, and area east of Jassoran. This area was also being covered by my tank alongwith Aslam's tank. I, therefore, moved these tanks to take up position on the western edge of the village and cover area east of Jassoran including MundekiBairan - Khurpa.

At this point of time the RHQ and my Squadron Commander were located at Nogaza. After 1200 hours the enemy tanks moved to southern outskirts of Jassoran and established an base of fire with a squadron of tanks, and started shooting at my troop. I returned the fire. After some time another enemy squadron started moving towards south of Jassoran. every thing was happening under my nose. I passed frantic messages that my position was being out-flamed by enemy tanks. Our Artillery fired to stop that move but only with approximation because there was no artillery FOO with us to correct the fire. The fire fell short and provided cover to enemy tanks. I was also told by my Squadron Commander that our friends would look after the enemy's move and I need not worry. The enemy did not use Artille ry during this manoeuvre.

At about 1400 hours I received a massage from Major Raza Khan that situation in Buttar Dugandi was not favourable. He was located at Nogaza. I looked left towards Buttar Dudgadi and saw that my tanks were moving back wards. I called my tank commanders on wireless but received no reply. At this time I received a message from Khaliq that he could see heavy concentration of tanks in Jassoran and south of it. He also said that I need not worry as he was coming to my help. Since the situation was obscure, three to four tanks were burning between Buttar Dugrandi and Railway line. I decided to reach that village. My tank was facing Jassoran. I ordered the driver to reverse and then face Buttar Dugrandi. As my tank started moving towards the village, I saw that a centurian appeared from behind the village and took up position under the sole kikar tree north of village. I order the driver to halt and Gulzar laid his gun on that tank. But the enemy gunner was faster, he fired first. I saw the flash with open eye. The shot hit the gun tube of my tank and then the gun shield. It did not pierce through the tank armour. Before I could react my gunner pushed me from underneath. I looked down in the turret, it was full of smoke. The operator had already abandoned the tank. I got out of the tank followed by the gunner. I straight went in front of the tank and found the driver bleeding form his face. Splinters had injured him. I encouraged Sawar Fazal Hussain and told him to reverse the tank and take it behind the hut which was only 10 yards away. The enemy again fired at the moving tank but missed the target. I then told Fazal Hussain to cross the railway line, reach the main track and head for workshop at Pasroor . I then turned to Dafadar Aslam's tank who was unaware of what had happened. He was concentrating towards Jassoran and Kot Izzat. I told him that enemy had reached our rear in Buttar Dugrandi and he should engage them. His tank was placed in such a position that on his left was a hut, on the right was a tree. To locate and fire at the enemy which had reached his rear he had to change his position. As he reversed and came in view of enemy tank in Buttar Dugrandi, he was fired upon and hit. Sawar Anwar turned the tank towards Railway line, enemy tank fired again on the moving tank. Three to four shots struck the tank but none of them was fatal. The tank crossed the railway line and went away. Half an hour later I saw that tank standing near MS 5 badly damaged and with one track duty.

DEFENCE NOTES

Aslam's tank was crossing the railway from line west to east while Khaliq's tank was crossing the line from east to west. True to his words he was coming to my help but it was too late. He was advancing towards me standing in Cupola. He had covered only few yards when the same centurian fired a shot which was fatal and Khaliq's tank went into flames instantly. There was no time for the crew to bail out. All four of them were burnt to ashes. All this happened in few minutes. I looked around, there were no own troops except myself, my gunner and operator. There were no enemy troops either to be seen except that one deadly tank which had destroyed our three tanks within five minutes. The remaining tanks of Khaliq's troop did not cross the railway line. In fact he alone had come for my help while remaining tanks of his troop stuck to their position area 15 R. I decided to go back and report the situation to my Squadron Commander. We crossed the railway line and walked over the platform. At this time enemy was subjecting the railway station to tremendous Artillery fire. Through that fire we were able to reach the main track Chaiwanda-Pasrur. There was panic in Chaiwanda, HQ 24 Brigade had moved out but HQ 3FF remained steadfast in the area of tall trees. Our troops were moving on the track towards Pasroor in a disorganized manner. RR Jeeps were loaded with men. This was the second most depressing situation, the first being on the 11th. Since my aim was to reach the RHQ quickest, I suggested to my crew to jump in one of the jeeps and reach Nogaza as soon as possible. My gunner Gulzar disagreed with me with the reason If we go back in Infantry Jeep these people after the war would say that armour people used our jeep for running backward. I considered his argument valid and started running. As we reached short of milestone 5, I saw Captain Raheem Shah of 3 FF (later colonel) dug in with his company in reserve. I told him what had happened to my troop. He looked confident. He had been teaching us CBR warfare in School of Infantry and Tactics, Quetta. I reached Nogaza and contacted my Squadron Commander Maj Raza Khan and Col. Nisar. The two of them were sitting between Railway line and Nogaza facing Buttar Dugrandi. I could see five of our tanks destroyed, few of them were burning, between Railway line and the village. Two of my troop belonging to Ghazanfar and Flak Sher and the other three belonged to 33 TDU. I could see that Indian tanks were milling around in Buttar Dugrandi. Few RRs and tanks were deployed on Railway line facing Butter Dugrandi to stop the enemy advance. Situation was extremely grave and as I reported the death of Khaliq, Col. Nisar started weeping. I caught hold of his shoulder and said please do not weep, what will happen to us if you start weeping. Call some tanks from B Squadron and we shall attack Butter Dugrandi,. Major Raza interrupted and asked me to go away and rest. If at this point of time, the enemy had subjected Nogaza to heavy Artillery fire and at the same time pushed a troop of tank to the Railway line, they could have won the battle of Chawinda.

But the enemy was no good, or in other words the enemy Squadron Commander felt contended after capturing Buttar Dagrandi without any losses and destroying eight of our tanks in the process. Alternatively, if, after the destruction of my troop and capture of Buttar Dugrandi, the Squadron which had established the base of fire at Jassoran had moved on to the Railway Station, there was no one to stop them. The enemy would have carried the day but to our good luck this was not to happen. There was a lull in the battle for about an hour. At about 1500 hour four Centurians appeared from Buttar Dugrandi and advanced eastward in the direction of Sarang Pur (8699 old map) . I was lying under big Banian tree when some one came running to me and indicated the tanks. Dafadar Awal Sher's tank was in hull down position behind the track. It was ordered to open fire. Apart from Awal Sher's tank there were few other tanks and Rrs in the area. Two Centurians were knocked out and the other two swiftly reversed and went into the village. I felt that our performance was no good. If the fire was coordinated and controlled we could have destroyed all the four tanks. The range was 1000 yrds, the tanks were presenting broad side and their guns were not pointing towards us. However we were satisfied because we had stopped advance of the enemy any further.

At about 1630 hours I was called by Major Raza. He told me that we had to attack Buttar Dugrandi. He gave me four tanks, one of them was turret No. 1 CO's tank commanded by Lance Dafader Kamal Khan. My other two tanks commanders were LD Amin and Dafader Ismail. He gave me the following plan verbally.

I was to form up left on Nogaza along the Railway line. Will cross the line and attack Buttar Dugrandi on order which were to be passed after our Artillery had stopped bombardment on the village. I was to charge (southern) left side of the village and take up position west of it. A troop was called from B Squadron which was commanded by N/Risaldar Akbar, the same Akbar who according to Col. Nisar had chased the Indian tanks up to Mehrajke on the morning of 8th. This troop was to form up right of Nogaza along the Railway line and was to charge the northern side of the village. The Squadron Commander was to charge in the centre. I called my tank commanders and briefed them verbally on the ground. I decided to advance in Box formation. I placed my tank on the right. On my left was LD Amin's tank . The other two tanks were to follow. I instructed my tank commander to fire continuously at short halts on the village, after crossing the railway line. Artillery fire started at about 1700 hours. Major Rasheed of I SP was in the area to control the fire. The fire was accurate and tremendous. No house was visible, it was all dust and smoke in the area. As soon as the fire stopped I heard the message from Major Raza, Charly - charly - 60 Advance Out, I may mention here that Major Raza had a peculiar way of making wireless transmissions which I admired and enjoyed during my 3 year service with him. I ordered my driver to move and simultaneously hand signalled LD Amin to advance. There was no need for me to make a collective call to the troop because each one of us heard the Squadron Commander. After crossing the railway line I did not look left or right my eyes were fixed on the village which was nothing but dust and smoke. I peared through the smoke in search of enemy while crew was acting automatically i.e. halting for a short while and letting off a shot or two on the village. Before the dust raised by Artillary fire and our shots could settle down we had reached the village. I crossed the line of two centurians which Awal Sher had destroyed from railway line an hour ago south of village and advanced further to the west. Area of Butter Dugrandi was plain, flat and not even a tree in sight upto 1000 yard in the direction of jassoran and Mandiki Barian. I knew that Jassoran and south of it was infested with enemy tanks and expected my tank to be shot up any movement. I was standing in Capula ever since we crossed the railway line. As my tank reached in the effective range o enemy tank in Jassoran and south, It was fire at and I noticed three to four shots whizz passed my tank one after the other. I could not locate the enemy yet I ordered the gunner to fire and the driver to halt and reverse. At the same point of time LD Amin yelled that few shots had rechocheted off his tank. I looked left for the first time after crossing the railway line and found Amin's tank on my left, other two tanks were behind us. I ordered him to reverse and get behind a clump next to the village. I ordered my driver to get behind the houses. After reaching to safety I looked around. All my four tanks were in the village. The tool box of turnet No. 1 was on fire. I informed the tank commander accordingly on wireless. Ghazanfar's tank which was destroyed at noon was burning on my right. Several bodies of soldiers (enemy and own) were lying dead. At this time intense Artillary fire also started on the village. The fire must have been from enemy side because Major Rasheed of 1 SP would not have engaged us. I was standing in the Copola with empty mind and not knowing what to do when heard a massage from my Squadron Commander.

Hello three for one one, Shamshad has not crossed the railway line.. ask him to advance .. I am under heavy fire,

Before one could reply I went up on the air Hello, 61, I have crossed the Railway line.. went ahead of the village..was fired at from Jassoran and now in Dograndi.. out , In return I received a dressing down for not reporting the situation earlier. I must mention here that leading troop leader must report the situation but he can not always do that when suddenly confronted by the enemy. Instinctively he will act to save himself first and then do anything else. It is for the Squadron Commander to keep himself up to such an extent from where he can observe his leading troop which is going in attack or advancing to contact. In these two operations of war the leading troop leader will seldom get a chance to report the situation because there are vast chances of his tank getting knocked out and will need immediate help. A Squadron Commander who remains in the rear or keeps his cupola closed will not only deprive the leading troop leader of the help he would need so badly and immediately but will also remain blind to the situation on battle field.

As I finished my transmission a platoon of Infantry appeared from behind the houses. They were advancing in extended line towards my tank with rifles on guard. I waved at them to find out who they were. Since the surrounding was hazy due to dust and smoke I could not make out whether they were friends or foes. I just could not visualise that enemy infantry could advance on my tank. I thought they were own troops. I tried to stop them at a distance with hand signal but they continued advancing. Artillery fire was still falling. I was double minded and confused. I ordered the gunner to fire machine gun on their feet and not kill them. They could be own troop. By that time they had reach as close as 20 yards from my tank, I suddenly noticed a turban and olive green uniform which looked khaki from a distance due to smoke and dust. I ordered the troop to open MG fire on the enemy. My machine gun developed fault at that crucial moment. I do not know whether my other tanks opened fire or not but I saw some soldiers taking position on the ground and others still advancing. More and more Infantry was coming from behind the houses Time was very short. I spotted a rocket launcher, ordered the gunner to fully depress the main gun and fire few HE round on the Infantry. The gunner fired three or four rounds rapidly. When the dust settled, I saw several soldiers laying dead, no living soul was visible. Meanwhile my squadron commander had ordered my troop to withdraw to railway line. I looked back, my three tanks were already moving backwards.

I ordered the driver to reverse. The tank reversed a distance of 1000 yards and reached behind the railway line from where we had started 20 minutes back.

What happened to the squadron commander and the other troop? After issuing orders to attack, Major Raza crossed the railway line and took up position under a lone tree about 20 yards away from railway line. He had closed down his cupola and therefore could not track my movement. He remained in this position and did not attack the centre of the village. N/R Akbar did not leave FUP ( railway line) at all. After few minutes I saw that enemy Infantry appeared from the village and started advancing towards railway line. We fired all weapons, artillery fire was called. The advance was halted. We remained pitched against the enemy till late at night when we were ordered to move back and leaguer in Matteke. As far as I know there was nothing between Buttar Dugrandi and Nogaza once we left that place for leaguer. I wonder if H Q 3 FF remained deployed on Railway station during night 16/17 September. I also do not know where Capt Rahim Shah was deployed during night 16/17 September. However, we met again at Nogaza on 17th September to Attack Jassoran that morning the details of which will appear in D.J. of May 98.






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Quran 23:110

Persistence commands success : Quaid e Azam