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Old Friday, October 21, 2005
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DEFENCE OF CHAWINDA

Maj (Retd) SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN gives an authentic first person account of the defence of the pivotal town of CHAWINDA in the SIALKOT SECTOR in the 1965 war

On 12th morning C Squadron was left with two troops due to loss of Sultan Bahadur on 11th at Phillorah. My squadron had lost only one tank so far as battle casualty, others were mechanical breakdowns and therefore only two troops were available to defend Chawinda. Khaliq’s troop was sent to Area 15 R on the northern outskirts of the village where Col. Shanwari’s Infantry had taken up position in the evening of 11 Sept. My troop was deployed along the railway line facing Jassoran with a task to stop enemy advance on Chawinda from that direction. Major Affendi’s Squadron was deployed on right of Chawinda. The exact location and extent is not known to me. Raccee troop with six recoilless rifles and six .30 brownings was also deployed independently, of which I have no knowledge. However, throughout the war, this troop did not suffer any casualty.

12th September was a peaceful day for my troop but not for Khaliq. The enemy did make probing attacks which Khaliq handled successfully. I heard unpleasant transmissions when a driver on one of his tank was killed through direct fire.

Somehow our deployment of tanks differed from Indians. They used tanks only for offensive action. Always concealed and camouflaged when deployed in static roll. They made good use of foot soldiers. Tanks seldom moved without infantry as per dictates of ground. In our case we did otherwise. Although our infantry was always around but we, as tank commanders, did not know their location nor did we know the forward and flanking extents of our defences. We also did not care much about concealment and positioned tanks which could be picked up by the enemy from long distance.

On the morning of 13th Major Raza Khan came back from rear and assumed command of the squadron. Khaliq was again deployed in area 15R and my troop along the railway line facing Jassoran. My tank was located behind high ground Nogaza grave, Grid reference 881012 (as per old maps). Regimental HQ was also located in the same area. At about 1200 hours I heard rifle bursts being fired at short intervals. I saw that an Indian soldier was firing at my tank from the direction of Dograndi. He was about 500 yards away. I called ‘Wurdee’ Major N/R Akhtar Hussain Shah and showed him the enemy soldier. His green uniform was clearly visible. We decided to catch him alive. A party of the men was formed including myself and N/R Akhtar Hussain Shah. We advanced in the direction of enemy infantry man with our stens on guard. We reached the point from where the enemy rifleman was firing, searched the entire field but there was no trace of enemy soldier, neither our infantry was deployed there. We came back disappointed. I can therefore conclude that enemy did send out patrol in order to probe our defences. I wonder if our infantry did the same. Khaliq’s troop remained under pressure on 13th September also but he remained steadfast.

On the morning of 14th we went into our positions as on 13th. At about 1600 hours I received orders to move and take up position in Mundeke Berian. I was told that enemy was advancing to that village from Jassoran.

I crossed the railway line and moved toward Mundeke Barian. When I reached near Butter Dugrandi I saw that a Shernam II was approaching from track Chanda-Jassoran. The tank Commander stopped me with hand signal. He was an elderly JCO with big mustaches from 33 TDU. He told me that he had gone across track Chawinda-Badiana, of which I had no knowledge. In fact I did not know that TDU was also operating with us. He further told me that his two tanks had been hit by enemy tanks short of Janewali. He requested me to accompany him and destroy the enemy tanks across the railways line. He further told me that there was good hull down position for me on the home side of railway line.

I asked for the permission to go with the JCO. The permission was not granted. I felt sorry for the JCO who had approached me with all the hope but I could not help him. I feel even today that I should have been allowed to go with the JCO who had seen the enemy tanks and could have directed me to a position from where I could destroy them.

From Buttar Dugrandi I was called back to Nogaza and was told that I was going to a wrong place. From the high ground I was shown a village on ground as Mundeke Barian and was ordered to reach there urgently. I reached that village and deployed my tank under a prominent tree. The troop was deployed in front of the village facing Jassoran and reported to the Squadron Commander. My Squadron Commander in turn reported to the Commanding Officer that his troop had reached the right destination. After some time I observed a civilian moving around in the area and inquired from him the name of the village. It was village Khurpa where I had taken up position. I wonder even today as to whether I had to defend Khurpa or Mundeke Barian. In any case map reading in the plains of Punjab is quite difficult specially in green season. In fact initially I was moving in right direction. After sometime I saw a troop of tanks coming out of Jassoran and moving parallel to the track facing Chawinda. I looked through my binoculars. Only the turret and gun was visible due to crop. To me they appeared to be M-48s. I passed the message accordingly to my squadron commander. I received the reply from Major Sikander that anything in front is enemy and I must open fire immediately. I ordered my tanks to open fire. The range was too great (3000 yards) to be accurate. The tanks in front did not return fire, instead they went north of track and disappeared. I remained deployed there for rest of the day with no activity.

Night fell and I was ordered to form a troop leaguer and stay there. I did not welcome this order and disliked to be left alone in the wilderness. I requested my squadron commander not to abandon me in the darkness of night. My request was not accepted and thereafter I collected my four tanks to form troop leaguer. No replenishment was to come.

Late at night I received orders to reach the high ground and join regimental leaguer there. It was a problem to reach the high ground because map reading was not possible at night. I requested Maj Raza Khan to show me a torch light signal from the high ground so that I could take direction. He did show the light which I could not locate. I then requested him to fire a very light to show me the direction which he refused to do and asked me not to bother him anymore and find my own way. I may mention here that north of my location very lights were being fired extensively.

I felt that enemy troops faced the same problems as myself, the direction problem. As I tried to line up one of my tanks failed to start. I ordered my other tank to toe the non starter. When the tank commander displayed reluctance, I decided to toe the non starter behind my tank. Keeping a safety margin I started moving towards east followed by other tanks. I hit Mattock instead of high ground where I happened to find Risaldar Riazul Hassan who was escorting few tanks, which were released from workshop, to regiment leaguer. I followed him and reached the leaguer at a time when Capt Rashid our quarter master, was leaving after replenishing the regiment. On the morning of 15th Khaliq was sent to 15R as usual and I was ordered to deploy along the railway line facing Jassoran.

At about 1200 hours pressure developed on Khaliq’s troop, thereafter I was ordered to move up for his support and stop enemy penetration between Jassoran and Chawinda. This was to prevent out flanking move from that direction by the enemy. I was also told to coordinate with the Battalion HQ of 3FF which was positioned in the area of tall trees little ahead of railway station in the north.

I ordered two tanks, Ghazanfar and Mohammed Khan, to take position in Butter Dugrandi. I along with Dafadar Aslam moved along the railway line keeping my tank west of the line and that of Aslam on the east. There was no visual contact between myself and Aslam due to intervening Railway station building. As I reached near the hut about 100 yards west of Railway station I spotted a centurion firing from area in the direction of rest house on Railway station. At the sametime I received uneasy messages from Dafadar Aslam. Gulzar, my gunner immediately engaged the enemy tank but he missed the target. The tank quickly reversed and went into the grove. I called for Aslam but there was no reply from his side. I could feel that something had gone wrong. I left my tank in position and ran towards rest house. There I saw that Aslam’s tank was standing rammed into a railway quarter Railway Station was under heavy artillery fire. The engine was under the debris which the crew was busy removing.

What happened was that as Aslam advanced ahead of rest house he came in the open and was engaged by the enemy tank which was already in position. The shot hit the rear left tool box and ricocheted. The driver reversed in hurry and hit the quarter in the rear. The tank stopped, meanwhile I engaged the enemy tank and Aslam’s tank was saved.

I helped them in clearing up the debris and started the tank. After placing Aslam in a suitable position I contacted CO 3FF in his bunker who was in good mood and high spirits. I briefed him about the location of my tanks which would remain in his support.

I may mention here that I did not ask him about the forward and flanking extents of his battalion nor did he brief me about that very important point of coordination for which we had to pay heavily the next day. Throughout the day my two tanks in Butter Dugrandi did not fire. However myself and Aslam did fire shots whenever the enemy tanks showed up in front of us. By now I had reached the conclusion that it was waste of ammunition to fire when the enemy tank is far too away. Mostly we kept them under observation and they were also doing the same. On this day the enemy also used air force in support of ground troops. My tank was rocketed several times but each time the rocket hit the ground few yards away from my tank. For rest of the day my troop remained in position with out any serious fighting, the enemy appeared occasionally in front of us. We fired at him and he disappeared every time in the grove.

At night we were told to leaguer close to front line and deploy next morning in the same position myself and Khaliq got together in the area of railway station close to 3FF battalion HQ who provided protection to our tanks. That night we spent together under one shelter and compared notes. Khaliq was quite bitter about the way his troops were being employed since last four days. He was being battered since last four days at the same location. He expected relief.

He was being used in anti tank role in static position while 106 recoilless rifles were available in plenty for that role. After few hours rest we were back again in our position at the first light 16th September.

For four days i.e. 12-15 September the enemy did not launch a determined attack on Chawinda which is evident form the casualties sustained by both sides, wich was almost nil.

However, the enemy did launch limited amend probing offensives frontly on Khaliq troop and also trying to fines flanks towards west of Chawinda. They did not attempt to prove the eastern side of Chawinda.

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Quran 23:110

Persistence commands success : Quaid e Azam

Last edited by Princess Royal; Sunday, June 21, 2009 at 03:06 PM.
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