Asif Ezdi
Monday, April 02, 2012

Gilani’s meeting with Obama was the highlight of the prime minister’s visit to Seoul last week to attend the Second Nuclear Security Summit. The two leaders had had their last and only meeting at the First Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the US president in Washington in April 2010. The fact that Gilani’s meeting with Obama took place at Seoul at all was taken by our government as a “success.” In remarks made to the media before they met, Gilani somewhat obsequiously thanked Obama “for sparing this opportunity to meet me and my delegation in Seoul.” But our prime minister had little of substance to say on the “resetting” of Pakistan-US relations or on issues of nuclear security for which leaders of more than 50 countries had gathered at Seoul.

Obama, on the other hand, used the occasion to deliver a very public message, that the US would not be stopped by any considerations of respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty from doing what it had to do for its national security and its “needs to battle terrorists who have targeted (the US) in the past.” In other words, there could be no assurance that the US would not repeat the kind of raid that killed Osama last May or take other military action on Pakistani soil if there was a “need.”

Obama also called for a “candid dialogue” between the two countries to work through these issues “in a constructive ... and transparent fashion,” and seems to have done some plain talking with Gilani at their talks immediately afterwards. If Pakistan meets the US demands, it will be rewarded with an invitation to the Nato Summit at Chicago next May.

Obama was also quite explicit in his public remarks on the perceived threat of nuclear terrorism from Pakistani soil and on Washington’s determination to take steps to counter the alleged danger. As he put it, because of terrorism that has taken place in Pakistan, the US “can’t afford to have non-state actors, terrorists, get their hands on nuclear weapons that could end up destroying our cities or harming our citizens.” The meaning was quite clear: if Washington felt that Pakistan’s nuclear assets were going to fall into the hands of non-state actors or terrorists, the US would not stand idly by. This is not new policy, but it has not been articulated before so publicly, so clearly and at this level.

But it is doubtful that Gilani understood the significance of these warnings. While the US president was uttering these portentous words, our prime minister kept a half-smile on his face and nodded several times as if to signal agreement, and he did not say anything to refute Obama’s allegations.

Obama’s public message to Gilani must no doubt have been delivered in even plainer language in their private meeting. It is remarkable that Pakistani officials have been completely silent on what the two leaders discussed on the occasion. Even Hina Rabbani Khar, who is usually quite voluble, has been uncharacteristically reticent.

A readout of the Gilani-Obama meeting was given soon afterwards by Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor to Obama. As Rhodes put it, the meeting reflected the importance that the US places on the “need to maintain vigilance against the threat of nuclear terrorism,” a not very oblique way of saying that Washington considers Pakistan as one, if not the main, potential source of that threat.

Pakistan no doubt takes the question of nuclear security very seriously and has taken a number of steps to safeguard its nuclear assets. In doing so, Pakistan has also not hesitated to accept US technical advice and assistance in this field, including in the setting up of intrusion detection systems, designing of tiered defences and training. At the Seoul Summit, Gilani underlined Pakistan’s firm commitment to enhancing nuclear security, in particular through capacity-building and international cooperation.

Much of the concern expressed in the Western world about nuclear security has focussed on the possibility that Islamic terrorists could obtain enough radioactive material to produce a “dirty” bomb. Yet, no Muslim extremist was involved in the only known case of the use of radioactive material to kill: the murder of a Russian dissident in London in 2006 through a dose of highly radioactive Polonium-210, which also contaminated thousands of others.

Some “experts” have raised the fear that Pakistan’s nuclear assets could fall into the hands of Islamic extremists. A 2010 Harvard study, released to coincide with the First Nuclear Security Summit two years ago, made the “finding” that Pakistan’s stockpile “faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth.” The campaign to cast doubts on the security of the Pakistani nuclear deterrent has continued unabated.

Not surprisingly, India has been hard at work trying to heighten these concerns. Shortly before the Seoul Summit, PTI, India’s official news agency, reported that India had “very little confidence” in Pakistan’s ability to secure its nuclear assets. According to its “sources,” an “insider threat” was the prime concern in the Indian establishment.

As for the security of India’s own nuclear material, Indian “sources” were quoted as saying said that it was under “tight security” and “very, very secure.” Neutral experts do not share this view. According to the nuclear security ranking given by the Washington-based research group Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), India – together with North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Vietnam – was among the five least secure countries. The NTI study said that the Indian government needed to ensure more transparency, more independence for its nuclear regulator and tighter measures to protect nuclear material in transit. As the Associated Press has reported, India’s lax security was displayed in at least two incidents in recent years in which radioactive materials – from a hospital and a university laboratory – were discarded and later ended up in a scrap dealer’s shop.

Shortly before the Seoul Summit, there were press reports hinting that Gilani would be making a strong case at the meeting for giving Pakistan non-discriminatory access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as well as membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In a statement before his departure for Seoul, Gilani himself urged the international community to give Pakistan access to civil nuclear technology. Also, buried deep inside the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security is a sentence saying that Pakistan should “seek” a civil nuclear agreement similar to that concluded by the US with India.

In the event, Gilani failed to raise the matter at Seoul apart from a statement urging the international community to give Pakistan access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses on a non-discriminatory basis and declaring that Pakistan qualifies to become a member of the NSG. But as Rhodes disclosed at his press briefing, Gilani did not raise the question in his meeting with Obama. The government has not explained why.

The fact is that Pakistan has enough leverage to back its demand for civil nuclear technology if our “leaders” are really serious. Without Pakistan’s consent negotiations cannot begin in the Conference on Disarmament to ban the production of fissile material, and without Pakistan’s ratification the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty cannot enter into force.

Besides, Pakistan’s role in the American strategy for winding down the war is Afghanistan is indispensable. We can at least insist that our demand for civil nuclear technology should be a top item on our bilateral agenda with Washington.

We should also know that we do not have unlimited time. India expects that its application for membership of NSG will make rapid progress after the US assumes the group’s presidency next July. Once India joins, it will no doubt use its veto to block the opening up of peaceful nuclear technology for Pakistan.

Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
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