Security Implications for Pakistan
A nation's foreign and security policy formulation and execution rests on the quality of its domestic polity. The quality of domestic polity, in turn, is based upon the nature and type of its civil-military relations. Huntington argues, "Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security...[and] nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risk." 
Having discussed the causes of intervention we now come to the ramifications of the intervention. What are the imperatives of the military regime for Pakistan's security? In the first instance, has security under the military regime improved or been undermined? How is security defined and interpreted under the military, internally or externally? What view of security prevails and remains predominant under the current regime? And more specifically, how does the present, overtly military rule impact Pakistan's foreign security relations, especially vis-à-vis the United States, India, and Afghanistan? Is there any substantial foreign policy shift in relation to these countries?
Today the concept of "security" can primarily be defined along two broad dimensions: internal and external. Traditionally, this distinction was based upon the assumptions that threats to a state's security arise from outside its borders and that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually require a military response if the security of the target state is to be preserved.  In other words, a state's level of security and insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities—both internal and external—that threaten to have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.  Therefore, as Caroline Thomas explains, in the context of developing states, "Security does not simply refer to the military dimension, as is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept...[but also to] the search for internal security of the state through nation-building, the search for a secure system of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for security through nuclear weapons."  Thus, to ensure a state's security, a delicate balance must be preserved and reconciled between the military and civil society. The dilemma this relationship poses for a developing country is in the question, "What if the two are mutually exclusive?" Or, "What if there exists an inverse or a trade-off relation between the two?" In the context of developing countries, promoting and strengthening one may weaken the other, since the balance is so delicate and precarious to preserve either by civil or military regimes in developing countries. For military regimes, achieving this balance tends to be more difficult because of the fact that military regimes, more often than not, are favorably disposed towards an economic-military view of national security—which usually translates into forming an alliance relationship with external (super or great) powers. Given this security paradigm, the questions arise as to how military regimes in Pakistan conceive of national security, and how the present regime contemplates the reconciliation between internal and external components of national security?
The regime's primary stated objectives on the eve of the takeover were internal in nature. These objectives included "putting the house in order," so to speak, by creating a basis for economic development, building institutions, restructuring, and establishing accountability. At the same time, the regime had also promised to initiate the process of democratization at the grassroots level, and had given a specific timeframe in which it expected to bring the plan to fruition. As such, the drive for legitimacy was motivated internally. The regime has met with some degree of success, in the eyes of some (this success appears marginal to others) in its movement for accountability and collecting more revenue. It is interesting to observe that, unlike the Ayub and Zia regimes, the present regime has not faced significant political opposition. Rather, the main opposition comes from two other sources. The first is the business class—owing to the government's attempt to impose tax reforms resulting in new taxes. The other set of people who could conceivably defy the military regime are religious groups. Religious political parties rose to the fore in response to the governments' proposed procedural amendments to blasphemy law, which they found unacceptable. As a result of the opposition from the business class and religious parties, the government had to withdraw on both of these accounts. Despite the significant opposition from these quarters, however, the corresponding political parties were unable to take advantage politically on a national scale on the strength of these issues. Rather, the politicians and political parties have responded in an opportunistic way to the idea of local body elections (at the district level), and in a way have politically accepted and facilitated the legitimization of military rule. This also suggests that the military's success in intervening and maintaining its hold in Pakistan owes a great deal to the gross inability of political parties to organize and align themselves.
The Socio-economic View of Security
A cursory glance at the history of democratization in Pakistan reveals the trend that the end of one economically progressive authoritarian regime marked the beginning of an economically regressive civilian regime, and vice versa. For instance, Ayub's era—known as progressive in economic terms—was followed by the secession of East Pakistan (a political failure) and Bhutto's regime, whereby industry received a setback as a result of nationalization policies. Similarly, during the Zia era in the 1980s, Pakistan's economic performance was far better than that of most of the developing countries in the world. This period was followed by the brief regimes of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir in the 1990s, during which time economic activity and performance was at its lowest ebb, despite the opening-up of the economy through measures like trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.
Therefore, because of this pattern some economists are of the view that the economic aspect of security improves during the reign of military regimes, while the rule of political-constitutional governments produces economic chaos. According to Shahid Javed Burki, "The type of democracy we had practiced under two of our three constitutions—the constitutions of 1956 and 1973—had not been good for economic development. These two constitutions—unlike the constitution of 1962—were given by civilian rather than military leaders. The first of these two constitutions had produced economic chaos. The second—the Constitution of 1973—was really operative in two periods. During both—1973-77 as well as 1988-99—it had seen a dramatic slowÐdown in the rate of economic growth and a sharp increase in the incidence of poverty." 
Nonetheless, what is significant and necessary is to quantify how much of the economic development can be attributed to the good governance and managerial performance of the military regime, and to what extent it is just a function of foreign policy compliance resulting in the easy flow of international capital. Second, economic benefits alone never present the full picture, unless we also calculate the socio-political and economic costs (in the form of the deepening of debt crises for generations to come) associated with the decisions. While the military regimes in Pakistan have been successful in negotiating and achieving foreign policy objectives, their performance in the domestic theater has been abysmal. It is quite obvious that the internal component of security weakens during military regimes. For instance, both Ayub and Zia successfully concluded separate economic and military package deals with the United States and enhanced the economic-military view of security, but had severely negative fall-outs in the area of internal security. The regimes of Ayub and Yahya Khan culminated in the separation of East Pakistan. Zia's ten years of rule saw the rise and upsurge of ethno-linguistic factions, the extreme polarization of society and militarization of religious groups, along with an increase in the spread of guns, drugs, and social violence. The present regime again follows the trend of past regimes in securing aid and loans from abroad, as comprehensive economic packages are reportedly being worked out in Washington, the European Union, and international financial institutions out of its foreign and security policy compliances. 
The Impact of the Events of September 11
The events of September 11 have further complicated the issues of military intervention and democratization of society and the polity in Pakistan. First, the aftermath has given the military regime an international legitimacy, as Pakistan's support and participation was critical to the United States in its fight against Afghanistan. This may hamper and delay the process of democratization, owing to the kind of legitimacy and financial support the regime enjoys from international quarters. In other words, these circumstances may prove to be a replay of the sort of situation present under the Ayub and Zia regimes. Second, the serious ramifications of September 11 in terms of Pakistan's military regime are that in drawing attention to its foreign policy-making role, it has also highlighted its sensitivity to internal security policies. Though civilians and military may never differ substantially on foreign policy choices, the military's explicit rule means facing the wrath of the public. As the events following September 11 have shown, the military's popularity and internal legitimacy have been eroded drastically. Therefore, there is a shift in the regime's drive for legitimacy: from internally driven to an externally or internationally oriented one. This may also mean a greater compliance at the international level with the United States and the West at the security policy level, translating into a more repressive regime internally.
September 11 carries the most serious policy repercussions for national security related organizations. In early October, General Pervez Musharraf moved swiftly against military commanders who resisted his support for the United States, forcing many to the sidelines or into retirement. Now, men who owe their jobs to him personally fill all of the top army posts. Analysts of the Pakistani military say that it amounts to a coup within a coup, and the most important change in twenty years.  The dismissal and reshuffling of the top brass within the army can be interpreted in two ways. It signals the friction or tension concerning the organizational integrity of the army—something never exposed before in such clear terms. At the same time, it reflects the army's ability to resolve and overcome national security policy-making dilemmas. This friction is natural once the army evolves into an agent for security policy-making, rather than policy-implementing,which is inherently riskier and dangerous. One analyst suggests, "The friction itself may have been caused by certain structural imbalances that are the product not so much of the military's internal working but its interaction with civilian governments and the rise in its stature from implementers of policy to makers of policy." 
In a move similar to this purging of military commanders, three top nuclear scientists were detained for questioning about their links and alleged sympathies toward the Taliban. A more grave concern is not that the top brass generals and scientists were dismissed over the perceived policy differences from within, but for the extraneous reasons of their alleged allegiance and sympathies toward the Taliban. These acts indicate a disturbing eagerness to acquiesce and accept the influence of the United States and its interpretations of the security structure of Pakistan.
The External Security Economic Front
As referred to above, the military regime has shown a somewhat better performance on the external economic front by securing fresh loans and the rescheduling of debt payments from international sources like the Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. A profile of the government's cabinet also reveals a strategy of pursuing economic management. These developments resulted in steady cash inflows and debt restructuring by the new economic managers, even before September 11, 2001.
Nonetheless, complying with IMF reforms and adjustments means negating and going against local and national industry and business, in the form of the imposition of new taxes, price hikes in utilities and food, and taking away subsidies. These policies created an environment discouraging investments by domestic investors who become alienated and frustrated with the present regime. This is a situation again quite unlike that of the Ayub and Zia regimes. The Ayub regime not only made foreign capital inflow available, but also augmented local industry through financial incentives and reforms. Similarly, Zia also made reversals on Bhutto's decision to nationalize and won the confidence of local/national business and industry people. Meanwhile, the present regime seems to be at odds with local business and investors and relies heavily on foreign goodwill. The problem with foreign inflow is that it is highly volatile, inconsistent, unreliable, and strategic in nature (since it depends heavily on the state of international politics). Hence, too much reliance on foreign sources of financing makes the regime more vulnerable—and weakens national security in the long-term perspective.
The scenario also implies, if a trade-off between internal security and international security exists, that the present military regime is certainly disposed towards achieving national security through strategies involving international security, rather than through internal policy.
The United States
One of the common features that invariably all military regimes in Pakistan emphasize is extremely good relations with the United States. This may be because of a strange coincidence whereby military takeovers in Pakistan have accompanied a resurgence in its geo-political significance in world politics—thus making Pakistan a "frontline" state, and hence explaining the convergence of its interests and security policies vis-à-vis the United States.
Nevertheless, unlike previous military regimes in Pakistan who had other options for conflict resolution (rapprochement with the Soviet Union, for example, during the Zia regime)—the present regime seems to be under intense pressure to cooperate with the United States.  It may very well be that the regime was already inclined to cooperate, but in any case for all practical purposes it had no option other than to do so. Pakistan, upon resisting American wishes, would have been perceived as harboring terrorists and hence considered equally responsible for the events of September 11. In addition, India's readiness to join the American coalition against Afghanistan generated greater impetus for Pakistan to join the United States as well. The gravity of the situation was reflected in General Musharraf's statements that an alliance with the United States was a dire necessity and Pakistan chose this option in order to save its strategic interests and assets. At the same time, Pakistan is in pursuit of its legitimate concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan; that is, not to have an unfriendly and pro-Indian regime in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The United States at the moment seems to take note of this concern. However, the question arises, what if the Taliban—predominantly a Pashtun entity that Pakistan has now antagonized—remains in one form or another? What if the United States pulls out abruptly (as happened in 1990) and leaves Pakistan once again to face the wrath of Afghan turmoil or civil war? What if the United States stays for longer than required? What if the United States becomes unable to set up a broad-based government in Afghanistan? What if the Northern Alliance and other groups vying for power refuse to accept the American version of peace? What if civil war persists?
The more pertinent issue here is to look for the degree of U.S. interests and hence America's commitment to Afghanistan and the region. This would be a determinant for explaining its security relations with Pakistan. At a very broad level, U.S. interests seem to be a mixture of short and long-term objectives: from the capture of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda forces, to the destruction of terrorist camps, to routing out the Taliban, to oil pipeline and geo-strategic interests. These do not relate to September 11 only, but instead date back even before that.  Though the idea of the pipeline and geo-strategic interests are more often than not denied by the representatives of the U.S. State Department,  nevertheless, they do talk of its viability indirectly, and the opinion that the economic benefits of an oil pipeline will have a stabilizing impact for all states in the region, including fostering a strategic stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Accordingly, the U.S. concern for Pakistan's strategic stability has increased manifold owing to the following:
i) Pakistan's geo-strategic centrality for providing a foothold in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
ii) The fact that most of the strategic analysts in Washington envisage the possible scenario (although this currently has a remote chance of coming true) that Pakistan, a country with nuclear capabilities, risks being taken over by radical Islamists. Hence, the United States wants to reduce such a possibility either by helping the regime in politico-economic terms or by evolving means to ensure the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
iii) The perceived need for greater control of fissile materials and its possible leakage into "the wrong hands" through personnel working in Pakistani nuclear installations.
iv) The desire to avoid nuclear war in the region. The India-Pakistan conflict and its escalation to an exchange of nuclear weapons is perhaps the more real and probable threat than any of the above.
Hence, American interest in the stability of the present military regime is not simply something related to the phenomenon of September 11 and its aftermath. Right on the eve of the takeover, General Anthony C. Zinni, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, said, "If Pakistan fails, we have major problems. If [military strongman, Pervez] Musharraf fails, hard liners could take over, or fundamentalists, or chaos. We cannot let Musharraf fail."  This was clearly pointed out in a report published in the Washington Post, that it was Zinni who "pushed the Clinton administration to open the diplomatic door with Musharraf when many demanded it be slammed shut. Convinced that Pakistan should be a regional stabilizing force, he helped persuade Clinton to visit Musharraf in March." 
It is equally important to recognize how Musharraf responded to the United States on the eve of the takeover. "When the general finally placed his call it was not to President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen or the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad. Instead Musharraf telephoned Marine Corps General Anthony C. Zinni, who happened to be sitting with Cohen at an airfield in Egypt. 'Tony,' Musharraf began, 'I want to tell you what I am doing...'"  This suggests the usefulness of further study, beyond the scope of this paper, on the deeper institutional links between Pakistan and the United States, especially as to how military-to-military relations impact democratization and polity in Pakistan. Some experts are of the view that institutional linkages of this sort may be the cause of democratization in Pakistan, as the U.S. military has become more sensitized over a period of time to the promotion in an effective way of democracy in developing countries.  Such linkages may act as an inhibiting factor preventing the military from intervening in a given country. Similarly, the U.S. military can effectively exert pressure for a return to democracy once a coup has taken place. Nonetheless, it can have the opposite impact as well, as happened in the case of Pakistan in past decades. With the realization of Pakistan's enhanced geo-strategic significance and American concern for regional stability, the military's presence in the polity is bound to prolong itself, as happened in the cases of Ayub and Zia. General Musharraf has already indicated that he intends to remain as President and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) even after holding the elections in 2002.
An issue related to the stability of the military regime is the nuclear program and policy of Pakistan. Seymour Hersh, famous investigative journalist on nuclear affairs, articulates this American concern: "The Bush administration's hunt for Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network has evolved into a regional crisis that has put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at risk, exacerbated the instability of the government of General Pervez Musharraf, and raised the possibility of a nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India." 
The scenario envisioned by Hersh and a consequent contingency plan for Washington as to what happens to Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the case of any instability for the regime concerns taking care that those nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of religious extremists, with the possible involvement of not only the Pentagon, but also the special-operations unit 262 of Israel.  This presents a very bleak security scenario for Pakistan, implying that nothing is secret and secured from Israel and the United States (and also suggests the potential for the involvement of India, given its level of cooperation with the two). Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi responded to the article in a very comprehensive manner, asserting that the Pakistani army has established an elaborate and effective command and control authority over nuclear weapons, ever since 1977. In addition, he also showed that over a period of time various forces have attempted to defame Pakistan's efforts to become a nuclear state in the wake of Indian nuclearization, by terming it as an "Islamic bomb" and speculating about a possible attack on nuclear installations in Pakistan.  Though Dr. Rizvi has emphasized that this is a speculative scenario, it is not inconceivable, given that the American forces are already stationed in Pakistan, and considering the historical level of distrust and the fact that despite the on-going cooperation between the United States and Pakistan, American authorities, media, and think tanks  continue to differentiate between the military and Pakistan's main intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and subsequently end up blaming ISI for non-cooperation with the Musharraf regime and the United States. Therefore, any change in government regimes in Pakistan (though the chances are very remote, since it ignores the current institutional and societal dynamics) is bound to be interpreted as a result of religious extremism.
At this point, it is equally important to recognize that the opposition and resentment to the United States, and hence with the Musharraf regime, are of two types: one which is obviously manifested in the streets of Pakistan is religious-based activism; the second can be termed as a secular, genuinely nationalistic and patriotic one—passive and institutional in nature. The problem with American government, think tanks and media is that they are overwhelmed with radical Islam and hence unable to make distinctions between these two types of opposition, and increasingly the latter gets mixed up with the former one. This could prove fatal for the United States in the long-term, where America sees states like Pakistan either as blind and faithful allies or as religious extremists. In other words, people and institutions with genuine patriotic concerns are likely to be dubbed as radicals, and hence treated likewise. Therefore, the very rationale for going all-out along with the United States, perceptibly in order to enhance stability and security for Pakistan by the military regime, is not free from challenge and criticism.
Historically, U.S. policy towards Afghanistan had always been shared by and converged with that of Pakistan. Contrary to popular belief, Pakistan never followed an independent path divergent of U.S. interests and policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The Taliban has been attributed as a creation of both the ISI (though not acting alone) and the CIA, since both wanted strategic stability in the region.  In fact, what happened after the Taliban established power was that the Taliban's extremism, ties with Osama bin Laden, and refusal to cooperate with Unocal (who had proposed the construction of a Central Asia Gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Pakistan that would have crossed western Afghanistan) made the United States anti-Taliban. The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan in 1998, seen in the context and events of September 11, represented a hardened and entrenched U.S. position to do away with the Taliban.
It is generally believed that Pakistan has completely reversed its Afghan policy under the military regime. However, this is not the case. Like other nations of the world, Pakistan also felt alienated by the Taliban and considered the Taliban government a liability due to its extremist policies and harsh treatment of women, young Afghans, and western aid workers.  There was a series of events from which Pakistan received diplomatic setbacks, such as the destruction of the Buddha statues in Bamiyan in February 2001, sectarian criminals hiding in Afghanistan, and the Taliban's inflexibility in dealing with United Nations workers. In actual fact, Sharif pursued a policy towards the Taliban similar to that of the current government. Recently it came out that Sharif's regime gave clearance to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. This was further supported by the military's monitoring of religious institutions—the maddrassas—that acted as a social and financial support base for the Taliban. This leads to the fact that foreign policy in regards to Afghanistan remains the same and in continuity under civilian and military regimes in Pakistan. The events of September 11 increased the pace at once of the United States as well as Pakistan to adopt anti-Taliban policies. Like the United States, Pakistan is also in a quagmire regarding the possibilities for the post-Taliban settlement in Afghanistan. Deposed King Zahir Shah and the Northern Alliance are not attractive options for Pakistan. Pakistan has already annoyed the Taliban and the Pashtuns, the ethnic group that makes up almost 40-45 percent of the Afghan population. Similarly, the United States is also quite skeptical of the predominant role the Northern Alliance could potentially play after the fall of the Taliban. Both Pakistan and the United States are vying for a broad-based representative government in Afghanistan.
India's initial reaction to the change in government in Pakistan was not to recognize the military regime. It was widely believed in India that General Musharraf was the one responsible for the Kargil crisis and hence the exit of Nawaz Sharif, and that peace and negotiations (the Lahore Declaration) were something not acceptable to the Pakistani army. Nevertheless, owing to Musharraf's peace initiative, force reduction at the Line of Control in Kashmir, and U.S. pressure, India changed its stance. Subsequently, the Agra summit was convened. Later, the ascension of the military regime was considered and interpreted as an opportunity to settle down Kashmir, as the military was considered to be the real entity with which to talk and strike a deal (and this was the case even in times when a civilian regime was in power). It was also believed that the military enjoys greater popularity than political regimes. The Indus Waters Treaty signed by the Ayub regime was most widely cited as an agreement that stood the test of time.
The events of September 11 had a de-legitimizing effect on Kashmir, from the perspective of Pakistan. India quickly moved back to square one—that is, of confrontation and denial—from the position of continuing dialogue and diplomacy. India is now bent on cashing in upon the new atmosphere condemning global terrorism. India wants to make Kashmir militant groups into objects of the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign.  The United States has succumbed considerably to India's pressure, as the initial list of organizations whose assets were frozen by the United states included two (and later, a third one, Jaish-e-Mohammad) with extensive activities in Kashmir. India sees the build-up of relations between Pakistan and the United States as zero-sum in nature, and wants to prevent Pakistan from again becoming the driving force behind U.S. regional policy.  India has been playing off of and sensationalizing the U.S. concern for the stability of Pakistan and the region by threatening Pakistan with war. The recent massive firing on the international border, let alone on the Line of Control, upon the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, constitutes a message not to ignore India. Hence, it is imperative that U.S. policy officials engage with India at the same time that they do so with Pakistan, so as to reduce the risk of an India-Pakistan war and further instability in the region.
For Pakistan, raising its voice at diplomatic and political levels has and will become even more difficult as India (through its powerful lobbying) is bent on establishing linkages between Afghans and the situation in Kashmir, thereby ignoring Pakistan's legitimate concerns and the historical context of the Kashmir dispute. India also intends to heighten its threat perception from Pakistan for its alleged support to Kashmir, and to legitimize hot pursuit across the border, possibly leading to war in the wake of the war of the United States against Afghanistan over terrorism.  From the American perspective, "an India-Pakistan crisis at this time would be most unwelcome to U.S. policy makers, and would strain relations with both India and Pakistan." 
Therefore, one can observe that with the arrival of the military regime, there has been no substantial shift in security policies of Pakistan towards the United States, Afghanistan, and India. The events of September 11 impacted in facilitating and enhancing the building of bridges in Pak-US relations, which even the erstwhile civilians wanted. In the wake of such a priority policy and as has been demonstrated above, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan should not be viewed as a reversal. Nonetheless, Pakistan-India relations suffered a severe setback, not because of regime change from civilian to military, but in the context of the post-September 11 world.