Could Hiroshima be saved?
By the summer of 1945, the Japanese had virtually lost almost their entire naval and air force and a single air attack on Tokyo had killed around 83,000 people in March.
“I have become death, the destroyer of the worlds.” This line from the famous Hindu poem Bhagvat Gita was recalled by the American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, on witnessing the first test explosion of the atomic bomb.
After the defeat of Hitler’s Germany in May, 1945, the Allies were concentrating all of their energies and resources on their war against the Japanese in the Pacific; and were urging them to surrender unconditionally or to face “Prompt and utter destruction.” The meaning of “utter destruction” became vividly clear to the whole world when on August 6, Hiroshima became the target of the first atomic bomb without any explicit warning. According to the US estimates, 70,000 to 80,000 people were killed or missing and equal number of people were injured in the initial blast. (The Japanese estimate of casualties is much higher.) Every year, on August 6, when thousands of people get together in the Peace Memorial Park built at the site where the bomb exploded, to remember those who were slaughtered in this lethal attack, they ask themselves whether it was really necessary to bomb their city. For a satisfactory answer to such questions, we need to have a clear understanding of the situation prevailing at that time and the views of those who were at the helm of affairs in those final moments of the World War-II.
By the summer of 1945, the Japanese had virtually lost almost their entire naval and air force and a single air attack on Tokyo had killed around 83,000 people in March. US intelligence agents had successfully broken the Japanese diplomatic codes and were continuously listening to the cable traffic between Tokyo and its embassies all over the world. After the German defeat, all indications suggested that the Japanese had realised the inevitability of their defeat. They were only waiting for some honourable terms of surrender from the Allies. They needed some sufficient pretext for ending the war to satisfy the die hard elements within their army. With the crumbling of the Japanese strength, a full scale US invasion of Japan was also being planned for early 1946. In these circumstances, the US intelligence experts generally believed that the Japanese would agree to surrendered if they were assured that their emperor Hirohito (whom they regarded as a god) would be allowed to remain in office (though with nominal powers similar to those of the British monarch) and would not be tried for war crimes. It was further suggested that such assurances should be accompanied by another military shock, which would come in the form of a declaration of war against Japan by the USSR, followed by a Red Army attack on Manchuria, a Chinese territory bordering on the USSR which was occupied by the Japanese. This Soviet attack was widely expected in August. On July 13, US intelligence officials decoded a message in which the Japanese foreign minister Togo told his ambassador to the Soviet Union that the emperor wanted to end the war and that the main obstacle to peace was the US insistence on unconditional surrender. But the Truman Administration seemed in no mood to take any serious notice of it. The reason was that work on the making of the atomic bomb was feverishly going on and Truman was waiting for its final outcome, before giving any concessions to the Japanese in the form of assurances regarding their emperor.
On July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb was successfully tested in New Mexico and this changed the whole scenario for Truman, who realised that after possessing the world’s most powerful weapon, he no longer required the Soviet help for ending the war and that he could also use this weapon as a potent threat against the Soviet Union in any future confrontation with it (Because the signs of tensions and differences over Europe were already becoming visible between the two countries.) Moreover, Americans had lost thousands of their soldiers in its war against Japan and the American public opinion was bitterly against giving any concessions to the Japanese government. By inflicting maximum damage on Japan, Truman was hoping to assemble maximum political support for his future political career.
Americans had lost thousands of their soldiers in its war against Japan and the American public opinion was bitterly against giving any concessions to the Japanese government. By inflicting maximum damage on Japan, Truman was hoping to assemble maximum political support for his future political career.
Thus, on the pretext of ending the war at the earliest time and minimizing the loss of further American lives in the war, he authorised the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, causing untold destruction and misery. Some analysts argue that it was an attempt on his part to hasten the end of the war, but even they cannot justify the dropping of another atomic bomb on Nagasaki just three days later, because the massive death and destruction brought about by the first bomb was quite sufficient to convince everyone that the Japanese surrender had become inevitable. It is interesting to note however, that even the two dreadful atomic bombs could not force the Japanese to capitulate immediately. They agreed to surrender five days later on August 14, only after receiving US assurances (though in implicit terms) regarding their emperor. It is argued that in case of a full scale invasion of Japan, many more American lives would have been lost. It is impossible to estimate the exact number of US casualties in such a case, but it is quite obvious that if in early April, the US government had given the above mentioned assurances to the already much weakened Japanese army, accompanied by the threat of an imminent Soviet attack, there would have been no need for a full scale US invasion of Japan and thus, the lives of those Americans and Japanese who were killed in the fighting between April and August could have been saved. In simpler terms, the bomb delayed the ending of the war and thus, caused more American and Japanese casualties.
Truman and his Secretary of State Byrnes were the most vocal advocates of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their will prevailed. But with the passage of time, it became increasingly clear that many top military officials of that time were not in favour of if, though they did not openly express their dissent at that time. For instance, General Eisenhower, who was the Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Europe during the World War-II and the President of the US from 1953 to 1961, later on recalled in his book “Mandate For Change” that when he came to know from the Secretary of War Henry Stimson that an atomic bomb was about to be dropped on a Japanese city, he had a feeling of depression and expressed his grave misgivings about the whole affair to Stimson “First on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.”
Even more forceful views on this subject were expressed in his book “I Was There” by Admiral William Leahy, who was President Truman’s Chief of Staff. “…The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender.…
“…In being the first to use it, we … adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”
Other prominent figures who regarded the bombing of Hiroshima as unnecessary include General Douglas Macarthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied forces in the Pacific, General George Marshall, President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff and President Truman’s Secretary of State, General Henry H. 'Hap' Arnold, commander of the US Army Air Forces; Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet; Admiral William Halsey, commander of the Third Fleet; Curtis Lemay, Army Air Force major general and commander of the 21st Bomber Command; and many others.
The above evidence clearly proves that the Japanese had already been completely humbled down and their destruction of their cities by means of atomic bombs was quite unnecessary. Even then, the Americans used them perhaps, to estimate the extent of their destructive capability, hoping that this information might be useful for them in their future wars. During the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans were again accused by some quarters of deliberately testing their newly developed weapons on innocent civilians. The debate over the legitimacy of Hiroshima bombing may continue for a long time to come, but every impartial historian is likely to conclude that Hiroshima could surely be saved, because even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped on it, the outcome of the war would have remained the same.
Professor Abdul Rauf