20.10.2013 Consensus with divergence
For the Pakistani government, the task of holding talks with militants appears to be alarmingly difficult because state ideology is essentially not different from what the Taliban subscribe to
By Tahir Kamran
The consensus that has been forged between various political actors of Pakistan to hold talks with Taliban is, generally speaking, a good omen. One can hardly dispute the fact that negotiation is the only way to resolve and disentangle all issues.
The ulema of various hues have also put pressure on all parties, primarily the Taliban, to bring the frenzy of killing innocent people to an end. Such a call coming from Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman is indeed a welcome development. One may hope that he, along with Maulana Munawar Hassan, will soon start condemning the suicide bombing. It would have been of huge consequence had Sami-ul-Haq said something to that effect too. His condemnation or even a mere statement would have carried far more weight than anybody else. Obviously, he is Taliban’s eminence grise and openly embraces this role.
Yet one can only speculate as to how effective the pleadings of these ulema will prove. Both parties are still keeping their respective cards close to their chest. The parameters of the prospective talks are yet to be determined and the government of Pakistan, as it seems, is in a state of ambivalence.
It is really disconcerting that the Pakistan government is not likely to hold these talks from the position of strength. It is not because the government of Pakistan has any inherent weakness vis a vis the Taliban (TTP). In any case, if the latter put forward such preconditions which the Pakistani government cannot agree to, like promulgation of sharia or in the eventuality that the talks are held but somehow fall through or fail to yield the desired results, the stakes for Pakistan government will be of entirely different kind.
As a government of a sovereign country, it is obligated to provide protection to its people by safeguarding their lives and property. That will be, as is the case even now, a gargantuan task, given the geography of Pakistan. The danger of the whole process of development coming to a halt is extremely deleterious for a democratically elected government. Democratically elected governments, if bogged down in such a situation, are looked at by the electorate as incompetent and devoid of any political sagacity.
For the Pakistani government, the task appears to be alarmingly difficult because state ideology is essentially not different from what Taliban also subscribe to. The difference is only a matter of scale. The difference between the two positions of the parties engaged in talks will at best be that of a literalist (Taliban) and exegetical (Pakistani government).
However, despite such a tiny difference may impede the process of dialogue because Taliban may not be amenable to a rather modernist approach of the Pakistan government. We have not allowed other ideologies to flourish rather they were ruthlessly muzzled. Consequently, in the whole of Pakistan the voices mounting ideological challenge to Taliban are few and far between.
A large majority of Pakistanis subscribe to what the Taliban profess and believe. Thus, the categorical resistance to the Taliban’s way of thinking in certain sections of society is virtually non-existent. Besides, the method of carrying out violence, too, has assumed new levels of subtlety, which has made the task far more arduous for the states to deal with the perpetrators of such ‘globalised’ violence. On top of it, the Taliban spokesperson keeps putting pressure on the government by accusing it of being a band of US lackeys.
The current government, many thought, enjoys a semblance of legitimacy in the eyes of Taliban but the events unfolded so far prove otherwise. Reverting to the point of violence and its different trajectory, one is forced to assume that the methods employed henceforth to deal with it, are far from effective any longer.
Ever since the violence along with other things has gone global, nation states are finding it extremely daunting to come to grips with this illusive opponent. Protagonists of theories of violence such as Arjun Appadurai, a world renowned anthropologist, contend that it no longer has any spatial or ethnic specificity. They are mobile, resourceful, equipped with technical know-how and thus they can launch their operations from multiple sites simultaneously. Unlike any state or country, they have no obligation towards the people at large, and indeed paradoxically while using the language of conscientious global citizenship they put members of society at risk.
The global network which these groups are often plugged into is illustrated in Pakistan by the example of the Sipah-i-Sahaba which used to operate in the 1990s. Immediately after carrying out an act of attrition anywhere, its operatives wasted no time in disappearing into the urban jungle that is Karachi, or finding refuge in the remote parts of neighbouring Afghanistan. Thus, the Jhang-Karachi-Afghanistan nexus worked to the benefit of offenders who perpetrated crimes in the name of religion.
Karachi was, and still is, a safe haven for such criminals, where they lived and did all they wanted with impunity. Now Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, one of the most feared militant organisation, is employing the same tactics rather it has perfected the art of their deployment. One question that arises, therefore, is how to engage in talks with a group that is so undefined and whose presence is not local but global?
The writer is a noted Pakistani historian, currently the Iqbal Fellow at the University of Cambridge as professor in the Centre of South Asian Studies