Afghanistan beyond 2014 — I
By Humayun Shafi

The Taliban will, however, certainly be in a position to challenge the writ of the government and cause a smouldering civil war. This in itself is disturbing, as such situations last for a long period of time, bringing economic downturns and anguish for the people.

The news out of Afghanistan is of concern to us in Pakistan. The events that are unfolding point to some major changes that will have an impact on the security situation in the region. US and NATO allies plan to withdraw the majority of their forces by December 2014. The residual force will consist of 10,000 US troops, including an independent special operations force, while NATO will continue to train the Afghan national security forces. So far, a military solution has failed to curb the insurgency and peace has remained elusive. Each passing day has seen a worsening of the situation.

By December 2001, it was thought that the Taliban, which had formed the government of the ‘Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan’ since 1996, had been effectively uprooted without having any further chance of returning to rule Afghanistan. The UN-sponsored Bonn Conference in December 2001, also known as the Bonn Process, to decide the future of Afghanistan, did not have present any representative of the Taliban. It established an interim Afghan authority, headed by Hamid Karzai. Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN representative who presided over the conference, later recalled the conference in the Washington Post in 2008 when he stated, “The deal was reached hastily, by people who did not adequately represent the key constituencies in Afghanistan and it ignored the core political issues. As I said publicly, then, any progress remains untenable.” The impression of haste and exigency rather than of a well thought long-term strategy was to prevail throughout the war years. Author and journalist Robert Fisk, in September 2001, viewed the proposed attack on Afghanistan by the US as “walking into a trap”. Elsewhere, Operation Enduring Freedom, which commenced in October 2001, brought an appreciation for the US initiatives.

Lakhdar Brahimi, describing the situation of 2008, also stated that in “the face of lawlessness, corruption and level of bombing, Afghan hopes have given way to despair,” adding that insurgents control one third of the country. During the same time, President Obama wanted to bring US troops home. How was it possible to leave Afghanistan with an ever-increasing level of insurgency? The Afghan national security forces were not trained enough. Placing extra US troops would manifest itself to the Taliban as a winning resolve with the purpose of bringing the Taliban towards peace talks. President Obama announced the surge of 30,000 troops on December 1, 2009, a significant date considering he was to deliver his acceptance speech in Oslo for the Nobel Peace Prize on Dec 10, 2009. He had to justify the announcement of the surge in this speech.

The surge was the last effort by the US to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan. Tragically for the US, this just resulted in mounting US casualties. All the Taliban had to do now was wait in the shadows until the US and its allies leave Afghanistan, which will happen in December 2014. The aspiration of the Taliban beyond 2014 will be to again occupy Kabul and form a government in Afghanistan, a repeat of 1996. This appears to be a rather farfetched idea. The third election for the president will be held in April 2014 and again a democratically elected president will be installed. It is difficult to topple a democratically elected government without inviting adverse global reaction. The Taliban know from experience between 1996 and 2001 that a government cannot survive in isolation with economic and political sanctions. The Taliban will, however, certainly be in a position to challenge the writ of the government and cause a smouldering civil war. This in itself is disturbing, as such situations last for a long period of time, bringing economic downturns and anguish for the people. A viable option for peace is to hold fair elections in Afghanistan in April 2014, which appear highly unlikely given that the last two elections were marred by rigging, and ethnic minorities like the Tajiks were not given a fair chance to participate.

In September 2008, peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government were conducted in Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah hosted an iftar (opening of the fast) for the negotiating teams. Moreover, this time, the Taliban had agreed to talk to President Karzai, who belonged to the Afghan National Front. Again, in 2010, Saudi Arabia offered the US a chance to negotiate but received no response. Peace negotiations received a setback when Chief of the High Peace Council Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in September 2010. The peace talks in Doha had to be terminated in June 2013; the Taliban insisted on using the words ‘Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan’ and upon flying the white flag, which was used by the Taliban government during 1996 to 2001. These talks were limited to formal greetings and remained inconclusive.

(To be continued)

The writer can be reached at humayunshafi@gmail.com
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...-11-2013_pg3_6