1953-62: Alignment with the West
Alignment with the West
The second phase of Pakistan's foreign policy was characterized by a transition from an independent foreign policy to a multifaceted alignment with the West. Pakistan entered into a number of security arrangements with the United States and obtained economic and military assistance from that source which entangled Pakistan in the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Pakistan's alignment policy was shaped primarily by its acute sense of insecurity within the regional context. Pakistan's security problems primarily with India and secondarily with Afghanistan were catalyst to Pakistan's frantic search for allies. The deepening economic crisis in the early 1950s also contributed to this decision. In early 1952, the prices of jute and cotton began to drop in the International market which adversely affected Pakistan's foreign trade. The foreign exchange earnings and gold and sterling reserves dwindled. Pakistan was also faced with a serious shortage of wheat in 1952-53. The United States came for Pakistan's rescue by offering a gift of wheat in 1953 which helped to overcome food shortages and built a lot of goodwill in Pakistan for the donor. Several other factors pushed Pakistan towards alignment with the United States. Pakistan suffered from a sense of isolation in the World. The efforts to promote unity in the Muslim World were not making headway. It also became clear that the UN and the Commonwealth would not facilitate the solution of the Pakistan-India problems, especially the Kashmir dispute. The choice of the United States was not surprising. Apart from the U.S. willingness to offer assistance as a part of its global strategy for the containment of Communism, Pakistan leaders had already given ample evidence of their pro-West disposition. Their distrust of the Soviet Union was quite known which was reinforced by the unearthing of a pro-Soviet 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' (1951) to dislodge the government in Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan's successors were politically weak and they thought that American economic and military aid would reinforce their position in the body politic. The top-brass of the military made a significant contribution towards building Pakistan-U.S. relationship. They put their weight in favor of the United States because, in their opinion, the West was more advanced in economic and technical fields and that the West had sufficient resources and determination to support its allies.
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
In February 1954, Pakistan agreed on the U.S. initiative to develop close cooperation with Turkey in the political, economic and cultural spheres. A formal Turkey-Pakistan Agreement was signed in April 1954, followed by a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan in May. The Unites States agreed to provide military equipment, training facilities and other related services to enable Pakistan to maintain “its international security, its legitimate self-defense or to permit it to participate in the defense of a area or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures.” Pakistan was obliged not to use the assistance provided under this agreement for undertaking “any act of aggression against any other nation.” It could not use this assistance for purposes other than those specified in the agreement.
SEATO
In September 1954, Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the Manila Pact. Its members (Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and the U.S.) undertook to develop capacity “to resist attack and counter subversive activities” and promote cooperation for “economic progress and social well being.” They pledged that an armed aggression or threat to territorial integrity of a member state would be considered a threat to all, and that they would consult each other in order to meet such a challenge. The United States made it clear that the SEATO pledge applied only to communist aggression or subversion. Pakistan's plea to include all kinds of aggression was not accepted.
The Baghdad Pact/CENTO
One year later (September 1955) Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (renamed CENTO in 1959 after Iraq's withdrawal). Pakistan attached greater importance to this pact because it involved three Muslim states, i.e. Iraq (up to 1959), Turkey and Iran. Great Britain was also its member; the United States maintained close links with it and participated in its military committee. The members of the Baghdad Pact agreed to cooperate with each other in the field of defence and security. The United States made it clear that its participation in the military committee and assistance for strengthening the defensive capability of the member states pertained “solely to communist menace and [carried] no connotations with respect to intra-area matters.”
Defence and Economic Assistance from the U.S.A.
A Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation was signed between Pakistan and the United States in March 1959, as an executive understanding. Its preamble declared that the United States regarded “as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of independence and integrity of Pakistan.” Article 2 of the Agreement provided that the United States would supply military and economic assistance to Pakistan as may be mutually agreed upon “in order to assist the government of Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.” Pakistan reciprocated by providing a communication/air base to the United States at Badaber, near Peshawar, for ten years: 1959-69.
Pakistan's alignment with the United States yielded several advantages. American economic assistance grants, loans, goods and services gave a boost to Pakistan's faltering economy. The most significant contribution was in the field of defense and security where the two states developed very close ties. Pakistan received grant assistance valued at US $ 650 million, and credit facilities worth US $ 55 million. The military assistance included arms and ammunition, artillery pieces, APCs, and transport for the Army; aircraft F-104, B-57, F-86, and C-130 for the Air Force; naval defense equipment, including warships; radar and communication equipment. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) was set up in Pakistan to advise and guide the modernization of the armed forces and the security arrangements. A number of divisions were reequipped, and a few new ones were raised, coupled with the restructuring of the defense system. Training facilities in Pakistan were improved and a good number of Pakistan military officers were sent to the United States on different training courses; Pakistan's Air Force and the Navy took part in joint CENTO exercises which enabled them to gain invaluable experience. not cost-free. Pakistan's independent foreign policy was compromised and the prospects for improvement of its relations with the Soviet
Cost of Alignment with the West
The alignment with the West was not cost-free. Pakistan's independent foreign policy was compromised and the prospects for improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union suffered heavily. The Soviet leaders were extremely perturbed by this development and they resorted to a two pronged strategy against Pakistan. First, the Soviet leaders made a blistering criticism of Pakistan's alignment with the U.S. and threatened Pakistan with dire consequences if Pakistan allowed its territory to be used against the Soviet Union. Second, they extended support to India on the Kashmir question, describing it an integral part of India. They also supported Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory. Pakistan's participation in defense pacts came in conflict with its desire to cultivate close and cordial relations with the Muslim states. With the exception of Iran and Turkey which shared the defense arrangements, the Middle Eastern states responded negatively to Pakistan's security ties with the West. Pakistan also lost ground with the developing countries. Pakistan was very active in organizing the Banding Conference in 1955 but, when the spirit of Ban dung crystallized into the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, Pakistan was excluded because of its participation in defense pacts. Earlier, it adopted an ambiguous policy towards the Suez crisis, 1956, which alienated Egypt. It kept its relations with the socialist/communist countries at a low-level in order to strengthen its credentials as a Western ally. Despite Pakistan's respect for the U.S. security sensitivities, the latter was not prepared to extend enough diplomatic support to Pakistan in its problems with India This raised doubts in Pakistan about the credibility of American support. If Pakistanis were sceptical of American commitment, questions were raised in the United States as early as 1957 about the advisability of relying on Pakistan as a defender of American interest vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, the two sides played down their difference and continued to cooperate with each other for different reasons.
Relations with China
China avoided an open condemnation of Pakistan's participation in these pacts and showed a remarkable understanding of the factors that led Pakistan to join the Western camp. However, Pakistan maintained a safe distance from China and its policy on the seating of China in the UN wavered; it was more in line with the U.S. Perspective.

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