What about 2010 ?????????????????????

yeap wat abt 2010???

hmmmm 2010, here should be updates..

January 2010 Current Events: World News



* Facing Threats, U.S., U.K. Embassies Close in Yemen (Jan. 3): The United States and the United Kingdom have closed their embassies in the country of Yemen due to ongoing security threats from the terrorist group alQaeda. Military and intelligence organizations in Yemen had information about plans to attack Western groups in the capital; military action prevented the threatened attack, however. The suicide bomber on the Christmas Day flight to Detroit has been tied to the terrorist organization in Yemen.

* 7.0-Magnitude Earthquake Devastates Port-au-Prince, Haiti (Jan. 12): The beleaguered country of Haiti is dealt a catastrophic blow when a magnitude 7.0 earthquake strikes 10 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, the country's capital. It is the region's worst earthquake in 200 years. The quake levels many sections of the city, destroying government buildings, foreign aid offices, and countless slums. (Jan. 13): Assessing the scope of the devastation, Prime Minister Préval says, "Parliament has collapsed. The tax office has collapsed. Schools have collapsed. Hospitals have collapsed." He calls the death toll "unimaginable," and expects fatalities to near 100,000. The United Nations mission in Haiti is destroyed, 16 members of the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti are killed, and hundreds of UN employees are missing. (Jan. 14): International aid begins pouring in, and the scope of the damage caused by the quake highlights the urgent need to improve Haiti's crumbling infrastructure and lift it out of endemic poverty—the country is the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. (Jan. 19): Though the dead are going uncounted and unidentified in Haiti while authorities attempt to bury those killed during the earthquake and its aftermath, experts estimate a staggering death toll of 200,000 people.

* Aide to Saddam Hussein "Chemical Ali" Executed in Iraq (Jan. 25): Ali Hassan al-Majid, cousin of and former aid to Saddam Hussein, is executed in Iraq for his role in the poison-gas attack of the village of Halabja, where 5,000 Kurds were killed. Nicknamed "Chemical Ali", al-Majid is part of the group of leaders responsible for the deaths of approximately 180,000 Kurds in the Iraq-Iran War.


February 2010 Current Events: World News


* Three American Soldiers Killed in Pakistan (Feb. 3): Three American soldiers, along with four Pakistanis, are killed in a suicide bombing attack in Pakistan. Members of the Taliban are responsible for the blast. While Pakistan is officially an ally to the United States, Pakistan does not allow American combat forces in the country. However, a Special Operations team of 60–100 American soldiers is currently in Pakistan to train the paramilitary Frontier Corps in counterinsurgency techniques. (Feb. 4): Pakistan officials arrest 35 people who they suspect were involved in the suicide bombing that killed 3 American soldiers.

* Olympic Luger from Republic of Georgia Dies in Training Crash (Feb. 12): A luger from the Republic of Georgia, Nodar Kumaritashvili, dies tragically in a crash during training for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada. Just hours before the Opening Ceremony, Kumaritashvili lost control of his sled while traveling at 90 miles per hour on the Whistler Sliding Centre track. The safety of the track, built in 2007, has been called into question recently because of the sheer speed at which the athletes are able to travel.

* Multi-Country Offensive Launched in Afghanistan (Feb. 12): Thousands of American, Afghan, and British troops storm the city of Marja, Afghanistan in an attempt to destroy the Taliban's latest haven. The attack by the 6,000 troops is the biggest offensive in the country since the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. (Feb. 14): A U.S. rocket strike that went awry kills at least 10 civilians in the Helmand province. Five children were among those killed.

* Taliban's Top Commander Captured (Feb. 15): The Taliban's top military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, is captured in Karachi, Pakistan in a secret joint operation by the American and Pakistani intelligence forces. American officials claim that Barader is the most significant human capture since the in Afghanistan began in 2001. (Feb. 18): Two senior Taliban leaders are arrested in Pakistan. Afghan officials are calling the two men "shadow governors" in two provinces of the country. Their arrest, along with the capture of Barader, severely hamper the Taliban leadership and their presence in Pakistan.

* NATO Airstrike in Afghanistan Kills 27 Civilians (Feb. 22): An airstrike launched by the United States Special Forces in Kabul, Afghanistan, targeted at insurgents, accidentally kills 27 Afghan civilians. President Hamid Karzai condemns the killings.

March 2010 Current Events: World News



* Violence Mars Election in Iraq (Mar. 7): Explosions marked general election day in Iraq, where two bombs killed at least 38 people. Iraq's election commission reports that 62% of Iraqis voted in the election, though that number drops to just 53% in Baghdad, where the violence occurred. Final results are not expected for several weeks, but preliminary figures put the State of Law alliance, led by Prime Minister Maliki, and the Iraqi National Movement, headed by former prime minister Ayad Allawi, in a close race ahead of the other candidates. Election officials said none of the alliances will emerge with a clear majority, forcing the winner to assemble a broad coalition to form a government. The glacial pace of the vote count was attributed to a painstaking process intended to reduce the risk of election fraud. (Mar. 29): Final results of the election give the Iraqi National Movement, led by former prime minister Ayad Allawi, 91 seats in Parliament out of 325. The State of Law alliance, headed by Prime Minister Maliki comes in a close second with 89 seats. A Shia religious movement, including followers of radical cleric Moktada al-Sadr, wins 70. The two main Kurdish parties together receive 43 seats. Maliki refuses to accept the results and says he will challenge them in court.

* U.S. Defense Department Contracted Killers in Middle East (Mar. 14): A Defense Department official set up a network of contractors to track and kill militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The official, Michael Furlong, hired contractors from private companies that employ former CIA operatives and had them track suspected militants in the Middle East. They were then told whether or not those militants should be killed.

* U.S., Russia Have Breakthrough in Arms Negotiations (Mar. 24): The United States and Russia report a breakthrough in arms control negotiations. Both countries agree to lower the limit on deployed strategic warheads and launchers by 25% and 50%, respectively, and will also implement a new inspection regime. President Obama and President Medvedev will sign in a treaty that outlines this agreement. A signing ceremony is planned for April 8 in Prague.

* Female Suicide Bombers Kill 39 in Russian Subway Stations (Mar. 29): Two female suicide bombers, acting just minutes apart, detonate bombs in two Moscow subways stations, killing at least 39 people. This is the first terrorist attack in the capital city since 2004, when Moscow experienced a string of deadly violence. Authorities attribute the attacks to the mostly Muslim north Caucasus region. Doku Umarov, a former Chechen separatist and the self-proclaimed emir of the north Caucasus, claims responsibility for masterminding the attack. (Mar. 31): Two explosions kill 12 people in the north Caucasus region of Dagestan. The attacks prompt concern that Prime Minister Putin will crack down on civil liberties and democracy as he did in 2004, following the siege of a school in Beslan.


April 2010 Current Events: World News


* 34 Rescued from Chinese Mine (Apr. 4): Rescue crew free 34 people trapped in a flooded coal mine in China, where they have been trapped since March 28. After the flood, 108 miners were immediately rescued, but the remainder of the workers, 153 total, remained trapped underground. All those freed remain in stable condition.

* Militants in Pakistan Attack U.S. Consulate (Apr. 5): Militants launch an assault on the United States Consulate in Pakistan. Six Pakistanis are killed and 20 are wounded; no Americans are harmed. At least five suicide bombers mounted the attack, though they were unable to reach the inner area of the compound. Azam Tariq, a spokesperson for the Pakistani Taliban, claims responsibility for the attack, saying they were acting in retaliation to American missile strikes and Pakistani military operations in the area.

* Kyrgyzstan President Forced to Flea Amid Protests (Apr. 7) President Bakiyev fleas Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan amid deadly protests and demonstrations, and former foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva, acting as the leader of the opposition, assumes power as acting president. Government troops and demonstrators are battling in the streets, and nearly 70 people are killed and more than 400 wounded. Demonstrations over sharp increases in utility prices broke out in the city of Talas and promptly spread to the capital of Bishkek, where protesters are also rallying against government corruption. Bakiyev refuses to resign despite Otunbayeva's support. Obama administration officials express concern that the upheaval may affect the deal United States and Kyrgyzstan made in 2009 over use of the Manas air base. Otunbayeva, however, says the supply route would remain in operation for the time being.

* Russia, U.S. Sign Nuclear Arms Pact (Apr. 8): The United States and Russia usher in a supposedly new era in nuclear arms control after President Obama and President Medvedev sign an arms reduction treaty and agree to act in a united fashion against the threat of Iran's nuclear program. The pact, called the New Start, has each country promise to scale back on their nuclear arsenals.

May 2010 Current Events: World News


* Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Offers to Hold Early Elections (May 3): Prime Minister of Thailand, Vejjajiva Abhisit, offers to hold early elections—one of the key demands of protesters loyal to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, called red shirts, who have been rioting since April—if the protesters called off their demonstrations, but they reject the gesture. Abhisit withdraws his offer and orders troops to blockade the protest area. (May 13): What started as a peaceful protest disintegrates into violence; the military fires upon the protesters and hits Khattiya Sawatdiphol, a general who sided with the red shirts. He later dies of his injuries. His death sparks further violence, and the protesters retaliated with grenade attacks. (May 17): The red shirts then offer to negotiate with the government, but are rebuffed. They then engage in large-scale rioting, looting, and the firebombing of several buildings, including Thailand's stock exchange and largest department store. The government cracks down on the movement (May 19): Rioters disperse, and protest leaders surrender. They will face terrorism charges. In the 68 days of the protests, 68 people died. The red shirts bore the brunt of most of the casualties.

* Picasso Painting Sells for Record-Setting $106.5 Million (May 5): A Picasso painting sells for a record-breaking $106.5 million at a Christie's auction. The painting, "Nude, Green Leaves and Bust," depicts Picasso's mistress and was painted in just one day in 1932. It was being sold by the estate of philanthropist Frances Lasker Brody.

* Prime Minister Brown Announces Imminent Resignation (May 10): British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announces he will resign as the head of his Labour Party by September. The country's general election produced a hung Parliament—none of the competing parties won enough votes—last week, and Brown announces his commitment to negotiate a new government before he leaves office. (May 11): Brown formally resigns as prime minister after acknowledging that his Labour Party will be unable to form a majority in Parliament. He recommends Conservative Party leader David Cameron as his successor; consequently, Cameron creates a coalition government with the ideologically opposed Liberal Democrats and becomes the prime minister of the United Kingdom. The leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, will become deputy prime minister. This is the first coalition government in the U.K. since World War II.

* U.S. Forms Agreement with Russia, China, and Others on Sanctions for Iran (May 19): The United States and major world powers Russia, China, and others agree to impose a fourth set of sanctions on Iran's nuclear program, in an attempt to stop the country from enriching uranium. The agreement is revealed shortly after Iran announces its own deal with Turkey and Brazil to relinquish half of the country's stockpile of nuclear fuel for a year. None of the three previous sets of sanctions had any effect on Iran's program to enrich uranium nor its willingness to fully disclose actions to international inspectors.

* Israeli Attack on Pro-Palestinian Aid Flotilla (May 31): Nine people are dead after an Israeli navy commando attacks a flotilla of cargo ships and passenger boats on their way to Gaza to provide aid and supplies for the area. Israel claims that the passengers on the flotilla, who were pro-Palestinians and mostly Turks, presented themselves as humanitarians but were clearly hostile.

* Al Qaeda Leader in Afghanistan Killed in American Strike (May 31): The top financial chief and co-founder of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, is killed in an American drone attack in Pakistan. American intelligence officials say he was the third highest leader in the organization, behind Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri.

June 2010 Current Events: World News


* Prime Minister of Japan Announces Resignation (June 1): Just nine months into his term as Prime Minister of Japan, Yukio Hatoyama announces his resignation from office. His countrymen reportedly find him an indecisive and ineffective ruler and have been clamoring for him to quit. He will be the fourth prime minister to leave in just four years.

* U.N. Security Council Passes Sanctions Against Iran (June 9): The United Nations Security Council passes another set of sanctions against Iran's nuclear program, in hopes that they can stop Iran's production of nuclear fuel. President Obama strongly supported the sanctions, though only 12 of the 15 members of the council voted in favor of passing it.

* U.S. Finds $1 Trillion in Untapped Mineral Deposits in Afghanistan (June 13): The United States finds more than $1 trillion in mineral resources in the mountains of Afghanistan, far more than expected or previously estimated. The findings, which include previously unknown deposits of iron, copper, gold, and lithium, could drastically improve the country's economy and fundamentally change the outcome of the war there.

* Ethnic Fighting in Kyrgyzstan Reaches Horrific Level (June 17): Street fighting between ethnic Kyrgyz and minority Uzbeks escalated in the city of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, leaving at least 200 people dead. Thousands of people are displaced after Uzbek neighborhoods are torched, and approximately 100,000 people have crossed the border into Uzbekistan, forcing that country's government to close its borders. (June 24): The death toll in the ethnic fighting in Kyrgyzstan rises to 2,000, yet the cause of the original skirmish remains unknown. Many of those who fled the country have begun to return.

* Graeme McDowell Wins Golf's U.S. Open (June 20): In a surprise victory, Graeme McDowell wins golf's U.S. Open at Pebble Beach Golf Links in California, beating second place Frenchman Gregory Havret by just one stroke. McDowell, from Northern Ireland, is the first European to win the tournament since 1970.

July 2010 Current Events: World News


* Serena Williams Wins Women's Wimbledon Title (July 3): American tennis champ Serena Williams dominates the women's Wimbledon final with a 6-3, 6-2 win over Vera Zvonareva of Russia. This win gives Williams her 13th Grand Slam title. (July 4): Spain's Rafael Nadal wins the men's Wimbledon title in a 6-3, 7-5, 6-4 set against Czech opponent Tomas Berdych. The win marks Nadal's eighth major title win.

* U.S., Russia Swap Imprisoned Spies in Trade Agreement (July 9): After discovering and imprisoning 10 Russian spies masquerading as civilians in the United States, the U.S. and Russia agree to and implement a swap of the captured spies. The Russian government traded four Russians who were purportedly spying for the U.S. or another Western country.

* Spain Beats Netherlands 1-0 to Win World Cup (July 11): After four weeks and 64 games, the 32 countries who entered the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa were whittled down to just two; the final game, between Spain and the Netherlands, went into overtime after a scoreless game. Spain finally scored in the 129th minute, winning the game and the World Cup title.

* Coordinated Bombings Kill 70 in Uganda (July 11): The Shabab, an Islamic insurgent group from Somalia, claim responsibility for the coordinated bombings that kill at least 70 people in a crowd of soccer fans in Uganda.

* Stampede During German Parade Kills 21, Wounds 500 (July 24): Twenty-one people are killed and 500 more wounded during a stampede at a German music festival, dubbed the Love Parade. While attempting to enter the festival, the large crowd crushed into an underpass, suffocating and trampling the victims of the tragedy. Prosecutors are investigating whether the event managers' negligence caused the stampede and subsequent deaths.

* Alberto Contador Wins the Tour de France (July 25): Alberto Contador wins the Tour de France, his third title in the world's most prestigious cycling race, and his second in a row.


August 2010 Current Events: World News


* Russia Bans Grain Export in Response to Drought, Wildfires (Aug. 5): Russian president Valdimir Putin bans the export of grains from his country, citing the widespread drought and wildfires that are crippling Russia. They are suffering from the country's worst heat wave in 130 years. Putin claims that the damage to their crops has increased food prices in Russia dramatically. (Aug. 6): At least 52 people have been killed in the more than 800 wildfires that have swept across Russia.

* Sucide Bomber Kills At Least 48 in Attack on Iraqi Army (Aug. 17): A suicide bomber blows himself up at an Iraqi Army recruiting office, killing at least 48 army recruits and soldiers, and wounding 120 others.

* State Department Increasing Civilian Presence in Iraq (Aug. 18): The U.S. State Department announces that it will increase the presence of civilian contractors in 2011 as the military prepares to leave the country. Contractors will be responsible for training Iraqi police and preventing confrontations between the Iraqi Army and civilian groups.

September 2010 Current Events: World News


* American Hiker Released on Bail from Iranian Prison (Sept. 12): The female American hiker imprisoned in Iran on charges of espionage is released on $500,000 bail. Sarah Shourd has been in prison for over a year, along with the two male American friends she was hiking with, Shane Bauer and Joshua Fattal. The three friends were hiking in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq in July 2009 when they allegedly passed over into Iranian territory and were arrested.

October 2010 Current Events: World News


*

U.S. Grenade May Have Killed British Aid Worker (Oct. 11): British aid worker Linda Norgrove, who was kidnapped by the Taliban while she was working in Afghanistan for an American aid organization, may have been killed during an American rescue raid, and not by a suicide bomb detonated by her captors, as was previously believed. British Prime Minister David Cameron announces the possibility that her death was an accident caused by a U.S. grenade, after learning of an investigation into the matter lead by General David Petraeus, top NATO commander in Afghanistan.
*

Talks to End Afghan War Between Karzai, Taliban Leaders (Oct. 19): Leading members of the Taliban in Afghanistan – members of the Quetta shura – and President Karzai and his advisors, meet to discuss the end of the nine-year war in Afghanistan. The Taliban leaders, whose identities are kept secret in order to prevent rival Taliban leaders from harming or killing them, were lead to the meetings from their safe havens in Pakistan by NATO troops.
*

Mass Protests in France Over Retirement Reform (Oct. 19): A one-day strike over the French government's pension reform plan turned into widespread protests, gas shortages, blockaded roads, closed schools, and violence in France. President Sarkozy and his government are proposing raising the legal minimum requirement age from 60 to 62, which resulted in the demonstrations of millions of French citizens.
*

Suspicious Packages on Airplane Bound for U.S. Contain Explosives (Oct. 29): President Obama confirms that the suspicious packages found on an airplane originating in Yemen and bound for the United States contained explosive materials. Saudi intelligence officials tipped the U.S. government about the packages, resulting in a brief terrorism scare across the country. No additional exploseives were found.
*

Church Attack in Baghdad Kills 58 (Oct. 31): An Al Qaeda-affiliated massacre at a church in Baghdad leaves 58 dead and scores more wounded. This is the largest attack on Iraqi Christians since the war in Iraq began in 2003. Gunmen took over 100 hostages in the church before killing most with two suicide bombs.


November 2010 Current Events: World News

*

Obama Backs India for Permanent U.N. Security Council Seat (Nov. 8) President Obama, breaking with tradition, announces support of India for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. A closer relationship between the United States and India should reduce some of the power of rapdidly growing China. The governments of China and Pakistan, both countries with strained relationships with India and close ties with the United States, respond with concern over the growing relationship.
*

Irish Prime Minister Dissolving Government After 2011 Budget Approval (Nov. 22): Irish Prime Minister Brian Cowen announces he will disolve his government and hold a new election after the 2011 budget passes. This announcement comes just one day after the Irish government requested a $100 billion bailout package from the European Union and IMF to help save its flailing economy.
*

North Korean Military Attacks South Korean Island, Killing 4 (Nov. 23): The military of North Korea unexpected attacks the island of Yeonpyeong in South Korea, killing two civilians and two marines. Eighteen others are wounded. This is the first time North Korea has fired on a civilian target since the suspension of the Korean War in 1953.


December 2010 Current Events: World News


*

Russia, Qatar Win World Cup Bids for 2018, 2022 (Dec. 2): Russia wins its bid as host for the 2018 World Cup, while Qatar secures the host duties for the international soccer tournament in 2022. The United States, in particular, was disappointed by the announcement; the country was hoping to host the World Cup in 2022. Qatar will be the first Middle Eastern country to the tournament; Russia has never had the privilege either.
*

WikiLeaks Founder Arrested in Sweden for Alleged Sex Offenses (Dec. 7): Julian Assange, the Australian-born co-founder of WikiLeaks, is arrested in England on a Swedish warrant in connection to accusations made in August: two women in Sweden accused him of sexual assault. He is denied bail by a London court. (Dec. 8): Hundreds of Internet activists attack several businesses seen as "enemies" of WikiLeaks, in response to Assange's imprisonment. Amazon.com, Paypal.com, and the MasterCard website are among those attacked with an onslaught of web traffic. (Dec. 14): Assange is released on $310,000 bail, but remains in British custody temporarily. He faces possible extradition to Sweden for his alleged sexual assaults on two women.


Source: 2010 Current Events — Infoplease.com

__________________
No matter how fast i run or how far i go it wont escape me, pain, misery, emptiness.

2010 in Pakistan

January

* 1 January – A suicide bombing occurs at a volleyball game in northwestern Pakistan, killing at least 95, and injuring over 100.
* 13 January - A train hit a school bus at an ungated railway crossing in Pakistan's Punjab Province near to the town of Mian Channu, killing 8 children and injuring several others.
* 30 January - A suicide bombing occurs at a military checkpoint within the town of Khar, in the Bajaur Agency, killing at least 16 people and injuring around 25 others.

February

* 3 February - A suicide bombing occurs within the Lower Dir District area of the country, killing at least 8 people, including 3 American soldiers and injuring around 70 other people.
* 5 February - Twin bombings, one of which includes a suicide attack occurred within the Pakistani city of Karachi, killing at least 25 people and injuring more than 50 others.
* 10 February - A suicide bombing targeting a police patrol in the Khyber Agency killed at least 19 people, including 13 local policemen.
* 17 February - Avalanche in the Kohistan District, killing over 100 people.
* 18 February - A bombing at a local mosque in the Tirah Valley of the Khyber Agency, killed at least 30 people and injured more than 70 others.

March

* 12 March - Three separate suicide bombings targeting Pakistani security forces occurred from the 8th of March till the 12th of March. It is known that more than 72 people were killed in these three-related suicide attacks and more than 190 others were injured.

April

* 5 April - A series of coordinated bombings at the U.S. consulate in Peshawar and at a ruling party rally in the North-West Frontier Province kills 50 people and injured 100 others.
* 8 April - Pakistan adopts the 18th amendment to the Constitution, stripping President Asif Ali Zardari of key powers.
* 10 April - The military kills 100 people in an air raid on a Taliban area in the north-west.
* 17 April -April 18 - Three suicide bomb attacks occurred within the town of Kohat within the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. At least 58 people were killed in these three suicide attacks and around 86 others were injured.
* 19 April - A suicide bombing struck a marketplace within the centre of Peshawar, killing at least 25 people.

May

* 28 May - A series of co-ordinated attacks were launched on two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. At least 86 people are killed in these terrorist attacks and more than 120 others are injured.

June

* 6 June - Cyclone Phet makes landfall near Karachi before wrecking havoc in coastal Balochistan province.
* 28 June - An accidental truck blast caused by an exploding gas cylinder, kills at least 18 people and injured around 42 others within the southern Pakistani city of Hyderabad.

July

* Extensive flooding after monsoon rains. At least 1,600 people were killed.
* 1 July - Twin suicide bombings targeted a Sufi shrine at the Data Durbar Complex, in the eastern Pakistani city of Lahore. At least 50 people are killed in these twin suicide attacks and more than 200 are injured.
* 9 July - A suicide bomb attack occurs at a market within the Mohmand Agency of north-western Pakistan. At least 104 people are killed in this suicide attack and more than 120 others are injured.
* 28 July - Crash of Airblue Flight 202, killing all 152 people aboard.

August

* 3–6 August - Riots in Karachi after the assassination of MP Raza Haider.
* 13 August - President Asif Ali Zardari a curb on the traditional Independence Day in favour a more sombre response to the floods. Zardari will instead spend the day visiting the regions worst affected by flooding.
* 14 August - 12 suspected militants in North Waziristan are killed by a suspected American drone attack.
* 14 August - At least 16 people are killed following an outbreak of violence in Balochistan.
* 14 August - Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani announces that as many as 20 million Pakistanis have been hit by the floods, contradicting earlier United Nations estimates of 14 million.
* 15 August - Condemnations and the promise of a government inquiry follow the lynching of two teenaged brothers, Mughees and Muneeb Butt, by a mob in Sialkot. The killings, believed to have been sparked by a mistaken belief that the brothers were robbers, was caught on film by a Dunya TV reporter and aired on all private media channels.
* 24 August - Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani raises fears of disease epidemic in flood-hit areas of the country, following reports from doctors in the areas that diarrhoea and cholera were spreading.

September

* 1 September - At least 35 people are killed and more than 250 others injured, following a series of bomb attacks on a Shia Islamic procession in Lahore. The attacks, two of which were said to be from suicide bombers took place at a commemoration of the death of Ali bin Abi Talib.
* 3 September - In a similar attack on Shia Muslims at least 50 people are killed in Quetta by a suicide bomber at a Shia rally. Responsibility is claimed by the Taliban who state that the killings were a revenge attack for the killing of a Sunni leader in 2009.
* 7 September - American actress Angelina Jolie visits flood-hit areas of the country as the UN launches a renewed appeal for aid.
* 10 September - Former leader General Pervez Musharraf announces his intention to return to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in London. He claims that he plans to establish a new political party in order to contest the 2013 elections.
* 16 September - Exiled politician Imran Farooq is found murdered near his home in exile in north London having been stabbed several times. Violence erupted in his hometown Karachi following his murder. Several shops and vehicles were set on fire however no casualties were reported. MQM called for a 10 day strike to mourn Farooq's death.
* 25 September - Four people are killed in Miranshah in a suspected American drone attack. Seven more die in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan in a similar attack the following day.
* 25 September - The three men accused of the 2008 Danish embassy bombing in Islamabad are acquitted by a Pakistani court because of insufficient evidence. The decision is to be challenged by the prosecution in the high courts.
* 26 September - Abdul Qayum Jatoi quits as Minister of Defence Production after claiming that the Pakistan Army was involved in political assassinations, including that of Benazir Bhutto.
* 27 September - Geo TV reveals that more than one third of cabinet ministers pay no taxes whatsoever and that Prime Minister Gillani had not paid taxes for any of the three years covered by the disclosure.

October

* 1 October - Pervez Musharraf launches his new political party, the All Pakistan Muslim League, at a club in London. At the launch Musharraf apologises for the "negative actions" he took whilst in power.
* 2 October - Nine more people are killed in the North-West in the latest in a series of American drone attacks on the bases of suspected militants.
* 20 October - Political and ethnic violence erupts in Karachi resulting in 35 deaths.
* 22 October - US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announces that the American government is to give US$2 billion in military aid.

November

* 1 November - An American drone attack kills six people in the northwest.
* 1 November - A suicide bomber kills two policemen and wounds 10 others as security forces tried to stop him from walking into their local headquarters in Swabi, 100 kilometres northwest of Islamabad.
* 3 November - Two government schools are destroyed by Taliban militants in an attack in the Mohmand area.
* 5 November - A bomb explodes in a mosque in Darra Adam Khel in North-West Pakistan, killing at least 55 people and injuring over 100. Later that same day a grenade attack on another mosque in the village of Sulemankhel near Peshawar claimed at least two lives. Both attacks occurred during daily prayer sessions.
* 5 November - 2010 Karachi Beechcraft 1900 crash
* 9 November - The headquarters of the Pakistan police's Criminal Investigation Department in Karachi is attacked by militants. After the attack in replused in a gun battle a lorry load of explosives are detonated, destroying a perimiter wall. 200 deaths and over 100 injuries are reported.
* 28 November - Sun Way Flight 4412 crashes.

December

* Car bombing of the Al-Zuhra mosque and maternity center.
* 24 December - Taliban militants clash with troops in the north-west. 11 soldiers and 24 militants are estimated dead.
* 25 December - A female suicide bomber kills at least 43 people in Khar near the border with Afghanistan.
* 29 December - President Asif Zardari requests crisis talks after the Muttahida Qaumi Movement opts to withdraw two of its members from the cabinet in protest at government corruption. However the MQM insists that it does not intend to bring down the government by going into oppostion.


2010 in Pakistan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

__________________
No matter how fast i run or how far i go it wont escape me, pain, misery, emptiness.

The United States parted company with its respected AAA credit rating for the first time in seven decades after being downgraded by Standard & Poor's. The country's credit rating was cut to AA+ following S&P alleged the conciliation made by Congress and President Obama in early August to slash expenditure and enhance the liability upper limit "doesn’t meet the level, in our view, would be essential to even out the government's standard-term debt dynamics." The agency was frank in its evaluation. Its statement read: "We downgraded the 70-year long AAA rating of the United States since we think that the protracted storm over increasing the constitutional liability upper limit and the associated monetary policy debate point out that additional upcoming development surrounding the increase in public expenditure, particularly on privileges, or coming to an agreement on generating income is less probable than we formerly understood and will stay put to a arguable and intermittent procedure," the ratings firm believed.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR DISPUTE:
EXAMINING VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR ITS RESOLUTION
by
Fahmida Ashraf

Introduction
The Jammu and Kashmir Dispute (referred to as the Kashmir Dispute) is the core issue between
Pakistan and India that has bedevilled relations between the two countries since August 1947. It is also a
known fact that the perceptions of India and Pakistan about what constitutes the dispute are totally
different. Pakistan regards it as an unfinished agenda of the Partition of the sub-continent in 1947 and as
an issue of granting the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris, a principle also upheld by the UN
Security Council resolutions. India, on the other hand, regards it as its territorial issue. It asserts that
Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and that Pakistan is occupying Indian territory. The
impasse has resulted with India occupying two thirds of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan
administering one-third, with an UN-recognised ceasefire line separating them.
In this connection it may be noted that the Indian government adopted a dual policy on the Kashmir
dispute. For example, following the landing of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir on August 26, 1947,
at the declaratory level, the Indian government expressed its commitment to resolve the dispute
according to the wishes of the Kashmiris through a plebiscite, but in practice the Indian leaders,
particularly, Prime Minister Nehru, were interested in incorporating the State of Jammu and Kashmir into
the Indian Union. In the words of Pandit Nehru, ‘Kashmir, because of her geographical position, with her
frontiers marching with three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately
connected with the security and international contacts of India.’1 Gandhi is reported to have said that
Kashmir ‘had the greatest strategic value, perhaps, in all India.’ Sheikh Abdullah, while talking to reporters
in New Delhi on October 21, 1947, said: ‘Due to the strategic position that the State (Kashmir) holds, if
this State joins the Indian Dominion, Pakistan would be completely encircled.’2 Also, when the partition of
the sub-continent was accepted by the then Indian leaders, it was done with mental reservations, and the
hope that Pakistan would not survive for long. The All-India Congress Committee (AICC), in its resolution
of June 1947, said: ‘the picture of India we have learned to cherish will remain in our minds and our
hearts. The AICC earnestly trusts that when the present passions have subsided, India’s problems will be
reviewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two-nations will be discredited and
discarded by all.’3
Through Kashmir, India hoped to be in a better position to strangulate Pakistan by securing a strategic
edge and by having control over the rivers flowing into Pakistan. India managed to obtain a land-link with
Kashmir through the manipulated Radcliffe Award. While partitioning the Punjab, the Award divided the
Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur in such a way that, besides Pathankot tehsil, even the Muslim
majority tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala to the south were awarded to India. India thus got access to
Kashmir. There are strong indications that Mountbatten had earlier reached an understanding with the
Congress in respect of Gurdaspur district. As mentioned by V. P. Menon, Mountbatten, during his visit to
Kashmir in June 1947, well before the Radcliffe Award, ‘assured the Maharaja that so long as he made up
his mind to accede to one Dominion or the other before August 15 no trouble will ensue, for which ever
Dominion he acceded to would take the State firmly under its protection as part of its territory.’4 Also,
during his press conference on June 4, 1947, Mountbatten did mention that the Boundary Commission
‘would be unlikely to throw the whole of the Gurdaspur district into the Muslim majority areas.’5 As
observed by Lord Birdwood, in his book Two Nations and Kashmir, (1956), ‘It was Radcliffe’s Award to
India of the Gurdaspur and Batala tehsils, with Muslim majorities, which rendered possible the
maintenance of an Indian force at Jammu, based on Pathankot as railhead, and which enabled India to
consolidate her defences southwards all the way from Uri to Pakistan border.’6 This collusion came to light
after the British Empire rolled back, leaving behind a festering dispute.
The Kashmir dispute dominates Indo-Pakistan relations, and has also become central for peace and
stability in the South Asian region. Since 1998 it has been described as a nuclear flashpoint. It is
unfortunate that while in the beginning the international community supported the Security Council
Resolutions, over the decades there has been a lessening of governmental interests in that commitment,
of those very countries such as Australia, UK and US, which had earlier played an active leading role in
the Security Council debates and resolutions with a view to solving the dispute. However, the nuclear
tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 renewed the interest of the world community in the unresolved
Kashmir dispute in South Asia. Though the international concern is palpable over Kashmir becoming a
potential nuclear flashpoint, the world community at the present juncture has yet to give more teeth to the
Security Council resolutions that it has neglected for so many years. It also necessitates that the
international community comes to grips with all the inter-related aspects and the dimensions of the
dispute.
The dire need for an urgent solution to the Kashmir dispute came to the fore recently, as India and
Pakistan faced each other with their armies deployed at their borders, since December 19, 2001, when
India announced its decision to deploy its troops to forward positions along the India-Pakistan
international border. This Indian position in itself follows recent precedents.
A dangerous trend that has surfaced in the post-September 11, 2001, international scenario is the
unspecified nature of America’s ‘anti-terrorism’ campaign, in which there is a blurring of distinctions
between terrorist activities and genuine struggles by oppressed people for self-determination. Taking
advantage of the unspecified nature of the ‘anti-terrorism’ campaign, the BJP government in India has
seized the opportunity to attempt to clinch the Kashmir dispute according to its own thinking, by recasting
the indigenous Kashmir struggle as a terrorist one. It is imperative for the international community to act
with responsibility and commitment, if it has to ensure that such vested interests do not confuse issues for
their own motivated ends, and lead to further conflagrations.
Self-determination vis-à-vis Terrorism
The concept of self-determination is an internationally recognised norm. According to Dr. Ijaz Hussain,
an expert on international law, the concept ‘started as a political (or moral) right’ and later during the
decolonisation period ‘evolved into a legal right.’7 For example, in 1917, Lenin conceived it as ‘political
self-determination that is the right to secede and form an independent state.’8 In 1918, the American
President, Woodrow Wilson, included it in the famous fourteen points and described it as ‘an imperative
principle of action.’9 A development in this connection was the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514,
adopted in 1960. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution proclaimed that ‘all peoples have the right to selfdetermination
and lack of political, economic, social or educational preparedness could not be a ground
for delaying independence.’10 Also, Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, (Chapter I ‘Purposes and Principles’),
states: ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of people, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’11
Other related important documents are the two International Human Rights Covenants, adopted in 1966.
The two Covenants - ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ and ‘International Convenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ - came into force in 1976. The common article 1 (1), incorporated in
both the Covenants, states: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’12
Another important document is the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, adopted in 1970, entitled:
‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States.’ The resolution ‘recognises the right of self-determination in favour of an oppressed people within
an independent state.’ 13
An important point to note is that various international conventions on terrorism have also pointed out
the difference between struggles for self-determination and acts of terrorism. For example, the UN
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the ‘Definition of Aggression’, adopted in December 1974,
in Article 7 states: ‘Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3 could in any way prejudice the right
of self-determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly
deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; or the right of
these peoples to struggle to that end and seek and receive support…’ The United Nations, in December
1979, adopted an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (came into force June 1983). It
declares that it: ‘shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts ...
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes
in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration on principles of International Law...’ (Article 12). Similarly, the ‘Convention on Combating
International Terrorism’ adopted by the OIC in 1999, states in its preamble ‘the legitimacy of the rights of
peoples to struggle against foreign occupation and colonialist and racist regimes by all means, including
armed struggle to liberate their territories in compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter
and resolutions of the United Nations’. Recently, ‘The Almaty Declaration’ signed at the end of the
‘Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia’ (CICA), held in Kazakhstan in June
2002, while condemning terrorism in all forms states in para 18, ‘We reaffirm the right of people living
under foreign occupation for self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter and International law.’
As emphasised by Dr. Shireen M. Mazari, ‘at present, there is also the imperative to understand the
centrality of the principle of self-determination to international law because given the present anti-terrorist
coalition that is building up, the moves for an international convention on terrorism are going to reach a
conclusion much sooner than would otherwise have been possible. The UN is presently studying a
number of drafts on terrorism, including the one adopted by the OIC, which has been presented on behalf
of the OIC. There is also an Indian draft, which in its present form would be invalid in terms of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties since it does not distinguish the principle of self-determination. Unless
the norm of self-determination is preserved, the fight against terrorism will become devoid of international
legality.’ 14
Taking advantage of the international campaign against terrorism, the Indian BJP government has
stepped up its two-pronged efforts to have Pakistan declared a terrorism-sponsoring state, and project the
Kashmiri struggle for self-determination in the Indian-held Kashmir as ‘terrorist’ activity. Under the
circumstances, it is important to understand the real genesis of any struggle, even military struggles,
before labelling them or the organisations involved, as terrorists. The indigenous struggle for selfdetermination
in the Indian-held Kashmir, recognised also by the UN, is a prime example, where the
oppressed people have been forced to take up arms for their right of self-determination, and as a
measure of resistance against the excesses being committed by more than 700,000 Indian armed forces
personnel, deployed all over the Indian-occupied areas, to eliminate the resistance.
Over the years, various solutions for resolving the Kashmir dispute have been suggested, in the United
Nations, and by international observers and specialists on South Asia. However, because of the
intransigence of the successive Indian governments, none of the proposed solutions could ever be
discussed or implemented. This paper aims at analysing the various proposed options and address the
important question: What could be a viable solution of the Kashmir dispute? However, before examining
these proposals, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of the dispute itself.
PART I
KASHMIR DISPUTE: KEY ASPECTS
Before we discuss the various proposed options, it is important to first understand the nature of the
dispute between India and Pakistan, which provides the backdrop to the official statements and positions
taken by both governments in the post-1947-48 period, when India first took the Kashmir case to the
United Nations. The following are the key aspects of this long-standing dispute.
1. Legacy of the Partition of the Sub-continent in 1947: The sub-continent was partitioned on the
agreed principle that contiguous Muslim majority areas were to be separated from the contiguous
non-Muslim majority areas, to form the two independent states of Pakistan and India.15 There
were about 562 Princely States, which existed under the overall paramountcy of the British
Crown. The Cabinet Mission, in its statement of May 16, 1946, clarified that ‘Paramountcy could
neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government’. 16 Also, in
Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, it was stated that ‘ the suzerainty of His Majesty
over the Indian States lapses.’ Thus, legally the Princely States became independent.17 However,
the last British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, during his address to the Chamber of Princes on July
25, 1947, asserted that ‘the rulers were technically at liberty to link with either of the dominion
(India or Pakistan)’.18 As regards the criteria to be followed, he held that ‘normally geographical
situation and communal interests and so forth will be the factors to be considered.’19 On various
occasions between June and July 1947, Quaid-e-Azam, the Governor General-designate of the
new State of Pakistan, stated, ‘The legal position is that with the lapse of Paramountcy on the
transfer of power by the British all Indian States would automatically regain their full sovereign
and independent status. They are, therefore, free to join either of the two Dominions or to remain
independent. The Muslim League recognises the right of each State to choose its destiny. It has
no intention of coercing any State into adopting any particular course of action.’20 By August 15,
1947, the majority of the Princely States, owing to their geographical contiguity and Hindu
population, joined India while only ten joined Pakistan. However, disputes over independence
arose with India in the case of three Princely States, namely Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu
and Kashmir.21
Junagadh, a maritime state in Kathiawar, with a Muslim ruler and a Hindu majority population,
decided to accede to Pakistan on August 15, 1947. By middle of September 1947 Pakistan
accepted the accession. India reacted by criticising Pakistan’s acceptance as ‘ in utter violation of
the principles on which Pakistan was agreed upon and effected.’22 On September 17, India
deployed troops around Junagadh and by November 1947 India had militarily annexed the State,
as its first expansionist act after the partition of 1947. It is to be noted that this happened when
Pakistan had no defence structure of any sort. Pakistan’s complaint, claiming Junagadh as its
territory, is still pending before the Security Council. Similarly, Hyderabad, also with a Muslim ruler
and a majority Hindu population, despite Indian pressures, decided to remain independent and in
fact executed a Standstill Agreement with India in November 1947, which India duly signed.
However, India continued to increase pressure on Hyderabad and by the middle of 1948 had
imposed an economic blockade as well as carried out border raids. During a parliamentary
debate, on July 30, 1948, the then British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill referred to a speech
by Pandit Nehru made in the last week of July, 1947, in which he had declared, ‘If and when we
consider it necessary we will start military operations against Hyderabad.’23 Commenting on this
remark, Winston Churchill said ‘It seems to me that this is the sort of thing which might have been
said by Hitler before the devouring of Austria.’24 On August 24, 1948, Hyderabad filed a complaint
before the Security Council, but before the case was heard before the Council, Hyderabad was
militarily annexed by India on September 13, 1948.
While India laid claim on the other two Princely States on the basis of them being Hindu
majority areas, as well as geographically contiguous to India, and that the partition of the subcontinent
was agreed to on these principles, it did not apply the same principle to the Jammu and
Kashmir State, which had a Muslim majority population, under a Hindu ruler who was in favour of
remaining independent. During the previous hundred years, the subjects of the Jammu and
Kashmir State had been in a state of ongoing series of revolts against the Dogra rulers. When
Partition took place, the Muslim majority population of Jammu and Kashmir was in favour of
joining Pakistan, whereas the Hindu Maharaja was reluctant, hoping that he would retain his
independence. Internally, there were already tensions due to repressive measures of the
Maharaja against the Muslims. 25 The situation further deteriorated when, towards the end of July
1947, the Maharaja ordered the Muslims to surrender their arms to the police, and communal
violence erupted. In the Jammu province, hundreds of Muslims were massacred by the Hindus
and Sikhs, who attacked Muslim villages. The massacre was one of the first attempts of ethnic
cleansing, which, in fact, had begun even before independence, with the connivance of the local
administration comprising units of the Maharaja’s Army and Police. In August 1947, on the eve of
Partition, Poonch revolted against the Maharaja’s rule and in September 1947, the Muslim
population liberated the area from the State Police.26 According to some estimates, between
August-October 1947, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir out of the Muslim population of
500,000 about 200,000 just disappeared, presumably were killed, and many Muslims from among
the rest fled to the neighbouring West Pakistan (now Pakistan).27
Another significant development of the time was that on August 12, 1947, the then Prime
Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Janak Singh, proposed a ‘Standstill Agreement’ to both India and
Pakistan. This was agreed to and signed by Pakistan on August 15, but India was reluctant and
suggested further discussions, keeping matters pending. Eventually no discussion took place
and, thus, the ‘Standstill Agreement’ was never signed by the Indian government with the
Maharaja of Kashmir even though it had signed a Standstill Agreement on November 29, 1947,
with Hyderabad, since Prime Minister Nehru had other plans to annex the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.
In October 1947, there was a revolt by the Muslim population against the Maharaja. He fled
from the capital Srinagar to Jammu on October 26, 1947, and appealed to India for help. India
claims that the Maharaja signed the ‘Instrument of Accession’ on October 26, following which the
Indian forces landed in the State supposedly on October 27, 1947. Regarding the signing of the
Instrument of Accession, its timing, terms and conditions, and the timing of the landing of Indian
troops, are all controversial. The study of historical events shows that initially the Maharaja sent
the Deputy Prime Minister, R. L. Batra, to New Delhi, on October 24, with a ‘letter of accession to
India’ which could not be signed. Mr. Batra, in New Delhi, held discussions with ‘who would listen
to him; but his mission was fruitless.’28According to British historian, Alastair Lamb, this was
‘certainly no blanket unconditional Instrument of Accession but rather a statement of the terms
upon which an association between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Dominion
might be negotiated in return for military assistance. The Indian side have been careful to avoid
specific reference to this particular document in their descriptions of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir’s plea for assistance. It is probable that it involved no more than a token diminution of
the State’s sovereignty. It certainly did not provide for an administration in the State of Jammu
and Kashmir presided over by Sheikh Abdullah.’29
Moreover, research also shows that Indian leaders were not in favour of signing the
Instrument of Accession before any military help was provided to the Maharaja. As has been
mentioned above the Maharaja was not in favour of unconditional surrender of sovereignty.
Pandit Nehru, however, was of the view that what was required was ‘not so much the formalities
of accession as some pragmatic arrangement whereby the Maharaja’s government might be
obliged to collaborate politically with Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference, bolstered in
power by Indian arms.’30 Also, during the Indian Defence Committee meeting on October 25,
1947, which discussed the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, V. P. Menon stressed, ‘it would
technically be quite proper for India to send its forces to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without
its prior accession to India, be it definitive or provisional.’31
Subsequent research has also thrown doubts on the official Indian version, which claims that
its intervention was legal, basing it on the signing of the so-called ‘Instrument of Accession’
signed by Maharaja Hari Singh. According to the British historian Alastair Lamb, the Maharaja
was forced to sign a conditional Instrument of Accession after the Indian troops had landed at
Srinagar.32 As the International Law expert Dr. Ijaz Hussain points out, article 49 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties states, ‘A treaty is invalid if its conclusion is procured by the
threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ Therefore,
the fact that the Instrument of Accession was signed under duress in the presence of Indian
troops ‘points to the use of force in obtaining consent of the Maharaja to the said Instrument. This
makes it patently defective.’33
The next significant element in that drama was the connivance of Lord Mountbatten, both as
out-going Viceroy and later as the first Governor General of India. While receiving the Instrument
of Accession regarding the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Lord Mountbatten, explicitly stated in
his acceptance letter of October 27, 1947, addressed to the Maharaja, that ‘…it is my
Government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil
cleared of the invader, the question of State’s accession should be settled by the reference to the
people.’ 34
India’s military intervention in Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947 was also accompanied by
the solemn assurances of the Indian Government to the Government of Pakistan that the final
decision would be in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. The Indian Prime
Minister in a telegram, dated October 27, 1947, to the Prime Minister of Pakistan stated: ‘I should
like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in the emergency is not designed in any
way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is
that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance
with the wishes of the people and we adhere to this view.’ In another telegram dated October 31,
1947, Prime Minister Nehru again pledged: ‘Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops
from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the
future of this State to the people of the state is not merely a promise to your Government but also
to the people of Kashmir and to the world’. Again, on November 2, 1947, in a broadcast on All-
India Radio, Prime Minister Nehru declared that the Government of India ‘was prepared when
peace and order have been established in Kashmir to have a referendum held under international
auspices like the United Nations.’35 These statements reflect the ‘conditional and provisional’
nature of the so-called accession. As has been pointed out by Dr. Ijaz Hussain it establishes that
‘the accession of Kashmir to India was not complete, final and irrevocable as contended by India.
It was no more than an ad hoc and temporary arrangement and was subject to reference to the
people for its final disposal.’36
India repeated the same commitment of deciding the question of the accession of Jammu
and Kashmir in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, when it took the issue to
the United Nations in January 1948. The Indian representative made this commitment in the UN
(discussed in section on Right of Self-determination). Although India took the issue under Chapter
VI, titled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” of the UN Charter, and not under Chapter VII, titled
“Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”, the
Indian efforts were to get Pakistan declared as an ‘aggressor’. The Indian Representative to the
UN in para 6 of the letter, dated January 1, 1948, stated: ‘The grave threat to the life and property
of innocent people in the Kashmir Valley and the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that
had developed as a result of the invasion of the Valley demanded immediate decisions by the
Government of India.’37 As Lord Birdwood, British historian, observed, ‘Illegal act of aggression by
Pakistan and a legal accession of Kashmir to India is, therefore, the basis of the Indian case.’38
Also, important to note are the arguments of the Indian spokesman, during the discussions in the
Security Council in January 1948, where he stressed, ‘We have referred to the Security Council a
simple and straightforward issue…The withdrawal and expulsion of the raiders and the invaders
from the soil of Kashmir…’39 Moreover, A. S. Annand, a Judge of High Court of Jammu and
Kashmir, in his book writes: ‘The government of India appealed to the Security Council, to ask the
Government of Pakistan: (1) to prevent government personnel, military and civil, participating in
or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State; (2) to call upon other Pakistani nationals
to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State…’40
As regards the controversy of ‘invaders’ or ‘raiders’ from Pakistan, as alleged by India,
according to research by Alastair Lamb, the Pathan tribesmen from the Pakistani side, crossed
over on the night of 21/22 October 1947 ‘at the invitation of internal elements in the political
struggle then going on in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The clearing of the way into the State
at Domel was not that of forced entry by the tribesmen but of a gate being opened, as it were, by
rebels within the State of Jammu and Kashmir.’41 Therefore, the entry of tribesmen cannot be
regarded as ‘aggression’ as termed by India.
However, when India realised that its initial attempts had failed and the United Nations, which
in clear-cut terms, also supported the right of the self-determination of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir, India started to wriggle out of its original commitments. For example, on January 20,
1948, the Security Council through Resolution 39 established a mediatory commission - the
United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) - to ‘investigate the facts pursuant to
Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations,’42 When India saw that its effort to get Pakistan
declared as an ‘aggressor’ was not endorsed by the UN, in the Security Council discussions, it
then adopted differing attitudes on various occasions. As observed by the British scholar, Rosalyn
Higgins, ‘Pakistan clearly felt that no impartial plebiscite could take place under Sheikh Abdullah’s
government; whereas, India, while conceding the possibility of a National Assembly being
elected, clearly thought it should be done while Abdullah was still leader. This in turn led to
disagreement on the UN’s role, Pakistan wishing it to have temporary administrative authority,
and India believing it should have an advising and observing capacity. Above all India regarded
accession as complete, and resented the view of many Security Council members that Lord
Mountbatten’s letter regarding accession was an integral part of the terms of accession.’43 It may
be recalled that Lord Mountbatten in his letter to the Maharaja, dated October 27, 1947, explicitly
stated that finally ‘the question of the State’s accession should be settled by the reference to the
People.’44
Simultaneously, India also started taking steps to gradually change the status of Jammu and
Kashmir, by tightening its illegal, unconstitutional control over the State with the ultimate aim of
unilaterally absorbing it within the Indian Union. In January 1950, India accorded a ‘special status’
to the State through Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Under the said Article three subjects,
namely defence, external affairs and communications only were to be dealt by the Indian
Parliament. Article 370 also limited the powers of the Indian Parliament to make laws regarding
subjects mentioned in the Union List and the Concurrent List of the Constitution. According to the
Kashmiri scholar, Prem Nath Bazaz, ‘while remaining within the framework of the Indian
Constitution, the Kashmir State virtually attained an autonomous status not enjoyed by any other
state of the Republic of India.’45 As commented by Prem Nath Bazaz, Article 370 of the
Constitution was ‘specifically meant to be a temporary provision as the Constitution-makers were
fully confident that the close association of the people of Kashmir with free democratic India
would convince them of their bright future by becoming an integral part of the Republic.’46
While this status accorded to Jammu and Kashmir went so far as to allow the Jammu and
Kashmir State, unlike any other Indian State, to have its own flag, constitutional structure and
government as well as judiciary, in June 1949, India exiled the Maharaja, and installed his son,
Karan Singh, temporarily as his Regent. The Indian government also put the National
Conference, under Sheikh Abdullah, in charge of running the administration of the State, with the
hope of using the National Conference as the rubber stamp for its other designs to absorb the
State.
In October 1950, the National Conference, with the Indian Government’s backing, tried to
convene its own Constituent Assembly to determine the future of the State. At Pakistan’s request,
the UN Security Council discussed the efforts to convene the Constituent Assembly and in its
Resolution 91 of March 30, 1951, stated: ‘the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method
of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations’. 47 Sir B. N.
Rau, the Indian representative, assured the Security Council that the Constituent Assembly of
Kashmir was not intended ‘to prejudice the issues before the Security Council.’48 The Kashmir
Constituent Assembly met on November 5, 1951. The Indian government’s interest in the
Constituent Assembly of Kashmir was to obtain a ratification of the accession to the Indian Union,
whereas Sheikh Abdullah intended to retain the special autonomous status of Jammu and
Kashmir State within the Indian Union.49 In July 1952, Abdullah and Nehru reached an
agreement, the ‘Delhi Agreement’, whereby the special status of Kashmir under Article 370 could
not be changed without the approval of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. The Hindus in Indianheld
Kashmir and India agitated for a complete integration of Kashmir in India. In August 1952,
anti-Abdullah demonstrations were held in the State. Sheikh Abdullah adopted a tough policy
against these demonstrations and ordered arrests of the Hindu protestors. The Indian
government, showing its displeasure, dismissed Abdullah as Prime Minister on August 9, 1953,
and imprisoned him, replacing him by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. British historian Alastair Lamb
notes, ‘With Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed in power, the state of Jammu and Kashmir drifted
steadily into the Indian orbit. …In February 1954 the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, while
adhering in principle to the special position of the State, confirmed (in language that would surely
never have been used if Sheikh Abdullah had still been presiding) the legality of its accession to
India.’50
In 1954, the president of India promulgated a Constitutional Order, with reference to Indianheld
Kashmir, empowering the Indian government ‘to legislate on all matters on the Union List,
not just defence, foreign affairs and communications.’51 Finally, in November 1956, the
Constituent Assembly of Indian-held Kashmir finalised the Constitution of the State. The UN
Security Council in its Resolution 122 of January 24, 1957, reaffirmed that the ‘final disposition of
the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people
expressed through the democratic means under the auspices of the United Nations’ and declared
that ‘the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the “All
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference” and any action that Assembly may have taken or
might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliating of entire state or any part
thereof, or action by the parties concerned in support of any such action by the Assembly, would
not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle.’52 Thus, India was
not able to get UN approval for its constitutional dabbling to incorporate the State in the Indian
Union. However, the Constitution came into operation on January 26, 1957. It provided that the
‘State is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.’53
Moreover, Sheikh Abdullah, then in prison, protested against the decision of the Constituent
Assembly. There was a split in the National Conference and the breakaway faction, which was
pro-Abdullah, known as the Plebiscite Front, was founded by Mirza Afzal Beg. The Front
advocated plebiscite under the UN supervision. When Sheikh Abdullah was released in January
1958, he supported the Plebiscite Front and vehemently criticised the decision of the
Constituently Assembly. As a result Abdullah was again imprisoned in April 1958. Meanwhile, in
1958 the Indian government, as part of its designs to integrate the State, through another
constitutional amendment brought the Indian-Occupied Kashmir under the purview of the central
administrative services. According to an Indian scholar, Sumantra Bose, ‘any trace of substantive
autonomy had been systematically eradicated from Kashmir by the mid-1960s, and without even
the pretence of a reference to the wishes of its people.’54
As a third step to illegally incorporate the State into the Indian Union, and also to undermine
the special status of the State accorded under Article 370, after the Constituent Assembly started
its meetings, the Indian central government managed to hold elections for a State Assembly and
the Lok Sabha in Indian Occupied Kashmir in 1951. After the 1967 elections, the central
government invited Karan Singh, then Sadar-i-Riyasat, to join the cabinet as Minister for Tourism.
He immediately resigned as Sadar-i-Riyasat and the central government appointed an acting
Governor to the State. Thus, the central government was able to abolish the office of Sadar-i-
Riyasat and in its place establish the office of Governor, which appeared, at least on the surface,
to bring it into line with the structure of the rest of the Indian States. Later, frequent impositions of
Governor and President’s Rule (1990-96) have practically eroded the principle of full autonomy
supposedly accorded through Article 370, by allowing greater central interventions.
2. Right of Self-determination: The Kashmir Dispute, as recorded in the UN documents, involves
the principle of the right of self-determination, which was basic both to the principle of Partition
and the Charter of the United Nations. According to the 1970 Declaration of the UN General
Assembly, the term ‘self-determination’ means ‘ the right of all peoples to freely determine their
political status.’55 The Kashmir dispute basically involves three parties. Pakistan and India, as the
two main parties according to the UN resolutions. The third are the Kashmiris, whose right of selfdetermination
has been recognised in UN resolutions. Pakistan and India, on their own cannot
decide the future of the Kashmiris. The commitment to enable the Kashmiris to decide about their
future was not only made by India when it accepted the conditional so-called ‘Instrument of
Accession’, but was also explicitly admitted in India’s complaint before the UN Security Council in
January 1948. The Indian Representative, in his letter to the President of the Security Council,
regarding the status of the State clarified that finally ‘its people would be free to decide their future
by the recognised democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum which, in order to ensure
complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.’56 Furthermore, the UN Security
Council discussions led to the resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, which clearly
laid down that ‘the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or
Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.’
These UN resolutions are still valid, even though India has made many efforts to declare them
‘dead’, particularly after the signing of the Simla Agreement on July 3, 1972. The Indian argument
is based on Article (ii) of the agreement, which states: ‘that the two countries are resolved to
settle differences by peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.’ However, it may be
noted that the said Article in no way implies that either party has agreed to give up the UN option.
In fact it follows Article (i) of the Simla agreement, which asserts the relevance of the UN
principles when it states: ‘that the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations
shall govern the relations between the two countries.’ Moreover, this Indian claim has been
refuted by various UN representatives who, on several occasions, have clarified that, only a
bilateral agreement, which solves the problem, would legally supersede the numerous existing
UN resolutions on that dispute. Also, in the absence of any fundamental change in the
circumstances, the UN resolutions can become invalid only when the UN Security Council
declares them null and viod.57 For example in 1956, the then UN Secretary General, Dag
Hammarskjold, had clearly stated that ‘the UN decision is valid until it has been invalidated by the
organ which took it.’58 In April 1990, the UN Representative, Francis Guiliani, clarified: ‘a bilateral
agreement, which solved the problem, would supersede the resolution aimed at solving the issue.
However, as long as the problem remained, the resolutions would remain in effect regardless of
when they were adopted.’59 Thus, the manipulated elections to the Jammu and Kashmir State
Assembly, often cited by India as the expression of the will of the people of Kashmir, cannot
replace the international consensus which endorses impartial plebiscite under the UN auspices,
as the means for ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiris regarding the future status of the State.
The Indian government again tried to use the election card to establish its legitimacy in
Occupied Kashmir by holding farcical elections in September/ October 2002. Commenting on the
Indian government’s move to hold elections, the Chairman of All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC), Abdul Ghani Bhat said, ‘Elections provide no answers to the question of the people,
which is that the future of Kashmir is yet to be determined. Elections did not provide anything in
the past and cannot in the future either.’ Ruling out participation in the scheduled elections Mr.
Bhat had said that elections should be held not for forming government but ‘to determine the
future of Kashmir in keeping with the wishes of the people.’60 APHC has been stressing on
holding trilateral talks, involving India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris, for resolving the Kashmir
dispute.
When in August 2002, India announced a four-phase schedule for the elections to the
Occupied Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, as part of its efforts to convince the APHC and other
Kashmiri parties to participate in the elections, the BJP government nominated the Kashmir
Committee, headed by the former Law Minister, Ram Jethmalani to hold talks. The Indian
Kashmir Committee held two rounds of talks with Mr. Shabir Shah, leader of the Jammu and
Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party and the APHC delegation. APHC and Mr. Shah, however,
rejected participation in the Scheduled Assembly polls. Here, it may be noted that the Indian
Kashmir Committee on September 8, in a joint statement at the end of the second round of talks,
supported the Hurriyat Conference’s demand to visit Pakistan for holding talks with Kashmiri
leaders and the Pakistan government for finding a solution to the Kashmir imbroglio. However, on
September 9, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, denied that there was any proposal
to allow the Ram Jethmalani-led Kashmir Committee to visit Pakistan to hold talks with the
Hurriyat leaders there. This shows that the BJP government started the internal dialogue process
as a face-saving measure, to project to the international community that a dialogue process has
begun and thus to avoid the international pressure for resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan.
Now, after elections a coalition government, by Congress, People’s Democratic Party and
Panthers Party, has been formed. It is obvious that this cannot be regarded as a true
representative government of the Kashmiris, as none of the major Kashmiri political parties
participated in the elections.
More currently, implementation of UN resolutions in the case of East Timor is an important
precedent. In the case of East Timor, the UNSC resolutions, No. 384 and 389, passed in 1975
and in 1976 respectively, recognised the ‘inalienable right of the people of East Timor to selfdetermination
and independence in accordance with the principle of the charter of the UN’, and
called upon Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the territory and the government of Portugal to
cooperate fully with the UN in implementing the resolutions. Indonesia and Portugal, finally,
agreed on May 5, 1999 to allow the UN to conduct a referendum for greater autonomy within
Indonesia or independence. If the UN was able to finally fulfil its commitment in case of East
Timor, after twenty-three years, then why not in the case of Kashmir?
3. An Internationally Recognised Dispute: The Kashmir dispute, though it appears to be
predominantly a bilateral one between India and Pakistan, as is stressed by India, directly
involves the international community. India itself took the dispute to the UN Security Council in
1948, where it is still registered as such and thus remains a pending agenda till it is resolved.
India presently takes the line that the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972, between India and
Pakistan, has made the earlier UN Resolutions redundant and that the issue has to be dealt with
bilaterally. The Indian argument that the Simla Agreement supports bilateralism is its
interpretation of Article (ii) of the agreement, which states: ‘That the two countries are resolved to
settle differences by peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.’61 The factual position
is that Pakistan has repeatedly stressed the need to begin the process of talks under the UN
resolutions. The said Article in no way implies that either party has agreed to give up the UN
option, in fact it follows Article (i) of the same agreement which asserts the relevance of the UN
principles when it states: ‘That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations
shall govern the relations between the two countries.’62
As far as the legal position of the UN resolutions is concerned regarding unresolved conflicts,
Article 103 of the UN Charter explicitly states: ‘ In the event of a conflict between the obligations
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’ Thus,
under its own provisions, the UN itself has a legal obligation to play the role of a ‘moderator’ or
‘facilitator’ in efforts for the resolution of outstanding disputes on its agenda.
4. An Indigenous Freedom Struggle: The Indian Government’s attempts to describe the mass
Kashmiri resistance movement in areas under its control, as terrorist activity being waged by
‘infiltrators’, is an attempt to nullify the indigenous nature of the freedom struggle in Jammu and
Kashmir. India blames Pakistan for fanning the movement. The fact of the matter is that the
struggle for the right of self-determination in the Indian-held Kashmir has been going on since
1947. Despite India’s harsh and repressive measures, the movement could not be suppressed. It
began as a political struggle, but faced with continuous setbacks and the Indian policy of
backtracking on promises made, transformed the movement into an armed struggle. An Indian
scholar, Sumit Ganguly, wrote, ’after years of frustrated attempts at meaningful political
participation, and in the absence of institutional means of expressing dissent, the resort to more
violent means become all but inevitable.’63 Lt. Gen. V.K. Nayar, a former Indian Army commander,
stated that the root cause of the Kashmir situation was ‘political ineptness, due to which
Kashmiris felt isolated both from the national mainstream and within the state itself.’64 According
to Sumantra Bose, an Indian scholar, ’Kashmiris rose in rebellion not because Muslims are
constitutionally incapable of loyalty to a “secular” state, but because they saw no hope of
redressal within the Indian state’s institutional framework to the gross, consistent and systematic
pattern of abuse of their rights as citizens and as human beings. The brutal and
disproportionately violent response to which their (initially largely non-violent) protests were
sought to be suppressed, especially in early 1990, steeled their resolve to seek “selfdetermination”,
through force if necessary, and it was thus that the gun became a legitimate
political weapon in a society where the “sight of blood” (as Walter Lawrence observed at the turn
of the century) was once anathema.’65
Pakistan being a legitimate party to the dispute, by virtue of the Partition Plan and the UN
resolutions, has the right to support the cause of the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris.
As argued by Dr. Ijaz Hussain, an expert on international law, ‘Pakistan’s locus standi in the
Kashmir dispute is also established by the fact that on 22 January 1948 the Security Council
decided to change the item on its agenda from the “Jammu and Kashmir Question” to the “India-
Pakistan Question.”66 The very fact that the freedom movement in Kashmir has been going on
since 1947, and gained momentum since 1989, itself establishes the undying indigenous nature
of the movement. No outside influence can sustain a movement for such a long period in this
manner, in which in the last decade alone, (since 1989), the Kashmiris have sacrificed more than
80,000 lives. To divert world attention from the real situation, India has, since long time, been
trying to portray the indigenous struggle as being waged by ‘religious fanatics’ or ‘Muslim
terrorists.’ The Kashmiri leaders themselves have belied the Indian propaganda. While attending
the 53rd Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, the then Secretary General
of All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Ghulam Mohammad Safi said: ‘first and foremost, it is a
movement for a realisation of the right to self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir
in accordance with international law.’67
PART II
PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION
OF THE DISPUTE
Over the past fifty years, besides the UN resolutions, observers and intellectuals have proposed
various other options for resolving the Kashmir dispute time and again at the UN fora and at the bilateral
India-Pakistan levels. These proposals are examined below.
I. UN Resolutions: The Plebiscite Option
The UN Security Council resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, proposed the plebiscite
option for resolving the Kashmir dispute. However, it is important to note that the Government of India
itself accepted plebiscite or referendum as a right of the Kashmiri people, when it filed the initial complaint
against Pakistan before the United Nations on January 1, 1948, as pointed out in Part I of this paper.
Beginning with Governor General Mountbatten, Indian leaders like Prime Minister Nehru also repeatedly
made the commitment to ‘the will of the Kashmiri people’ as has been discussed in detail earlier in Part I.
After India filed its initial complaint, the UN Security Council passed the two important resolutions of
August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. (See Appendix I and II) These resolutions laid down the principles
and procedures for a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices. Broadly, the resolution of January
5, 1949, stated: ‘(a) the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India and
Pakistan, would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite after the
cease-fire and truce agreement provided for in the Resolution of August 13 had been carried out; (b) the
Secretary General of the UN would nominate a Plebiscite Administrator, who would be appointed by the
government of Jammu and Kashmir and given powers which he considers necessary for holding a free
and impartial plebiscite; (c) on implementation of the ceasefire and the truce agreement, the Commission
and the Plebiscite Administrator would determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final
disposal of Indian and State Armed Forces, as well as the Forces in Azad Kashmir (in consultation with
the local authorities); (d) persons who had entered the State since August 15, 1947 would be required to
leave the State, and citizens of the State who had left the State on account of disturbances would be
allowed to return.’68
Both India and Pakistan accepted the above UN Resolutions. However, later, differences arose over
the interpretation of various clauses of the resolutions, especially on the issues of demilitarisation and
disbandment/disarming of the ‘Azad Kashmir’ forces. India gave its own interpretation to the agreement
and suggested that the Azad Kashmir forces be disbanded and the defence and administrative
responsibility of the region be given to India and Indian Kashmiri authorities.69 Pakistan, on the other
hand, was in favour of a complete and simultaneous withdrawal of armed forces personnel by both the
countries.70 On this issue, the President of the Security Council, General McNaughton, in his proposal of
December 22, 1949, in para 2, clarified that the Resolutions of 1948 and 1949 called for demilitarisation of
the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir and not merely Azad Kashmir: that ‘demilitarisation should
include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the
withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of
local law and order.’71 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 80 on March 14, 1950, which called
upon the Governments of India and Pakistan ‘to prepare and execute within a period of five months from
the date of this resolution a programme of demilitarisation on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of
General McNaughton’s proposal, or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed.’
Pakistan accepted that Resolution as well, but India maintained its position as regards the demilitarisation
issue. Later, the UN Representatives continued discussions with the Governments of India and Pakistan
over various proposals.
Based on these discussions, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 98, in December 1952. (See
Appendix III) The UNSC Resolution, regarding demilitarisation issue clarified that: (Article 4) ‘the
Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United
Nations representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement on the specific number of
forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation, this number
to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and
between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the India side of the cease-fire line.’ Though
during the discussions Pakistan’s representative to the UN, Mr. Zafrulla Khan, pointed out that the number
of forces proposed was not fair, yet he said that Pakistan ‘is prepared to go forward on the basis of this
resolution.’72 The Indian representative, Mrs. Pandit, in her speech, however, categorically said, ‘I should
like to repeat that we reject the proposal in it and we are not prepared to enter into any talks on the basis
suggested.’73
Regarding the question of plebiscite, Pakistan was in favour of giving complete authority to the UN for
holding, organising and supervising the plebiscite. India, on the other hand, only wanted the non-binding
advice of the UN. Various UN mediators were appointed to resolve this issue, but no one was successful
in convincing India on a compromise. Sir Owen Dixon, the UN mediator, in his report submitted in 1950,
wrote: ‘In the end I became convinced that India’s agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation
in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of plebiscite of any such character, as would in my
opinion, permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation
and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be
imperilled.’74 Dr. Frank P. Graham, appointed UN representative for India and Pakistan in 1951, submitted
five reports, up to March 1953, but his efforts at mediation also proved to be unsuccessful as India would
not agree on the size of the forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line after demilitarisation.
India, therefore, consistently refused to take recourse to all proposals of various statesmen and UN
representatives for the holding of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, it is on record
that Pakistan supported all such international mediation and UN efforts.75
Defending the Indian position on plebiscite, Sisir Gupta, an Indian scholar, wrote: ‘it became obvious
even at the early stages of the Kashmir dispute that a plebiscite - an “ideal” solution according to some –
because of the complexities in Kashmir was difficult to accomplish. Even as a democratic solution, it had
loopholes. Kashmir, clearly, is not composed of one people: in religion, it has three major groups; in
language, four. If there is a section which wants to secede from India, there are others who do not.’76
However, the fact of the matter is that, right from the beginning, India feared that if a plebiscite was held it
would lose what it had already occupied. According to a Kashmiri activist, Prof. Mrs. Shamim Shawl,
‘plebiscite is the most plausible solution of the problem. This has been accepted in the Resolutions of
August 48 and January 1949. It is these resolutions, which confirm the disputed character of the problem
and negate the Indian position that says Kashmir is an irrevocable part of India. India is in fact challenging
the rightful and legal authenticity of the United Nations by delaying the implementation of UN
resolutions.’77
Keeping in view the basic genesis and nature of the dispute, the option incorporated in the then UN
resolutions is still valid. The UN resolutions are not time-barred, as observed in 1956, by the UN
Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, who clarified the important principle that ‘the UN decision is valid
until it has been invalidated by the organ which took it.’78
II. The UN Trusteeship Option
Generally, this option proposes that Kashmir should be placed under UN Trusteeship and then
plebiscite may be held for the final resolution of the dispute. It is argued that this will provide a face-saving
for India, and will also give Kashmiris, on both sides of the Line of Control, enough time to come up with a
joint option. The JKLF Chairman, Ammanullah Khan in December 1993, proposed: (1) complete,
simultaneous withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops and civil administration, non-Kashmiri personnel
from Jammu and Kashmir; (2) the reunification of Indian and Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir; (3)
placement of the State under UN control for five to ten years; and (4) holding of a plebiscite.79 Well-known
Pakistani economist, the late Dr. Mahbubul Haq, in an interview he gave to an Urdu Weekly Hurmat, in
1994, proposed that only the Kashmir Valley be placed under UN Trusteeship for ten years and then
plebiscite be held in the Kashmir Valley.80
As India regards Occupied Kashmir as its integral part, it is obvious that it will never voluntarily agree
to the placing of the State, or the Kashmir Valley under UN trusteeship. Secondly, both the above
trusteeship options support the plebiscite option under the UN auspices, an option that has been rejected
by India even though in the early years of the dispute India committed itself to holding of the plebiscite.
As regards Pakistan and the Kashmiris, since the above proposals support a UN role and the option
of plebiscite, in view of the already existing UN resolutions which provide the plebiscite option under UN
auspices, the above proposal would mean unnecessarily prolonging the solution beyond five or ten years.
Moreover, according to Article 76 of Chapter XII of the UN Charter one of the basic objectives of the
trusteeship system is ‘to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or
independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples…’
The case of Jammu and Kashmir does not require placement under UN trusteeship as the Kashmiris
have, over the years, demonstrated their political will by waging an indigenous movement in Occupied
Kashmir for their right of self-determination, underscoring the fact that their preferred option is selfdetermination.
III. The Partition Option
Regarding the option of the partition of Jammu and Kashmir, this has largely been an academic
debate and various scholars have suggested different proposals. The first is a division-related option for
Jammu and Kashmir, based on the holding of regional plebiscites. This proposal was first given by UN
Representative, Sir Owen Dixon, in his report of 1950-51. Called the ‘Dixon Report’, it proposed the idea
of holding regional plebiscites, instead of a general plebiscite as proposed in the UN resolutions.81 The
Owen Dixon Plan proposed the division of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into four main regions:
Jammu, Ladakh, the Vale of Kashmir including Muzaffarabad, and Gilgit-Baltistan. According to his plan
the district of Poonch was to remain with Pakistan. He proposed that of the four regions, Jammu and
Ladakh should go uncontested to India and the Northern Areas to Pakistan. He concluded that in the
Valley a plebiscite might be held to decide about its future. Pakistan, did not outrightly reject the proposal,
but was in favour of a general plebiscite in the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. India on the other hand
regarded Jammu and Kashmir as a unit of the Indian Federation and thus was not in favour of any
regional plebiscite.82
The second partition proposal is an option based on a ‘Trieste-type’ solution. The Trieste issue,
between Italy and Yugoslavia, arose as a result of the two World Wars. After World War I, Trieste and the
adjoining areas, including the whole valley of the Adige river and Istria, went to Italy, but in 1945 it was
claimed by Yugoslavia on the grounds that Italy was guilty of aggression against Yugoslavia. However,
Trieste and its environs and the Gorzia region to the northwest (Zone A) remained under Anglo-American
control and the southern portion (Zone B) was under the control of the Yugoslav troops. Finally, in 1954,
Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to a partition and Zone A (including Trieste) was given to Italy and Zone B to
Yugoslavia. Italy agreed to maintain a free port at Trieste. Later, the agreement was given a de jure status
by the 1975 Treaty of Osimo between Italy and Yugoslavia.
The ‘Trieste’-type option for Jammu and Kashmir proposes that the Valley along with some adjoining
parts of Jammu and the Pakistani side of Kashmir (Azad Kashmir), be made an autonomous units, under
India and Pakistan, respectively. The LoC would be a soft border between the two autonomous units. The
remaining areas on both sides of the LoC may be merged with India and Pakistan, respectively. India and
Pakistan would be required to withdraw their forces under UN supervision.83 Again, this proposal lacks
viability, as it does not address either the genesis of the dispute, nor the complexities that have
accumulated since then to date. The struggle in Jammu and Kashmir is not for autonomy of any one
region but for the right of self-determination to be expressed by the Kashmiris, as granted to them under
UN resolutions. Also, India and Pakistan being parties to the dispute will continue to have a clash of
interests in the proposed autonomous regions; therefore, this would certainly not result in any stability in
the region. Moreover, the option implies that the existing Line of Control (LoC) may serve as the line of
division. The LoC remains the UN-recognised ceasefire line (CFL) and was not drawn with any basis for
serving as a permanent border, but with the intention of bringing about cessation of military hostilities.
The third partition proposal considers the conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into an international
border. This means maintenance of the prevailing status quo. This option is in principle supported by
India. If it were accepted, India would take additional advantage by then propagating that it had conceded
Indian territory to Pakistan and would try to emerge as a peacemaker in the region. As assessed by
Robert Wirsing, ‘by asserting the primacy of actual military control over punitive legal entitlement, it tacitly
acknowledges India’s dominant political standing in the region. By requiring Pakistan to relinquish its
claim of the coveted Valley of Kashmir and the Kashmiri separatists their claim of independence, while at
the same time entailing little or no detachment from India of territories now in its possession, it leaves
existing political and economic arrangements essentially undisturbed. Thus, of the several conceivable
forms of partition, it is clearly among the most generous to India.’84
However, the ‘the LoC as a border’ option has to take into account the fact that the LoC is merely a
ceasefire line, as well as take stock of the struggle for the right of self-determination that is going on in the
Indian-held Kashmir. Moreover, Kashmiris do not recognise the LoC. Prof. Mrs. Shamim Shawl, a
Kashmiri scholar from Srinagar, has argued that ‘the proposal of division is in contravention of the basic
principle that Jammu and Kashmir is an indivisible entity. It also violates the fundamental fact that the
Kashmir problem is basically the problem of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It is not a bilateral
problem between India and Pakistan. Nor is it a territorial dispute.’85 Secondly, the present LoC is an
altered ceasefire line, whereby India acquired territory through military aggression in 1971. Therefore,
accepting LoC would mean legitimising Indian military aggression. Thirdly, the LoC as accepted by both
Pakistan and India at Simla in 1972 does not exist anymore. Indian incursion into Siachen in 1984 has
destroyed the sanctity of the ceasefire line.
Fourthly, some Western scholars have proposed the partition of Kashmir along ethnic/cultural,
religious, and linguistic lines. For example the Kashmir Study Group, a US-based group comprising
academics and diplomats from various countries as members, 86 has made various proposals along these
lines in its report entitled, Kashmir: A Way Forward (September 1999). The proposals suggested are as
follows:
(a) Two hypothetical sovereign entities, self-governing in all aspects, established on both sides
of the Line of Control on cultural and linguistic grounds. According to the study, ‘On the
Indian side of the LOC every tahsil in Kashmir proper and in Doda district in Jammu, and
Gool Gulab Ghar tahsil in Udhampur district in Jammu would seek incorporation in the
proposed state. All these areas are imbued with “Kashmiriyat” or interact with Kashmiri
speaking people. On the Pakistani side it is conceivable that the whole of Azad Kashmir
would opt to have a sovereign status. This is predominantly Punjabi-speaking, wholly
Muslim area’;
(b) A new sovereign state on the Indian side of LoC with no territorial exchange between India
and Pakistan. The state would include ‘within its maximum potential area the whole of
Kashmir proper as well as adjoining areas in which Kashmiri is either the majority language
or that of a plurality of the population’;
(c) Desirable territorial changes along and beyond the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.
Viewing that ‘LoC is dysfunctional and has been violated innumerable times’, it proposes
that a new state be created with territorial exchanges between India and Pakistan.
However, it proposes that Pakistan gives almost twice as much area (7,366 sq. km) to
India, than India ceding territory (4,501 sq. km) to Pakistan. The rationale given for such an
exchange is ‘ overall, the territorial adjustments should not be excessively disruptive of the
established order and yet should appear significant and be of such a nature as to allow all
parties to claim a victory.’87
The above proposals are again not viable solutions, as they tend to complicate the situation in
Jammu and Kashmir and result in a further division of the region, rather than leading to a stable solution.
Moreover, the ‘Kashmir Study Group’s’ proposals make no provision for the right of self-determination of
the people of Kashmir to which presently a military struggle is underway by the Kashmiris in Indianoccupied
Kashmir.
IV. The Independence Option
An option gradually evolved as a result of the impasse on the Kashmir issue is that of independence,
generally known as the ‘Third Option’. Under this option, the pre-Partition status of the Jammu and
Kashmir State is to be restored and an independent state established. The proposal is mainly advocated
by the JKLF. Its Chairman, Amanullah Khan, in one of his articles says, ‘the future independent Kashmir is
to be neutral, like Switzerland, with friendly and trade relations with all its neighbours.’ According to
Amanullah Khan’s proposal, ‘Independent Kashmir is to consist of five federating units: Kashmir Valley,
Jammu province, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, each enjoying considerable internal
autonomy, having its own elected provincial government. At the centre there will be a bicameral
parliament.’ He further says, ‘the re-unification and independence of the state can be brought about
without making any drastic changes in the existing socio-economic, political and administrative structures
of any of the present three units i.e. Indian occupied areas, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.’88
According to Indian scholars ‘independence, either for part or all of J&K, is equally unrealistic. They
maintain that although an artificial product of war, the Line of Control does follow a rough and ready
ethno-cultural divide in some measure. Further, “self-determination” within the two parts of J&K could
result in the Balkanisation of a mosaic put together by history, with every new ‘self-determined’ minority
being assailed for a newly-created majoritarianism, which lesser minorities refuse to accept. Such an
unravelling would be a recipe for strife, insecurity, and destabilisation of the region.’89
The option for an independent Jammu and Kashmir state does not seem to be a viable solution, as
the State would be land-locked and, therefore, permanently dependent on its neighbours. For India the
proposition would be unacceptable because it could lead to a similar unravelling in other areas where
separatist movements are going on in India.
As regards Pakistan, the ‘third option’ can be advantageous. An independent Jammu and Kashmir
state would have a preference for good relations with a neighbour that has consistently extended its
support to the principles of self-determination. Pakistan’s position on the ‘third option’ has been that it
should not confound the existent problems further, and, therefore, it stresses the need to address the
issue in the light of the Security Council Resolutions, as a first step in the resolution of the dispute.
V. The Irish Model
Recently, various scholars have suggested the Irish model, based on the ‘Good Friday Agreement’
signed in April 1998 between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of Ireland, as a possible option for resolving the Kashmir dispute between
India and Pakistan.
The main features of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’90 are: (a) it recognises the consent principle: that
change in the status of Northern Ireland can only come about with the consent of the majority of its
people. It acknowledges that while a substantial minority in the North and a majority on the island want a
united Ireland, the majority in the North currently wishes to maintain the Union. However, it says that if
that situation changes, there is a binding obligation on both governments to give effect to whatever wish
the people of the North express; (b) it recognises ‘the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland’ to
identify themselves and be accepted as Irish, British or both; (c) it proposes concrete legislative and
constitutional changes; such as, the Government of Ireland Act , claiming British jurisdiction over all of
Ireland is to be replaced, future polls in the North on its status are to be held on the order of the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland. Such polls must be at least seven years apart; (d) it proposes a 108-
member Assembly elected by proportional representation; (e) it establishes a North-South Ministerial
Council under legislation at Westminister and the Oireachtas, to bring together ministers from the North
and the Republic; (f) it establishes a British-Irish Council consisting of representatives of the British and
Irish Governments, devolved in situations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, the Isle of Man and
the Channel Islands; (g) it establishes a new British-Irish Conference; (h) reaffirms commitment to the
total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations, and confirms intention to work constructively with the
Independent Commission on Decommissioning; and, (i) establishes an independent commission to make
recommendations for future policing arrangements in the North.91
Based on the Irish model, some Indian scholars have made suggestions supporting autonomy for
various regions of Jammu and Kashmir. For example, Amit A. Pandya, an Indian scholar, has proposed
the following steps: (1) An India-Pakistan commission to discuss boundary issues in Jammu and Kashmir,
and to engage in joint monitoring of the LOC; (2) Phased demilitarisation at the LOC, contingent first on
substantial cessation of ‘cross-border’ terrorism; (3) Three-way (Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri) commission
on internal law and order. Kashmiris to be chosen from Pakistan-occupied Azad Kashmir and all Indianoccupied
segments—Valley, Jammu and Ladakh. (4) Indian and Pakistani commitments to proceed with a
scheme of local government reform and strengthening of local institutions and local autonomy in
respective areas of Kashmir. (5) Issue-specific consultative bodies (water, power, tourism, finance)
comprising such local units, and Indian Jammu & Kashmir State and Azad Kashmir governments.
(6) Regularly scheduled and publicity-free consultative mechanism for Indian government’s talks with all
parties, and with non-party civil society institutions, within Indian Kashmir on political issues.
(7) Corresponding mechanism for Azad Kashmir. (8) Consultative mechanism for talks among all parties
on ethnic and religious minority protections. (9) Consultative mechanism for dialogue between these
processes on the Indian and Pakistani side of the LOC. (10) Indian commitment to allow free access,
consistent with security requirements, to independent and credible Indian human rights monitoring
organizations, and to Indian, and Pakistani press. Corresponding commitment by Pakistan for Azad
Kashmir. 92
Another Indian scholar, Professor Sumantra Bose, basing his suggestions on the Irish model
proposes three dimensions. Dimension one: the New Delhi-Islamabad axis, involving the ‘establishment
of a permanent India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference to promote the harmonious and mutually
beneficial development of the totality of relationships between the two countries.’ As suggested by
Professor Bose, this body is to be chaired by the respective prime ministers, and its twice-yearly meetings
to be rotated between Indian and Pakistani cities. Dimension two: the New Delhi-Srinagar and Islamabad-
Muzaffarabad axis, here the ‘objective in Kashmir would be the gradual, incremental normalisation of
politics within Kashmir in both Indian-and Pakistani-controlled zones, and the devising and
implementation of political frameworks which can foster a working degree of internal accommodation and
cooperation between the representatives of communities holding radically different basic political
allegiances.’ Dimension three: the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad axis, proposes ‘along with the progressive
normalisation of the overall framework of India-Pakistan relations and the gradual normalisation of life and
politics in both sides of the Kashmir border’, that there is greater need to make the border porous. He
further suggests ‘the establishment of a cross-border Jammu and Kashmir Council for Cooperation, with
representatives from inclusive, elected and autonomous governments from both sides of the line of
control.’93
These Indian proposals, selectively use the Irish model, but basically support autonomy for the
regions of Jammu and Kashmir under the supervision of India and Pakistan. The central aspects focusing
on self-determination and total disarmament after implementation of the agreement are ignored. The
Indian proposals are similar to the idea of a condominium with dominant Indian influence. Also, the LoC
has been proposed as the dividing line and a soft border. This is against the genesis of the Kashmir
dispute, which is not for greater autonomy or ‘self-government’, as proposed, but for the right of selfdetermination
to be expressed by the Kashmiris. However, as Dr. Mazari has suggested, 94 it is the central
aspects of the Irish model, which are relevant in case of the Kashmir dispute and could be used as
guiding principles for a resolution of the conflict. For instance the underlying principle is recognition of the
right of the people as of Northern Ireland to choose their political future through a referendum. Also, the
principle of deweaponisation is linked to it, as following the implementation of the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
The Kashmir dispute basically involves three parties, namely, India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris.
Pakistan and India are the two main parties according to the UN resolutions. The third party is the
Kashmiris whose right of self-determination has been recognised in UN resolutions. Therefore, Pakistan
and India, on their own, cannot decide the future of the Kashmiris, by excluding them from any such
process.
It is now evident that for solving the Kashmir dispute in any durable manner, a viable solution would
have to include as a sine qua non the full support of the Kashmiri people. The Indian policy of imposing a
solution, based on autonomy, within the Indian Union will not be successful. This became clearly evident
from the outcome of the two rounds of talks, in August/September 2002, held by the Indian Kashmir
Committee headed by Mr. Jethmalani, with the APHC delegation and Mr. Shabir Shah, leader of the
Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party. The Committee conducted consultations to persuade
APHC and Mr. Shah to participate in the September 2002 elections in the Occupied State. APHC and Mr.
Shah, however, rejected participation in the Assembly polls in Occupied Kashmir being held in
September-October 2002.
Now the elections have been held in the Occupied State. Wile the Indian Election Commission
claimed the process was fair and had a voter turnout of 44 per cent during the four phases of the
elections, independent estimates put the voter turnout at 10-12 percent. Also according to reports in the
Indian media, a strong anti-incumbency wave against the National Conference was visible in the centres
where voting took place. People at various places protested and resisted the attempts of the enforced
franchise. According to reports in Greater Kashmir, slogans heard during these protests were, ‘no
election, no selection, we want freedom.’ 95 Reports by various Indian organisations also confirm the
coercive role played by the security forces. For example, on October 4, the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition
of Civil Society reported “violent coercion” by security forces in most of the 16 constituencies, which went
to polls during the third phase. 96 Keeping in view the past role of security forces in the elections in
Occupied Kashmir, it is difficult to believe that under such a heavy deployment of 700,000 armed forces
personnel the elections can be termed as being ‘free’ and ‘fair’.
The BJP government projected these elections in Occupied Kashmir as an expression of the will of
the people of Kashmir. For example, in a statement in Denmark, the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said
that the vote in Occupied Kashmir was for ‘India’s unity, Kashmiriyat and against Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism and Islamabad’s anti-India propaganda.’97 However, rejecting the Indian Prime Minister’s
statement, the APHC chairman, Abdul Ghani Bhat, had said that ‘the people voted in anger against the
incumbent government and India.’ He stressed that the elections should not be construed as an
alternative to plebiscite. He, however, added ‘if a plebiscite is not workable for some reason, then let there
be a dialogue involving India, Pakistan and the Hurriyat Conference.’98
Interestingly, according to the official results none of the parties, participating in elections, have won
enough seats to form the government by itself. The National Conference won 28 seats, Congress 20
seats, People’s Democratic Party 16 and the BJP in alliance with RSS could win only a single seat. For
forming a government in an 87-member assembly the party needs 44 seats. As this study goes to print,
negotiations were underway for a coalition to be set up. Both the Congress and PDP are contenders for
the Chief Ministership. Moreover, though the National Conference emerged as the single largest party, its
leader, Omar Abdullah was defeated and no member of Abdullah family could win a seat in the elections.
Omar Abdullah, also the Minister of state for External Affairs in NDA government, and Farooq Abdullah,
the caretaker Chief Minister, resigned from their posts and the Vajpayee government imposed Governor’s
Rule in Occupied Kashmir on October 17, 2002. Commenting on the situation, the Governor, Girish
Chandra Saxena, said on October 19, that the complex political situation necessitated the imposition of
Governor’s rule.99 Whatever the end result of the political scene in Occupied Kashmir, it has become
obvious that the new government will not be the true representative voice of the people of Kashmir, as the
major representative voice, the APHC, did not participate in the elections.
Pakistan has been stressing the need for a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In this
context Pakistan supports the resumption of the dialogue process100 between India and Pakistan. In this
connection, President Pervez Musharraf, during his address to the nation on January 12, 2002, called
upon the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Vajpayee, to ‘come forward and help create peace and harmony with
a view to resolving all disputes through peaceful means and through dialogue.’101 President Musharraf,
while talking to the Aspen Strategy Group during his visit to US in January 2002, suggested a four-part
process to defuse the crisis in Kashmir. According to the four-part process, (a) India and Pakistan must
resume an official dialogue; (b) both must accept the premise that Kashmir is central to the dispute; (c)
eliminate from discussions what each side finds unacceptable; and (d) construct an agreement on the
basis of alternatives to their known positions. 102 Later, President Pervez Musharraf, while addressing the
57th session of the UN General Assembly on September 13, 2002, has suggested a three-point proposal
for reducing tensions in the region: (a) mutual withdrawal of forward deployed forces by both states, (b)
observation of a ceasefire along the Line of Control in Kashmir, and (c) cessation of India’s state terrorism
against the Kashmiri people.103
The decision by the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security, on October 16, 2002, to pull back troops
deployed along the international border with Pakistan is the first step for de-escalation of tension between
India and Pakistan.104 In response Pakistan also announced withdrawal of forces to peace time
locations.105 These developments, if followed by the resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan
for discussing all outstanding issues, particularly the Kashmir dispute, will not only result in normalisation
of relations between India and Pakistan but will also promote peace and stability in the South Asian
region. To begin with, it requires normalisation of diplomatic relations, and for that restoration of all
communications links ( air, rail and road) has to take place.
Keeping in view the ground realities, the Indian rejection of a general plebiscite under UN auspices
and the continuing struggle by the Kashmiris for their right of self-determination, what are the options for
Pakistan for finding a solution within the parameters of self-determination? If the bilateral talks are
resumed for resolving the dispute, then Kashmiris will have to be included, at some stage, for discussing
various options. In principle, India has also recognised third party mediation on Kashmir by allowing the
US to play an indirect role. For example, on August 27, 2002, a high-level American delegation, led by
Lisa Curtis, Senior Adviser to the US Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca, paid a two-day visit to
Occupied Kashmir it may be noted, via New Delhi. The delegation consisted of Sheetal Patel and Kailash
Jha of the Political Department of the US Embassy in Delhi as members. It held meetings with APHC and
other Kashmiri leaders. Such third party meetings provide an opportunity to the APHC and other Kashmiri
leaders engaged in the freedom movement to express their views directly to foreign dignitaries. Along with
a growing recognition of the representative nature of the APHC, this development does show that India is
gradually moving towards accepting some of the ground realities of the Kashmir dispute. However, it still
needs to overtly recognise that without Pakistan, which is an integral party to the dispute, there cannot be
a durable solution of the Kashmir dispute.
REFERENCES
1. See Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, Karachi, National Publishing House Ltd., 1971, p.94.
2. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Research society of Pakistan, Lahore, 1985,
p. 284.
3. V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1956, p. 384.
4. V. P. Menon, The Story of Integration of the Indian States, Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1956, p. 394.
5. See Victoria Schofield, Kashmir: In the Crossfire, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London, 1996, p. 127;
6. Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, London, Robert Hale Limited, 1956, p. 74; quoted by
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op.cit. p. 216.
7. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, National Institute of Pakistan
Studies, 1998, pp. 141-152.
8. Ibid, p. 142.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, p. 145.
11. See text of the UN Charter signed on June 26, 1945.
12. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, op.cit, p. 146.
13. Ibid, pp. 148-149.
14. Dr. Shireen M. Mazari, “Pakistan and the anti-terrorist coalition: Self-determination and Terrorism”,
Defence Journal, October, 2001.
15. See Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op.cit. p.149-159
16. Ibid. p. 226
17. Ibid. p. 228
18. Ibid. p. 232-33
19. For details see Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op.cit. p. 232; Also, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Time Only
to Look Forward, p.42; quoted by S.M. Burke in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis,
Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1973, p.17.
20. See Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op.cit. p. 230.
21. For details see, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, ibid. pp. 222-236.
22. Ibid. p. 276.
23. Ibid. p.281
24. Ibid. p. 281.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid
27. For details see, Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1864-1990, Oxford University Press,
Karachi, 1992, pp. 121-140; Victoria Schofield, Kashmir: In the Crossfire, I. B. Tauris Publications,
London, 1996, pp. 133-135.
28. Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Roxford Books, 1994, p. 82
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Alastair Lamb, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948, Roxford
Books, 1997, p.175. As stated by Lamb, ’The veracity of this tale was challenged, albeit tacitly, in M.
C. Mahajan’s autobiography which appeared in 1963. M. C. Mahajan asserts that he did not leave
Delhi on October 26, following his arrival there early that morning. He indicated that the joint visit to
Jammu with V. P. Menon actually took place on 27 October.’ Menon and Mahajan were going to
Jammu to obtain the signature of the Maharaja on the Instrument of Accession. Also, in the book
Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy-1846-1990, Lamb states that Patiala forces had already landed at
Srinagar airfield on October 17, well before October 26, the date Indian officials claim the Indian
troops intervened in Jammu and Kashmir. p. 131. For detailed discussion also see Alastair Lamb,
Birth of a Tragedy, Roxford Books, UK, 1994, pp. 91-98.
33. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, op.cit. p.75.
34. Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, p. 295.
35. Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, ibid, p.296-97
36. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, op.cit. pp.51-53.
37. See text in M. S. Deora and Grover (ed.), Documents on Kashmir Problem, Vol. I, new Delhi,
Discovery Publishing House, 1991, p.64.
38. Adaresh Sein Anand, The Development of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Verinag
Publishers, Azad Kashmir, 1991, p. 101.
39. Ibid, p. 102.
40. Ibid.
41. See Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy-1846-1990, p.154
42. Kashmir in the Security Council, Government of Pakistan publication.
43. Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peace-Keeping 1946-1947: Documents and Commentary, II, Asia,
London, Oxford University Press, 1970, p.318.
44. For full text of the Resolution see, ibid, pp. 323-325.
45. For details see Prem Nath Bazaz, Democracy Through Intimidation and Terror: The Untold Story of
Kashmir Politics, Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1978, p.3.
46. Ibid.
47. Kashmir in the Security Council, Government of Pakistan publication.
48. See K. Sarwar Hasan, (ed) Documents on the Foreign Relation of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question,
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966. pp. 279-283.
49. See Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy-1846-1990, p. 190.
50. Ibid. 201-202.
51. Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace, Sage
Publications, New Delhi,1997, p. 33
52. Kashmir in the Security Council, Government of Pakistan publication.
53. A. Lamb, op.cit. p.203.
54. S. Bose, op.cit. p. 35.
55. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, National Institute of Pakistan
Studies, 1998, p. 149.
56. M. S. Deora and Grover (ed.), Documents on Kashmir Problem, Vol. I, New Delhi, Discovery
Publishing House, 1991, p.64.
57. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, op.cit. p. 207
58. Ibid.
59. The Pakistan Times, April 30, 1990.
60. The News, August 3, 2002.
61. See Text of Simla Agreement at, http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/spedi...ia/accord3.htm
62. Ibid.
63. Sumit Ganguly, ‘Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilisation and Institutional Decay’,
International Security, Vol. 21, No.2, Fall 1996, p.96.
64. See article by Lt. Gen. V. K. Nayar, ‘Low Intensity Conflict: Jammu and Kashmir’,U.S.I. Journal, Vol.
C XXVIII, No. 533, July-September 1998.
65. S. Bose, op.cit. p.115.
66. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, op.cit.
67. Reported in The Pakistan Times, (Islamabad), March 27, 1997.
68. K. Sarwar Hasan, (ed) Documents on the Foreign Relation of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question,
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. K. Sarwar Hasan, ibid, p. 240-243
72. Ibid, pp. 221-238.
73. K. Sarwar Hasan, ibid. p. 241.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1967,
p. 470.
77. Article by Prof. Shamim Shawl, “Solution: Plebiscite, Partition, Independence and Condominium” in
edited book by Dr. K. F. Yusuf, Perspectives on Kashmir, Pakistan Forum, Islamabad, 1994, p.332.
78. Dr. Ijaz Hussain, op.cit. p. 207
79. Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 1995, pp. 222
and 326.
80. Quoted by Dr. S. M. Qureshi, in the book by Irshad Mahmood (ed), Maslaa Kashmir ke Imkani Hal,
(written in Urdu), Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1996, pp. 51-66.
81. K. Sarwar Hasan, op.cit.249-292
82. Ibid.
83. See Selig Harrison, ‘South Asia and the United States: A Chance for Fresh Start’, Current History,
Vol. 91, No. 563, March 1992, pp. 102-103; Kuldip Nayar, ‘Globalization of Kashmir,’ The Tribune,
(Chandigarh), January 19, 1994.
84. Robert G. Wirsing, op.cit. p. 220
85. Article by Prof. Shamim Shawl, op. cit., p.333
86. The US-based Kashmir Study Group was formed in 1996. Mr. Farooq Kathwari, a Kashmiri; is the
Chairman of the Board. Its members include: Ambassador Howard B. Schaffer of Georgetown
University, Dr. Joesph E. Schwartzberg of University of Minnesota, Dr. Robert Wirsing of University
of South Carolina, Dr. Charles S. Kennedy of Wake Forest University, Dr. A.T. Embree of Columbia
University, Dr. Peter Lyon of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, Dr. David Taylor of the
School of Oriental and African Studies, London.
87. For detailed study see the above report.
88. Amanullah Khan, “Free Kashmir only Way out”, The News, December 30, 1995.
89. B. G. Verghese, “Kashmir: The Fourth Option,” Defence Today, 1:1, August 1993, p. 65, quoted in
Robert Wrising, op.cit. p. 231.
90. See text of ‘Good Friday Agreement, April 10, 1998’, CAIN: Key Events of the Northern Ireland Conflict
peace/docs/agreement.htm
91. Ibid.
92. Amit A. Pandya, ‘The Current Crisis in South Asia’, www.globaldem.org/ default.cfm?
page=amit_hirc_1
93. Sumantra Bose, ‘Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace,’ Survival, Autumn, 1999, Vol.
41, No. 3 p. 149-171.
94. Dr. Shireen M. Mazari, ‘Kashmir in the new Pre-emptive doctrines’, The News, (Islamabad), October
2, 2002.
95. Greater Kashmir, October 2, 2002.
96. See report in Greater Kashmir, October 4, 2002.
97. Reported in The Hindu, October 11, 2002.
98. See Times of India, October 13, 2002.
99. Indian Express, October 20, 2002.
100. Pakistan and India started the Foreign Secretary level talks in 1990. Between 1990 and 1992 six
rounds of talks were held. The talks were resumed in 1994, however in 1997 Pakistan and India
agreed to set up Working Groups at appropriate levels to address all outstanding issues in an
‘integrated manner’ As a result working groups were identified but this could not be implemented.
After remaining stalled for more than a year the first round of meetings of the Working Groups was
held in October/ November 1999. Since then the process of bilateral dialogue between the two
countries remains stalled.
101. The Dawn, (Islamabad), January 13, 2002.
102. The Hindu, quoting New York Times reported on January 21, 2002.
103. The Dawn, (Islamabad), September 14, 2002.
104. Times of India, October 17, 2002.
105. The News, October 18, 2002.
Appendix-I
Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August, 1948.
(Document No.S/1100, Para. 75, dated the 9th November, 1948).
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives, of India and
Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the
continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to
implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final
settlement of the situation,
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:
PART I
CEASE-FIRE ORDER
[A] The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue
separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four
days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.
[B] The High Commands of Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that
might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(For the purpose of these proposals ‘-forces under their control” shall be considered to include all forces,
organised and unorganised, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides).
[C] The Commanders-in-Chief of the Forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any
necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.
[D] In its discretion, and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military
observers who under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands will
supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.
[E] The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples
to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.
PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined
in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce
agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the
Commission.
A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes
a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the
Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
(2) The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of
Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered
the State for the purpose of fighting.
(3) Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local
authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan
nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was
represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of
Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being
withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw
the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
(2) Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu
and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire the
minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to
assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed
where it deems necessary.
(3) The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir will take all measures within their power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will
be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.
C. (1) Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or communique containing the principles
thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.
PART III
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that
end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement both Governments agree to enter into consultations with
the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.
The UNCIP unanimously adopted this Resolution on 13-8-1948.
Members of the Commission: Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia and U.S.A.
Appendix-II
Resolution adopted at the meeting of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 05
January, 1949 (Document No. S/1196, dated the 10th January, 1949)
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan in Communications, dated December 23
and December 25, 1948, respectively their acceptance of the following principles which are
supplementary to the Commission’s Resolution of August 13, 1948;
(1) The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan
will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite;
(2) A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire
and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission’s resolution of 13
August 1948, have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been
completed;
(3-a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the
Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high
international standing and commanding general confidence. He will be formally appointed
to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3-b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the
powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for
ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.
(3-c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff or assistants
and observers as he may require.
(4-a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission’s resolution of 13 August
1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored
in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in
consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed
forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of
the plebiscite.
(4-b) As regards the territory referred to in A 2 of the Part II of the resolution of 13 August,
final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission
and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities.
(5) All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal political elements of
the State will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the
preparation for and the holding of the plebiscite.
(6-a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the disturbances will be invited
and be free to return and to exercise all their rights as such citizens. For the purpose of
facilitating repatriation there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of
nominees of India and the other of nominees of Pakistan.
The Commissions shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Governments of
India and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will collaborate with the
Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision to effect.
(6-b) All persons (other than citizens of the State) who on or since 15 August 1947, have
entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required to leave the State.
(7) All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to ensure in
collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator that:
(7-a) There is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery other undue influence on the
voters in plebiscite ;
(7-b) No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State. All
subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall be safe and free in
expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State to India
or Pakistan.
There shall be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the
State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit ;
(7-c) All political prisoners are released;
(7-d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection ; and
(7-e) There is no victimization.
(8) The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission for India
and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance, and the Commission may in
its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out on its behalf any of the
responsibilities with which it has been entrusted;
(9) At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall report the result
thereof to the Commission and to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The
Commission shall then certify to the Security Council whether the Plebiscite has or has
not been free and impartial;
(10) Upon the signature of the truce agreement the details of the foregoing proposals will
be elaborated in the consultation envisaged in Part III of the Commission’s resolution of
13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these
consultations;
Commends the Governments of India and Pakistan for their prompt action in ordering a
cease-fire to take effect from one minute before midnight of first January 1949, pursuant
to the agreement arrived at as provided for by the Commission’s resolution of 13 August
1948;
and
Resolves to return in the immediate future to the sub-continent to discharge the
responsibilities imposed upon it by the resolution of 13 August 1948, and by the foregoing
principles.
* UNCIP unanimously adopted this Resolution on 05-Jan-1949.
Members of the Commission:
• Argentina
• Belgium
• Columbia
• Czechoslovakia and
• U.S.A.
Appendix- III
Resolution 98, adopted by the Security Council at its 611th Meeting on 23 December, 1952. (Document
No. 5/2883, dated the 24th December, 1952).
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
Recalling its resolutions, 91(1951) of 30 March 1951, its decision of 30 April 1951 and its resolutions 96
(1951) of 10 November 1951,
Further Recalling the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of
13 August 1948, and 5 January 1949, which were accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan
and which provided that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or
Pakistan would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted
under the auspices of the United Nations.
Having received the third report, dated 22 April 1952, and the fourth report, dated 16 September 1952, of
the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan;
1. Endorses the general principles on which the United Nations Representative has sought to bring about
agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan;
2. Notes with gratification that the United Nations Representative has reported that the Governments of
India and Pakistan have accepted all but two of the paragraphs of his twelve-point proposals;
3. Notes that agreement on a plan of demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been
reached because the Governments of India and Pakistan have not agreed on the whole of paragraph 7 of
the twelve- point proposals;
4. Urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices
of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement on the specific
number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation,
this number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire
line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the India side of the cease-line, as
suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals of 16 July 1952, such specific numbers
to be arrived at bearing in mind the principles or criteria contained in paragraph 7 of the United Nations
Representative’s proposal of 4 September 1952;
5. Records its gratitude to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan for the great efforts
which he has made to achieve a settlement and requests him to continue to make his services available
to the Governments of India and Pakistan to this end;
6. Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to report to the Security Council not later than thirty
days from the date of the adoption of this resolution;
7. Requests the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to keep the Security Council
informed of any progress.
The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 23-12-52 with the following result:
In favour: Brazil, China, France, Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, U.K. and U.S.A.
Against: None
Abstaining: U.S.S.R.
One Member (Pakistan) did not participate in the voting

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"It was inevitable: the scent of bitter almonds always reminded him of the fate of unrequited love."

WORLD

Janruary:

Governor of Punjab Province, Pakistan, Assassinated (Jan. 4): The Governor of the Punjab Province, and a close ally of the President of Pakistan, is assassinated. Gov. Salman Taseer is shot getting into his car by Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, an elite-force security guard, who is apprehended immediately after the shooting.

At Least 24 Die in Tunisian Protests (Jan. 11): At least two dozen people, mainly young civilian men, are killed in government protests in Tunisia. The protesters are unhappy with the chronic unemployment they are facing in the country, as well as perceived police brutality. President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali ordered a night curfew, and schools and universities have been temporarily closed. (Jan. 14): After 23 years of authoritarian rule, President Ben Ali flees Tunisia for Saudi Arabia amid protests. Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi announces he will take over as interim protests. It is the first time a President of an Arab country has been overthrown because of widespread protesting.

11 Cabinet Members Resign, Toppling Lebanese Government (Jan. 12): Hezbollah and its allies withdraw from the Lebanese government, breaking a unity government that has been in place since 2009. Eleven of the 30 cabinet members resign. The government has been in turmoil since 2005, when former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated.

Egyptian President Asks Army to Intervene After Days of Violent Protest (Jan. 28): After days of violent protest in Cairo, Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak calls the army into the streets to stop the demonstrators, protesting over government corruption, the economy, and lack of personal freedom. Those involved called the event a "day of wrath"; the protests have stretched on for four days.

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February

Unrest in Middle East Spreads to Bahrain (Feb. 14): Violence erupts in Bahrain as protestors, inspired by recent events in Egypt and Tunisia, select Feb. 14th as a day of protest to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the National Action Charter. Bahrain is the most recent country facing unpheaval among its citizens, mirroring the instability in Yemen, Iran, and Libya.

Libya on Brink of Civil War (Feb. 24): Civilians and defected soldiers seeking the removal of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi hold off his forces in cities close to Tripoli, Libya's capital. Unlike the Facebook-enabled youth rebellions in neighboring Egypt and Tunisia, the insurrection in Libya is being led by people who have been actively opposing the regime for some time. In a series of determined stands these rebel forces are proving to be a well-armed revolutionary movement.

Security Council Approves Sanctions on Libya (Feb. 26): The UN Security Council votes unanimously to impose strong sanctions on Libya's leader, Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi, and his inner circle of advisers. The council also calls for an international war crimes investigation into "widespread and systemic attacks" against Libyan citizens.

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March

Egyptian Protestors Demand Faster Change and Accountability (March 6): Newly appointed Prime Minister Essam Sharaf addresses tens of thousands of protestors in Tahrir Square, where demonstrators press for faster and more substantive changes. The former interior minister, Habib el-Adly, pleads not guilty to corruption charges. A series of fires break out in government security and financial investigation offices angering protestors who suspect that senior officials are trying to destroy evidence that will implicate more of them in corruption and human rights abuses.

Upheaval Continues in Libya (March 7): Government warplanes repeatedly bomb rebel positions near an oil refinery in the coastal city of Ras Lanuf, seeking to drive them back to the east, as the country's slide into civil war continues. In Tripoli, government supporters celebrate after state television falsely reports that Col. Qaddafi's forces had regained the entire country.

Yemen President Rejects Proposal to Step Down (March 7): President Ali Abdullah Saleh rejects the political opposition's proposal that he step down by the end of the year, calling it undemocratic and unconstitutional, the official Saba news agency reports. Saleh calls for a national conference to be held, which is rejected by the opposition.

Thousands Protest in Bahrain (March 8): Thousands of Shiite protestors form a human chain around the Manama, the capital of Bahrain while hundreds demonstrate outside the U.S. Embassy in an appeal for support. Opposition leaders vow that they will not be mollified by offers of money and jobs.

Interim Government Dissolves State Security Dept. in Tunisia (March 8): The State Security Dept., which had been accused of human rights abuses under the ousted president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, is disbanded by the interim government in Tunisia. The prime minister also names a new cabinet, selecting new leaders for six ministries while retaining ministers in significant agencies like defense, interior, and justice.

Bahrain Cracks Down on Demonstrators (March 18): Bahrain brings in troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to crack down against peaceful protestors clamoring for reform. The government also tears down the monument in Pearl Square, the site of many protests. The 300-foot sculpture, a stone pearl held by six sweeping arches, is seen by protestors as the defining monument of the protest movement. The official Bahrain News Agency reports the change as a "face-lift" to "boost the flow of traffic."

No-Fly Zone is Imposed in Libya (March 19): American and European forces unleash warplanes and missiles, striking against the government of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi in a mission to impose a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone. The goals of the no-fly zone are to keep Col. Qaddafi from using air power against rebel forces and to prevent a massacre in Libya. French warplanes begin the campaign. U.S. forces knock out air defense systems as well as missile, radar, and communication centers around Tripoli, Misurata, and Surt. NATO plans to take over the operation and enforce the no-fly zone.

Military Kill Protestors in Syria (March 25): Troops open fire in the southern part of Syria after tens of thousands take to the streets in peaceful protests around the nation. At least twenty demonstrators are killed.

Cabinet Resigns in Syria (March 29): President Bashar al-Assad accepts the resignation of his cabinet. The cabinet resignation reflects a rare responsiveness to public pressure by the Syrian government. Meanwhile, in the capital, government supporters take to the streets in an effort to counter the ongoing pro-democracy protests in several cities.

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