M Ismail Khan

Northern Areas contributes 72 per cent to the flow of the Indus River at up stream of Tarbela. In fact, two out of the three proposed mega dams -- Bhasha (Diamir) and Skardu dams -- currently being debated are located in the Northern Areas. Yet, people of the region who will have to bear the brunt of major social, economic and ecological cost of inundation are nowhere on the consultation map of the president, parliament, and political parties. Diamir, Skardu and dozens of other potential dams' sites in the Northern Areas, which houses the world's largest inland natural glaciers, holds the key to Pakistan's future water security. The region's growing strategic importance for a water reservoir has made it a paramount party to the Kashmir dispute, meaning, multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank may seek clarification about the constitutional status of the Northern Areas before they could make longer term financial investments in the water sector of the region.
It is clear that the country is in desperate need for more dams. Tarbela Dam constructed in the 70s has lost 30 per cent of its storage capacity, and de-silting the reservoir is a rather expensive task. The opportunity cost of elevating the height of Mangla Dam is high, it can however give a breathing space for a few more years but Pakistan will have to have more dams along the Indus. Kalabagh, Bhasha (Diamir) and Skardu dams are major options on the table.
The Kalabagh Dam site continues to be most appropriate for a mega dam, both in terms of water to irrigate millions of acres of land and in providing cheap electricity to populous provinces of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP. However, with the current level of disagreements and controversy surrounding the Kalabagh issue, it is likely that the onus of the dam site may well shift to the Northern Areas. Yet, the Northern Areas Legislative Council, political groups and the strong NGOs are completely out of the consultation net both in terms of formulating dam proposal and building support for the cause. They are completely at loss to figure out what is actually being planned in Islamabad to sink them under million of acres feet of their own glacier melts.
My earlier articles' warning impending risks related to a high altitude dam at Skardu and the earthquake seems to have worked in persuading the pro-Skardu dam lobby to quieten down, at least for the time being. But the proposal for Bhasha dam, which in fact should be called the Diamir dam as the entire reservoir falls in Diamir district of the Northern Areas, is no less scandalous. Major reasons behind these otherwise direly needed projects falling prey to politics is perhaps the lack of involvement of the local stakeholders, and ill intentioned manipulation of facts and design concepts by vested interest. Take the case of Diamir (Bhasha) dam, located 314 kilometres upstream of Tarbela dam and about 120 km downstream of the confluence with the Gilgit River. The dam is proposed with a view to inflict all social and ecological cost to the Northern Areas by building the reservoir entirely in the Northern Areas while the electricity turbines are designed to be located in the NWFP enabling it to net the royalties. Now, this may well have been an individual action on part of WAPDA, an official posted in the Northern Areas or survey team leader from NWFP, yet for decision makers at the top it is no less a minefield, as, it is going to be an up-hill task for the officials now to take along the conservative tribes living on both end of the proposed dam site. There are hundreds of potential dam sites in the` Northern Areas; it is not understandable why it was necessary to propose a dam on the margins of Northern Areas boundary.
In recent weeks the NWFP cabinet has been pushing hard for the Diamir/Bhasha dam, primarily to take the heat off from the Kalabagh dam which they fear will entail large scale inundation and relocation of population in the province. The Bhasha dam is expected to prolong the lifespan of the heavily silted Tarbela dam reservoir. Its own life span is expected to be longer than Kalabagh as the sediment load at the site is less than half of that at Kalabagh, the dam is also tipped as cheaper at around $2 billion. It is expected to generate 3360 MW of electricity against 3600 MW for Kalabagh and would have lesser storage capacity (7.3 MAF against 7.9 MAF for Kalabagh). It will inundate a 120 kilometre stretch of the Karakoram Highway and because of the distance from the mainland it may take a little longer to build.
Whatever may be its specificities, the local people, leaders and institutions should be taken into confidence about the dam and benefits. , The World Bank has recommended a review of the dam royalties and benefit sharing formula. It has pointed out that the present arrangement of royalties going to the province housing electricity turbines is extremely unfair, in case the real socio-economic and environmental cost of actual inundation by the reservoir is borne by another province.
Pakistan can ill afford to delay construction of new reservoirs but the challenge here is how to build internal consensus for dams, and where to build the dams. The idea for Kalabagh Dam does not seem to be making any headway. Punjab may remain supportive Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan assemblies have already passed resolutions against the idea and are not in a mood to show any sort of flexibility. According to International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), dams are considered 'large' if they are more than 15 metres high or have a reservoir capacity of over three million cubic metres. According to the World Commission of Dams (WCD) currently there are about 45000 dams worldwide which meet the above capacity. However, the WCD urges nations to go for smaller dams instead of the large ones. Given the large number of potentials dam sites in the Northern Areas, it may be more feasible for Pakistan to go for series of smaller dams.
Sindh fears that a large dam at Kalabagh will deprive them of their due share of the Indus River as the already thin water resources would be diverted to Punjab for expansion of irrigation system. They also fear that it will cause irreversible harm to the Indus Delta ecosystem due to sea intrusion. NWFP too has one eye on the potential benefits but are concerned about turning the fertile districts of Mardan and Swabi into water-logged marshlands, and possible inundation of large tracts of fertile lands including the city of Nowshera. Latest events in edgy Baluchistan also forbid raising tempers in the volatile province. At this point, any feeling of smaller provincial being made a scapegoat for Punjab would mean more trouble for the president and the country. Thus, the Northern Areas is the only viable option left for President Musharraf to move on with the dam drive. If Quaid-e-Azam had called Kashmir the jugular vein of Pakistan, one is sure that it was because of the rugged Northern Areas (Gilgit -- Baltistan) occupied by the then Dogra Maharaja and not the beautiful picnic point called Kashmir Valley, where he was seated. So better make a quick and prudent choice.

The dam controversy


By Shahid M. Amin

IN any mature society, national issues are discussed in a rational manner, keeping in view the supreme interests of the country as a whole. Unfortunately, in our country, the building of a dam has been converted into an emotionally charged issue, full of sound and fury, with parochial and even secessionist overtones. There are accusations and counter-accusations; and some political parties are even threatening to break up the federation on the issue of building a dam.

In short, we have been making a sorry spectacle of ourselves. This can only give satisfaction to those sceptics who claim that Pakistan is a �failed� state; and to those antagonists in our neighbourhood and beyond who have always argued that a state based on the concept of a common religion cannot survive. Let those engaged in the current bitter debate in Pakistan on building dams ponder if this is the kind of message we want to send to the rest of the world.

Agriculture is the backbone of Pakistan�s economy. But our agriculture cannot survive and prosper without irrigation since almost 90 per cent of the country does not get sufficient rainfall. Fortunately, we have great rivers and level plains and have developed (thanks to the British colonial rule and our own efforts since independence) one of the most elaborate irrigation networks in the world.

However, in recent years, there has been a growing shortage of water for agriculture because of the growing population and the silting of the existing dams. Moreover, as much as 40 per cent of the total arable land in Pakistan remains uncultivated, mainly because of lack of irrigation. Hence, there is a consensus that the country needs to build up more water reservoirs. The issue really is as to how this objective is to be achieved.

There are several possible dams that could be built, namely, Kalabagh, Bhasha, Skardu-Katzarah, Akhori and Munda. President Musharraf said the other day that the Bhasha dam and be built first). Surprisingly, our experts are giving contradictory assessments about the respective pros and cons of these dams, including the cost of construction. It seems that the majority of experts are in favour of Kalabagh, whose construction can also be started straightaway.

All of these projects involve displacement of inhabitants currently living in the affected areas. Kalabagh would displace 120,000 people, Bhasha would displace 24,000 and Akhori 49,300 people. Skardu-Katzarah dam would displace 160,000 people and the city of Skardu would be submerged. That would produce a great deal of resentment.

The capacity of the Skardu-Katzarah dam would be more than the total capacity of all other dams. Its design life is estimated at 1,000 years compared to less than 100 years of every other proposed dam. According to the ex-chairman of IRSA, Skardu dam will generate 15,000 MW of power if 35 MAF is stored, which is possible. However, according to the Pieter Lieftinck Report by the World Bank, �the problem of accessibility (of Skardu) would be almost insuperable.� Similarly, Bhasha dam would require upgradation of 323-km of road from Havelian to the dam site and relocation of 140 km from Sazin to Raikot bridge.

The existing road (Karakorum Highway) links Pakistan with China and was completed in the 1970s by the two countries as an outstanding engineering feat. The new road would be even higher up in the mountains and will be extremely expensive to build. Moreover, Bhasha and Skardu-Katzarah are more exposed to seismic risk as compared to Kalabagh and Akhori.

According to the recent briefing given to our Senate, Kalabagh will have a water availability of 90 MAF, live storage of 6.1 MAF and will produce 3,600 MW of power and would have no logistic problem. Comparative figures for Bhasha will be 50 MAF, 7.34 MAF and 4,500 MW of electricity. Figures for Akhori will be 14 MAF, 7 MAF and 600 MW of electricity. Kalabagh would have no problem of power dispersal, while power generated at Bhasha (high up in the mountains) as also Skardu-Katzarah would be very difficult to disperse.

Hence, on a comparative basis, there is much to support the building of Kalabagh dam. President Pervez Musharraf was quite right in arguing in its favour. In fact, one must admire the president for going to the critics and opponents in all parts of Sindh to explain the case in favour of Kalabagh. No other Pakistani head of state ever showed such guts.

However, while the president�s sincerity should not be questioned, he has to be faulted for a lack of understanding of the current political realities. The fact is that most political circles in Sindh are against building the Kalabagh dam. It can be argued that they are being influenced by strong prejudices, bordering on paranoia, but their determination to oppose the Kalabagh dam is manifest.

Similarly, there is varying degree of opposition to the Kalabagh dam in the NWFP and Balochistan.

Under the circumstances, building Kalabagh would harm national unity. The president would be well advised to remember the saying from the old American West that �if catching a thief means burning down the whole city, then it is not worthwhile catching the thief.� The hard political reality is that national integrity and political stability is much more important than building a dam, whatever its benefits.

It is, of course, quite pathetic that Muslim League-N of Nawaz Sharif, which had always supported the building of Kalabagh dam, has remained a silent spectator while critics have been pillorying the whole project. In the past, Benazir�s Pakistan Peoples� Party had also come out in favour of Kalabagh but it has now joined the project�s opponents. Political expediency has clearly influenced both of these parties. It seems that they would make common cause with any forces, if necessary, in order to get rid of Musharraf. One would have thought that, at least for the two major mainstream parties, the country�s welfare should be above considerations of political advantage. Of course, little good can be expected from the extremists.

Furthermore, one can only feel sad by the anti-Punjab sentiments that some circles in Sindh and NWFP are bent upon stirring. While over the years, Punjab has not been blameless in several instances, on the whole, it has shown magnanimity despite its larger size. For instance, in the last 58 years of Pakistan�s existence, Punjab has held the top political post only for about nine years (viz. by Prime Ministers Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and Feroz Khan Noon in the 1950s and by Mian Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s). On the other hand, Punjab was instrumental in bringing to power two Sindhi prime ministers viz. Z.A. Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, and also supported Mohammad Khan Junejo. Together, they ruled Pakistan for nearly 14 years.

Moreover, Punjab has in the past even given its share of water to Sindh. The smaller provinces should also not forget that if the water requirements of Punjab are not met in the coming years, much of that province would lose its fertility, leading to an acute food shortage in the whole country. That would hurt, in particular, the food-deficit provinces of NWFP and Balochistan, as also Sindh.

Pakistan is already faced with a great many problems. It would be unwise to precipitate a crisis of national integration by rushing through the Kalabagh dam. Hence, the present government would be well advised at this time to think of alternatives to the Kalabagh dam. For instance, smaller dams could be given priority in the immediate future. The raising of Mangla and Tarbela Dams would also help. The de-silting of our existing dams should be given priority. More efficient use of the existing water resources should be explored. Seepage of canal water and its consequent wastage could be reduced by the lining of canals as also the water channels which link them to farms. Irrigation through water sprinkling system should be more widely practised. Crops like sugarcane consume too much water and could be replaced by more water-efficient crops.

The foregoing measures might still not be sufficient to remove the likelihood of serious water shortages in the next few years. But since Sindh is the most vociferous in opposing the building of Kalabagh dam, it must be prepared also to face the consequences of such opposition. Possibly, after facing water shortages and counting its losses due to non-construction of the Kalabagh dam, Sindh itself will, at some point of time, rethink the issue and come out in favour of this project. That would surely be a much more desirable scenario for building the Kalabagh dam.

One of the most talked about issues in Pakistan has been the building of dams. We see a lot of people commenting on their merits and demerits. It has often been maintained that big dams have gone out of favour and the nation can easily meet its water and energy needs through small dams.

It is also said that the mighty Indus can be tapped in its upper reaches, especially near Skardu, resolving the problem of water and energy scarcity in the country. That the people coming up with such faulty arguments may not be qualified enough, however, has rarely been mentioned.

Before discussing whether or not big dams have gone out of favour, or if the alternatives on offer hold any water, it seems appropriate to state some facts. At present a little over 54.5 million acres of land is under cultivation in Pakistan (in all the provinces), while a chunk of 22.5 million acres is waiting to be tapped.

In addition to the need for bringing this huge acreage under cultivation, we see that tail-enders of various canals don’t get enough water. The drought-like conditions, as witnessed in recent years, have led to great shortfalls in production.

This is largely why we have had to import food grains. The drought, however, did have its positives in the shape of better drainage. That it has led to a reduction in the earlier proposed expenditure of Rs33 billion, under the National Drainage Programme, is another story and surely a recipe for disaster if the present climatic wet cycle stops short of expectations.

From these statistics, we can conclude that 7.5MAF to 10MAF of extra water needs to be made available firstly in order to cater to the depleted capacity (to the tune of 4.89MAF) in the existing mega-storages of Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma and secondly to irrigate at least a portion of the area not under currently cultivation.

The country’s per capita water availability has already reached the alarming figure of 1,126 cubic metres per person, while anything less than 1,000 cubic metres per person is considered as disastrous.

We also see that our country is fast approaching an energy crunch — up to 1,700MW by the year 2007. In case the present national growth continues at a medium level, this shortage of 1,700MW by 2007 is going to increase at least to 5,000MW by the year 2010.

The last time an effort was made to resolve the power crisis was in the early 1990s when several Independent Power Plants (IPPs) were set up. This had a debilitating effect on the economy, with the economy still being plagued by it. This can be gauged from the fact that Wapda had to pay 50 per cent of its total revenues to buy 33 per cent of its energy needs from the IPPs for the financial year 2004-05 alone.

As a consequence, whatever people say about the purported efficiency of the private entrepreneur or the good which the IPPs had done for the country, it is a fact that we have to come up with a new solution to bridge the gap in the supply and demand of power and to meet our future energy requirements.

This becomes even more important when we try to grapple with the issue of affordable power tariff rates and the fact that the same can only be taken care of if the hydel-thermal mix of power generation remains around a ratio of 70:30, as opposed to the current ratio of 35:65. International oil prices and their ramifications on countries like Pakistan also should be taken into consideration.

The idea of producing hydro-power through canal heads is not new. In addition to several small power plants that are in operation in the country since decades, Wapda has identified a total potential of about 700MW which may be generated at 500 different sites.

However, the maximum potential at any given site is not more than 5MW. On an average a small plant can only produce 1MW of electricity.

Connecting a number of small power plants to the national grid is another problem. Consequently, the total cost of numerous small plants, if built, will be much greater than that of a single power house running through a big dam.

From the above, it can be concluded that in order to irrigate the 54.5 million acres of land already under cultivation, to bring additional areas under cultivation, and to enhance our power generating capacity we need to better harness the available water resources. We have to devise an efficient system between now and 2010.

As economics play a vital role in all projects of importance, the most economical means should be adopted, otherwise we will not succeed in achieving our goals. This can only be done through the creation of mega-reservoirs.

This can happen only if we build large dams. Similarly, our capacity to generate power can only be increased efficiently through big dams, which lead to production of electricity as a bye-product at very low rates.

It also needs to be remembered that electricity usage in Pakistan depends upon many factors, including some cultural aberrations due to which we witness huge fluctuations in load during the course of a single day. This necessitates the enhancement of production capacity which can only be handled properly through appropriate additions to the existing number of hydel stations.

Implementation of conservation programmes to offset losses in the transportation and distribution of both water and power are sometimes put forth as a potential solution. Indeed, conservation is important and cannot be discounted, but on its own it cannot be deemed a viable option. Also, it can never do away with the need for big reservoirs. Actually, conservation and construction of new facilities need to move concurrently.

Two things, thus, are important — namely the need for an additional 7.5MAF to 10MAF of water and up to 5,000MW of power. How this can be achieved without the use of big dams is unclear.

Let’s see now if big dams have really gone out of favour throughout the world. Well, we see that internationally there is a clear divide between those who support big dams and those who don’t.

We see that people are against construction of dams in the North American continent and also in the once pro-dam areas like Brazil and its neighbours in South America.

Similar is the case for quite a few of the North European/Scandinavian countries. Delving a little deeper, we see that all these areas are energy surplus. Canada and Brazil stand out as good power producers, with tens of thousands of megawatts of spare generation capacity. The situation is such that up to 40,000MW of spare cheap hydel power in Canada is not allowed to be exported to the American Mid-West (which gets its power requirements transported from other nearby states at a much higher cost).

The North European/Scandinavian countries after having generously tapped hydel resources and also after using cheap local coal apparently have no use for further generation, especially when nuclear generation takes care of the needs of the energy-starved nations of Europe like France (which fulfils above 50 per cent of its needs through nuclear power plants). Similarly, these areas of the world also crop huge quantities of water and thus do not feel any need for new reservoirs.

On the other hand, we see that countries like China, Turkey, India, Iran and even an industrially advanced country like Japan are in the process of building as many as 707 dams, out of which 161 would be more than 200ft high, putting them in the “big dams” category.

Thus, for a country like Pakistan, solution lies in the construction of big dams one after the other. Otherwise, we would be heading towards an Ethiopia-like situation. Our growth will peter off and we may not even be able to meet the demand for food.

Reservoir Sedimentation (Maf)

Reservoir Gross Storage Capacity Gross Storage Loss

Original Year 2004 Year 2004 Year 2012 Year 2025
(Maf) (MAF) (MAF)

Tarbela 11.62 (1974) 8.36 (72%) 3.26 (28%) 4.17 (36%) 5.51 (47%)

Mangla 5.88 (1967) 4.64 (78%) 1.24 (22%) 1.72 (29%) 1.97 (34%)

Chashma 0.87 (1971) 0.48 (55%) 0.39 (45%) 0.48 (55%) 0.50 (57%)

Total 18.37 13.48 (73%) 4.89 (27%) 6.37 (35%) 7.98 (43%)


By Engr Tahir Basharat Cheema

__________________
[COLOR=Blue][B]The best way to predict the future is to invent it[/B][/COLOR]

The Bhasha Dam Rip-off

People in the Northern Areas are upset over the Bhasha/Diamir Dam controversy. Initially, they were not against the dam but are now furious about the way they are being cheated out of its benefits even before the ground-breaking ceremony has taken place. They are unhappy because some vested interests have succeeded in naming it Bhasha Dam, after a village in the neighbouring Kohistan district of the NWFP, when the entire reservoir is situated in the Diamir district of the Northern Areas. They are disappointed because ill-intentioned planners are creating an unnecessary dispute by choosing to set up the power station on the left bank of the Indus in Bhasha, rather than establishing the same on the right bank of the river in the Northern Areas.

The proposed dam, located 165 kilometres, from Gilgit will submerge 110 kilometres of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) in Diamir, from the dam site to Raikot Bridge next to the Fairy Meadows right below Nanga Parbat. Some 24,000 people will be displaced when every low-lying village in Diamir along the KKH is inundated. However, in accordance with the constitution, royalties will go to the province where the power station, not the reservoir, is located. So it is simple: the Northern Areas will foot the bill for all the social, economic and ecological costs of Bhasha Dam while the NWFP will pocket the royalties. Very equitable.

The Diamir Dam (not Bhasha) site is 314 kilometres upstream of Tarbela on the Indus. According to specifications available with Wapda, the dam is sited at a pronounced bend where the Indus is roughly 160 metres wide. Here the selected axis entails the possible inundation of a large tract of barren land along with interspersed villages dominated by the town of Chilas. The maximum depth of the river bed alluvium is 55 metres near the right bank. The bedrock has been identified for foundation and embankment structures, and has been deemed positive for low compressibility. Nonetheless, the distance of the dam site from power-load centres would require heavy investment to establish a connection with the national grid.

The project will be an earth- and rock-filled dam costing US$6.5 billion with a powerhouse likely to be built on the left bank of the Indus in Bhasha village, carrying an installed capacity of 3,360 MW. The reservoir in Diamir district would have a gross capacity of 7.3 MAF and a live storage of 5.7 MAF. In case the government decides to build the powerhouses on the right bank of the Indus, royalty accruing from the dam will go to the Northern Areas. Part of this money could be allocated to Diamir district, one of the most backward areas even within the context of the Northern Areas.

A lot more homework is required in terms of financial, social and environmental impact before actual construction can start. Detailed engineering designs featuring spillways and flood resistance freeways have to be prepared and finalised before any major construction work can take place. Given the high level of sedimentation flow, the estimated lifespan of Diamir Dam is about 80 to 100 years. The dam may, however, reduce sediment inflow to Tarbela by 40 per cent. It will also significantly prolong the life of Kalabagh Dam, if it is ever constructed.

The spontaneous reaction in Diamir suggests that any attempt to build the dam without resolving the boundary dispute between the Northern Areas and the NWFP, renaming the dam and evolving a fair agreement regarding sharing of benefit will land the project in serious trouble. In the past, there were some half-hearted attempts to resolve outstanding issues. In the early 1990s, for instance, the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas Affairs (KANA) constituted a standing committee comprised by officials from the NWFP government and the Northern Areas. As the administration functionaries were also from the NWFP, discussions obviously remained one-sided due to the non-representative character of the committee. Since then there have been suggestions to refer the case to the Council of Common Interest (CCI), a constitutional body empowered to resolve inter-provincial conflicts. But since the Northern Areas is a disputed territory and outside the constitutional ambit of Pakistan, it is highly unlikely that a conflict between a federating and non-federating unit can be placed under arbitration by the CCI.

The Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas Affairs recently took the positive step of directing Wapda to brief the Northern Areas Legislative Council on the dam initiative. This was the first time that the federal government made an effort to put the public representatives of the region into the loop. However, Wapda officials have failed to satisfy the local leadership on various counts including rehabilitation, compensation and royalty. Many local politicians argue that since the Northern Areas are legally and technically part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, the government cannot build a dam without amending Article 1 of the constitution. They further insist that in case the Government of Pakistan is serious about providing justice to the people, it must also do away with Article 161(2) of the constitution, which stipulates that "the net profit earned by the federal government, or any undertaking established or administered by the federal government, from the bulk generation of power at [a] hydro-electric station shall be paid to the province in which the hydro-electric station is situated."

In 2001, the Northern Areas Legislative Council came up with a joint resolution in favour of the construction of the dam on the condition that it be renamed Diamir Dam, but the generous offer, as is usual, received no attention in Islamabad. Today the public mood in the region has changed dramatically. People in the Northern Areas, and particularly Diamir, strongly believe that they should have been consulted, taken into confidence about the blessings and blights of the dam. Their long-standing conflict over boundaries with the NWFP should have been settled, and they should have been extended assurances for a fair treatment before the political announcement was made regarding construction of the dam.

That did not happen, and now people in Diamir and elsewhere in the Northern Areas are furious, reacting in the way Sindhis and Pakhtuns fussed over Kalabagh. They will protest, strike, grow violent, but in the end their demand for fairness and justice will most likely be ignored. Just as all their concerns about turning Gilgit and Baltistan into the faceless and ambiguous 'Northern Areas' have been ignored, just as their inalienable political and constitutional rights have been ignored for the last 58 years, just as their once popular accession to Pakistan has been ignored in the name of Kashmir. There is only one hope: when the president performs the ground-breaking ceremony at the dam site, he will break new grounds by providing justice to the unfairly wronged people of the Northern Areas.

by : M.Ismail Khan

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[COLOR=Blue][B]The best way to predict the future is to invent it[/B][/COLOR]

The practice of Irrigation existed in the Indus valley in ancient times as
remains of old civilizations of Moenjodaro and Harepa remind us that
inhabitants of this fertile valley were acquainted with the art of ?well?
and ?river? irrigation.

Before the middle of nineteenth century irrigation was done through
inundation canals, which worked only during high supply periods. The modern
era of irrigation practice in the sub continent took start in 1854 when a
Directorate of canals was established under chief engineer, irrigation
works. Step by step development of canal systems is given as under.

The older canal system known as the Upper Bari Doab Canals, off taking from
river Rabi was improved and opened from Modhupur Headworks (now in India) in
the year 1859.

The Sirhind canal (now in India) was opened in 1872 from river Sutlej at
Ruper headworks, followed by Sidhnai canal from river Ravi at Sidhnai
headworks in 1886, Lower Chenab Canal from River Chenab at Khanki headworks
in 1892 and Lower Jhelum Canal from river Jhelum at Rasul Headworks in 1901.

The tripple canal project comprising Upper Jhelum Canal from river Jhelum at
Mangla, Uper Chenab Canal from river Chenab at Marala and Lower Bari Doab
Canal from river Ravi at Balloki headworks was commissioned during 1912 ?
1915.

The Sutlej Valley Project, comprising Depalpur, Baikaneer and Eastern Canals
off taking from Ferozepur headworks (now in India), Eastern Sadiqia, Fordwah
and Pakpattan canals from Sulemanki Headworks, Bahawal, Qaim and Mailsi
canals from Islam Headworks, was completed in 1922 ? 29 to utilize the
waters of river Sutlej and Beas.

To improve the Sidhnai Canal system Trimmu Barrage. Project consisting of
Haveli and Rangpur canals was put into operation during the year 1939.

The sind Sagar Doab, a strip of land between the rivers Indus and Jhelum was
provided with irrigation facilities through Thal canal off taking from
Kalabagh Barrage from Kalabagh Barrage on River Indus in the year 1949.

Taunsa Barrage on Indus was completed in the year 1959.


With the development of irrigation networks in Sutlej and on Indus valley
various states expressed their concern over the adequacy of available
supplies compared with demand. To redress the concerns of various states in
Indus Basin Commissions/Committees were setup by Govt. The detail is as
under.


Anderson Committee

In view of continuing protest from Bahawalpur State & Sindh even after
sanction of Sukkur & Sutlej valley projects, the Govt. of India set up a
committee popularly known as Anderson Committee to study the distribution of
supplies. The recommendations of this committee were passed by Govt. of
India in 1937. These related to additional allocation of water to Sukkur and
Panjnad canals, allocation to Paharpur, Thal and Haveli canals and basis for
sharing of shortages and utilization of surplus supplies.



Rao Commission

In October 1939, the Sindh Govt. again lodged a complaint regarding effects
of Punjab projects in on inundation canals of Sindh. The Govt. of India and
Govt. of Sindh appointed a three members Indus Commission known as the Rao
Commission. The commission recommended that the principal of equitable
apportionment should govern the respective rights of the parties and
affirmed the rule that an Upper riparian can not take any action that
interferes with the existing irrigation of the lower riparian. The
commission also suggested that representatives of Punjab and Sindh should
sort out sharing of water on bilateral basis.


Indus Waters Treaty

By the time, Pakistan and India became two independent countries, the
irrigation system of the Indus Basin had already become the most extensive
and complex in the world. But the partition line in 1947, drawn between
them, cut across the rivers and canals comprising the most highly developed
portion of the Indus Basin irrigation system in a manner that certain canals
headworks, which also supplied water to canals in Pakistan, were left in the
Indian Territory. The assumption probably was that arrangements for
continuity of supplies made at the time of partition would be respected. But
India lost no time to exploiting its upstream position and in April 1948
arbitrarily cut off the supplies to every Canal crossing into Pakistan.

A serious situation developed on the Pakistan side, which led to long drawn
negotiations. The issue was settled with the signing of the Indus Basin
Treaty through the good offices of the World Bank in 1960. Under the Treaty,
the Indians were given the right to use the waters of the three eastern
rivers, namely, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej and Pakistan, the three
western rivers, namely, the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab.

In the closing stages of the negotiations with India on the Indus waters,
the Government of Pakistan set up an organization, called the Indus Basin
Advisory Board (IBAB), in 1959 to prepare a plan for replacement of water
from the western rivers for uses in Pakistan, till then met from the eastern
rivers. The list of works, both for replacement and development, was
approved by the Government and is generally referred to as the ?Settlement
Plan?.

As per ?settlement plan? any points of disputes between the units in
Pakistan will be resolved in a fair and equitable manner, if necessary by
appointment of impartial commission by Federal Govt. The following
committees/commission were appointed for apportionment of Indus Water after
independence.

Akhtar Hussain Committee year 1968.

Fazal Akbar Committee year 1970.

Anwar ul Haq Commission 1976.

Haleem Committee 1983.

The issue of water distribution could not be resolved and provinces received
irrigation supplies through adhoc distribution of Indus waters notified by
Federal Govt. for each period/season of the year.


Water Accord

During the year 1991 provinces agreed to devise a mechanism for sharing
Indus waters which is known as Indus Waters Accord.

As per para 2 of the Accord the sharing of water among the provinces is as
under:


APPORTIONMENT OF THE WATERS OF THE INDUS RIVER SYSTEM

BETWEEN THE PROVINCES ? ACCORD 1991

(IN MAF)



PROVINCES KHARIF RABI TOTAL
PUNJAB 37.07 18.87 55.94
SINDH 33.94 14.82 48.76
NWFP 3.48 2.30 5.78
(b) CIVIL CANALS* 1.80 1.20 3.00
BALUCHISTAN 2.85 1.02 3.87



*INCLUDING ALREADYS SANCTIONED URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL USES FOR METROPOLITAN
KARACHI.

*UNGAUGED CIVIL CANALS ABOVE THE RIM STATIONS





BALANCE RIVER SUPPLIES (INCLUDING FLOOD SUPPLIES AND FUTURE STORAGES) SHALL
BE DISTRIBUTED AS BELOW:


Punjab Sindh Baluchistan NWFP Total
37% 37% 12% 14% 100%

__________________
Life is a kaleidoscope of flaws, desires, emotions and mishaps__ YHK

Kalabagh & the water crisis
By Shahid Javed Burki


“WATER is precious, use it wisely” says a notice placed in the bathroom of a five-star hotel in Karachi. There could not be a sounder piece of advice but it should be given not only to the guests at five-star hotels but to the entire citizenry of Pakistan. As I wrote in this space last week, Pakistan is rapidly moving to the situation when it will begin to be ranked among the countries that have severe shortages of fresh water. Wise use of this precious resource is one way of dealing with this crisis.

There are three basic uses of water — agriculture, industry and human consumption. Using water wisely in these three uses is one way of saving the country from economic and social disaster. The greatest waste takes place in agriculture where vast amounts of water are lost to evaporation and seepage or used in such water-intensive crops as sugar cane. Wouldn’t it be more prudent to invest the government’s scarce resources in improving the efficiency of water use in agriculture rather than commit them to the construction of large dams such as the one Kalabagh? This is a fair question but it should remembered that improving the efficiency of water use and increasing its supply are not mutually exclusive solutions to the coming crisis. They should be done simultaneously.

I recall a conversation with the late S.S. Kirmani, the father of the Indus Water Replacement Works. It was his remarkable engineering vision that gave shape to the replacement works. It was the persistence and stubbornness of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was then the chairman of Wapda, and Kirmani that finally led to the agreement of the donor community to finance the construction of Tarbela on the Indus. After serving as Wapda’s chief engineer, Kirmani went to the World Bank and became director of projects in East Asia. He was of the view that by simply lining the canals and tens of thousands of distributory channels, and straightening them, and levelling the fields that received water from the irrigation system and changing the cropping pattern, Pakistan could double the availability of water for irrigation.

The expenditure needed for such a programme would be considerably less than that to constantly ensure an increase in supply. But such a programme can only be completed over a long period of time. Its success will depend on the education and skill development of the farming community, largescale commercializing of agriculture, the removal of implicit and explicit government subsidies on inputs such as water and power and privatization of all commercial operations. Meanwhile the water shortage will continue to become more serious. Islamabad needs to focus immediately on the supply side.

There are several reasons why the policymakers in Islamabad need to worry about the coming shortage of water. The most significant of these relate to the availability of food supply for a population that is already being fed by imports. According to the government’s water sector investment planning study, unless this situation is addressed, the country will face a deficit of 12 million tons in grain output in 2013. In other words, having once become the granary for all of British India, within a matter of a few years Pakistan will become one of the largest food deficit countries in the world. In today’s prices, it will have to spend $4 billion to $5 billion a year to save its population from starvation.

The immediate response to this developing crisis is to increase the supply of water by tapping what is available in the impressive system of rivers that run through the country. This is where the construction of large dams such as the one at Kalabagh enters the picture. The proposed dam at Kalabagh is a critical component of the strategy to help Pakistan face a catastrophic shortage of water.

I was reminded by a member of an audience to which I spoke in Karachi on the day Dawn published my first article on the subject of the coming water crisis that I should not underestimate the sentiment in Sindh against the construction of the dam. All the more reason why we should look at some of the arguments that have been advanced against Kalabagh as well as those put forward in its favour. I will spend the rest of this article on looking at the “cons” of Kalabagh and indicate why I believe most of the criticism advanced are not grounded in facts.

The dam site is located 210 km downstream of Tarbela and 26 km upstream of Jinnah barrage on the Indus. When completed, the rock fill dam will rise to a height of 260 feet and will be 4,375 feet long. It will create a reservoir with usable storage capacity of 6.1 MAF. This will almost fully compensate the anticipated losses at Chashma, Mangla and Tarbela and bring back the amount of water available for use to the point reached in 2004. The dam will have spillways on either side; on the right it will have two spillways to discharge flood waters with the capacity of two million cusecs.

On the left side, a spillway will feed water to a power station that will generate 3,600 MW of electricity. The project, by adding significantly to the contribution of power from hydro sources, will bring about a significant savings in foreign exchange. Since hydro power is much cheaper than thermal power, it will also reduce the price charged to the consumers.

The entire project is estimated to cost $6.1 billion and will take six years to construct. The project is estimated to yield benefits amounting to $1 billion a year — it will pay for the cost of constructing it in less than six years. Both, the estimates of cost and benefits, are outdated. The dam would probably cost $8 billion in today’s prices but its benefit particularly when we factor in the changes that need to be made in the pattern of cropping, will be much higher than $1 billion, perhaps twice as high.

Kalabagh became controversial from the time it was proposed; the opposition to it is based on a number of apprehensions, some of which have changed over time. Initially, the most serious objection to the dam was on the basis of the number of people who were likely to be displaced by the creation of the large reservoir. Most of the affected population is in the NWFP there was apprehension that the lake would almost totally submerge the important city of Nowshera.

However, two experts, one Chinese and another American, produced models to show that the lake would end about 16 kms downstream of Nowshera. The city would not be inundated even by the recurrence of the record flood of August 1929. The two experts concluded that the city would not be affected even after the bed of the lake was raised by sedimentation over a period of 100 years.

Another objection to the dam is that even if Nowshera is not submerged, the sheer size of the lake — about 420 square kilometres — would still displace a large number of people. My estimate is that the number of people who will have to move if the dam’s construction were to start today would be about 150,000. This is not a small number but there is now enough experience from around the world to draw up a resettlement plan that would leave the displaced people economically and socially better off compared to their present situation.

The Chinese, for instance, have done a commendable job of caring for the displaced population from large dams. The Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze alone has displaced 1.1 million people, more than seven times the number likely to be affected by the Kalabagh dam and the Kalabagh lake.

Wapda’s plans for resettlement call for housing the displaced population in new towns and villages — 27 in number — to be located along the periphery of the lake. Some $800 million have been allocated for resettlement works which, from the perspective of international standards, is a generous amount. It is equivalent to $550 per head of the population.

Sindh’s opposition to the project is based on the flow in the Indus expected after the completion of the project. Once again, expert opinion regards these fears as largely unfounded. After the completion of Tarbela, some 35 MAF of water flowed into the sea. The Kalabagh reservoir with a total capacity of 6.1 MAF would still leave 29 MAF in the river. However, it should be recognized that dams don’t consume water; they only store water during periods of abundance.

In fact, by regulating the flow they can actually increase the supply during dry seasons. This was amply demonstrated by Tarbela dam. According to Wapda, the total canal withdrawals from the Indus in 1960-67 were 35.6 MAF. These increased to 44.2 MAF after 1976, following the completion of Mangla and Tarbela. The same is likely to result from the construction of Kalabagh. A computer model has estimated that canal withdrawals in Sindh would increase by about 2.25 MAF after the construction of the dam which would allow for its greater regulation..

Then there is the fear that Kalabagh, by holding back water, would affect the ‘sailaba’ crops, watered by floods that occur practically every year along the wide banks of the Indus. There are at this time about 660,000 acres under this type of cultivation but water availability is uncertain and farmers normally augment the supply by tubewells installed in the area. By regulating the flow in the river, Kalabagh would help this class of farmers.

There is also some apprehension that by reducing the flow in the river in the initial phase of the project when the reservoir is being filled, the construction of Kalabagh will result in the backflow of sea water into the Indus estuary. Even in this case, experts believe that the intrusion of water from the sea has already reached its maximum level and is not likely to increase further following the construction of the dam.

On the positive side, the additional storage that will become available after the construction of Kalabagh will make it possible to implement the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991 that assumed availability to be maintained rather than depleted through silting of the Mangla and Tarbela reservoirs. Without Kalabagh, inter-provincial tensions on water distribution would be exacerbated since the amount of water to be distributed would be significantly reduced.

Rather than allow a great deal of political emotion to seep into the debate on the construction of the dam at Kalabgh, President Musharraf needs to move forward with firmness, indicating that he has consulted, listened, reflected and decided to proceed in the larger interest of the nation. It was only with this approach and attitude that the administrations that oversaw the previous major developments of the water of the Indus river were able to succeed. There is a lesson to be learned from experience.