CSS Forums - Moscow summit 2009

ONLY someone with a crystal ball may be able to predict the outcome of the three-day Moscow summit.
However, the meetings between President Barack Obama, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will be seen as an extension of the ongoing struggle between global heavyweights America and Russia to increase their zone of influence with minimum bargains.
A glance at their relations since 1945 shows that America and Russia have never compromised on their respective national interests, no matter which leaders held the reins of power. Mr Obama’s offer to reset the relations button with Russia appears to be a placebo since this action can only restore the machine to its default conditions. Underlying conflicts resurface unless paradigms change.
While there have been improvements in relations on the surface, recent events in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and elsewhere point to a different direction. The Moscow summit is not likely to achieve anything substantial except that there may be minor bargains encapsulated in a lot of rhetoric. However, these can be a matter of survival for the smaller players.
The argument can be better understood by comparing core Russian and American interests to the summit agenda. Russia’s aspirations did not diminish by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Thanks to Putin, Russia is waking up from a rather short slumber. Russia is projected to lose a staggering 40 million from its current population of 140 million in the next 50 years, after Cold War Russia’s vulnerable borders shrunk from a 1,000km-plus buffer against Nato to less than 200km with no geographical barrier in between. Moreover, its economy lacks diversity and stands on the single pole of abundant energy resources.
Owing to these geopolitical imperatives, Russia cannot avoid reasserting its power and reclaim it former zone of influence. Its interest in Europe brings it in direct clash with the US with the potential to spark another Cold War. America may be ready to concede some ground on certain issues but will not let Russia expand its influence in the former Soviet states. As geographer Halford John Mackinder said, “Who rules East Europe (Russian Europe) commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (Eurasia); who rules the World-Island controls the world.” With diametrically opposite grand strategies their agendas cannot be different. It is difficult to understand how Russia and the US will a strike compromise at this summit; at best it will be a test of wills. The Obama-Medvedev meeting in April this year set a bad precedent as there was no unanimity of views.
To stop the further expansion of Nato, Russia desperately wants America to recognise it as a regional power that dictates policies in the Caucasian region, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia. To show its muscle, Russia got Kyrgyzstan to close America’s Manas air base in May and then offered the carrot to Americans last week by asking Bishkek to reverse the decision.
Whether America gives up on its embittered Georgian and Ukrainian allies will be clear soon. The improvement in relations will be subject to American neutrality towards the Baltic states and Poland, which is a long call given that these states are members of Nato.
During his April visit to Europe, Obama had promised not to abandon Prague and Warsaw and promised the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Shield but linked it to a threat from Iran. Russia has stood for Iranian interests so far. The fate of these smaller players now hangs in balance over the test of US and Russian wills during the summit.
The dictates of America’s grand strategy demand the country’s continuity as a preeminent global power and Washington will seek such recognition from Moscow that would mean the dilution of the latter’s power and influence. Could this affect the interests of others? America’s main supply route through Pakistan to Afghanistan is highly vulnerable. After a long debate Russia has finally agreed to let US military cargo enhanced passage rights through its territory. This has grave implications for Pakistan since a less dependent America means a more demanding America.
As for Iran, the US needs Russian influence in two areas: coercing Iran into halting its alleged nuclear weapons programme and the cessation of advanced military technology supplies to Tehran, which affect the regional balance. Russia and America are likely to achieve a breakthrough in these two agendas since there is little to lose in doing so. America will be happy to save face in the region even if it has to temporarily jettison support to Poland and Nato’s expansion — it can always make a comeback like it does in Pakistan.
Granting lebensraum to the Russians in Europe is a risky business. In February, Russians used their gas supply through Ukraine as a lever to bring the latter and other European powers to agree to its terms. Russia will be further emboldened once America looks the other way and it may be difficult to contain it later. There is deepseated anti-Russian sentiment in the former Soviet states of Europe and ditching them at this stage may affect longterm US credibility.
Disregarding domestic sentiment in relations with Russia can affect Mr Obama’s popularity although the same would not apply to his Russian counterpart who can afford to disregard it. At this point, one can only keep one’s fingers crossed and hope that world politics are not affected negatively by the state of USRussia ties in the months ahead