When everyone is dead, the Great Game in Central Asia is over: Not before.
(As quoted in Peter Hopkirk, ‘The Great Game Revisited’)
The paper examines the geopolitical situation in Central Asia after September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US, which resulted in the deployment of the US-led anti-terrorist coalition forces in the Central Asian States (CAS), to carry out combat operations in Afghanistan, where the main suspect held responsible by the US, Osama bin Laden, was taking refuge under the former Taliban regime. The focus of this study is to evaluate the Central Asian perspectives on the geopolitical situation of the region, as it prevailed then, and consequent to the events in neighbouring Afghanistan.
Given the socio-political complexities of the CAS, their internal dynamics are not an easy matter to grasp, and least of all to predict its possible directions, which in the present context of Afghan-related developments, is becoming more and more complicated with the passage of time. The various states of the Central Asian region, as well as of neighbouring areas and other global states, remain in pursuit of both preserving their national interests, or to derive political benefits from this strategically important region, whose huge hydrocarbon resources are a source of interest to them. Since the early 19th century, with the start of the era of industrialisation and its growing requirements for energy, there was also the corresponding pursuit of the need to explore, exploit, and control the hydrocarbon resources where these existed, including the huge oil and gas reserves known even then to exist in the Caucasus and Central Asian regions.1 This rationale was a dominant feature in the external factors that influenced the geopolitics of Central Asian region earlier. After the CAS achieved their independence, from the disbanded Soviet Union in 1991, it continues to attract various international state and non-state actors to carve out a share in the abundant oil and gas resources of the region. But the events of 9/11 have brought some major changes in the traditional geopolitical landscape of the Central Asian region.
The current geopolitical chess game in Central Asia, referred to as ‘Great Anti-Terrorist Game’,2 is different from the earlier geopolitical developments of the region in several ways. Before September 11, Russia figured as dominant actor due to its geographic proximity and its own compulsions to dominate the region. Post-revolution Russia in its USSR phase made efforts to forge deep political, economic, linguistic, and cultural linkages with the CAS. In the current ‘Great Anti-Terrorist Game’, along with Russia, the USA is also emerging as a dominant player due to its military presence in the region as well as the huge military resources at its command. At present there are around 1000-1500 troops of the US 10th Mountain Division, stationed at Uzbekistan’s Khanabad air base. Another 3000 troops of US-led anti-terrorist coalition are deployed at the Kyrgyz Manas International airport, and an unidentified number of forces are stationed both in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.3 In response to their extensive and active support to the US in its war on terrorism, the CAS are receiving economic, political, and military assistance from the US, giving the US greater leverage over Russia in this strategically important region, vis-à-vis securing an access to the land-locked region and consolidating its position in order to exercise control over the huge oil and gas resources of the region. Using the events of 9/11, the US has enmeshed its short-term goal of pursuing Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network with its long-term goal to establish its presence in the Central Asian region. It should not be forgotten that it places the US in direct proximity to both Russia and China, where both are vulnerable. Although it remains to be seen what directions that presence will take in times to come.
To understand the present post-9/11 geopolitical landscape of the region, the following three sets of relations are essential to understand and analyse, as they form the main aspects of the new ‘Great Anti-Terrorist Game’. These are (a) US-Central Asia Relations, (b) Russia-Central Asia Relations, and (c) Russia-US Relations.
Plz pray,
Sardarzada

The US and CAS had no prior history of diplomatic relations before the demise of former Soviet Union, but throughout the 1990s they maintained good friendly relations with each other. Massive economic, political, and military support remained the main instruments of the US policy towards this region. In fact, the region’s strategic importance, owing to its unique geographic location with proximity to both Russia and China, and its huge oil and gas resources, and its willingness to welcome and absorb the US-led western ideals of democracy and free market economy made it one of the important regions for the US. For CAS, the US provided an alternate to the decades of Russian supremacy, which they wanted to distance themselves from.
The events of September 11 further strengthened bilateral relations between various CAS and the US. Their common borders with and geographic proximity to Afghanistan, on an immediate basis made the CAS frontline states in the US war on terrorism. Four CAS allowed the US to use their airbases in war on terrorism, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Even Turkmenistan, an officially declared neutral state which is not part of any regional organisation or alliance system in Central Asia, offered its bases and air corridor to the US air force for logistical support, search and rescue operations. All the airbases were for re-supply missions, transporting of aid goods, carrying out search and rescue operations, for handling any emergency situations, and in some cases launching attacks on Afghanistan, as in the case of the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan.4
Besides attaining its short-term military objectives, in the long-term the US presence in the CAS offers some other advantages to the US as well. The proximity of the CAS is not only to Afghanistan, but also to Iran, Russia, China and its Tibet region. The Central Asian bases have placed the American forces close to China’s western frontier where, in combination with the US bases located in the proximity of China’s eastern and southern regions - such as those based in South Korea and the Indian Ocean - they allow the US to militarily encircle China. These bases in Central Asia have positioned the US troops close to Russia’s southern border for the first time in the post-WW II period. The Central Asian bases also provide the US military with an outreach to Iran, which Bush singled out as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in his State of the Union address in January 2002. Already, under its ICBM regime, the US has missiles and advanced surveillance systems that can target all important sites in Iran, Russia and China; and with its troops and airforce positioned in active deployment in the Central Asian bases, indicates a grand and horrific strategy of world dominance that lies behind the current US strategies. Moreover, for exercising control over the oil and gas resources of Central Asian region, which according to estimates are around 200 billion barrels of oil and about 236-237 trillion cubic feet of gas5, the US military presence gives the US a leverage over Russia and other states, with regard to the oil diplomacy vis-à-vis Central Asian region. Some American political observers and analysts have gone so far as to state that the September 11 incident was pre-planned to secure an access to and exercise control over the Eurasian hydrocarbon resources. A pamphlet published in New York in December 2001, stated as follows:
‘The heinous terrorist acts of September 11 gave the rulers an excuse to launch a war they had already plotted anyhow. As Bush and his advisors have repeatedly warned, this war has no end in sight. Far more than Afghanistan is at stake. US imperialist, led by Rockfeller’s Exxon Mobil, need to grab the profit bonanza that can come from fuelling the East Asian energy boom anticipated over the next decade or so. The grander strategic design is nothing less than US control of the entire Eurasian landmass and the sea-lanes that serve it.’6
The US military presence in Central Asia will have profound effects on the alliance system of the region, which was earlier marked with the dependence of the CAS on Russia, given their seven decades of subjugation under the former Soviet rule. In the post-9/11 period, the CAS are entering into a new phase of strategic partnership with the US. Of these, Uzbekistan enjoys a more special status, since it signed a strategic security pact with the US on 12th October 2001, which the Uzbek government termed as having established ‘a qualitatively new relationship based on a long-term commitment to advance security and regional stability.’7 Since then high level US officials have been streaming in and out of CAS. For instance, the US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, paid four official visits to the CAS since 9/11, the last one being in April 2002, to appraise the role that these states played during the war on terrorism.8 Similarly, the Presidents of CAS also paid separate official visits to the US. For example, the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, went to the US on a state visit in December 2001. The Uzbek President paid a four-day official visit to the US in March 2002. Both the countries signed with the US ‘the Decleartion on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework’, and affirmed their joint commitments to tackle the threat of terrorism in all its forms.
The eager receptivity of the CAS to the US presence and role in the region lie in their own economic, political, and security concerns. Particularly, a major concern commonly shared by all of the CAS is to attain maximum security guarantees from the US against the terrorist threats in their own region. Since their independence, all these states have been faced with varying kinds and degrees of internal unrest bordering on terrorism, stemming from their religious militant groups, and the historical ethnic disputes existing in these states, with their own outfits like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ul-Tahrir, and Tajikistan’s Tajik Opposition Front, which has remained a security threat to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As events came to light, it brought to the surface the fact that these organisations had links with the al-Qaeda and other regional and global militant religious groups. The US, in its terrorist list has already blacklisted IMU. Its commander, Juma Namangani, was reportedly killed in the early phase of the US bombing on Afghanistan.9 Within this commonly shared concern, there are tensions arising out of the domination of bigger states vis-à-vis their smaller neighbours. In Central Asia that domination is exerted by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and resented by other states, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.10 As stated in the observation that the area’s two biggest states, Kazakhstan (population 14.8 million) and Uzbekistan (24.2 million), ‘are sparring for local hegemony’, while the two smaller states, Kyrgyzstan (4.9 million) and Tajikistan (6.2 million), ‘seek security’.11
When the US troops established their presence in Uzbekistan, there were fears that Uzbekistan would exploit the US support to exercise its hegmonistic designs over other states in Central Asia. However, the stationing of US forces in other CAS, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, has helped mitigate such concerns among the smaller CAS.
All these states need long-term economic support from the US as well, because of their poor economic conditions. A sizeable increase in the US aid and financial assistance to CAS is further strengthening ties among them. For poorer countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the financial resources brought in by the Western troops, particularly in the form of aid assistance, as well as fee charges for utilising base facilities and take off and landing charges, are the main inputs into their deprived economies. Apart from that the US pledged $125 million unconditional assistance to Tajikistan, while $14 million had already been injected into the Kyrgyz economy. It is further expected that $40 million will be further put into the Kyrgyz economy by the end of 2002.12
The most important economic boon for these states would be in form of oil and gas export pipelines from the CAS to the outer world. The recently signed deal between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to construct a gas pipeline from Daulatabad gas field in Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to the Gawader sea port in Pakistan is an encouraging development for the CAS, since the pipelines could be a fore-runner to roads as well. But the crucial link remains stability and peace in Afghanistan for the success of any such project. Signs are that the Afghan government and people are conscious of benefits that would accrue to them out of such developments, and are likely to work for their interests rather than against it.
The political regimes in power in the CAS hope that in response to their active support to the US, it would be less critical of their poor human rights and democracy record. All these regimes in the post-9/11 period, cracked down on their political opposition, which has led to political unrest notably in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan

Plz pray,
Sardarzada

__________________
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife....

The US presence in the CAS is likely to have far-reaching impact on the Russia-Central Asia relations, a fact that is not lost upon the Russian government. Even before the events of September 11, there were tensions between the CAS and Russia. One major reason was the separatist movement by the Chechens, which led to war. After the first Chechen war (1994-96), around four thousand Russian troops and thousands of innocent Chechen civilians were killed.13 The inhumane killings of thousands of innocent Muslims in Chechnya raised sympathies of the Muslim population in the CAS, especially when the Russian government asserted that it would fight the threat of Islamic militancy at all levels and in every former Soviet republic. The Chechen war raised fears of Russia’s intentions to interfere in the internal affairs of other Caucasian and Central Asian states, since Russia insisted that their weak and fragile regimes needed Moscow’s active support in their internal affairs if they were to survive.14 Economically, on account of being dependent on the export routes of Russia for the Central Asian goods and energy resources, the CAS remain wary of Russian dominance. Russia not only pays poorly, but is also very tardy with payments whether it is the government or private sector. Many Russian companies reportedly owe millions of dollars to the CAS.15
Getting the desired economic and political support from the US does not mean that for CAS it will be easy to abandon Russia. Both Russia and the CAS are economically inter-dependent. Approximately 50% of Russian foreign currency revenues are generated by the Central Asian region’s oil and gas sales, in which the Kazakh energy resources are a major contributor. Gas from Turkmenistan flows into Russian markets and supplements Russia’s European exports.16 Turkmenistan is entirely dependent upon Russia’s state-owned gas giant, Gazmprom, for its gas exports, except for a small pipeline that it runs to Iran. The same is the case with the oil-rich Kazakhstan, where only one pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port carries Kazakh oil to the outer world. Although the recent trans-Afghan pipeline deal has raised hopes in Central Asia for another non-Russian route, but that depends largely upon permanent peace in Afghanistan.
For security reasons as well, the CAS cannot end their association with Russia, because of the presence of a large Russian diaspora in these states, which may resist such a move. That, too, could have destabilising effects for the entire region of Central Asia. The presence of Russian military and security guards in these states, makes Russia an important guarantor of and a factor within the Central Asian security scenario. Russia’s historical involvement in the region gives it a deeper understanding of and insight into the regional dynamics, as compared even to the USA. From the CAS point of view as well, the known factor would be preferable to the unknown and uncertain factor.
In fact, Russia itself fears that if regional instability and insecurity, emanating from the illicit drugs and weapons trade, political suppression, religious extremism, and international terrorism, is left unchecked, it may spill over into its own territory.17 That is why since the independence of the region in 1991, Russia has laid emphasis on close security relations with CAS, to attain its own security objectives in the region, as well as to provide the much-needed security to the CAS. The events of 9/11, and the consequent US military presence in the region, only served to increase the emphasis Russia places on multilateral and bilateral cooperation with its neighbours in Central Asia.18 The recent Russian military exercises in the Caspian Sea (7-15 August, 2002), involving around 60 warships and 10,000 men alongwith some Kazakh and Azeri units, is a manifestation of how Russia has accelerated its efforts to pursue and maintain its security influence in this region. The stated objective of these exercises is to check the preparedness of the Russian seamen for tackling any sort of regional and international threats, linked to international terrorism in particular. As the Russian Navy Commander, Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, stated, these exercises show that Russia can protect its interests in the Central Asian and Caucasus region.19 Moreover, the Russian readiness skills for interaction with other Caspian states, will be improved accordingly.20 Some of the regional states, particularly Iran, are sceptical of the Russian designs in the region.
Following the official statements emanating from the US State Department and Pentagon, with respect to the stationing of the US troops in the CAS on a long-term basis, Russia’s resolve to play a decisive role in Central Asian region has also increased. Wary of the US intentions with respect to its future strategy vis-à-vis the CAS, Russia desires to solve all the regional problems by involving the regional states, and minimising the role of outside powers in any future economic, political and security problems of the region. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), held at St. Petersburg (Russia) in June 2002, and the first Summit meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held at Almaty (Kazakhstan) from June 3-5, 2002, is a step in this direction. The fact that the charter of the SCO was signed in the said meeting and a decision also reached in that very meeting on the establishment of a counter-terrorism centre in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), is ample proof of the fact that the revitalisation of the organisation at this crucial hour testifies to Russia’s desire to play a more proactive role in its backyard. Also Russian efforts at the CICA conference, which was attended by nearly 16 countries, testifies to Russia’s ambitions to play a more predominant role in world affairs as a Eurasian power.
Although, at present the geopolitical balance in Central Asia seems to be in favour of the US, in the long run Russia would not allow the US to totally outweigh its own influence in the region. A recent meeting of heads of state of CAS, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, discussed the post-war political situation in Afghanistan, and the prospects of increasing economic cooperation among these states with Russia. In fact, both the CAS and Russia are aware of the fact that sidelining each other in their policies will create security and economic problems for them, that is why all of them are trying hard to maintain a balance in their ties in the American presence in the region. Roger N McDermott, a political consultant at the Scottish centre for International Security at University of Adenburg, commenting on Central Asia-Russia security interdependence, quite rightly points out; ‘… the truth is that the Central Asian states know that Moscow cannot afford to turn its back on them and their struggles and see militant Islam spread further northwards: for them it is not a choice Moscow or Washington, so much as Moscow-plus.’21
Plz pray
Sardarzada

__________________
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife....

For the first time since their independence, the CAS have seen Russia and the US function as allies, sharing the common goal of tackling the threat of international terrorism in all its forms in the region. In this new phase of cooperation, Russia has taken steps such as, providing intelligence data on Afghanistan, opening of its air space for humanitarian missions only, supplying military support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban, and most importantly, helping by not obstructing, the US to secure airbase in former Soviet Central Asian States, four of whom are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.22
These developments have greatly affected the geopolitical re-appraisals for the authoritarian regimes of the CAS. After the demise of Soviet Union, generally speaking both Russia and the US had several parallel interests in Central Asia and Caspian-Caucasus region. These included, containing the threat of Islamic militants, terrorism, check on nuclear proliferation and the spread of small arms in the region in the hands of terrorist elements, drug trafficking, migration of displaced population, environmental degradation, and instability of the entire region. The war on terrorism made these common perceptions stronger than before. During the visit to Russia of US President, George W. Bush in May 2002, he and President Putin signed a Joint Declaration reiterating their ‘common interests’ in the region:
‘We recognize our common interests in promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this [Central Asian and Caucasus] region. The United States and Russia reject the old model of ‘Great Power’ rivalry that can only increase the potential of conflict in these regions. We will support economic and political development and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation on counter terrorism and counter narcotics.’23
The one bone of contention in their policies towards the Central Asian and Caucasus region is the oil and gas pipeline issue, which has overshadowed their common interests. The US wants to lay pipelines bypassing Russia; while Russia wants the pipelines to pass through its own territory. In Russia there are mainly two schools of thought on Putin’s policy of cooperation with the West. There are the liberals who want to integrate Russia with the Western multilateral security and economic organizations like NATO and WTO, which would give Moscow a new identity.24 They are opposed by the communist and conservative nationalist elements, who do not favour any shifts in the traditional Russian policy and assert that the continued US support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that bypasses Russia, is quite a disturbing and an alarming factor in the emerging geopolitics of the region.25 Several think tanks and political and defence analysts in Russia are suggesting to the Kremlin to revise its old traditional policy in Central Asia and play its cards in the region, should the USA prolongs its stay in the region, which would threaten Russian interests. As the Vice President of the Russia’s Reform International Foundation, Nabi Ziyadullayev observed:
‘Russia must play her trumps, which are her traditional ties with Central Asia and Caucasus, her military reckon capable of finding and preventing the attacks of Islamic terrorists now gone to the underground, and her long-time interaction with China, India, Iraq, and Iran in the spheres of atomic power production and arms trade.’26
But quite contrary to these varying prevailing perceptions, signs of cooperation and agreement on the issue of oil and gas export pipelines between the US and Russia have also surfaced. The US supports and appreciates the recent demarcation agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan, and between Russia and Azerbaijan on Caspian Sea, which demarcate their respective sectors of the Sea. On May 16, 2002, the US envoy, Steve Mann, in talks with Azerbaijan’s President, Haider Aliev, commended the approach demonstrated by Russia and other sea for dividing the sea into sectors.
In fact, Russia is well aware of the fact that its current state of the economy is not in a position to challenge the US economic supremacy and military superiority in the region. Moreover, in return to its full-fledged support to the US, Russia expects US to turn a blind eye towards its operations in Chechnya.27 On the other hand, the US also knows the Russian sensitivities in this region, which still forms Russia’s soft underbelly. The US knows that it cannot destabilise the decades-long and deep-rooted economic, political, cultural, historical, and linguistic linkages between Russia and the CAS. Observers feel that Moscow and Washington would obviously try to prevent their competition for control of energy resources of Central Asia from getting out of hand.28 In their May 2002 meeting, the Russian and the US presidents reaffirmed their commitment to increase bilateral economic cooperation, particularly in energy exploration and in the development of the oil and gas rich Caspian Sea region.29
Plz pray,
Sardarzada

__________________
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife....

The events of September 11, thrust the CAS into a challenging situation. Overnight these states became important to both the US and Russia, who are bestowing them with political, economic, and security concessions, which they could not have thought of during the last one decade following their independence. It largely depends upon the CAS as to how they exploit the emerging geopolitical situation by balancing the US and Russian interests in their welfare.
Deriving economic benefits from US presence in their region will have to be balanced by their manifold linkages with Russia to allay its own security concerns. Russia can very easily instigate and support the anti-state elements within the CAS, that function as extremist and opposition elements in the region, to sabotage the security measures in CAS guaranteed by the US, and are thus an important trump card in the Russian hands, which would be used whenever Russia feels the need. Recently, Turkmenistan’s opposition leader, Boris Shikhmuradov was in Moscow, reportedly trying for an uprising against Turkmen President, Suparmurad Niyazov.30
Moreover, given the manner of the US commitment world-wide, the political and security support of the US to the CAS is short-term in nature. Meanwhile, the authoritative regimes in Central Asia have tried to capitalise on the US presence to strengthen their hold in their respective countries, as the following developments show. The referendum in Uzbekistan in January 2002, extended the term of President Islam Karimov for the next five years; the removal of Turkmen Security officials who might have threatened President Niyazov’s rule; the arrest and trial of several opposition leaders both in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, can be quoted as examples of undemocratic trends in the CAS. Like in other countries around the region, there is a rising distrust for the US among the masses of CAS, who, while appreciating the American effort to eliminate Taliban and al-Qaeda would perceive that USA is ‘prioritising counter terrorism to the detriment of human rights, and the promotion of democracy is being translated into direct US support of increasingly repressive and authoritarian Central Asian regimes. Growing number of disaffected Central Asians are thus seeking membership of Islamic opposition groups as the only alternative for invoking change.’31 Most of the regional and international human rights organisations have expressed grave concerns about the US support to the repressive regimes in Central Asia, as these states and particularly Uzbekistan have a poor human rights record. Uzbek President, Islam Karimov has been charged of several human rights abuses like torture of dissidents, politically motivated arrests and custodial deaths. This has led and is still leading towards ordinary people joining extremist groups who pledge that they would get rid of Islam Karimov’s repressive rule.
Many analysts believe that the US presence and its political support to the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia may lead towards problems like resurgence of Islamic militant groups, drug trafficking, smuggling, and economic corruption. The US presence is fuelling the already rampant economic corruption in the CAS. For example in Kyrgyzstan, where already civil unrest prevails because of the Government’s measures against its opposition, the President’s relatives are reportedly using the American money for their own benefit. President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, acknowledged that his son-in-law, Adil Toigonbayev, sold jet fuel to the US airbase.32
In fact, the US is in a strong position to use its influence in the region to push the regimes towards reforms, by making its economic and security assistance contingent on their democratic and economic reforms, thus addressing the root cause of the peoples’ dissatisfaction, which lies in ongoing poverty, unemployment, and the lack of education. The post-9/11 period has brought for the CAS the chances of change in the traditional geopolitical set-up in the region, which can be beneficial if their leadership rises to the occasion. The oil and gas resources, which were once the cause of conflict among various powers in the region, may also become the greatest hope for peace and development in the region, particularly if the dominant players like the US and Russia convert their confrontation over the exploitation of the oil and gas in the CAS, to one of multilateral cooperation.
However, much depends on the regimes of the CAS and how they preserve their national interests. Like other dominant actors in the region, no one is more aware than the ruling regimes of the CAS that ‘Central Asian politic is in fact a house of cards: every time you remove one element, the whole thing comes crashing down.’33 So sidelining one for the sake of the other may again thrust the CAS in a ‘New Great Game’ situation of 1990s, in which Russia and US tried to counterweigh each other, but at the cost of the entire region’s economic and political stability and prosperity.
Plz pray,
sardarzada

__________________
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife....

1. Dr. Pavel K. Baev, ‘How Does History Inform Russia’s Policy in the Great Anti-Terrorist Game?’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1(13), 2002, p. 14.
2. Ibid.
3. J. Eric Duskin, ‘Permanent Installation’, www.inthesetimes.com/ issues/26/11/features2.shtml
4. ‘Russia surrounded with US military bases’, www.cdi.org/russia/200-12.cfm
5. Bruce R. Kumiholm, ‘The Geopolitics of Caspian Basin’, The Middle Eastern Journal,Vol. XXXXXIV No.4, Autumn 2000, pp.549-550.
6. ‘Capitalism after September 11’, www.plp.org/pamphlets/ afghanwarpamph110.htm
7. M. A. Shaikh, ‘US-Russian alliance against terrorism: Central Asian geopolitics’, http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/w...usruss-geo.htm
8. Central Asia Report, www.rferl.org/centralasia/2002/05/ 17-020502.html
9. ‘America’s Afghan War: Courting the Central Asian States’, http://www.subcontinent.com/sepral/b...n200111269.htm
10. ‘Out of shadows’, www.worldlink.co.uk/stories/storyReader$1065.
11. Ibid.
12. Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Dangers of Playing the Central Asian Game’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 14, No.6, June 2002.
13. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad; The Rise of Islamic Militancy in Central Asia, 2002, (Vanguard; Lahore), pp. 193-195.
14. Ahmed Rashid, ibid, pp.193-195.
15. Nadeem Malik, ‘Race of oil, gas pipeline heats up’, www.atimes.com/articles.html
16. Fiona Hill, ‘The Caucasus and Central Asia in US Foreign Policy’, www.brook.edu/default.htm
17. Constantine Dmitriev and Mark Eaton, ‘The Trans-Caspian After 11 September, 2001’, Central Asia and the Caucasus: Journal of Social and Political Studies, No. 3(15), 2002, pp.21-23.
18. Ibid.
19. ‘Caspian: Russia starts large scale military exercises’, http://www.middleeastwire.com=8080/s...e.jsp?id=16959.
20. ‘Second phase of joint cruse starts on Caspian Sea’, www.kazakhstannews.com/p/5d/95d023561.html.
21. Ibid.
22. Vadim Volkov, ‘Russia’s Stakes in Anti-Terrorist Game’, socvrates.berkeley.edu/caucasus/newsletter/2001-01.pdf
23. http://www.whithouse.gov/news/releas...20020524-2.htm
24. Timothy J. Colton and Micheal McFaul, ‘America’s Real Russian Allies’, Foreign Affairs,Vol. 80 No. 6, November-December 2001, p. 48.
25. Sadia Sulaiman, ‘Role of Central Asia in war Against Global Terrorism: Futuristic Appraisal’, Strategic Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 89.
26. ‘Central Asia: Seven Months Without Russia’, www.rosbalt.com/2002/06/ 46575.html
27. ‘US and Russia seed of ‘New World Order’ seen’, www.rense.com/political/politics.htm
28. M. A. Shaikh, op.cit.
29. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relea...5/20020524.htm
30. Stephen Blank, ‘The Turkmen Challenge’, http://www.cacianalyst.org/2002-07-0..._TURKMENISTAN_ CHALLENGE.htm
31. Tamara Makarenko, op. cit, p. 16.
32. www.new.bbc.co.uk
33. Ted Rall, ‘The New Great Game: Oil Politics in Central Asia’, http://www.chss.montclair.edu/englis...hewgtgame.html
Plz pray,
Sardarzada

__________________
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife....