The last calendar year was by far the most tumultuous in a decade of tense and mistrustful relations between Pakistan and the United States. It began with CIA contractor Raymond Davis shooting and killing two Pakistanis in broad daylight in Lahore, then only worsened in May when Osama bin Laden was found and killed in a US raid at a compound near the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad (an episode that severely angered Pakistanis and embarrassed the Army, which was domestically seen as unable to secure the homeland against foreign intrusion and internationally suspected of providing refuge to America’s worst enemy). Tensions escalated further as the US began pressuring Pakistan to attack the Haqqani Network (HN), a Taliban group with safe havens in North Waziristan. Pakistan refused, and crisis hit when the HN launched a twenty-two hour assault on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul. An infuriated Admiral Mike Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lashed out against Pakistan, saying the HN was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Weeks of diplomatic efforts finally thawed relations, but just as the situation stabilized, a NATO attack on a Pakistani checkpoint in Salala in late November threw the relationship into a tailspin. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers died in the two-hour assault. Pakistan was furious, immediately suspending NATO supply lines and boycotting the Bonn conference on Afghanistan held in early December.

The crises of 2011 prompted debates in both countries over how to move forward. In Washington, several administration officials and members of Congress have argued for sidelining Pakistan and giving India a larger stake in Afghanistan. Others insist that it is important to tread carefully and that Pakistan cannot just be dumped. In Pakistan, many are arguing for complete disengagement while others are pushing for new rules of engagement.

There are two fundamental problems undergirding US-Pakistan troubles. First, instead of a broad partnership that includes trade and cultural linkages, the two countries have a one-dimensional transactional relationship centered along security concerns, i.e., the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In a way, General Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s retired Army chief and ambassador to the US, underscored this point, saying that, in his assessment, “US-Pakistan relations were at their worst because relations between the Pentagon and the Pakistan Army were unstable.” US-Pakistan relations are further complicated because of clashing security interests, especially vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban.

These two problems will not yield to quick diplomatic fixes. Barring a fundamental re-thinking, Washington and Islamabad should get used to making the best of an ambiguous alliance, and one that, going forward, will be limited, transactional, and security-centered, featuring competition over the endgame in Afghanistan, cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda, and a trimmed-down and conditional aid structure.

The main source of US-Pakistan tensions has been the war in Afghanistan, and recent scuffles are linked to the shifting American strategy there. In 2009, the Obama administration set a goal of reversing the momentum of the Taliban by carrying out counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan. The main objective was not to defeat the Taliban, but to create a situation that could allow for a face-saving withdrawal. The 2009 troop surge was aimed at gaining control in major cities and roadways and imposing costs on the Taliban that would force them to the negotiating table. These objectives would be bolstered by the parallel Afghan-led national reconciliation program announced in January 2010, two months after the November surge. The US publicly supported the process and even established a special fund of $1.5 billion to provide monetary incentives to Taliban fighters.

However, Pakistan’s role was crucial in the success of this program. While NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) targeted the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan was supposed to launch an operation against the group’s bases in North Waziristan. It was to then follow this with political pressure that would force the Taliban to negotiate with the US and the Karzai government. Pakistan, whose security establishment has continued to provide refuge to the Afghan Taliban over the past decade, refused to comply. Leaders of all three major Taliban factions live in Pakistan, with a large part of the leadership of Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura having relocated to Karachi. According to a study published by the London School of Economics, ISI representatives sit in on the meetings and decisionmaking of the Taliban’s major councils. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid has written that members of the Taliban even travel abroad on Pakistani passports.

That Pakistan would support a Taliban insurgency should be hardly surprising. First, Pakistan sees the Taliban as the group in Afghanistan that is the least averse to its interests and most capable of blocking increased influence by India, which Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment fears might pick up the pieces in Kabul following a US withdrawal. It is this strategic calculation, more than anything else, that has prevented Pakistan from cutting the Taliban loose, and it was disastrously naive for US policymakers to think that they could buy off such a deeply held security obsession for temporary offerings of $1.3 billion a year in aid.

It is also true that deviousness in this situation has not been a Pakistani monopoly. While it has been insisting that Islamabad press on with attacks against the Taliban over the past year, the US has held secret meetings with Taliban representatives in Germany and Doha, Qatar—and kept Pakistan out of those talks. This only increased Pakistani insecurity and reinforced the idea that Washington will ignore its interests in the Afghan endgame.

The US goal in Afghanistan now is to reach a negotiated settlement that allows it to withdraw most forces, leaving a few thousand behind on bases in the north and west to protect the government in Kabul and carry out limited counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and other groups that threaten the government or US interests. A Time magazine blogger captured the new strategy poignantly, saying, “Counter-insurgency is so 2007. . . . All the cool kids are into counter-terrorism now.” Moreover, the US and Taliban are also moving toward more serious negotiations. Some initial confidence-building measures such as the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha and the release of Taliban prisoners from Guantánamo are being undertaken.

Prospects of peace, however, cause disunity as much as prospects of war. Pakistan is already suspicious of the Qatar initiative because the US has kept it (and Afghanistan) out of the dialogue. It also won’t hesitate to exercise its influence over members of the Taliban leadership in exile. It has jailed several members of the group and is keeping others under house arrest and will undoubtedly seek several preconditions and concessions before it releases them to participate in the reconciliation.

It is also true that while negotiations shimmer, mirage-like, on the horizon, the Taliban has continued to systematically assassinate people in Karzai’s government to weaken the regime, and there is no guarantee that they will cease such attacks between now and 2014. Any future Taliban attack threatens to again raise the heat between America and Pakistan.

Finally, the negotiations themselves will prove a tough endeavor. During the bargaining process, the United States’ rational goal will be to concede as little as possible in terms of power and control to the Taliban and other Pashtun groups being supported by Pakistan, while Pakistan’s goal will be to draw away as much power as possible from the US and its Afghan allies, who are mainly composed of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras and belong to the group formerly called the Northern Alliance. Moreover, Pakistan, like other countries in the region, would not want a long-term American military presence in Afghanistan and will also make that an issue that will continue to complicate the tug-of-war with the US over ultimate outcomes in Afghanistan.

While the US seeks a political settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, its policy against al-Qaeda is to “disrupt, defeat, and dismantle” the organization and prevent its return to Afghanistan or Pakistan. The war against al-Qaeda is an area in which the US and Pakistan have cooperated in the past and will continue to cooperate in the future. Since 2002, Pakistan has been steadily attacking al-Qaeda in the tribal areas and arresting its operatives in Pakistani cities. Several members of al-Qaeda, including senior member Younis al-Mauritani, were arrested in Pakistan in 2011.

The war against al-Qaeda, however, raises the key issue of drone strikes. Since 2004, the CIA has been conducting a drone campaign inside Pakistan that has eliminated hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters and their local allies. Last year alone, at least three top al-Qaeda operatives, including military chief Ilyas Kashmiri, were killed through drone strikes.

The drone program has, however, been an issue of contention for two reasons. First, these strikes are unpopular with the Pakistani public because of the civilians who perish in the collateral damage. A 2011 Pew survey found that sixty-one percent of Pakistanis disagreed that missile strikes were necessary and eighty-nine percent said strikes kill too many civilians. A survey carried out within the tribal areas by the New America Foundation found that seventy-six percent opposed US missile strikes and forty-eight percent said they kill civilians rather than militants.

While Pakistan’s official policy has been to condemn drone strikes, the military and the civilian government have supported them behind the scenes. In one cable released by WikiLeaks, Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani was quoted as saying, “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, the powerful head of the Pakistani military, was reported to have even requested more drone support in South Waziristan. Moreover, these strikes have occurred with intelligence sharing between the ISI and CIA, with the human intelligence that is required to conduct the strikes coming from Pakistan. Finally, until recently, the drones often flew from Pakistan’s Shamsi Airfield.

But a shift in policy has now taken place with the forced vacation of the Shamsi air base and the Pakistani Parliament’s recommendation that “no unauthorized incursions into Pakistan’s airspace” occur. Based on Pakistan’s new policy, drones can no longer fly out of Pakistani bases and Pakistan itself should have an increased role in the decisionmaking over the strikes. According to Zafar Hilaly, a retired Pakistani diplomat, “due to the indiscriminate and hugely counterproductive attacks of recent years, Pakistan wants to limit their number and also be informed of the strikes and the targets prior to their occurrence.”

Despite these shifts, however, the drone program will continue to be an area of cooperation between the two countries. This point was clearly illustrated through the two strikes that took place on January 10th and 12th of this year. The strikes killed Aslam Awan, a senior al-Qaeda aide, and also allegedly targeted Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of the Movement of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), an al-Qaeda allied group. Several more strikes have taken place since, and despite tensions over the Salala incident no sustained opposition has been voiced from Pakistani officials, evidencing continued cooperation in the drone program and the fight against al-Qaeda.

US aid to Pakistan, a third major issue between the two counties, has become contentious as relations have deteriorated and American policymakers and elected officials have often charged that Pakistan has been given more than $20 billion in recent years in effect to bite the hand that was feeding it. But this is an issue, from Islamabad’s point of view anyhow, that is not as simple as it appears. First, in terms of the breakdown of US financial transfers to Pakistan, based on figures compiled by the Congressional Research Service, from 2002 to 2011 Pakistan is supposed to have received approximately $5.7 billion in security aid, $7.47 billion in economic aid, and $8.9 billion in Coalition Support Fund transfers. Thus, out of $22 billion, US aid to Pakistan has totaled approximately $13.2 billion in ten years. The remaining $8.9 billion, or forty percent of the total, has actually been reimbursements to Pakistan for the costs it has incurred in fighting al-Qaeda and its allies, and not aid.

Second, aid disbursement has been chaotic. Many times payments have been delayed, millions have often remained stuck in the pipeline, such as money from the Kerry-Lugar bill, and Pakistan has been owed money from previous fiscal years.

Finally, US aid has not made enough of an impact on Pakistani civilians to provoke any significant gratitude. Most do not see the benefit of civilian aid, much of which goes to foreign contractors, or is distributed by the government to its cronies and supporters. Moreover, some Pakistanis see US aid as a way to force Pakistan to fight America’s wars. In the absence of tangible benefits and in the face of war wariness, many average Pakistanis are now said to favor the end of American aid so Washington loses the power to compel Pakistan to agree with its objectives.

In the aftermath of the bin Laden raid, and because of congressional desire to cut expenditures, the US-Pakistan aid relationship has changed in the last year. For example, $700 million of military aid was frozen in July 2011, when Pakistan expelled American military trainers. Congress has also made economic and security aid conditional upon Pakistan fighting militants. Although the Obama administration was influential in tripling non-military aid to Pakistan through the Kerry-Lugar bill, experts are predicting a future shrinking of economic assistance as well. Currently there is a bill in the House of Representatives titled the Pakistan Accountability Act, which seeks to cut all aid to Pakistan, except for money for the protection of nuclear weapons. The bill has yet to be voted on, but it foreshadows where the aid relationship is headed. It is quite possible that, over the next few years, US aid to Pakistan will become minimal, except for funds for protection of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan is often described in Washington as “double-dealing” and “duplicitous.” Pakistani analysts describe their country’s relationship with the US to me as “unequal” and “humiliating.” Najam Rafique, a US expert at the Institute of Strategic Studies, in Islamabad, said, “Pakistan has been treated with contempt by the US; it’s been mistreated and ordered around.” Sadly enough, both characterizations are accurate. After 9/11, the US essentially coerced Pakistan to join the Global War on Terror and, since then, often forced it to act against its own perceived interests. Pakistan, on the other hand, accepted Washington’s monetary incentives but undermined the US effort by providing safe havens to its enemies.

The lack of a broad partnership between America and Pakistan prevented the building of mutual trust or the alignment of interests. Instead, the two countries settled for a one-dimensional, transactional relationship centered along security concerns. What was missing was a synchronicity between the two countries’ security calculus for the “AfPak” region. Nor is there much evidence that this state of affairs will change, a point painfully obvious to foreign affairs experts in the US and Pakistan alike. Bruce O. Riedel, a former CIA officer who authored the Obama administration’s 2009 policy review for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was recently quoted in the New York Times Magazine as saying, “I can see how this gets worse . . . And I can see how this gets catastrophically worse. . . . I don’t see how it gets a whole lot better.” Similarly, Zafar Hilaly, a retired Pakistani diplomat, recently said to me, “This relationship is not headed anywhere—our ways part, our paths are divergent.”

While disengagement is not an option—the continuation of relations today despite the horrors of 2011 illustrates this point—limited collaboration is the best that can be expected. Even as both countries cooperate to eliminate al-Qaeda, their positions in the Afghan endgame will be competitive. Pakistan will seek concessions before it allows the Afghan Taliban to fully participate in negotiations. Moreover, it will seek greater influence for its allies in a future Afghan government, while the US will push to secure the power of its Afghan allies. Finally, military and economic aid to Pakistan will be conditional and results-oriented.

It is important to point out that although such a relationship can accomplish short-term objectives, it cannot tackle mid-to-long-term challenges. That is why there is a crucial need for Washington to vigorously rethink relations with Pakistan. US regional interests and Pakistan’s geopolitical importance warrant a pragmatic, complex, and dynamic Pakistan policy. The US plans to maintain sizable bases and a military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014. It also has interests in Central Asia because of the region’s vast reserves of oil and natural gas. On the other hand, Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state led by corrupt and unaccountable leaders and institutions, with a weak economy, growing population, and a youth bulge. Moreover, it suffers from resource scarcity and mismanagement (especially in water, gas, and electricity) and will need resources to provide postconflict stability in many parts of the country. In the long run, the US can scarcely afford a minimalist relationship with Pakistan. It must engage Pakistan on multiple dimensions and create partnerships to encompass the government, business, and financial sector and civil society. The alternative to such a creative rethinking is not pleasant to contemplate.

Shehzad H. Qazi is a research associate at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

Pakistan: Hatf V – Ghauri Ballistic Missile Successfully Test Fired
Wednesday, 28 November 2012

Pakistan today successfully conducted the training launch of Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)Hatf V (Ghauri).

The launch was conducted by a Strategic Missile Group of the Army Strategic Force Command on the culmination of a field training exercise that was aimed at testing the operational readiness of the Army Strategic Force Command. Ghauri ballistic missile is a liquid fuel missile which can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads over a distance of 1300 kms. The test monitoring of the launch was conducted at the National Command Centre through the medium of National Command Authority’s fully automated Strategic Command and Control Support System (SCCSS). It may be recalled that the SCCSS enables robust Command and Control capability of all strategic assets with round the clock situational awareness in a digitized network centric environment to decision makers at the National Command Centre (NCC). The test consolidates and strengthens Pakistan’s deterrence capability, and national security.

The President and Prime Minister congratulated all ranks of the Army Strategic Force Command on the excellent standard achieved during training which was reflected in the proficient handling of the weapon system in the field and the accuracy of the training launch

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

i need articles on mala yousafzai and us elections plz paste on this forum i am new member of this forum and will give css papers 2013 so please guide me

Data on US Elections

http://edition.cnn.com/election/2012...rticle_sidebar

http://edition.cnn.com/election/2012/results/main

http://edition.cnn.com/election/2012/candidates.html

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Sangdil Riwajoon ki ya Imart-e-Kohna Toot bhi Tou Skti hay
Yeh Aseer Sehzadi Choot bhi tou Skti hay

The recent spate of attacks on Shia processions during Muharram has been linked erroneously to security lapses, inapt responses from the authorities, and to the stoking of tensions for political objectives. Some scholars and experts have gone on to claim that the two sects have lived in peace since Pakistan's inception, and that sectarian tensions in Pakistan are always politically motivated.

These assertions may be plausible in some ways but are criminally simple, given that the sectarian violence does involve two rival sects, of which one forms an overwhelming majority and the other is susceptible to discrimination and hostility.

Unlike the ghettoization of Indian Muslims in the events right after India's independence, overt discrimination against Shias is rare in Pakistan. But certain events in the country's history, and the passive silence of the political set up about these events, reveal some frightening truths.

The two most pivotal events in the country's history were the Objectives Resolution and Ziaul Haq's undue preference for Sunni dominance during his tenure. Despite the former, considering Pakistan as a federal, democratic and Islamic entity, the constitutionally ambiguous environment helped the country move towards authoritarian rule. The vast majority of Pakistanis felt content with this arrangement as it was modeled on the British Raj, which had been benevolent and benign according to them. At the same time, it also reinforced a particular mindset of Pakistan's Islamic ideology that depended on interpretations of orthodox Islam, rather than on ensuring peaceful coexistence through secular channels. Military dictatorships reinforced the Sunni ideology of Islam and also sought ways of beating down Shias, by being passive in the advent of religious violence.

There have however been futile attempts to forge some sort of cohesion between rival sects by some political figures. Ziaul Haq, for example, briefly attempted to expand his power base by offering to include some members of the PPP in the government, of whom a majority were Shia, in order to thwart sectarian clashes. The aftereffects of the compulsory Zakat deductions by the Zia government - which applied to all recognized sects of Islam - however ensured that discrimination against a sect considered heretical by orthodox Sunnis continued unabated. The funding provided to both the sects to ensure that rivalries could continue unabated was tolerated during Zia's tenure and the fruits of that tolerance are being witnessed even today, as Shias continue to bear the brunt of hostilities.

This antagonism gained steam again when countries like Saudi Arabia were sought for inspiration and economic support by various dictatorships, whereas the large Shia minority considered Iran's Islamic Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini as an important event in the formation of their identity. Practices which contravene orthodox Sunni Islam were frowned upon with the expansion of the Jihadist culture in the country as well. In 1992, the appointment of Lieutenant General Javed Nasir as the director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence, highlighted the horrific development of the nation's intelligence into serving the interests of the majority of Pakistanis at the expense of those who were considered heretics. Nasir, by all true means, was a member of the evangelical Tableeghi Jamaat, which is a nonpolitical religious movement. Its members share the concern of political Islamists to curb the ascendancy of non-Muslims in the world order. It is thus unfathomable that experts and Interior Minister Rehman Malik fail to point at an intelligence failure and resort to counterterrorism measures such as suspending cellular networks during processions as the only viable solution.

It is quite evident that in a nation where horrendous incidents such as the Gojra riots of 2009 and violence against Ahmadis and Hindus indicate a majority-minority bias, the inability of the government to respond is open to skepticism and all sorts of interpretations.

As far as terrorist outfits are concerned, Stephen Cohen, in his book 'The Idea of Pakistan', has drawn a clear understanding that such groups are connected to larger religious political parties that were used by the army to stop democratic forces from emerging in the country in the 1980s. The events during Gen Musharraf's tenure also reinforce the notion that the events of hostility against the Shias are a product of deeply ingrained animosity directed at a minority sect, in a country which has historically struggled with diversity.

In Karachi, the paramilitary Pakistani Rangers have been constantly deployed even in some of university campuses, but hundreds of political murders occur every year. More relevant however are the murders of Shia doctors and professionals by Sunni killing squads during Musharraf's tenure. Given that Karachi was Musharraf's hometown, the lack of a prompt response to these killings is perplexing. For example, the murder of a prominent Shia doctor in 2003 was met with no action by the government.

Days of military rule may have gone by, but with a weak democratic set up, incidents of violence against Shias are bound to be tolerated in one form or another. Members of the Sunni sect, regardless of their political affiliations, need a channel to assert their dominance. It would be naive to believe that the recent incidents of violence against Shias, or the spates of violence against them and other minorities in Pakistan's history, are being carried out by exogenous forces.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

On Sunday, Japan headed to the polls to return the Liberal Democratic Party to power and select former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo as the man to steer the country out of its nearly quarter-century long financial crisis.

But Abe might face just as serious a challenge dealing with the country's security crisis with China. On Thursday, just three days before the election, the Japanese government responded to a Chinese propeller plane flying over what Japan considers its own airspace by sending eight F-15 fighter planes in response. Ominously, it's the first time a Chinese aircraft has intruded into Japanese airspace. The incident is just the latest in the two countries' ongoing showdown over who owns the Senkakus (the islands over which the Chinese plane was flying, known in China as the Diaoyu) that threatens to destroy their bilateral relationship and possibly even send them to war. Prime Minister-to be Abe shows no sign of backing down over the issue, and reiterated the day after the election that the Senkakus are indisputably Japanese territory.

In Shanghai, China's economic center, discussion about Japan focuses on just how much Tokyo might be willing to risk trade between the two countries over the uninhabited islands. When he takes over next week, Abe needs to understand that China's new leader Xi Jinping has apparently unanimous backing domestically, and can patiently continue to chip away at Japan's administrative control over the Senkakus without fear of having to settle the issue anytime soon. That means Tokyo will have to counter with an equally patient, yet credible strategy.

After a seemingly smooth power transfer in November, Xi leads China's Communist Party and is slated to take over government positions next year. Now the ruler of one of the world's most powerful countries, Xi has unfortunately given little indication of his views on international affairs, other than repeating bromides about China's peaceful rise and asserting that it is "absolutely not a threat" to its neighbors. In a recent meeting with foreign experts, he was quoted as saying that China "will not seek hegemony or expansionism." Yet on specific issues, such as territorial disputes like the Senkakus, Xi has been quiet.

Ties between the two Asian giants remain central to the region's economic prosperity and political stability. In 2011, China and Japan did nearly $340 billion in bilateral trade, largely in electronics, machinery, and foodstuffs, as well as component parts for assembly in China. Millions of Chinese are employed by Japanese firms on the mainland. In June 2012, the two countries introduced a direct yen-yuan exchange mechanism, allowing them to bypass the U.S. dollar and reduce costs of financial transactions.

Yet at the same time, each is also attempting to shore up its own economic position, Japan by flirting with the idea of joining negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade area, and China by exploring ways for the yuan to play a larger global financial role. Politically, each continues to jockey for more international prestige and influence, whether through multilateral organizations or direct ties with other countries.

Politics, however, has put economic ties between the world's second and third largest economies at risk. Major exporters, such as Toyota, have seen sales decline by up to half during the autumn after weeks of demonstrations in China over the Senkakus. Japan's decision this summer to buy several of the privately owned islands may have been a move to forestall Tokyo's then-governor Ishihara Shintaro from doing the same thing, but it ruptured relations with Beijing, unleashed a firestorm of anti-Japanese protests throughout China, and set off an ongoing maritime face-off in the waters around the islands. Chinese generals and commentators have been reported urging the country to prepare for combat, and Western observers, including U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, have raised concerns that conflict could break out between the two historical rivals.

Like Abe, Xi is unlikely to radically alter Beijing's stance on the islands, which is that they have always been China's territory "historically and legally," according to an October press briefing by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun. Yet he will have to balance a firm diplomatic line with far harsher semi-official stances that serve to inflame Chinese nationalism. For example, Lt. Gen. Ren Haiquan, at meeting of senior military officials from 16 countries in Australia in November, stated that the dispute could cause war with Japan, which he reminded his listeners was once a "fascist" nation that attacked Australia. The hawkish Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan even recommended that rather than negotiating with Japanese, China should send hundreds of maritime vessels to the disputed area to conduct maritime guerrilla warfare. So far, Xi has not specifically repudiated such statements, but neither has he indicated that he intends to reduce the pressure on Japan. Chinese vessels continue regularly to enter the waters around the Senkakus, triggering Japanese Coast Guard responses.

Apart from the rhetoric from various levels of the Chinese government, these near-daily deployments of Chinese ships show that Beijing is not yet considering a reduction in its presence, which might be interpreted as backing down on its claims. Tokyo considers these intrusions near its waters extremely provocative, and believes that the Chinese are attempting to redefine the perception of "administrative control" over the islands that underlies the U.S. security commitment to Japan. In essence, the Japanese government believes Beijing is attempting to show de facto or at least equivalent control over the islands (by claiming to "expel" Japanese ships from the waters around the Senkakus) so as to undercut the U.S. understanding that any territory administratively controlled by Japan falls under Article 5 of the security treaty.

It seems that Xi supports the current policy of challenging Japan's claim, or at a minimum has not yet proposed an alternative approach that satisfies his co-leaders. Even a diplomatic outreach by Japan's new premier , were it possible, might not result in any deal that Xi could bring back to China's top leadership body, the Standing Committee, particularly if the leadership is confident that China is slowly wearing down Japan's defenses or is prompting a domestic political backlash against Japan's government. This may well be a misreading of Japan's will and strategy, but it at least means the current policy of continually testing Japan will continue.

What China's ultimate policy over the Senkakus and Japan will be may thus be shaped significantly by Xi's relationship with the military. Unlike President Hu Jintao, who for the first two years of his reign had to contend with Jiang Zemin as chairman of the Central Military Commission, the body that manages the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Xi already runs both the party and the military. Also , Xi has some experience with the PLA; he served as the personal secretary to a former defense minister in the early 1980s and held military positions in his provincial assignments in Nanjing, Fujian, and Fuzhou. These experiences may help decrease friction between Xi and the PLA, as should the promotion of senior military officials known to be close to Xi.

Given the PLA's hard-line stance toward Japan, and the expansion of its naval and air activities in the East China Sea, where the Senkakus are located, it seems unlikely that Xi will challenge the military leadership and dramatically change China's security presence near the islands. Rather, he can be expected to support the PLA and expand the scope of its missions in waters that China claims, including the East China Sea, as long as it doesn't appear to be a reckless move that either causes outright conflict or brings in the United States in a far more active manner. Success in keeping the pressure on Japan and appearing in lockstep with the PLA could also protect Xi from any potential rivals who might seek to undermine him through cultivating their own support from the military.

All this augurs poorly for a tamping down of tensions with Japan, even if China's policy of maritime incursions into the Senkakus so far has not resulted in any evidence that Tokyo will abandon its claims.

Unfortunately, there are few positive counterbalances in Sino-Japanese relations to offset the tensions over the Senkakus. Trade between the two nations has fallen due to anti-Japanese protests in China; Japan's consideration of joining the TPP has further alienated China, which feels left out of the negotiations; and there are few joint diplomatic initiatives between the two countries, such as the six-party-talks over North Korea or anything relating to the East Asian Summit, an annual forum attended by leaders of nearly 20 countries. Beijing also continues to try and isolate Japan regionally, as it does to Taiwan, thereby minimizing the only other potential power center in East Asia. Moreover, while Japan will be an important part of China's economic picture for the rest of this decade, Chinese leaders have already calculated that Japan will suffer more from an economic downturn and poor relations than will China, perhaps increasing their willingness to push Japan ever harder on the Senkakus.

There also is not much Japan can do to bolster its position abroad. Any weakness in defending the islands will only embolden China, but Tokyo is also leery of being thrust into the position of "counterbalance" to China, as a senior Philippines officials suggested in early December. Not only does such an idea ignore over a decade of decline in Japan's defense budget, Tokyo will not further endanger trade with Beijing by appearing to become the ringleader of Asian opposition to China. Moreover, these other nations are interested primarily in South China Sea issues, and not Japan's problems further north. This leaves Tokyo with no option other than to rely even more heavily on U.S. support and to ensure that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains the bedrock of security assurance.

This leaves much of the momentum in Sino-Japanese relations in Chinese hands. If there is any respite, it might come from Xi's likely focus on domestic affairs in the first years of his rule. As for Xi, he must be seen as a strong leader after the Bo Xilai debacle this past summer and rumors of continuing splits among the party's top leadership. While he will try to repair Beijing's "smile diplomacy" and not make China an object of fear among its neighbors, what better way to show strength at home and abroad than to adopt the time-honored tactic of standing up to the Japanese?

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

US Presidential Election 2012 & Worlds Future

Fifty-one-year-old African-American Barack Hussein Obama was reelected as the US president on November 7, defeating his Republican rival Mitt Romney in a hard-fought and expensive battle, but he will have to contend with a gridlocked US Congress.

It was not such a long night after all as Obama swept the polls, proving wrong many a pundit who had predicted a close contest, to secure himself a second term at the White House. In fact, not only did the incumbent President doggedly defend the Democratic bastions of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan but the blue wave that he unleashed also swallowed whole the swing States of Virginia, Nevada, New Hampshire, Colorado, Iowa and Ohio — effectively shutting out all routes to victory for his Republican challenger Mitt Romney.

Obama’s reelection bid by a narrow margin gives him four more years in an American environment that is challenging by any standards. Just before he took over as the first black President in his country’s history, he faced the biggest recession that hit his homeland since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

In securing his place in history, however, he will have to continue to face the challenges of a divided nation and Congress, as the popular vote in the highly divisive election was split evenly between him and his Republican rival, Romney, at 49 per cent.

It is a vote for Obama’s stress on jobs, health-care reform and pro-gay, pro-abortion and pro-immigrant policies. Soon after the result, a relieved but energetic Obama promised “the best is yet to come”. It will, however, be a tough going for the new President as the Republicans have retained their hold on the House of Representatives, though the Senate stays with the Democrats.

Obama, however, faces the prospect of renewed challenges posed by a divided Congress with the Republicans retaining control of the House of Representatives and his fellow-Democrats maintaining their hold of Senate.

Election Process
US presidential elections are decided by an electoral college, which gives states a certain number of electoral votes based on population. A candidate must get 270 electoral votes to win the presidency.

Preliminary indications suggested that voter turnout was lower this year than the breathtaking levels that it soared to in 2008. Although it peaked at close to 70 per cent in some States such as Wisconsin, it also dropped heavily in others, by around 11 per cent in Texas.

The biggest plunge by far, according to media reports quoting a study by American University, was in Eastern Seaboard States that were still recovering from the devastation in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, which caused major property damage and knocked out power for millions, thus disrupting standard voting practices.

Obama shot past the 270 mark, garnering 303 electoral votes and winning most of the battleground states. On November 7, a final result was awaited in Florida, where the President had a narrow lead. Florida has 29 electoral votes.

Romney got 206 electoral votes. While the electoral vote margin was significant, the difference between the two candidates in the popular vote was much smaller. Obama got 50 per cent of the popular vote compared to 48 per cent for Romney, a Mormon. In all, Obama won 25 states and the District of Columbia, while Romney won 24 states.

In the 100-member Senate, the Democrats now have 52 seats, a net gain of one seat. The Republicans are left with 45 seats, with a net loss of one seat. Two independents usually caucus with the Democrats.

Two Republican candidates who had made controversial comments on the subject of rape and abortion during campaigning ended up losing the race. Both of them were Tea Party favorites – Richard Mourdock of Indiana and Todd Akin of Missouri.

Road to Success
Undoubtedly, it is true that for all his achievements, including the risky directive to get Osama Bin Laden in his Pakistan hideout, Obama’s four years are a litany of broken promises. He dramatically announced the closure of the notorious Guantanamo prison complex in a year and made a clarion call to the Muslim world from Cairo and promised to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Guantanamo is still very much in existence and the Palestinian plight in overthrowing Israeli rule has never been more desperate, with more and more Palestinian land being colonized with little more than hand-wringing from the Obama administration.

On Guantanamo, he met stout Republican opposition in Congress, and on Israel he was up against the insurmountable Jewish lobby’s hold on the American political system, which has supported and helped the Israeli state in every way since the British departed from the region. It is an indication of Tel Aviv’s ability to influence US policy in the Middle East, as the world calls it, that going against Israel’s interests, whatever the cost to Washington, is a sure road to calumny and oblivion for any American leader.

Focus on Challenges
It is equally true that Americans are tired of fighting wars, particularly in the Arab and Muslim world, and American help in the overthrow of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was described as “leading from behind” by placing the European powers in front in the Nato air war camouflaging key US inputs.

The Iraq war, perhaps the greatest mistake of the George W. Bush presidency, was wound down and a timeline was set at 2014 for withdrawal from Afghanistan. In addition, President Obama has been seeking to temper Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s belligerence on Iran.

President Obama’s priority must, however, be to make the congressional system work. There are many anomalies in the US electoral system — for instance, Electoral College votes based on state quotas trumping the popular vote — and the President’s right to appoint justices of the Supreme Court is flawed.

It is expected that Obama will push for higher taxes on the wealthy so as to trim down the debt burden and also generate money for his pet programs. Equally importantly, he will try to cut a massive financial deal with Congress in the coming months to reduce the budgetary deficit.

Foreign Policy Issue
Barack is unlikely to do any major change on the foreign policy front. This is a comfortable scenario for India because Obama had amended his policy initiatives vis-à-vis India after his pro-China posturing during the initial months of his first term. He quickly realized the merits in the policy pursued by the George W. Bush administration which had clinched the historic nuclear deal with India. It was a matter of relief for India when he ultimately reverted to Bush’s policy, which was aimed at containing China to protect US interests in East Asia. Attempts at the containment of China were essential as most countries in the region are scared of an over-assertive China, which sees itself as the future superpower.

However, Pakistan and Iran must be feeling uncomfortable with Obama’s reelection as US President, as there is unlikely to be any let-up in the drive to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapon capability and the targeting of Taliban activists in Pakistan’s tribal areas through drone attacks. Of course, Barack Obama, whose forefathers were Muslim Kenyans and who spent his early childhood in Indonesia, no longer has to prove that he cannot be soft toward these countries posing threat to global peace. The truth is that no US President can afford to be lax towards terrorists or an Iran which is considered more dangerous for peace in West Asia than Israel by US allies like Saudi Arabia.

Boost to Indo-US Ties
Obama’s reelection is a good news for the Indian economy, although balance will have to be established between rhetoric and practicality on prickly issues like outsourcing of IT services.

With elections out of the way and status quo maintained, India Inc is betting on increased focus on reviving growth in the US which will also lift its own fortunes and also spur growth across the world. Being one of India’s largest trading partners, the US accounts for more than 13 per cent of total Indian exports and 60 per cent of IT exports.The recent reforms initiated by the UPA government are expected to enhance the Indo-US economic partnership.

The US accounts for more than 13 percent of total Indian exports and 60 percent of IT exports. The feeling is that Obama’s win will ensure continuity in growing India-US relations.

The issue of curbing outsourcing, which Obama made a poll plank, remains to be sorted out. Indian IT firms hope to get an opportunity to partner with US companies to achieve growth targets.

India’s exports to the US grew from $17.24 billion to $19.61 billion, showing a growth of 15 per cent during April-September, 2012, over the corresponding period last year. The share of the US in total exports went up to 13.88 per cent and it has surpassed the UAE as the prime destination of India’s exports.

On defense front, Obama’s reelection is set to boost the defense relations between New Delhi and Washington with focus on technology sharing, joint research, co-production of defense equipment and increased military engagement.

In his first term in 2009, Obama had opened the gates for US companies to enter the multi-billion dollar Indian defense market that was essentially dominated by the Russians and Israelis. As a result, India placed a huge order for US-produced defense equipment worth $9 billion – approximately Rs 47,000 crore. Obama’s second term promises even more deeper ties with India. It was illustrated by US Defense Secretary Leon E Panetta visit to India in June when he listed out several long term partnerships in the defense sector.

In the past four years, New Delhi has ordered medium lift transport planes (C-130-J), heavy lift planes (C-17 Globemaster) and long-range maritime reconnaissance planes (Boeing P8-I). The ties took a significant upswing last month when India gave nod to the purchase of Boeing ‘Apache’ attack chopper.

Assessment
The US president presides over a superpower on the retreat and is more concerned about fixing economic problems back home rather than playing the global “supercop”. By and large, he has not created or aggravated tensions. Having friendly relations with India may be part of the US policy to counter the rise of China, but the change has not hurt India’s interests.

To what degree Obama is successful in this regard will depend on how well he can reach out to the Republicans. He will be well advised to do so with utmost sincerity, as this and other such deals will determine his presidential legacy, which otherwise stands the risk of being rendered hollow by petty partisan politics. All it needs is a new resolve to move away from strange ideologies and beliefs that seem to thrive in the free American air to the detriment of logic and common sense.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Really nice efforts, Keep it up please.

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Life is a Comedy if you feel, and tragedy if you think

Peshawar on the brink
By
Imtiaz Gul

Peshawar is in the eye of the storm. Regardless of whether the orchestrators belong to Al Qaeda or Taliban, they have demonstrated that the old plan of laying siege around greater Peshawar is still very much in place. Back in early 2009, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had upstaged the entire security apparatus in and around the provincial capital, triggering fears of an impending siege of the city.

"The deadly string of attacks throughout 2009 - on the average a suicide bombing or ambushes every 36 hours - had upset the civilian and the military apparatus to the extent that the ISI and the Peshawar Corps officials had begun playing with the idea of creating a security ring to protect the main town of Peshawar," a former intelligence official had told me then.

Recounting one of the meetings attended by all security agencies and the military, the official had expressed his displeasure over what he called the "defeatist mindset" of the military institutions. I asked the proponents of the security ring around Peshawar how they would stop militants if they converged on the city from three sides - ie Khyber, Darra Adamkhel, and Charsadda/Shabqaddar/ Orakzai - in large numbers; and whether we would then wait for them to attack us, he had said.

This, said the official, I asked being conscious of the fact that the TTP and other militant outfits have already infiltrated the greater Peshawar region and those "sleeper cells" would in fact provide the social cover in case of a physical invasion of the city.

On December 15, we probably witnessed glimpses of such a commando attack - a combination of rockets as a means of distraction, followed by a physical, multi-pronged heavy-armed assault on the premise that houses both the commercial airport and the aviation base of the Pakistan Army. For several hours, city residents shivered in anger, grief and fear, followed next morning with a renewed wave of violence in the form of a shoot-out between police and the five suspects, who it appeared were linked to the raiders of the airport and had managed to slip through the security cordon in the dark of the night.

In the end, police and military commandos of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which is part of the 11th Corps, put down all ten assailants but not before they had terrorized the entire city, and also exposed the serious preemptive security lacunas that continue to beset responses and question the security establishment's state of preparedness.

Military and civilian officials associated with the investigation tell us that the dramatic attacks probably were part of a strategy that would first surprise the security cordons on ground and then activate their assets within the city to mount a rebellion against the state through occupation of strategic locations such as hospitals, airport, and key police stations besides numerous hostage-takings.

Officials often dismiss such a scenario, arguing the presence of the entire 11th Corps, backed up by the Frontier Corps, and several thousand police will not allow such an eventuality. Terrorists may disrupt life and security arrangements but cannot hold on for long, they insist. Theoretically this argument holds water. Also, realistically a few hundred terrorists cannot take-over the entire city. But the events between December 15 and 19 - several attacks including the one on the airport, one near the military academy in Risalpur, and several on polio vaccinators in three cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa - clearly underscore a stark reality that stares the entire security apparatus in the face. The terrorists are on the loose, many of them nestled inside or around the periphery of Peshawar (where scores of TTP and like-minded terrorists had descended after the Swat and South Waziristan operations in 2009).

The airport attack bore the hallmarks of yet another shocking commando raid, reminiscent of the strikes on PNS Mehran Base (May 22, 2011), the GHQ (Oct 20, 2009), the Parade Lane Mosque (Dec 4, 2009), and Kamra airbase (Aug 16, 2012). It left the city of Peshawar in a state of shock and fear, and also raised many questions as to how several layers of preemptive security ie intelligence (both civilian and military) as well as multi-layered physical protective barriers comprising the political administration of tribal regions, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and Levies failed in preempting such a brazen raid?

Apparently a contingency plan for such an eventuality was missing and hence the chaos on roads leading to and around the areas under attack.

People have also begun asking whether the army and the paramilitary are supposed to only protect the Peshawar Cantonment area and whether the police alone can handle a region surrounded by FATA and PATA and the Frontier Regions?

Senior police officials believe that the aberrations such as PATA must be abolished. Terrorists, criminals, proclaimed offenders and anti-state elements all use these regions for shelter, training and planning. Strangely, the 2002 Police Order extends to PATA but practically the policing there remains dismal. That is why you find scores of smuggled vehicles and other goods in the PATA areas.

Akbar Khan Hoti, the outspoken Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police chief, believes abolition of PATA regions can hopefully help curtail, if not eliminate, crime and terrorism. We also need additional human and material resources. Currently, the strength of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police stands at around 68,000, backed up by some 10,000 contract employees (largely retired army personnel).

The second major handicap is the absence of quality training and the equipment required for it. The police, we are told, is acquiring heavy arms to fight the heavily-armed terrorists but training on these weapons is an expensive business. Every single round for a heavy machine gun costs several thousand rupees. The heavy cost-factor essentially limits the training opportunities, say officials.

While the authorities may be focusing more on the supply side of the issue ie improving human resources and acquiring modern heavy arms aside, the demand side, ie a comprehensive counter-terror strategy, still remains an elusive goal. Civilian and military officials insist they have a policy but they perhaps confuse training and equipment procurement with a strategy. The response to attacks on several police and strategic installations so far suggests that while the forces manage to kill the attackers, they lack the preemptive capabilities as well as the ability to catch some terrorists alive. How long would the forces need to devise means and develop capabilities to get to the core of terrorists or get them alive when confronting them?

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Middle East Peace?
By
Larry Derfner

MA'ALEH ADUMIM, West Bank — When you drive out on the highway to the West Bank settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim from Jerusalem, you're driving through big sky country. After passing Jerusalem's new Jewish neighborhoods and old Arab villages, all you've got on either side of you are the soft hills of the Judean desert. Emptiness, except for the unseen Bedouins. But very soon, you see a long, long line of beige houses and apartment buildings on the ridge of a steep hill, stretching nearly from one end of your field of vision to the other. Welcome to Ma'aleh Adumim.

The population is 40,000 -- but if someone told me it was 400,000, I'd believe it. It is huge, monumental: Long, sweeping roads lead up the hill to its entrances, and wide avenues course up and down beautifully landscaped neighborhoods built from Jerusalem stone. Ma'aleh Adumim, founded in 1975, does not look like anybody's idea of a settlement. It is truly an Israeli city, and it looks invulnerable to U.N. resolutions.

Ma'aleh Adumim is a stick in the eye of Palestinian attempts to build a state in the West Bank. And its very presence is spurring further Israeli construction: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent threat to build a sprawling, 3,500-unit housing project linking the settlement with Jerusalem has provoked expressions of outrage and distrust from Brussels and, in much more restrained tones, from Washington. The latest diplomatic skirmish was set off after European foreign ministers, in no uncertain terms, warned of the disastrous effects of the so-called "E-1 plan" on the prospects for a two-state solution.

Western diplomats fret that E-1 construction will drive a stone wedge through the heart of the would-be Palestinian state -- cutting off Palestinians' access to East Jerusalem, their hoped-for capital. But this misses the point: The presence of Ma'aleh Adumim makes E-1, or something like it, inevitable. Israel has no intention of letting this city go in any sort of peace agreement, and it's not going to let it remain as an isolated Jewish enclave linked to the capital by a thin, three-mile stretch of highway with nothing but Palestine on either side. The world has remained on the sidelines these last 37 years during the construction of Ma'aleh Adumim. It's a little late in the game to go complaining about E-1.

Besides, who says this settlement, the third most populous in the West Bank, isn't already a stake in the heart of a prospective Palestinian state, even without E-1? "Ma'aleh Adumim was established to break Palestinian contiguity," Benny Kashriel, the town's mayor since 1992, told the Jerusalem Report in 2004. "It is Jerusalem's connection to the Dead Sea and the Jordan Valley [on the other side of the West Bank from Jerusalem]; if we weren't here, Palestinians could connect their villages and close off the roads." (Kashriel declined to be interviewed for this article; the City Hall spokesman said local officials had talked enough to the media about E-1.)

This West Bank settlement functions as a suburb, or satellite city of the capital, and that's how the residents -- as well as Israelis at large -- see it.

"It's too big to be a settlement," says Yael Benayoun, a native-born 16-year old girl shopping in the gleaming mall in the heart of town. She and her friend, Etti Lazar, also 16, say they can't imagine Ma'aleh Adumim ever ceasing to exist, like the settlements of Gaza that were destroyed in 2005, or those of Sinai that were bulldozed in 1982. "There's no place to put everyone," Lazar says. Indeed, there are roughly five times more Israeli settlers in Ma'aleh Adumim than there were in all of Gaza, and eight times more than there were in Sinai.

Nor is there a constituency in Israel for relinquishing Ma'aleh Adumim in any peace deal. The city is considered by all Israeli Jews, except those on the marginal non-Zionist left, to be a "settlement bloc" -- one close to the pre-1967 border that must be retained in a final agreement through land swaps with the Palestinians. With its large population and proximity to Jerusalem, the settlement sits snugly within the revered national "consensus" as permanently protected Israeli territory.

The birth of Ma'aleh Adumim also speaks to the support it enjoys across the Israeli political spectrum. Following the conquest of Jerusalem in the 1967 Six Day War, Israel built an inner ring of Jewish neighborhoods on the eastern part of the city to "strengthen" and "protect," in nationalistic terminology, the holy city from ever being "divided" again. The outer ring was made up of Givat Ze'ev lay to the north, Efrat to the south, and Ma'aleh Adumim to the east.

"This was the plan of the doves of the Labor Party of that time," explains historian Meron Benvenisti, who was a deputy mayor of Jerusalem in the 1970s. "To keep the land around Jerusalem and give the rest back to Jordan. Nobody was talking about the Palestinians back then."

Indeed, none of this started with Netanyahu, or even with Likud -- it started with the Labor Party, the party of peace process devotees Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, the party that later midwifed the Oslo peace accords with Yasir Arafat. E-1 didn't start with Netanyahu, either -- it started with Rabin in 1994, who, according to the Jerusalem Post, "provided then-mayor Benny Kashriel with annexation documents for the E1 area."

In the marble-trimmed lobby of Ma'aleh Adumim's City Hall, the walls are lined with photos of Kashriel hosting prime ministers going back to Yitzhak Shamir. In one photo, Kashriel holds a pen over a map of the region, showing Rabin the lay of the land. The message is clear: This is consensus Israeli territory you're standing on -- left-to-right, decade after decade.

The only problem people in Ma'aleh Adumim seem to have with E-1 is that it's only in the planning stages. "Bibi's bluffing. He's never going to build E-1 because of the international pressure," a real estate agent in the mall told me. "We only wish he would build it -- do you know what the construction of 3,500 more homes would do for our economy?"

Netanyahu's unfreezing of plans for E-1 was his immediate punishment of the Palestinians and the "international community" for the Nov. 29 U.N. vote to grant Palestine non-member observer state status. He has followed that with high-profile plans to build about 5,000 housing units in Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and West Bank settlements (though not in Ma'aleh Adumim, to the locals' great disappointment). A typical reaction came from the European Union's foreign-policy chief, Catherine Ashton, who said the expansion plans "seriously undermine the prospects of a negotiated resolution ... by jeopardizing the possibility of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state and of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states."

"It's nonsense," Benvenisti retorts. "People want to believe there's hope for the two-state solution, they believe it's the only game in town. Forget it."

Benvenisti has traveled a long ideological road since his time as Jerusalem deputy mayor, moving from a proponent of the two-state solution to an advocate of a binational state encompassing Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, with full political equality for Jews and Arabs. In the early 1980s, he founded an organization that tracked the growth of West Bank settlements. "I started when there were 20,000 settlers and said that when they reached 100,000, the settlements will be irreversible," he says. The number passed 100,000 before Oslo, and today there are upwards of 350,000 -- not counting the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, who number another 200,000. Benvenisti, once dismissed as a congenital pessimist, is now seen as a realist who was ahead of his time -- a prophet of doom whom history seems to have proven right.

"You can't build a Palestinian state in the West Bank -- the settlements [and road infrastructure built for them] have permanently cantonized the territory," he avers. "Yes, E-1 will certainly cut Jerusalem off from Ramallah in the north and Hebron in the south -- but they're already cut off."

He keeps going, ticking off the other fractures on the land where Palestinians hope to build their state: Jenin and Nablus are similarly cut off, he says. Netanyahu's plans to build a settlement in southern Jerusalem will sever the city's links to Bethlehem. "All this talk about a two-state solution, about a viable, contiguous Palestinian state with a capital in Jerusalem -- who's kidding whom?"

I ask Benvenisti where he would rank Ma'aleh Adumim among settlements on a scale of strategic obstructionism. "There all the same," he replies. And despite half a century of international wailing, none of them looks vulnerable.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins