Rich vs Poor
By
Maimuna Ashraf

Rich countries are getting richer and poor are getting poorer day by day. The phrase seems very ordinary but is it possible that expression hidden in it can be a cause of global revolution in future?? This question is catching the attraction of many and the history of French and Russian revolutions teaches us to ponder upon it. As many years before at the time of Russian and French revolution, it was avowed that these revolutions were consequences of social and political upheaval against autocracy.

In fact these revolutions were not mere mounting against monarchs but these revolutions were result of voices raised by ‘haves not’. Their voices caused such a mammoth blow up that it compelled ‘haves’ to leave their seats. If we take a close view of history we will observe that the contemporary western democracy came into birth after this French revolution and the modern capitalism was delivered through contemporary western democracy. Whatsoever is currently happening in world concerning with revolutions is somehow very much related to efforts for saving capitalism. All these are tactics and treacheries to save capitalism for which different reason are being given up for these revolutions.

The basic reason behind these revolution is one, that on national and international level, difference between haves and haves not is increasing day by day, a gap between rich’s and poor’s is getting hype promptly, whether we accept it or not. There is a war going on between rich countries and poor countries for grasping resources and this war is totally one-sided as it can be seen clearly that how speedily affluent countries are holding their strong grip over the world resources and we are going towards a global revolution. This verity can be understand by the World Bank report (2005) that was published on the statistics related to conquest of world resources by the rich countries, the statistics were unbelievable! The report said that world can be divided into three divisions, first, twenty percent people are poor, second, approximately sixty percent belongs to middle-class, third, twenty percent are rich.

The report spoke an astonishing fact that the twenty percent poor’s are getting only 1.5 percent of world resources. Twenty percent of world resources are in the hands of sixty percent middle-class while seventy-seven percent of world resources are being enjoyed by the twenty percent rich people! World Bank prepared this report in 2005 but due to the fear of intense remonstration by the world deprived circle, the report didn’t appear publically till three years and this report got published in 2008.

Before this report, United Nations also prepared an analogous repot in 1995 that also was not publicized till three years and was published in 1998. The statistics mentioned in United Nations report are even more horrifying as compared to World Bank report, as the United Nation’s report revealed that the world rich countries are holding eighty-seven percent of world resources while the underdeveloped are only holding 1.3% of world total resources. It was mentioned in this report that from total production of meat in world, rich countries use forty-five percent while only five percent goes for underdeveloped countries. Similarly if we talk about the energy resources fifty-eight percent are being used by the rich countries and only four percent power is being used by the underdeveloped countries. Likewise, seventy-four percent of telephone facility is being used by rich countries and 1.5% by the underdeveloped countries. Eighty-seven percent vehicles are for the wealthy states and only 1% vehicles are being utilized by the poor countries.

It’s interesting according to this report that in Europe people spends eleven Arab dollars annually on ice-cream, while in America and Europe people apply perfumes of twelve Arab dollars. Moreover America and Europe spends seventeen Arab dollars on dog’s food and Europe squanders fifty Arab dollars on smoking and one-hundred five dollars on wine. While underdeveloped countries are able to spend only six Arab dollars on education and eleven arab dollars on health which is equal to the ice-cream budget of Europe. This is how the world pattern is going on; tricks and treachery are being used by the rich countries against the under-developed countries in order to uphold their hegemony. Those who become the victims of their tricks budge to decline.

It will not be wrong to say that the human beings of rich countries are taken superior as compared to underdeveloped countries. Humans of rich countries are treated as superior and humans of poor are treated as inferior. It can be understand by a minute illustration of Buford town. In American state Wyoming, there is a small town Buford. This town is located on 8000 feet height. In winters the wind often blows at 70 mph (113 km h) and gives a wind-chill factor of minus 20. This town was developed in 1866 by General John Buford, and since the town is associated with his name. This town is considered unique in all over the world because Don Sammons, 60, is the only person in Buford, who lives up a cold mountain. Mr. Sammons left Los Angeles in 1980 with his wife and son, and came in this town. Then his wife died 15 years ago and his son moved to Colorado three years back and left Sammons in Buford on his own. Here he is the owner of a small store; he punctually went to his store and wait for the visitors. But despite of his old age and intricate environment he is living there peacefully because this one-man town has all the facilities. For this one man, this town has roads, petrol pumps, electricity, gas, water; town has the facility of telephone and internet, while it also has post office and railway lines.
So the man living at 8000 feet height enjoys all the facilities of life and I am sure that if ever he fell in serious illness, he will not die without medical care. This is called the humanity and governance and for practicing these two things, a country needs not to be a first rate rich country.

As a Pakistani I am sure that the facilities which a man is enjoying in one-man town, even our big cities are not enjoying all of those facilities. No doubt there is no logic of making comparison between US and Pakistan in term of facilities and wealth, but nations don’t purchase humanity and governance by wealth. We are badly lacking these two; we are living in a country where every pillar of society revolves around its own individual benefits. Where blood is thinner than water and money is superior to man.

Our governance has been restricted to fallow the foreign orders and the humanity has been sold for dollars. Public has become a victim from all around. Government and every institution is meant to govern the public by giving them all the basic necessities and rights of life and off course the most important is the right to live. Life of each human should be secure, rights should be given. Each institution should be accountable for its responsibilities, and it can only be possible in a case when our establishment will ensure humanity and rule of law.

Global conflicts of the past decade have left behind a sour note across the Muslim world.

To the ordinary person on the streets across the Islamic world, the notion of one Muslim country after another bearing the brunt of Western military force has only been reinforced with campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and now the ongoing effort to force out Libya’s leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Even for the world’s most seasoned analysts, it will clearly be impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy how the ongoing Libya campaign will end. Clearly, Gaddafi’s own use of brutal power and refusal to accept political dissent in a country he has held together with an iron fist has only added to the case for military intervention in the name of saving human lives in the line of fire.

Clearly there are many double standards in what has driven the Western impetus for military action in Libya. On the one hand, it is evident that protection of civilian lives is an argument that is applied selectively.

But for over four decades, the repeated targeting of Palestinians living in territories occupied by Israel has been ignored as a case deserving action to protect civilians living under the threat of Israeli force. On the other hand, the absence of a long-term plan to help Libya rebuild itself after the conflict once again highlights a familiar trend. The cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan abundantly highlight a similar trend — eagerness to launch a war without a clear strategy on how best to wrap it up later.

As this latest conflict flares up, Islamic countries face compelling questions about their future. The Libyan conflict has been touted as the case of a brutal dictatorship refusing to yield to the popular will of its subjects. That may be the case, but only on the surface.

Down below lies the far more compelling issue of building a progressive state, which not only cares for its subjects but also has the ability to update and reform itself over time. This must involve systems of government capable of responding to citizens needs. There must also be enough space for institutions of popular representation.

Here, the case of Pakistan can well be brought in as an illustrative case. The country has indeed returned to the path of democracy after its former military dictator Pervez Musharraf was forced out of power in 2008.

Multiple challenges

Pakistan faces multiple challenges and there is widespread criticism of its rulers. But the bottom line is that unlike some countries in the Middle East that have recently succumbed to abrupt political change, Pakistan has witnessed dissent through the media and street reaction. For leaders of countries in imminent or potential distress across the Islamic world, the case of Pakistan must illustrate the benefits of providing space for dissent.

More broadly, there must be lessons for Muslim countries in general. Entities like the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Conference indeed have stakes in the future of stability across not just the Arab world but in fact the entire Islamic world.

Given the experiences of the past decade with military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya, there is even a stronger case today for the creation of a pan-Islamic peacekeeping force. The idea has been raised before though never brought together, given dissent among Islamic states.

Yet the emerging picture has brought out the need for fresh thinking along the lines of the creation of a pan-Islamic peacekeeping force, armed with the ability to enforce a consensus on member states as well as the means to intervene in unexpected emergencies among the member countries. This is essential to preventing a recurrence of future crises of the kind witnessed in the past decade.

If the Islamic world fails to rise to the occasion, the danger is indeed that of future catastrophes of the kind witnessed in the past decade, which are likely to throw up a familiar outcome.

If indeed there are more interventions in times to come, the world is in danger of witnessing more states around the Islamic world hit by the rigours of armed conflict but left without the means to help them embark on a new future once the conflict ends.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Rising powers and problems
By
Jean-Pierre Lehmann

The world is witnessing a chaotic transition to uncertainty. While there is a profound transformation in global economic power balance, the lack of leadership has created a serious vacuum.

Not much more than a decade ago the emerging economies – China, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Vietnam and others – were still little more than global economic minnows. In the course of the last decade, the share of world GDP of the three main emerging economies, Brazil, China and India, has doubled. Not only have the emerging economies surged, they have also become increasingly interconnected. South-South trade, aid and investments are booming.

The surge of the emerging economies has been all the more marked since the 2008-09 Western financial crisis. The woes of the erstwhile established economic powers – the EU, Japan and the US – stand in stark contrast with the high growth rates and levels of confidence of the emerging economic powers. From São Paulo to Istanbul to Jakarta there is a buzz that reflects recent achievements and envisages far more.

China has already surpassed Japan as the world’s second biggest economy in nominal GDP. Brazil has overtaken G7 members Italy and Canada to hold 7th position. India, now in 10th place, is looking for bronze by 2030. The US, according to the International Monetary Fund, will be overtaken by China in 2016!

Whatever the exact figures and dates may be, the profound transformation is on and will continue. A G7-dominated world will soon be a thing of the past

Ironically, the life of the dying order is being prolonged by the political failure of the emerging countries. If proof were needed, the recent pathetic response of the emerging economic powers to the succession of managing director of the IMF provides a vivid example. While the G7 is on the way out, it is premature to suggest that the E7 – combined GDPs of seven emerging countries, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and Turkey – could overtake the combined G7 soon.

The current deplorable state of global governance, of course, is not the fault of the emerging powers. The resistance and myopia of the established powers loom large – whether in international finance, trade, climate change, security, development or poverty alleviation. American obstreperousness is the biggest obstacle to the conclusion of the World Trade Organisation Doha Round, which would have unleashed new growth. The floundering economies of the Eurozone are causing havoc with the international monetary system. Unfulfilled promises made at the G8 summits in Gleneagles and L’Aquila help account for failures in meeting some of the Millennium Development Goals. The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009 ended in tragicomedy.

The rising powers, however, do not rise to the occasion – neither by displaying leadership nor by getting their act together.

This century’s trade policy battles are primarily between the developed and the developing economies, with the latter demanding a more level playing field, and the former refusing to abandon their discriminatory practices. The attempt to launch a new World Trade Organisation round at Seattle in 1999 foundered due to the chasm between the two. The round was launched two years later in Doha, Qatar – though this is attributed to the fact that just after “9/11” the US was eager to take steps to help the developing countries.

A new acronym was born in Copenhagen: the “BASIC” countries, Brazil, South Africa, India and China, banned together to avoid commitments on climate change they deemed unacceptable in light of both their growth requirements and the EU’s browbeating intransigence.

Now the globe watches the IMF saga. The emerging economies had, quite rightly, long complained that power in the international financial institutions was too concentrated among the G7 countries, expressing special rancour that the heads of the World Bank and the IMF are reserved, respectively, for an American and a European. Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s departure was expected, as he planned to resign to run for the French presidential election. Thus, while the manner and speed with which he left may have been a surprise, his imminent resignation was not. There was plenty of time to reflect and plan.

Here was a real opportunity for the emerging powers to exercise collective clout and assume the leadership of the IMF. They have no lack of eminently suitable candidates. The EU managed to get its act together rapidly, displaying how effective it can be when it comes to defending its perceived prerogatives. The emerging powers stood dazed on the platform watching the global governance train leave with another European driver.

Two candidates remain in the race. Agustín Carstens of Mexico is highly qualified; he did not, however, obtain the endorsement of the emerging powers, after some, like Indonesia, had already announced their support for the EU candidate Christine Lagarde, who now looks like a shoo-in. Suspicion and differences among the emerging countries seems a more potent force than resistance to the bullying established powers.

We live in turbulent times with heightened risks on all fronts – geopolitical, economic, environmental, demographic, social – with a dangerous global leadership vacuum The leadership qualifications and qualities of the G7 are tattered, and there is no leadership from the emerging powers, apart from a collective capacity to say no.

Until and unless the G7 countries are prepared to share global leadership and the emerging economies are prepared to assume global responsibility, the chaotic transition to uncertainty will remain the poignant feature of our times. The multi-polar world can either gain centripetal momentum or fragment into centrifugal forces of de-globalisation. The emerging powers must quickly learn the lessons from the “Lagarde saga” and get their collective leadership act together.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

WHEN President Obama announced his decision to surge more troops into Afghanistan in 2009, I argued that it could succeed if three things happened: Pakistan became a different country, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan became a different man and we succeeded at doing exactly what we claim not to be doing, that is nation-building in Afghanistan. None of that has happened, which is why I still believe our options in Afghanistan are: lose early, lose late, lose big or lose small. I vote for early and small.

My wariness about Afghanistan comes from asking these three questions: When does the Middle East make you happy? How did the cold war end? What would Ronald Reagan do? Let’s look at all three.

When did the Middle East make us happiest in the last few decades? That’s easy: 1) when Anwar el-Sadat made his breakthrough visit to Jerusalem; 2) when the Sunni uprising in Iraq against the pro-Al Qaeda forces turned the tide there; 3) when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was routed in 2001 by Afghan rebels, backed only by U.S. air power and a few hundred U.S. special forces; 4) when Israelis and Palestinians drafted a secret peace accord in Oslo; 5) when the Green Revolution happened in Iran; 6) when the Cedar Revolution erupted in Lebanon; 7) when the democracy uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Egypt emerged; when Israel unilaterally withdrew from South Lebanon and Gaza.

And what do they all have in common? America had nothing to do with almost all of them. They were self-propelled by the people themselves; we did not see them coming; and most of them didn’t cost us a dime.

And what does that tell you? The most important truth about the Middle East: It only puts a smile on your face when it starts with them. If it doesn’t start with them, if they don’t have ownership of a new peace initiative, a battle or a struggle for good governance, no amount of U.S. troops kick-starting, cajoling or doling out money can make it work. And if it does start with them, they really don’t need or want us around for very long.

When people own an initiative — as the original Afghan coalition that toppled the Taliban government did, as the Egyptians in Tahrir Square did, as the Egyptian and Israeli peacemakers did — they will be self-propelled and U.S. help can be an effective multiplier. When they don’t want to own it — in Afghanistan’s case, decent governance — or when they think we want some outcome more than they do, they will be happy to hold our coats, shake us down and sell us the same carpet over and over.

As for how the cold war ended, that’s easy. It ended when the two governments — the Soviet Union and Maoist China, which provided the funding and ideology propelling our enemies — collapsed. China had a peaceful internal transformation from Maoist Communism to capitalism, and the Soviet Union had a messy move from Marxism to capitalism. End of cold war.

Since then, we have increasingly found ourselves at war with another global movement: radical jihadist Islam. It is fed by money and ideology coming out of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. The attack of 9/11 was basically a joint operation by Saudi and Pakistani nationals. The Marine and American Embassy bombings in Lebanon were believed to have been the work of Iranian agents. Yet we invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, because Saudi Arabia had oil, Pakistan had nukes and Iran was too big. We hoped that this war-by-bank-shot would lead to changes in all three countries. So far, it has not.

Until we break the combination of mosque, money and power in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which fuel jihadism, all we’re doing in Afghanistan is fighting the symptoms. The true engines propelling radical jihadist violence will still be in place. But that break requires, for starters, a new U.S. energy policy. Oh, well.

George Will pointed out that Senator John McCain, a hawk on Libya and Afghanistan, asked last Sunday, “I wonder what Ronald Reagan would be saying today?” with the clear implication that Reagan would never leave wars like Libya or Afghanistan unfinished. I actually know the answer to that question. I was there.

On Feb. 25, 1984, I stood on the tarmac at the Beirut airport and watched as a parade of Marine amphibious vehicles drove right down the runway, then veered off and crossed the white sand beach, slipped into the Mediterranean and motored out of Lebanon to their mother ship.

After a suicide bomber killed 241 U.S. military personnel, Reagan realized that he was in the middle of a civil war, with an undefined objective and an elusive enemy, whose defeat was not worth the sacrifice. So he cut his losses and just walked away. He was warned of dire consequences; after all, this was the middle of the cold war with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. We would look weak. But Reagan thought we would get weak by staying. As Reagan deftly put it at the time: “We are not bugging out. We are moving to deploy into a more defensive position.”

Eight years later, the Soviet Union was in the dustbin of history, America was ascendant and Lebanon, God love the place, was still trying to sort itself out — without us.

Source: New York Times

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

If the current Palestinian strategy succeeds, a huge debt of gratitude will be owed to the governments and people of South America, who, by their well-timed recognitions of the State of Palestine, have given this strategy credibility, momentum and hope.

I am grateful to the organizers of this conference for inviting me to speak on the applicability to the State of Palestine of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. While I have been involved with the Palestinian cause for a quarter of a century, I must confess that I was not previously aware of the Montevideo Convention. However, I now know that it was a pioneering multinational treaty addressing the vexing question, “What is a state?” under international law and that it remains relevant, not simply within the Western Hemisphere and among its state signatories, but also beyond, including with respect to Palestine.

The convention was signed in this city on Dec. 26, 1933, by all the Spanish-speaking states of this hemisphere except Bolivia, as well as by Brazil, Haiti and the United States of America. At the Seventh International Conference of American States, which gave birth to the convention, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared his “Good Neighbor Policy,” which promised a less aggressive American approach to inter-American relations, and this more respectful and egalitarian spirit in state-to-state relations is reflected in the provisions of the convention.

Article 1 of the convention sets the following agreed criteria for a state to exist under international law: “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”

In this context, it is important to recognize the distinction between the existence of a state and the diplomatic recognition of a state by other states. Article 3 of the convention specifically states: “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, to administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.”

Indeed, diplomatic recognition is a fundamentally political issue. No state can be compelled to recognize another state or prevented from doing so. The United States provides extreme examples, in both directions, of the absolute discretion of states to grant or refuse recognition. For 30 years, the United States refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China, whose existence was scarcely in doubt. On the other hand, during the 50 years prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States continued to recognize the three Baltic states which had been effectively absorbed into the USSR by the end of World War II. The prewar flags of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania continued to fly at fully accredited embassies in Washington.

This Baltic precedent might be usefully recalled if the United States were to argue that, much though it would like to be able to recognize the State of Palestine and hopes to be able to do so at some time in the future, it would be legally impossible to do so now, since its territory is effectively occupied by another state.

The criteria for statehood set forth in Article 1 of the convention did not purport to create international law. Rather, Article 1 restated and codified customary international law as existing in 1933. In fact, the convention’s four criteria – a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with the other states – set what today must seem a very low bar for qualifying as a state and, accordingly, for the rights enjoyed by all states, regardless of recognition, as set forth in Article 4 of the convention, as follows: “States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence under international law.”

Palestine, currently recognized by 118 other states, clearly qualifies as a state under the convention’s criteria. So does Kosovo, currently recognized by 75 states, even though most states, as well as the United Nations as an institution, still consider its entire defined territory to be the sovereign territory of Serbia. So does the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in Western Sahara, currently recognized by 49 states and a member state of the African Union, even though its government is based abroad, in Tindouf, Algeria, while virtually its entire territory has been occupied by the Moroccan Army for the past 35 years. So do South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Transnistria, recognized by four, four, one and no states, respectively.

Interestingly, Israel does not qualify as a state under the convention’s criteria, since it has consciously chosen never to define its territory and borders, knowing that doing so would necessarily place limits on them.

Since 1933, customary international law has become somewhat more restrictive on the criteria for, at least, “sovereign statehood.” (The words “sovereignty” and “independence” do not appear in Article 1 of the convention.) The convention’s requirement for “a defined territory” is now commonly tightened to “a defined territory over which sovereignty is not seriously contested by any other state,” while the convention’s requirement for “government” is now commonly stated as “effective control over the state’s territory and population.” With the bar raised higher in these two respects, all but one of the aspiring “states” cited earlier fail to qualify as “sovereign states,” in all except Israel’s case because sovereignty (the state-level equivalent of title or ownership) over their defined territory is vigorously contested by another state which (except in the case of Morocco and Western Sahara) is recognized by most other states as the legal sovereign. Palestine alone still qualifies.

Jordan renounced its claim to sovereignty over the West Bank in 1988. While Egypt administered the Gaza Strip for 19 years, it never asserted sovereignty over it. While Israel has formally annexed East Jerusalem and an arc of surrounding territory (an annexation recognized by no other state, not even the United States of America), it has for 44 years refrained from asserting sovereignty over any other portion of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, an act that would raise awkward questions about the rights (or lack of them) of those who live there.

Since November 1988, when Palestinian statehood was formally proclaimed, the only state asserting sovereignty over those portions of mandatory Palestine that Israel conquered in 1967 (aside from expanded East Jerusalem, as to which Israel’s sovereignty claim is universally rejected) has been the State of Palestine. Its sovereignty claim is therefore both literally and legally uncontested, even if not yet universally recognized.

It was, of course, profoundly gratifying that some 100 states promptly recognized the State of Palestine when it declared its independence in 1988. However, it was then and for several years afterward legally challenging to make the argument that Palestine met the customary international law criterion for “effective control over the state’s territory and population.” This is the best argument I could make in an article published in the Washington quarterly journal Middle East Policy in early 1993, prior to the “Oslo” Declaration of Principles signed that September on the White House lawn:

“The weak link in the Palestinian claim to already exist as a state is, of course, the fourth criterion, ‘effective control.’ The state’s entire territory is under the military occupation of another sovereign state. (For seven months, Palestine and Kuwait had that much in common.) Yet ‘effective control’ is not purely a question of guns and the capacity to compel submission by physical force. It also encompasses the allegiance of the population, what is sometimes termed ‘the general acquiescence of the people.’

“Few states on earth can claim the degree and intensity of allegiance which the people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip manifest, day after bloody day, to the State of Palestine. When the State of Israel and the State of Palestine issue conflicting instructions to the population, it is abundantly clear which state exercises ‘effective control’ over their allegiances.

“Accordingly, as a matter of customary international law, if not yet of international power politics or Western public consciousness, the status of the occupied territories today is clear and uncontested. The State of Palestine is sovereign, the State of Israel is the occupying power, and UN Security Council Resolution 242, explicitly premised on ‘the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,’ is the internationally accepted basis for terminating the occupation.”

The next paragraph of that article is one which I recall with some regret:

“It is absolutely clear that a territory cannot be ‘autonomous’ or ‘self- governing’ under its own sovereignty. Therefore, if the Palestinians were to accept a regime of ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-government,’ the ostensible goal of the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral talks, sovereignty would necessarily have to shift elsewhere – presumably to Israel. By agreeing to ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-government,’ the Palestinians would be acquiescing, for the first time, in the occupation and would, de jure, be renouncing their existing sovereignty over those portions of mandatory Palestine where they still constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. What could possibly induce them to do so?”

Of course, as we all know, the Palestinian leadership did do so – and the State of Palestine, while never being formally renounced, was effectively consigned to a dark closet before, in recent months, being brought out again into the light of day, dusted off and polished up, with considerable help from South America.

On the bright side, notwithstanding all its disappointments and humiliations, the Oslo process has permitted a governmental Trojan horse called the Palestinian Authority to be dragged into the occupied territories and to start building the structures of a state which, until recently, dared not speak its name. The State of Palestine, exercising effective control over all the state’s population and most of its territory, will emerge from that Trojan horse, fully equipped, before it applies for UN membership in September.

This transformation will, logically, require the prior dissolution of the Palestinian Authority (which, legally, should have ceased to exist in 1999, at the end of the “interim period” provided for in the Oslo Accords) and the accompanying proclamation that all of its ministries and other governmental agencies have become ministries or agencies of the State of Palestine. In this context, it would, of course, be highly desirable for a reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas to be achieved prior to September.

One other article of the convention, Article 11, deserves to be cited. It reads: “The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.”

The principle expounded in Article 11 of the convention is a precursor both of the most important principle in the UN Charter, Article 2′s prohibition of the acquisition of territory by war, and of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is explicitly premised on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. The applicability of Article 11 of the convention to Palestine is clear and requires no commentary.

While, in recent years, the conduct of the United States of America outside its borders has not been noticeably restrained by legal concerns of either a domestic or an international nature, it is worth noting that the Montevideo Convention of 1933, as a ratified treaty that has not been renounced, has the status of domestic law in the United States. Both domestic and international law require the US government to respect and observe its provisions, which are not subject to any geographical qualifications or limits.

Under both the criteria of the Montevideo Convention and the more restrictive criteria of recent customary international law, the State of Palestine exists – now. Its existence does not require Israeli consent or American recognition. It is a reality that must no longer be ignored.

It is no secret that many long-time friends of the Palestinian people and cause (myself included) have concluded in recent years that a decent two-state solution was no longer conceivable and that the Palestinian people should henceforth take their inspiration from Martin Luther King, Jr., and Nelson Mandela and pursue, by strictly nonviolent means, the full rights of citizenship in a single democratic state with equal rights and dignity for all.

At least for me, this calculation has been changed by the current strategic decision of the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah to break free from a so-called “peace process” which has been cynically manipulated to perpetuate “process” and prevent peace and to rely instead on the United Nations, international law and the support of decent people around the world by seeking diplomatic recognition of the State of Palestine by a large majority of the world’s states, comprising an overwhelming majority of the world’s people, prior to applying for full member-state status at the United Nations this September.

Seven of the nine South American states that have recognized the State of Palestine since December have recognized the state explicitly within its full pre-1967 borders. If Palestine, within its full pre-1967 borders, were a UN member state, not simply “the occupied territories,” the end of the occupation and peace with some measure of justice, even if not imminent, would instantly become a question of “when,” no longer of “whether.” The writing would be clearly on the wall.

The Holy Land is rumored to have been the site of miraculous resurrections. The current Palestinian strategy offers the last, best hope of raising the two-state solution from the dead and making it a reality in a form that offers not simply a restructured and renamed occupation but genuine liberation and some measure of justice.

Decent people everywhere should do everything in their power to make this last-chance strategy succeed. If it does succeed, a huge debt of gratitude will be owed to the governments and people of South America, who, by their well-timed recognitions of the State of Palestine, have given this strategy credibility, momentum and hope. (Concluded)

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

HERE is no doubt that the Islamic world is lagging far behind today from other countries in several important fields including education, science and technology and except a few oil rich Arab nations, it is facing poverty and illiteracy. Also, it lacks sense of unity as some Muslim countries are closer to the West, others are hostile towards western countries.

There are grave ideological differences too. Also, Muslims have poor record of human rights situation and especially status of women.

Here we present five suggestions which can be debated and discussed by Muslims and can make additions or deletions to these suggestions so that Muslims could achieve a high status among the nations of the world in all fields. Muslims have a tendency to invoke past glory and what they had achieved during Abbasid period in the filed of philosophy, science and technology. It is quite natural that when we have nothing to show at this juncture we, in order to hold our head high, invoke past glories. However, it does not help.

Before we discuss these suggestions, I would also like to stress here that we Muslims are too pre-occupied with theological issues and rush to ulema for fatwas even in fields where they have no skills to guide. It is again because of poverty and illiteracy of poor Muslim masses in entire Muslim world. Unfortunately the ulema that are trained only in purely theological
issues – and a theology which was evolved during medieval ages –dominate the Islamic world.

That is why so many fatwas are issued and even the Saudi King had to issue an order restraining ulema from issuing fatwas which become subject of controversies and media focus. Too many fatwas of mutually contradictory nature are issued which hardly help resolve modern complicated issues. Islam does not encourage priesthood and certainly not institutionalised priesthood. Despite this it is thriving in the Islamic world.

Our first suggestion in this respect is that the Islamic world should commit itself to spread and consolidate education. The Muslim nations must compulsorily spend a least 2 to 3 per cent of its GDP on education. The very first aim should be universal literacy. Investment in primary education pays later very rich dividends.

Our second suggestion is about science and technology. Muslim nations are far behind in the field of science and technology.

At one time westerners used to learn from Muslims. Today it is the Muslim world which is totally dependent on the western world. This reversal needs to be reversed again.

Today oil rich Arab countries spend millions of dollars to buy weapons from America and other western countries but shy away from spending on education of their own people. The western countries exploit these oil rich nations in two ways; they make super profit by selling these weapons to them and also use these weapons ultimately for their own security in the Middle East by establishing military bases.

No Muslim country has won Noble prize in sciences. A Muslim scientist like Abdus Salam was able o get the prize when he worked outside his home country – Pakistan. If Dubai can become a huge international market, why can’t one of the emirates become an excellent centre of learning.

Fatwa culture in Islamic world has become a curse for Muslims. On petty matters of theology or jurisprudence fatwas of kufr are issued and even injunctions are issued to renew one’s Islam and even renew one’s nikah. There are acute prejudices against the other both within religious sects and against non-Muslims.

This is also because of secular education and over-emphasis on madressah and religious education. Also, partly responsible is poverty among Muslim masses. These are, needless to say, inter-related matters. One strengthens the other. Traditional ulama’s influence must be contained and restricted to strictly theological matters. Religious tolerance should be accepted as a Islamic duty and as mentioned in Quran in Adam’s story and repeated in several places, punishment or reward in doctrinal matters should be left to Allah.

No ‘alim should be allowed to pronounce who is kafir and who is on right and who is on wrong path. Also, mutual sectarian differences are so deep and wide that every other sect for these ulama is on wrong path and would be assigned to hell. Where will it lead us to?

In all our madrasas religious intolerance is taught as Muslims of other sects are denounced as on wrong path and students even encouraged to go for medieval type of munazaras (i.e. polemics) and denouncing other sects. Thus intolerance in-built in the very system of religious education today. This must be totally abolished. When terrorist activities were at their climax, many educational experts from Middle East had expressed this opinion.

What is needed is a new breed of ulema who can rise above such narrow sectarian approach and who have themselves deeply reflected on Quran in the light of modern developments in different fields.

We must realize that the theology developed by the great theologians of medieval ages was in response to their needs and situation. We should also understand that theology is a human endeavor as if in partnership with divine and human needs and endeavors can never be eternal. The greatest problem of Islamic world today is that we are treating past theology as eternal as the Quran itself.

We must make our theology dynamic and responsive to modern challenges. Today Muslim theologians must come forward and lead the world in this respect by developing new theologies like theology of peace, theology of environment, liberation theology, third world theology and so on for which Quran provides eminent guidance.

This writer has tried to develop theology of liberation and theology of peace. When one reads the Quran and reflects on its verses in the light of these challenges one is wonderstruck and begins to think Quran is indeed a divine miracle. Unfortunately Muslim theologians are so caught in the past that they are unable to realize the importance of Quran.

For this what is needed is religious freedom and tolerance. Religious freedom is very fundamental to the Quran and no genuine faith (imaan) is possible without genuine freedom of conscience. Today we hardly find religious freedom in Islamic world and it is one of the causes of our stagnation. The moment one exercises such freedom one attracts Fatwa of kufr. Our great institutions of Islamic learning like al-Azhar of which one can just be proud suffer from the same problem. When one of its great scholars Abu Zaid Nasir tried to understand tanzil and tawil (revelation and understanding revelation by human beings) he was immediately declared kafir and even his marriage was declared invalid and he had to flee from Egypt.

Earlier Prof. Fazlur Rahman from Pakistan who also was a great scholar of Islam had to leave Pakistan and go to Chicago and teach there. This is how we treat our great scholars who try to develop new theological outlook and contribute richly to our Islamic heritage.

Our third suggestion is about women’s status. Muslims never tire of asserting that Islam gives women equal rights and high status but record of Islamic world in empowering women is very poor. In fact Islamic world’s record in respect of women’s status is one of the poorest in the world. For years modern education was a taboo for them.

Now after great struggle they have won some rights including going to schools and colleges. Even this is not without problems in many Muslim countries. In Afghanistan even today Taliban burn their schools and throw acid if they do not cover themselves from head to foot. In tribal areas of Pakistan the situation is same.

Though the present Saudi king is more enlightened and is encouraging modern education for women but situation is far from satisfactory. Women cannot drive car, cannot go alone from home, cannot do their own business and representation of women in work force is just 17 per cent. They have to cover themselves from head to foot while going out. They cannot vote in municipal elections.

In many Muslim countries apart from mentioned above situation is not very different. Hijab is purely cultural and has not even been mentioned in the Quran, let alone made obligatory. Yet hijab is being enforced more and more in all Muslim countries. It is not a healthy sign. Muslim societies are highly patriarchal. There are very few women who can make independent decisions and can assert rights over their own bodies and affairs.

Our fourth suggestion is about democracy and human rights. Like our record on women’s status the record on democracy and human rights is equally woeful. There is great lack of democracy in Muslim countries except a few countries. It is because of such lack of democracy that ignorant scholars maintain that there is no place for democracy in Islam or that Islam and democracy are antagonistic. Far from it. There is nothing in Islamic teachings which can go against democracy. Islam is as democratic as any religion can or cannot be.

In fact it is feudal culture and feudal authority inherited by Islamic world that keeps democracy out of Islamic world. And western imperialism and its interests are more responsible for this than Islam. The western countries have kept feudal rulers in power in most of the Muslim countries to serve their own oil interest.

The best examples are from Iraq and Iran. Both countries have defied US interests and authority in the region and America sent its troops to Iraq on the false pretext of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and destroyed the whole country killing more than half a million of its innocent citizens. US is also a sworn enemy of Iran though it can hardly do to Iran what it could to Iraq for number of reasons.

Our fifth suggestion is about intra-religious unity. There are very sharp sectarian divisions among Muslims throughout the world though there is empty rhetoric of unity of the ummah. Here we would suggest that Muslims must put pressure on their leaders to sit down and talk to followers of other sects in the spirit of dialogue and promote unity at one level while adhering to ones belief with full freedom, on the other.

It is minimum requirement to cease the violent and physical attacks as it is happening in the Muslim world today especially in Pakistan. Pakistan, unfortunately, has become a battle ground for such sectarian fights due to powerful interests involved.

Even mutual polemics must stop forthwith denouncing each other as kafirs. In India, being a democratic and secular country, all Muslim sects coexist peacefully though occasional denunciations do take place.

__________________
When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

The future of water wars
By
Peter H. Brooks

"Water security for us is a matter of economic security, human security, and national security, because we see potential for increasing unrest, conflicts, and instability over water."
--Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, March 22 2011, World Water Day.

"The national security implications of this looming water shortage...will be felt all over the world."
--US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, Feb. 22, 2011.

"...fresh water scarcity at local levels will have wide-ranging implications for U.S. national security."
-- Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Feb. 10, 2011.

With a bombing campaign in Libya, counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an ongoing recovery in Japan why are the leaders of the U.S. foreign policy establishment talking about water? Well, when you consider that by 2030 global demand for fresh water will outstrip supply by forty percent you can begin to understand their concern.

But does more scarcity mean more conflict? Are we really in for a future full of water wars? The answer is not quite so clear.

The Fallacy of Water Wars
Mark Twain once said, "Whiskey is for drinking. Water is for fightin over." The history of water conflict is extensive and well-documented (pardon the pun). But by and large water conflicts are local, intra-state affairs.

In the last fifty years, of the 1800 or so interstate, water-related disputes the vast majority ended in peaceful agreements on water usage. But many of these agreements were low-hanging, diplomatic fruit, unlikely to be so easily negotiated or resolved again, particularly as demand for fresh water continues to rise. The peaceful relations in three river basins in particular are beginning to show signs of strain.

Indus River Basin
In South Asia tensions are mounting between India and Pakistan over the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), an agreement governing the flow of the vital Indus River.

When the Senate report quoted above was released in late February, the Pakistani media jumped on it as proof of India's violations of the IWT. Some opinion-makers have even said that a water war is already underway or at least a "water war of words". Op/Eds in Pakistan argued that India exercises "water hegemony" by continuing to violate the IWT or at the very least by benefiting from its flaws. Some outspoken, fringe voices even suggested the use of nuclear weapons to solve the problem. And all of this in the last month!

Given India's overwhelming military strength, Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaigns in its North West Frontier, and America's vested interests on both sides, the dispute seems likely to remain a water war of the words, but there is certainly no guarantee of peace between the countries.

Tigris/Euphrates River Basin
In 1990 Turkey deliberately cut off water supplies to its southern neighbors, Syria and Iraq, over concerns of their support for Kurdish separatists in Turkey. In February 1992, then Prime Minister of Turkey, Suleyman Demiral said, "We do not say we share their oil resources. They cannot say they share our water resources. This is a matter of sovereignty. We have the right to do anything we like."

In 2009, responding to severe water shortages, Iraqi parliament demanded an increase in the share of Turkish river waters. Despite this and continued droughts, Turkey has continued building dams. As broader regional instability permeates into Syria and Iraq, expect water to play an increasingly important role in future local and international disputes between these three countries.

The Nile Basin
Three prominent Egyptian leaders in the last half century predicted water wars in Egypt. In 1979, Anwar el-Sadat said that water was "the only matter that could take Egypt to war again." In 1995 Egyptian World Bank official, Ismail Serageldin said "Many of the wars this century were about oil, but those of the next century will be over water." In 1988 Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, "The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics."

Fearful that upstream neighbors Sudan, Ethiopia (where 85 percent of the river originates), Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo would turn off the tap, Egypt has fought any attempt by neighbors to divert the Nile. The wars these men predicted have been avoided because of diplomatic agreements like the Nile Basin Initiative. But, as post-revolution Egypt evolves, these statements are important to remember, particularly in light of Ethiopian plans to build a hydropower dam and the growing uncertainty of who will rule the new Egypt.

The Future of Water Conflict
The future of water conflict -- like most other kinds of conflict -- will remain, for the most part, local in its scope. But as diplomatic options dwindle and the scarcity increases, expect water conflict to take on a more international flavor than ever seen before particularly in these three volatile river basins.

In any event, it's safe to say water deserves the attention that it is getting in our political, diplomatic, and intelligence establishments.

So before you dismiss water as some sort of fringe consideration to the future of international security consider Secretary Clinton's words from last year's World Water Day, "It's not every day you find an issue where effective diplomacy and development will allow you to save millions of lives [and] advance our national security interests. Water is that issue."

A former Marine infantry officer, Peter H. Brooks is now a Fulbright-Nehru Scholar in Rajasthan, India, studying drinking water and public governance. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Fulbright Program or the US State Department.

__________________
When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

The Most Notable Revolutionaries of 2011
By
DAVID J. ROTHKOPF

The U.S. is celebrating Independence Day and 2011 has been a year of revolution. So, it only seems appropriate that we spend a moment or two celebrating the year's most notable revolutionaries. Some directly channel the spirit of Samuel Adams and Thomas Paine, others earned their place on the list inadvertently. But everyone cited below has, for better or for worse, generated some fireworks.

Let's begin with a few honorable mention contenders for top revolutionary honors, then we can conclude by crowning a Miss Congeniality, a runner up, and a champion.

Honorable Mention: Wael Ghonim

To start on a serious note, few people captured the revolutionary spirit more fully than did Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian Google executive that even President Obama cited as an ideal leader of tomorrow for the post-Mubarak Era. Ghonim's website "We Are All Khaled Said," named after a young Egyptian who died at the hands of the government, helped galvanize opposition to Mubarak. But it was his arrest and his appearances following his release that made him the face of Tahrir Square and helped fill the world with hope that this Arab Spring might lead to real political change in Cairo and throughout the region.

Honorable Mention: Mohamed Bouazizi

The year began with the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, the 26 year-old fruit vendor whose abuse by the authorities led him to burn himself in protest. He died on January 4. Ten days later, the president of Tunisia, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, fled the country and, in mid-winter, the Arab Spring was born. Bouazizi was an unlikely revolutionary, but that is what made him such a powerful symbol and empowered him to be the man who, with a single act of personal defiance, set a match to the entire region.

Honorable Mention: Austerity Protesters

The protestors in the streets of Greece and of England and of Wisconsin and everywhere else in the world where government austerity programs bit hard rival those of the Middle East for their impact this year. Like those in the Arab street, these demonstrators work may have just begun. Nonetheless, a strong message has been sent that average citizens will not quietly allow feckless politicians and greedy bankers to make the people the victims of the follies and misdeeds of the elites. Sadly, it is unlikely even the most vigorous protests will be able to protect them from the consequences of the fiscal, regulatory, and monetary irresponsibility of the recent past, but it is certain they will play a vital role in determining political outcomes worldwide for the foreseeable future.

Honorable Mention: Shanghai's Truckers

The Shanghai truckers who struck in April also earned a place on this list, not just because of the visibility of their strike in protest of fuel price inflation, but because the protests that began at the local port resonated so broadly throughout China. The impact of the rising cost of living in China has the leadership in that country deeply uneasy, so much so that they actively tried to suppress references to the Arab Spring on the Internet and elsewhere.

China's economic miracle is built on a fragile social foundation and with a leadership change scheduled for next year and with China increasingly attuned to upheaval elsewhere in the world, it could be that the aftershocks of the truckers' strike and protests like it could have the most profound implications of all this year's dramatic street scenes.

Honorable Mention: Masataka Shimizu

Sometimes revolutions are triggered by accidental revolutionaries. One of these may have been Masataka Shimizu, the 66-year-old CEO of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the operators of the Fukushima nuclear reactors. Shimizu earns his place on the list, of course, as a consequence of such prodigious mismanagement that the tens of billions he cost his company may be the least of his negative impacts. Within weeks of the catastrophe that TEPCO failed to prepare for and then failed to contain, the nuclear power industry worldwide was knocked on its heels. Given the need of many renewable energy sources for government supports that many developed world governments can't afford, it could end up being that Shimizu has done more for the fossil fuel industry than anyone since John D. Rockefeller, thus proving beyond doubt that hydrocarbons do come from dinosaurs.

Honorable Mention: Bridge and Tunnel Twins

In U.S. politics, on the plus side, there were a few -- sadly, a very few -- revolutionaries who actually tried to fix the mess the country was in. In the interests of bi-partisanship, we shall give the award on behalf of all such outliers to the Bridge and Tunnel Twins, Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York and Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey. Aside from their bluntness and effectiveness, these two are very different but they do illustrate what can happen when political leaders set aside ideological litmus tests, roll up their sleeves and actually work hard on behalf of their constituents.

Honorable Mention: The Not-So-Noble

Of course, there are countless more candidates who deserve mention for their revolutionary approaches, noble and otherwise. We have for example, the revolutionary Hamid Karzai and the Pakistani government seeking to blaze new trails in the annals of diplomacy by seeking to be both the United States' allies and enemies at the same time, demanding U.S. money and support and condemning it all at the same time. We have the cultural revolutionaries in our rising generation who this year made "Call of Duty: Black Ops" not only the top-selling video game in U.S. history but have conspired to place it in one out of every eight households in the U.S. (Be afraid, be very afraid.) And of course, we have Lindsay Lohan, serving again as the Samuel Adams of her generation, a lone voice standing up to authority, demanding, in her case, that stupidity actually be recognized as a legal defense in the State of California.

Miss Congeniality: Michele Bachmann

No contest is complete without a Miss Congeniality and in this case, the winner of this award is definitely more of a miss than a hit. This year's award is in fact given to Republican U.S. presidential candidate Michele Bachmann for misunderstanding the most basic aspects of the revolutionary spirit she had hoped to embody when she mistakenly suggested that the battles of Lexington and Concord took place in New Hampshire rather than Massachusetts. This gaffe would be easy to over look because she makes so many, but it deserves recognition as a symbol of a larger, more revolutionary idea on the part of her party.

In a nation beset with financial problems, confronted by failing students and a withering workforce, in need of technological innovation and seeking to drawn on the best precedents from the past, the Republicans this year have decided to throw convention to the wind and actually run on a platform that is against math, science, history and, given the performance of Bachmann, Palin and others, also, it seems, against the English language. They argue that budgets can be balanced without revenue enhancements, that the facts of evolution and climate science are "theories," and that the founders sought a theocracy they actually fought to avoid. They are wrong in their approaches, their tactics, their logic and their facts … but you have to give them credit. They are bold.

Runner-Up: The Women of Barabacoas

The women of Barbacoas in Colombia deserve a special place on this list for their understanding of effective revolutionary tactics. 300 such women from the small town on the Pacific coast of the Andean nation banded together to demand the paving of a road connecting their community to the next town that happens to be the nearest place medical services are available. In what has been dubbed "the strike of the crossed legs" they have resolved to deny sex to their husbands until the roadwork was completed. Although the men have failed to comply with the protest, begun late in June, and they have ungallantly suggested that they would prefer their wives indulge in a hunger-strike instead, such protests have been known to work in the past in Colombia … and elsewhere. In fact, apparently, these Colombian woman have learned a lesson their Greek counterparts have forgotten, but might reconsider, as illustrated by Aristophanes' Lysistrata, a comedy about a similar strike designed to end the Peloponnesian War.

Winner: No One

The winner is no one. And by no one … I mean no one individual. The revolutionary of the year for 2011 was, in the end, without one name or one face, it was and is the people who are combating the autocrats and thugs of the regimes of North Africa and the Middle East...and who are standing up to the fat cats and big spenders of the West and the party bureaucrats in China. Ghonim captured the idea well when he compared the revolution to Wikipedia and said, "Everyone is contributing content, [but] you don't know the names of the people contributing the content. This is exactly what happened. Revolution 2.0 in Egypt was exactly the same. Everyone contributing small pieces, bits and pieces. We drew this whole picture of a revolution. And no one is the hero in that picture." The battles are all still on-going and outcomes everywhere are in doubt. But the idea that the people could rise up as a group and, in the case of the Middle East, successfully depose leaders who raised on traditions of cults of personality or dynasties, sent what undoubtedly has to be seen as the most important revolutionary message of 2011 so far.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

What are the implications of political transformations in the Arab world for U.S. policy?

The United States has thus far been in a reactive mode—responding to events and improvising to a spiral of rebellions that no one was in a position to predict. The challenge is to move beyond this period of reaction and adjustment to forge policy responses that are strategically coherent yet responsive to the diverse social, economic, political, and ideological factors animating political change in the region. The desire for coherence is understandable. Democratic actors in the region—along with their supporters in the United States—hope that the events in the Arab world will provide a compelling rational for overcoming the long-standing tensions that have animated, and at times hobbled, U.S.- Mideast policy. Their message to Washington is that in the long term, U.S. security interests are best served by the creation of governments that enjoy popular support expressed through the institutions and rules of democratic governance. I agree with this basic statement, which is strongly echoed in USIP’s report, “In Pursuit of Security and Democracy in the Greater Middle East." The statement provides, in a general way, a point of departure for a more proactive U.S. policy. Still, there is no simple recipe for going from the chimera of autocratic domestic “peace” to a reality of democratic stability. If we are to have a U.S. policy that is not merely driven by events, it must be organized around a sober , case-by-case analysis of both the constraints and opportunities for peaceful political change in the diverse national arenas of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. Flexibility, responsiveness, and appropriateness: these are not rationales for avoiding the challenges of democratization; on the contrary, they are the bases for effective policies.

How would you characterize the emerging political landscape in the Arab World?

The emerging political landscape in the Arab world is at the same time more united and more fragmented than it has ever been. It is united by the awakening of a new generation of political activists (and their growing constituency of followers) who are fed up with regimes that were out of touch with the economic, social, political, and even moral concerns of their populaces. If the Arab world shares one common structural characteristic it is this: the end of decades of political resignation and apathy, particularly within the urban middle classes.
But if there is a shared aspiration among the new generation to move beyond political apathy—and to participate in defining a new social and political contract between governments and societies—the opportunities and constraints that could invite or resist such a change differ from country to country. In some cases, there are significant ideological, sectarian or ethno-religious differences that dramatically raise the risks of democratization for regimes under siege. The most obvious examples are those of Bahrain and Syria, where minority based regimes (Sunni in the first, Alawite in the second) portray democratization as a path to political suicide. In Yemen, tribal, sectarian, and regional issues are also at play. These factors not only raise the stakes for ruling regimes, but also work against the formation of a united opposition front that is capable of opposing a regime and, more importantly, working together once that regime falls or its leader resigns. Libya is another case where the possibility for this kind of fragmentation—or conflict—also exists. Happily, the impediments to democratic peacemaking in Tunisia and Egypt are less imposing. A greater sense of national cohesion and solidarity prevails in both countries. But Islamist-secular tensions are growing in Egypt and Tunisia—a trend that if continued could create a rocky path for transition. The economy–and the associated challenge of reviving economic reforms that do not have popular support—is also a huge challenge in both countries. Unless the escalating economic crises facing Tunisia and Egypt are dealt with quickly, it will be difficult reach a consensus on how to pursue economic reform programs that assure growth, social equity, and political accountability. In short, the push and pull of local politics throughout the Arab world is the reality that analysts, policy makers, and activists must now confront—a reality that calls for the kind of policy flexibility I have discussed above.

What are the main risks and opportunities associated with the changes underway in the Middle East?

The main risk is one of national fragmentation or even state collapse. Yemen is the most prominent example. But such a dynamic cannot be excluded in the cases of Libya or even Syria. Behind the veneer of “strong states” is the sobering reality that these states are also very brittle. The prospect for a political vacuum emerges once the combined mechanisms of fear and patronage, that up until recently held each state together, fall apart. Such a prospect can open a space for extremists to fill. On the other hand, if ruling regimes manage to prevail over the forces pushing for change, they will do so at the cost of losing all legitimacy. Such a scenario poses a dilemma for the United States when we are aligned with regimes that, for geo-strategic reasons, play an important role in U.S. security policy. The most obvious example here is Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. There is no gainsaying the vital role that Bahrain plays in sustaining U.S. strategic leverage in the Gulf. But if the Bahrain-U.S. alliance is based on backing a regime that is disliked by the majority Shiite population, then a question needs to be asked: would U.S. long term security interests be best served by pressing Bahrain’s leaders to listen to and negotiate with their opponents rather than trying to crush them?

The opportunity is to create a new political and social contract between governments and citizens, so that the policies of those who govern have a measure of real legitimacy and accountability. Of course, with such opportunity comes the reality that democratically elected governments may choose to be less friendly to certain American policies. For example, a poll recently conducted by the Pew Research Center suggests there is popular antipathy to the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. Nevertheless, my sense is that aligning U.S. values with U.S. interests will be best served in the long haul by advancing workable democratic reforms that bring governments and populaces into dialogue .The challenge is to navigate through a sea of short and medium term challenges or obstacles that will almost make this long term goal seem like a mirage. This will be easier in some cases and far more difficult in others.

__________________
When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

• Thomas Ruttig: Real reconciliation in Afghanistan
• Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman: Unanswered questions in Obama's Afghanistan policy
• Brian Katulis: The U.S. still doesn't know what it wants to get done in Afghanistan
• Gerard Russell: Afghanistan still needs a long-term commitment
• Michael Waltz: Obama's dangerous message
• Masood Aziz: Are we making the same mistakes again in Afghanistan?
• Douglas A. Ollivant: In Afghanistan, huge challenges remain

Real reconciliation in Afghanistan

The announcement of the troop drawdown by President Obama last night will not change the military balance on the ground in the short term, because the drawdown will start slowly. More problematic is the signal it sends to Afghans -- and I mean those outside positions of power who are afraid of the consequences when the drawdown ends, when international attention and development assistance to Afghanistan will dwindle. This announcement, they fear, runs parallel to a possible power-sharing deal with the Taliban that may emerge during this period. For them, today was the beginning of the end of the world's support for Afghanistan, for the third time after 1989 (the Soviet withdrawal) and the 1990s factional wars.

Despite all the claims of progress put out by NATO, the U.S. troop surge has not damaged the insurgency beyond repair, and has not shifted the strategic balance away from the Taliban. The Taliban's network structure is elastic; although many mid-ranking Taliban have been killed during the surge, they were quickly replaced -- often, it appears, by younger and more radical newcomers who are likely less inclined to talk. In cases of claimed success in clearing various districts, whether in Kandahar, Helmand or Kunduz, the fighters just went to the next district or laid-low in Pakistan for a while.

And despite claims that there was no Taliban spring offensive, the Taliban have killed four provincial and even region-level police commanders as well as one provincial governor, while two other governors narrowly escaped death. For the first time, the Taliban managed to injure a NATO general. And these are just the prominent victims.

Equally important, if not more so, are the political results of the surge. Instead of forcing the Taliban to the negotiating table, the coalition actually closed the door with the start of the surge, just when there was an internal Taliban debate about the wisdom and morality of suicide bombing as carried out by Mullah Dadullah, and Taliban voices began expressing concern about the bloodletting in the country. The surge shut up those dissenting voices. A chance was squandered. It will be more difficult now to reopen these doors, although some channels seem to be open again. But make no mistake: Channels and contacts are not "talks" and no "negotiations" yet. The mistrust is mutual: The U.S. and many Afghans do not believe that the Taliban want peace, and the Taliban did not perceive the surge as a peace offer.

If the drawdown is coupled with further confidence building measures and the inclusion of important sectors of the Afghan society beyond the Kabul government in shaping an approach to "reconciliation" that is not seen as surrendering rights and freedoms, moral and political high-ground might be recaptured. This would be much more important than clearing a few dusty districts.

Thomas Ruttig is a Co-Director and Senior Analyst of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, a Kabul-based think-tank. He speaks Pashto and Dari.

Unanswered questions in Obama's Afghanistan policy

President Obama has set the right strategic direction for U.S. policy in Afghanistan going forward, officially beginning a transfer to Afghan control of security and a realignment in U.S. strategy. While the pace of withdrawal could have been more significant than the declared 10,000 troops this year, with 23,000 to follow by September 2012, it clearly signaled the initial trajectory of a military drawdown. The President also strongly highlighted aspects of the political, diplomatic and economic strategy that American efforts in Afghanistan must be oriented around moving forward. This includes a political settlement to the conflict, a reduction of Afghan dependency on international aid, and reducing extremism in Pakistan.

Despite these rhetorical acknowledgements, much of the detail available in the president's speech was focused on troop numbers and military schedules, and many questions remain unanswered. For all the administration's claims of progress to date, the groundwork for these other priorities is still only in the early stages, and a shift in strategy is required to make that happen.

For too long, the international military effort in Afghanistan, which has received the overwhelming bulk of the resources and attention from U.S. policymakers, has superseded these key lines of efforts. More worryingly, the degree to which military operations will be aligned with the current stated objective of a political settlement to the conflict remains unclear even after the president's speech -- although some administration officials indicate that a reorientation in operational priorities will now take place. The administration has interpreted the raids and targeted operations that have created a high rate of deaths or captures of mid-level Taliban commanders as a successful tool for pressuring the insurgents to the negotiating table. But if this process is not more clearly linked to the political track to allow those commanders who might want to join a peace process the time and space to show their followers that negotiations offer better prospects and a respite from ISAF attacks, it is not clear that we will have many reliable interlocutors with whom to negotiate.

Further lacking at this point are the details of the political reforms necessary to make such a political settlement possible, and more information on how the U.S. plans to use its levers of influence -- most critically, an eventual strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan and our considerable support to the Karzai government -- to push for action. While the administration is right to affirm the need for a lead Afghan role in this process, the current Afghan government remains an exclusive and highly centralized system with few incentives to offer those on the outside short of presidential patronage. In fact, the parliament -- the one body that has served as a potential domestic check on the executive and a means of bringing opposition voices into government -- is under attack as a Karzai-appointed special electoral court announced today that nearly a quarter of the winners of last fall's highly contested election were invalid, raising the prospects of a constitutional crisis as parliament and the executive dispute the court's authority to alter the election results.

President Obama has set a direction for U.S. policy. The departments and agencies of the U.S. government must now work together to back up his remarks with policies and plans that can make political settlement and civilian transition in Afghanistan a reality.



America still doesn't know what it wants to get done in Afghanistan

It seems that the constituency for sort of starting to kind of end the longest war in America's history is pretty small, based on the initial reactions in America to President Obama's speech on Afghanistan.

Inside the Beltway, the initial responses were all over the map. Republicans are sharply divided -- some warned against mission creep and costly nation building, while others argued that America needs to stay the course and "win" in Afghanistan without defining what a "win" actually is. This confused reaction from Republicans is part of a broader dynamic I have written about before -- today's Republican Party is more divided on national security issues than it has been in decades and does not know what it stands for on foreign policy.

Democrats mostly expressed concerns about the financial costs of the operation, while others raised concerns about the size of the troop withdrawal not being enough. Despite these misgivings from both sides of the aisle, don't expect some sort of coherent political coalition to come together anytime soon to challenge the Obama administration's approach, for two reasons. First, the center of gravity in America's political debate is on domestic policy issues, not foreign policy. Unless some political movement connects the anxieties about the economy and jobs at home with what's going on with the administration's Afghanistan policy, then the war debate will remain mostly an elite one without the political backing from the public to achieve serious policy changes. Second, in the wake of the killing of Osama Bin Laden, President Obama has strong credibility and leverage with the American public on dealing with terrorism -- just before the speech, fully 63 percent of Americans approved of how Obama is handling terrorism.

Beyond the political reception, as a matter of policy substance, President Obama's speech took some steps in the right direction by signaling a drawdown of troops and flagging several important issues. But the biggest weakness of the speech was that it did not outline a clear way forward on many of the key policy questions connected with those issues -- including five key questions I raised before the speech in this article. For example, the passages about reconciliation in Afghanistan and the way forward in Pakistan sounded more like placeholders acknowledging their importance -- nor were these core issues woven together and integrated in what could be called a coherent strategy. This perhaps expects too much from a prime time speech aimed at the American public, but it augers continued challenges ahead in making the case for why the continued investment in Afghanistan is worth it.

Nearly ten years into the war, the missing ingredient from last night's speech was a clear definition of success in Afghanistan a longstanding problem for U.S. policy in the country. A decade in, the United States lacks a clear answer to the question: "How do we know when the job is done?" We are still in "we'll know it when we see it" territory.

In addition, the speech did not fundamentally resolve a central confusion at the heart of the Obama administration's policy objective defined previously as "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda." The Obama administration has said that there are few al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, arguing instead that most of the problem is across the border in Pakistan. In briefings and discussions before the speech, a number of administration officials noted that al-Qaeda and its affiliates have not posed a threat from Afghan territory in years. Some also made the case that keeping U.S. boots on the ground in some places only prolongs the cycle of radicalization. In the wake of bin Laden's death -- the only leader al-Qaeda has ever known, as President Obama pointedly noted last night -- the American public may understandably remain puzzled about why our country continues to spend billions of dollars a month in Afghanistan when we have serious economic problems at home, and face challenges scraping assistance packages together for other strategically vital countries like Egypt.

President Obama went into his speech last night seeking to strike the right balance between challenges at home and abroad, and between competing visions for the future of Afghanistan policy among his advisors. But the unanswered questions that remain about his strategy, and the lack of a clear definition of the end state America is working towards in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, remain fundamental policy problems. Without that clarity of goals, the policy debate in Washington will remain impressionistic, and clashes of favorite policy hobby horses falling under general labels like "counterinsurgency," "nation building," or "counterterrorism," or catch phrases like "let's go lighter but longer," which only serve to distract from actually defining what America needs to achieve to say it is done. Ten years into the Afghanistan war, the Lewis Carroll quote -- "If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there," still applies. And that remains the biggest danger for U.S. policy in Afghanistan today.



Afghanistan still needs a long-term commitment

The President has taken a safe approach in his speech last night on Afghanistan, in terms of domestic politics. He cannot easily be accused of playing fast and loose with national security, given that he will likely have more troops in Afghanistan at the end of his first term as there were at the beginning (though analyzing troop numbers can be misleading, based on the number of contractors deployed and the nature of troops that are withdrawn). At the same time the numbers -- 10,000 leaving this year and 23,000 next -- sound sizeable enough to placate at least some of those who are tired of the expense and unpleasantness of the Afghan war.

I wish he had gone further. Whatever happens on the field of battle, what will win or lose the fight for stability in Afghanistan is the mass political psychology of the Afghan people. There is evidence that the sheer scale of the Coalition presence in Afghanistan, and the way that it operates, has sapped the Afghan commitment to the struggle against the Taliban. Most obviously, when the Afghan president himself complains that the Americans are occupiers, it is not easy to argue that Coalition forces are there at his request, fighting a fight led by him. There could hardly be a clearer sign that the time has come to trust the Afghans to defend themselves, and reduce the foreign troop presence more significantly.

On the other hand, the timing of the announcement was unfortunate. It came just a few days after President Karzai revealed that the U.S. was having talks with the Taliban. Defense Secretary Roberts Gates, and now the President in his speech, have confirmed that fact. The impression that may result from this series of confirmations, especially among Afghans, is that the U.S. wants to cut a deal in order to withdraw.

It would in my view have been better if the announcement of troop withdrawals could have been coupled with a longer-term commitment to the future of Afghanistan. A promise that even just 10,000 troops would stay for thirty years -- unobtrusively, in bases, subject to the agreement of the Afghan government and operating only with its permission, providing air power, training and weaponry for Afghan government forces -- would be worth more than having 70,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, fighting in its villages and farms.

This is all easy to say, of course. Militarily, Afghan forces almost certainly need more time to be ready for a large-scale U.S. withdrawal -- a lot more time. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) estimates that no single Afghan unit can operate without foreign assistance, although when I was in Kabul last month, some Afghans pointed out that no unit will want to lose its resource-rich foreign mentors by proving that it doesn't need them.

The question here though is political, not military. It is a question of depriving the Taliban of their most powerful weapon, which is the claim that they are defending Afghanistan and their enemies are non-Muslim foreigners. A swift withdrawal of Coalition forces from the front line would be a very painful test for the Afghan military, though they would be free to choose their battles. But ultimately, it would be a very healthy thing for Afghan politics, and Afghan society.



Obama's dangerous message

"We always suspected you would abandon us again. Now your president has said it," the deeply lined leader of a key Mangal subtribe scolded me across a small wooden table set with a bowl of Afghan raisins and nuts. To his left, dozens of other Afghans nodded in agreement. We were sitting in the small office of a women's center on the outskirts of Khost city that was apparently funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and abandoned years ago.

I had been working closely with him for most of the year to garner his support along with his 500 arbakai, or tribal militia, during my most recent tour in Afghanistan. This meeting was supposed to be the final step toward winning over this historically pro-government subtribe.

He and his tribal council were now withdrawing their support completely. It was only week after U.S. President Barack Obama's 2009 speech at West Point, where he announced the surge of U.S. forces but undercut the policy with the simultaneous announcement that he would begin their withdrawal by July 2011.

"We appreciate all that you have done for us -- wells, roads, schools," the elder continued. "But until you are prepared to commit your children to stand side by side with our children, we cannot work with you."

"The Haqqanis and their Arab friends will build their training camps on our graves when you leave us," he concluded before walking away.

The president's speech on Wednesday, June 22, outlining his strategy to begin the withdrawal of U.S. forces is evidence that American policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is more about U.S. domestic pressures than it is about making any sort of long-term commitment to stabilize the region so that terrorist sanctuaries can no longer be used to attack the West.

The debate within the administration and among Washington's pundits over numbers of troops and timelines misses the point. According to former colleagues still at senior levels of the military commands and at the Pentagon, the differences between the most extreme options offered to the president amounted to only a few thousand troops and several months on the timeline.

The larger strategic issue is the broader signal Obama has sent to U.S. allies and the region: America is leaving. This signal, which was received loud and clear by those Afghan elders in 2009 and reinforced Wednesday night, presents four fundamental problems.

First, the entire region has begun to maneuver for a post-American Afghanistan and mostly in ways that run counter to U.S. interests. What this administration doesn't fully realize is that the Afghans, their government, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Iranians, and the rest of South and Central Asia aren't listening to the policy nuances of Wednesday's announcement. All they hear is U.S. withdrawal and abandonment. More disturbingly, all the Taliban and al Qaeda hear is that they have survived the worst of it and they only need to last a few more years until 2014. Three and a half years is nothing in that part of the world. Although Obama attempted to emphasize that significant U.S. forces will remain after the withdrawal of the surge, their very mission to win over the populace will be severely undercut by the message he sent Wednesday night. The entire region is now hedging against the United States rather than siding with it.

Second, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates has recently addressed very bluntly, the United States cannot let the withdrawal of a few thousand U.S. troops be the green light for the Europeans to run for the exits. Unfortunately, despite the attacks on Madrid, London, and Denmark, we know that will likely be the case. At least the planned drawdown of U.S. civilian capacity is something we can control. During my most recent visit to Kandahar, one senior U.S. military commander described USAID as a source of instability rather than stability due to its continued lack of a meaningful presence in the provinces and therefore its inability to fulfill its promises to Afghans.

Declining troop numbers will also affect the ability of U.S. government civilians -- most of whom operate under military protection as they provide aid and guidance on agriculture, governance, and the rule of law -- to go out in the field. From what my former colleagues have told me, the civilian agencies have their own withdrawal schedule, with plans to pull back their already meager presence from forward bases.

Third, every Afghan I've spoken to recently, from ministers to my former interpreters, is increasingly concerned about the prospect of civil war. My Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara friends believe the United States is cutting a deal with Pakistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the Taliban at their expense. A multitude of notable Tajik leaders -- the late Deputy Interior Minister Daoud Daoud, former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh, former Minister for Reconstruction Ehsan Zia, former Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, and others -- are increasingly spending time in their home turf reconstituting old alliances and networks. The Northern Alliance is getting the band back together and that includes outreach to its old allies in Iran, Russia, and India -- all of whom are increasingly viewed as more reliable than the United States. The U.S. policy of withdrawal based on timelines rather than conditions -- not to mention excluding minorities from talks with the Taliban -- are only exacerbating the situation.

Finally, Obama's policy is based on the assumption that al Qaeda is defeated and cannot reconstitute itself in the seams of an increasingly unstable Pakistan, a diminished U.S. and coalition presence, ethnic tension, and Afghan army and police forces that are years away from independent operations. This is a very dangerous assumption. Al Qaeda can and will restore itself as the United States invariably loses its hard-fought gains with the Afghan people due to diminished resources and will. A counterterrorism strategy must be nested within a counterinsurgency strategy, as the populace won't risk their necks to work with the coalition unless they feel they will be protected. It takes a network to defeat a network.

Success in Afghanistan and the region is going to be tough and expensive. Most importantly, it will take time. Nearly every commander and civilian who has served there, including me, cites the progress that has been made in the last 10 years, but caveats his or her response with the need for more time. Although the costs are great, they will be far greater if the United States leaves too soon. The people of the region will never trust America again, and the cost of re-engagement if our assumptions are wrong will be nearly insurmountable.



Are we making the same mistakes again in Afghanistan?

In announcing a 33,000-troop reduction in U.S. forces from Afghanistan last night, President Obama said "we've inflicted serious losses on the Taliban" and "we are meeting our goals." Although it is true that certain victories have been achieved over the Taliban, according to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander Gen. David Petraeus, these gains are reversible. And I wonder if we are indeed meeting our goals in Afghanistan.

First, what are America's goals in Afghanistan? Is it to defeat al Qaeda? To degrade the Taliban and then negotiate with them? Is it to help build an effective Afghan state capable of stabilizing its own territory? Or as President Obama put it "The goal that we seek is achievable, and can be expressed simply: no safe-haven from which al-Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland, or our allies." Perhaps our goal is all of the above? The true nature of the challenges and threats in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is such that these elements are all interconnected. If they are not addressed together, unlike what President Obama stated last night, we will not meet our goals.

It is not sufficient to take "strongholds" from the Taliban in Afghanistan. To truly remove the Taliban threat, institutional support in Pakistan for the Taliban and its affiliates-which harbor global ambitions-need to be stopped. Therefore, a regional strategy needs to be articulated, one that I did not hear that from the President. As the intent behind U.S. strategy remains obscure and unable to match the true character of the challenges encountered in this region, it will invariably invite geostrategic hedging by the regional power players such as Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia, and China. This strategic vagueness may be an error of colossal historic scale, setting all of us back again, and costing even more.

However, I commend the President for directly addressing U.S. domestic concerns caused by a weak economy, high unemployment and continuing fiscal challenges. Bringing back the entire amount of the "surged" troops will alleviate political anxiety in his own party, just in time for presidential elections. However, will this be sufficient? What if Mr. Obama's poll ratings decline further? What if the US economy continues to stay anemic or get worse? Will the President announce another major troop withdrawal from Afghanistan? How about another 70,000 to bring the U.S. presence there to zero? The fact is that the solution to the woes of the U.S. economy is not to be found in troop reductions from Afghanistan. Nor will it secure the homeland from extremists emanating from this region.

The hope is that cooler heads might prevail if indeed the economy does not improve. A hasty withdrawal of troops and a loss of focus on Afghanistan will be a fatal mistake, again. The evidence of such colossal errors is not simply based on opinions expressed by political analysts. Recent history is crystal clear about these costly mistakes. Let us review the evidence:

• Exit Mistake #1: Defeating the Russian Red Army & the Rise of Taliban: In the 1980s, over a ten-year period, the U.S. supported the Afghan resistance to help expel the Soviet Army. In February 1989, the Red Army withdrew in defeat. However, almost overnight, U.S. assistance to Afghans also stopped. The U.S. left the country in shambles. This led to the rise of a new force, the Taliban, which al-Qaeda then dominated, helping it to perpetuate the 9/11 attacks.The costs of 9/11 are incalculable compared to what a meager spending on basic governance and infrastructure might have achieved in Afghanistan after the Russian withdrawal.
• Exit Mistake #2: Defeating the Taliban & Misadventures in Iraq: After 9/11, it became clear that the U.S. needed to return to Afghanistan, which it did. In 2001, US troops, allied with Afghans ousted the Taliban regime and its fighters in less than a month. Once again, a space was created to rebuild the country. The years 2001, 2002 and 2003 were golden years where another opportunity presented itself to help with basic institutional building, rudimentary economic development, building schools, clinics and courts. However, the U.S. lost its focus again. It started a new war in Iraq and pulled resources, intelligence, and focus out of Afghanistan, leaving a fledgling state exposed. This short-sighted measure led to the resurgence of the Taliban, the growing powers of warlords and an insidious circle of fraud and corruption. Realizing the gravity of the situation in 2008, the U.S. had to send more troops and then again in 2009 orchestrating a troop surge, all of which led us to where we are now, spending over $110 billion a year on U.S. military forces.

The costs of inattention, of a lack of sustained focus and a lack of enduring commitment are indeed very high. The problem is not that we are spending $110 billion a year in Afghanistan but the fact that we did not prevent such costs when we had the chance to do so. Sept 11, the Iraq war and the more recent troop surge in Afghanistan all have roots in the rush for the exits from Afghanistan in 1989 and in losing focus after defeating the Taliban in 2001. The term "nation-building" has become a bugaboo because of the mistaken notion that pouring billions in a military approach will create stability in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Instead, the relatively tiny amounts of money needed to build infrastructure and assure the rule of law in 1989 and then again in 2001 could have saved us trillions we are now spending.

In his speech, President Obama was right to state that U.S. credibility around the world depends more on American values than on projecting power via military force. Mr. Obama now has a chance to articulate a significant shift in the Afghanistan strategy. Keep a smaller number of troops in Afghanistan, but commit the U.S. and international community there for the long haul. A fraction of the savings from a smaller military footprint should be sufficient to focus on building governance and the necessary infrastructure to promote the rule of law. The U.S. can also help spur economic growth and jobs by leveraging Afghanistan's huge mineral resources and engaging allies in supporting national programs in education and health. Let us stop repeating the same mistakes again. Loosing focus once more will only provide incentives to the Taliban, its institutional supporters, the warlords, and all of the regional power players pushing them to seek their own interests at the expense of others.

Let us heed the lessons of history and not panic our way out of Afghanistan. If we do so again, the resulting costs will make $110 billion a year look like small potatoes.



In Afghanistan, huge challenges remain

"Of course, huge challenges remain. This is the beginning - but not the end - of our effort to wind down this war. We will have to do the hard work of keeping the gains that we have made, while we drawdown our forces and transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government. And next May, in Chicago, we will host a summit with our NATO allies and partners to shape the next phase of this transition. "

This is a great aspirational goal, and is the end-state of any third-party counterinsurgency campaign; to make the problem simple enough for the host national government (that you have trained in the interim) to handle the remaining security challenge, and pull out the remaining third-party forces. But as numerous field commanders have found, this is often easier said than done. An insurgency exists in most cases precisely because the host nation government has been weak, corrupt, or both.

So what will the President (or his successor) do if, despite herculean efforts on the part of the NATO mission to defeat Taliban forces and train both Afghan security forces and Afghan civil government, the Afghans are simply still not ready to have security transitioned to them? What then? Are our interests in Afghanistan important enough to extend our effort? If so, for how long, at what strength, and at what price? This has always been a tension in the President's policy, or with any policy that imposes an external timeline (one imposed by the host country is a different matter altogether). This policy simultaneously states that we have interests worth shedding American blood for in Afghanistan, while signaling exactly what our price point is for foregoing those interests.

We need to accept that a disengagement from Afghanistan may be ugly, which may tempt us to extend our involvement. We must not kid ourselves that there won't be more rounds of hard choices about Afghanistan. The policy as outlined by the President is a good first step towards a more rational policy that aligns our real but limited interests in Afghanistan with the costs appropriate for those limited interests. But we must prepare ourselves for the cold reality of what our withdrawal from Afghanistan will look like. When the President says that Afghanistan will not be a "perfect place," he may be understating considerably. But the President is still right. Fixing Afghanistan is an Afghan responsibility, with the costs not borne by either American taxpayers or American soldiers. We may still decide that a long-term residual training and counterterrorism force in Afghanistan is in our interest-and may fall within the context of a long-term relationship with Afghanistan. But this will be a much lower cost endeavor, both in money and troop presence, than the current operation.

In short, we cannot plan on success. We must make the best plan that gives the best chance of success and work as hard as we can, within our resource constraints, to bring it about. But to plan on success is pollyannaish. Calmer heads should be thinking now about a wide range of contingencies, because it will almost certainly not be as simple as that laid out by the president last night. When it comes to Afghanistan, we still have the wolf by the ears.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins