Current Affair Notes
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="4"][CENTER]Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan
[/CENTER][/SIZE]
[SIZE="2"]Congressional Testimony by Moeed Yusuf[/SIZE]
May 5, 2011[/CENTER] [/B]

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to present my views on U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Thank you for this opportunity.
My views are my own. They are informed by my work at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) which provides analysis, training and tools to help prevent, manage and end violent international conflicts, promote stability, and professionalize the field of peacebuilding. USIP’s work in Pakistan encompasses three interrelated areas: improving mutual understanding between U.S. and Pakistan; strengthening capacity to mitigate conflict; and promoting peacebuilding through education and civil society initiatives. Over several years, USIP has been involved in training conflict resolution facilitators, promoting peace education in Islamic seminaries, and conducting research and analysis on the ground in Pakistan. I travel frequently to Pakistan and have a broad network of contacts across the country.
Mr. Chairman, you could hardly have selected a more pressing moment to reflect upon the state of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. Just five days ago, the world’s most wanted man, Osama Bin Laden was killed inside Pakistan. There are multiple ways to absorb and analyze this development. The most obvious reaction, as we have witnessed in the wake of Bin Laden’s killing, is to question Pakistan’s commitment as a partner in the fight against terrorism given that he was found living comfortably in a Pakistani Garrison town. Understandably, many have suggested that Pakistan is not sincere, and thus Washington should contemplate breaking off ties.
I, however, believe the U.S. should see this extremely difficult moment as an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship. America has tried the ‘walk away’ route before; it is primarily the reason for our presence in Afghanistan today. But this time, the outcome of a ruptured relationship with Pakistan is certain to be even more detrimental as its multiple fault lines have rendered the country much weaker and fragile than it was at the end of the Afghan Jihad.

For detailed notes follow the below link:
[url=http://www.usip.org/publications/congressional-testimony-assessing-us-policy-and-its-limits-in-pakistan]Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan | United States Institute of Peace[/url]

The Impact of Osama bin Laden's Death on al-Qaida
 

[B]The Impact of Osama bin Laden's Death on al-Qaida
by Colonel John Maraia
May 2, 2011[/B]

USIP's Army Fellow, Col. John Maraia discusses the impact of Osama bin Laden's death on al-Qaida and U.S. counter-terrorism activities.
[LIST=1][*]What impact will bin Laden’s death have on U.S. efforts to combat terrorism?[*]What impact will this have on al-Qaida and Islamic extremism?[*]What about the impact on U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan?[/LIST]
visit the following link for complete notes......
[url=http://www.usip.org/publications/the-impact-osama-bin-ladens-death-al-qaida]The Impact of Osama bin Laden's Death on al-Qaida | United States Institute of Peace[/url]

Crisis in Yemen and U.S. Objectives. . .
 

[CENTER][SIZE="3"][B]Crisis in Yemen and U.S. Objectives
Yemen Strategic Exercise[/B][/SIZE]
By
Frederick W. Kagan
Director, AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Katherine Zimmerman
Analyst, AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Published May 17, 2011[/CENTER]

[B]Content[/B]
[LIST][*]Topic Slides [*]Abbreviations[*]Reference Maps (natural resources and political)[*]Yemen and the Arab Spring[*]Yemen Basics (demographics, economy, government, governance)[*]Security Threats to the Yemeni State[*]Key Actors in Yemen[*]Outcomes of most likely and most dangerous scenarios[*]U.S. Strategic Interests in Yemen: Defeat al Qaeda and Regional Stability[*]U.S. Military Objectives and Military Strategy[*]U.S. Political Objectives and Political Strategy[*]Considerations[*]Initial Policy Recommendations[*]Contact information[/LIST]
for detail notes visit the following address:
[url]http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/Yemen_Strategic_Exercise.pdf[/url]
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wht is the middle east issu???
 

can u just brief me wht actually the middle east issue is?? uprising in egypt turkey..... all plzz

@face~bradley cooper
 

[QUOTE=face~bradley cooper;307219]can u just brief me wht actually the middle east issue is?? uprising in egypt turkey..... all plzz[/QUOTE]

A wave of change has been shaking the Arab Middle East led by Tunisia and Egypt, spreading to Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. We are witnessing what is apparently the emergence of “people power” in the Middle East. Whether it will be institutionalized in the form of democracy is yet to be seen. It may still be too early to come to the conclusion that people power will reign in the Middle East, but the pressure is on.

At this juncture, it is time to question the old Orientalist frame of mind, which prevails in some Western circles that people of Middle East are not ready for democracy. With this state of mind they have exempted the Middle East from the global drive for democratization and supported suppressive regimes. It would be a welcome change that instead of siding with dictators in the Middle East, the West would take up the cause of the people. For decades a policy of supporting despotic regimes in the Middle East was excused to hinder the rise of radical Islamic governments even if this meant oppression, violence, and poverty. The last popular demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt that led to non-violent revolutions were initially met by Western hesitation, as the main question asked was “who will succeed the dictators? The Islamists?”

This position is all the more ironic because these suppressive and corrupt
governments of the Middle East used the “threat of Islamism” as a scapegoat to secure the support of the West, turning the threat into a “strategic asset” for their survival.

As a result, democratization was viewed a risk the West was not willing to take. At best, a gradual liberalization policy was advocated by outside observers and policy makers.

However, the real story on the ground is that this is a grass roots movement of “people power. ” The “Islamist” debate seems outdated. It is not radical Islamists but the population of these countries that will benefit from democratization. It has been fundamentally misconstrued to equate democratization with Islamization in the Middle East. What people want is a representative and accountable government. It is an Orientalist reductionism to assume that Muslims would blindly vote for an Islamist party, disregarding their program and performance. Nevertheless, inclusion of Islamists in the political process is absolutely necessary to establish representative governments in the Middle East. The people of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and others in the Middle East are capable of electing their representatives and holding them responsible for what they do and what they do not while in government. In the long run, the West will also benefit from governments that are elected by their own people and represent their needs. Representative governments founded on the solid bed rock of democracy would do much more to foster stability and contentment in the region.

Discontent can no longer be contained. There is a moment when the cost of oppression outweighs the cost of tolerating democratic change. The Middle East is at such a crossroads. The international community needs to decide: will they stand for the sustainable stability of democracies or the fragile stability of dictators?

For years the people of the Middle East were squeezed between “two ways.” They were told to put up with repressive regimes, or the alternative was a totalitarian Islamist state. The latest uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt open the
door to a “third way” for the Middle East, which is democracy.

In this context the “Turkish experience” shows that people of the Middle East do not have to choose between an authoritarian government and an Islamist regime. There is a third option, which is a representative and accountable government with free and fair elections.

Thus a new debate has been launched on the relevance of the Turkish experience to the changes in the Middle East. The “new Turkey” may indeed present a “third way” for the Middle East with its advancing democracy and flourishing economy with a free market and an open society. The ruling AK Party with its “conservative” social and cultural outlook but “liberal” political and economic program stands out as a novel model. It demonstrates that Islamic identity is not in contradiction to democracy and that there is no inevitable clash between Islamic identity and the West, globalization, and the market economy. The story of the AK Party is the one that demonstrates what a reformed Islamic party can achieve through democracy. It adopted a language of human rights and democracy, mobilized popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy, and built a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors at home and abroad. All these have resulted in speedier democratization, higher economic growth, and freer civil society. Thus, Turkey and the AK Party can offer a new way of thinking about Islam, democracy, and the West in the “new” Middle East.

Current issues in the middle east
 

[CENTER]
[SIZE="2"][B]CURRENT ISSUES
IN THE
MIDDLE EAST[/B][/SIZE]


[B][SIZE="2"]a graduate class project of
Fairleigh Dickinson University[/SIZE]

by [/CENTER][/B]
Mahmoud Aboud --- Alexandra Acosta
Idrees Mohamed Ali --- Anwar Al-Barout
Mohammed Al-Hadrami --- Nageeb Al-Jabowbi
Waheed Al-Shami --- Abdullah Al-Shammari
Adel Al-Sheikh --- Eve Burnett
Matankiso Chachane --- Ahmad Daoudzai
Johannes de Millo --- Naseer Ahmed Faiq
Khalid Faqeeh --- Bobette Jansen
ikolaos Kouroupis --- Shihana Mohamed
Siham Mourabit --- Chan Pee
Lila Ratsifandrihamanana --- Tania LaumanulupeTupou
Sanaa Eltigani Uro

[B][CENTER][SIZE="2"]Editor
Ahmad Kama[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

[U][B][CENTER]Index of Contents[/CENTER][/B][/U]
[B]Introduction [/B] Ahmad Kamal

[B]Definitions and Limits [/B] Mahmoud Aboud

[B]Linguistic Commonalities[/B] Chan Pee

[B]Cultural Influences [/B] Khalid Faqeeh

[B]Jerusalem – Crucible of Religions [/B] Alexandra Acosta

[B]Inter-Faith Dialogues[/B] ‘Matankiso Chachane

[B]Israel – a Jewish View[/B] Bobette Jansen

[B]Palestine – an Arab View [/B]Mohammed Al-Hadhrami

[B]Western Influences [/B] Idrees Mohamed Ali

[B]Russian Influence [/B] Ahmad Daoudzai

[B]Shia-Sunni Divide [/B] Abdullah Al-Shammari

[B]Baath and Muslim Brotherhood [/B] Nageeb Al-Jabowbi

[B]Democratic Traditions [/B] Anwar Al-Barout

[B]Terrorism and Extremism [/B]Tania Tupou

[B]Minorities [/B] Eve Burnett

[B]The Red Sea [/B] Adel Al-Sheikh

[B]Water Problems [/B] Siham Mourabit

[B]Migration Flows [/B] Nicolaos Kouroupis

[B]The Impact of Oil [/B] Waheed Al-Shami

[B]The Search for New [/B] Technologies Johannes de Millo

[B]Iran and its Nuclear Program [/B] Naseer Ahmad Faiq

[B]The WMD Free Zone Proposal [/B]Shihana Mohamed

[B]The Role of Women [/B] Sanaa Eltigani Uro

[B]African Union and Arab League [/B] Lila Ratsifandrihamanana


Click here: [url]http://www.un.int/kamal/publications/Current_Issues_in_the_Middle_East.pdf[/url]
Enjoy it

Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments
 

[CENTER][SIZE="3"]
[B]Pakistan: Key Current Issues and
Developments [/B]
By
K. Alan Kronstadt
(Specialist in South Asian Affairs)[/SIZE][/CENTER]

[B]Contents [/B]
Overview: Key Current Issues and Developments .......................................................................1
The Obama Administration Strategy............................................................................................3
Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative.......................................................................5
Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review I...................................................................................5
May 2009 Trilateral Summit and Ensuing Diplomacy............................................................7
Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review II .................................................................................7
January 2010 Regional Stabilization Strategy ........................................................................8
March 2010 Strategic Dialogue Session.................................................................................9
Other Notable Recent Developments in Bilateral Relations .................................................10
Increasing Islamist Militancy .................................................................................................... 11
Al Qaeda in Pakistan...........................................................................................................13
Threats to Punjab and Sindh................................................................................................15
The Swat Valley..................................................................................................................17
The 2009 Swat Accord and Reactions............................................................................17
Accord Fails, Army Moves In .......................................................................................18
Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency....................................................................................20
Pakistani Views on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan ...........................................................21
London Conference and Moves Against the Afghan Taliban in Early 2010 ....................23
U.S./NATO Supply Routes............................................................................................25
Pro-Taliban Militants in the Tribal Agencies........................................................................25
The Pakistani Taliban....................................................................................................26
The Demise of Baitullah Mehsud ..................................................................................27
Pakistani Military Operations in the Tribal Agencies ...........................................................27
Bajaur ...........................................................................................................................28
South Waziristan...........................................................................................................29
Other Agencies .............................................................................................................30
Analysis of Pakistani Military Operations .....................................................................31
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) ....................................................................................33
Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency.........................................................35
Shifts in Pakistani Public Attitudes ............................................................................................37
Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals.....................................................................................38
Attempted Times Square Bombing......................................................................................38
Other Recent Cases .............................................................................................................39
U.S. Government Response.................................................................................................40
U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism Cooperation.............................................................................40
Joint Security Initiatives/Programs ......................................................................................41
2008 Frontier Corps Deaths and U.S. Special Forces Raid...................................................42
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks ............................................................................43
Rivalry and Conflict With India.................................................................................................46
The “Composite Dialogue” Process.....................................................................................46
Mumbai Terrorist Attacks and the LeT ................................................................................48
The Kashmir Dispute ..........................................................................................................48
Competition in Afghanistan.................................................................................................49
Nuclear Weapons, Power, and Security......................................................................................50
Deteriorated Economic Circumstances ......................................................................................51
Domestic Political Upheaval .....................................................................................................53
President Zardari and the National Reconciliation Ordinance ..............................................54
The 18th
Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution...............................................................55
Ongoing Tensions Between the Executive and the Judiciary ................................................56
Recent Human Rights Issues .....................................................................................................56
U.S. Foreign Assistance and Congressional Action....................................................................57
The Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP).......................................................................59
U.S. Economic, Development, and Humanitarian Assistance...............................................59
U.S. Security Assistance......................................................................................................60
Defense Supplies...........................................................................................................61
Training and Law Enforcement .....................................................................................63
Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 111th
Congress ................................................64

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Pakistan .........................................................................................................69
Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West Frontier)
Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas .................................................................70

click here:[url]http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41307.pdf[/url] for detailed material.
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20 years of ECO (Part-1)....
 

[CENTER][SIZE="3"][B]TWENTY YEARS OF
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANISATION

PART-I :[/B] BASIC DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATION[/SIZE][/CENTER]

CO N T E N T

Preface

[B]BA S I C DO C U M E N T S[/B]
1. Treaty of Izmir 1977 - Amended as the Basic Charter
2. Economic Cooperation Strategy for the ECO Region
3. Functional Methodology of ECO

[B]DE C L A R A T I O N S [/B]
4. 1st Summit Communiqué (Tehran, February 16-17, 1992)
5. 2nd Summit Communiqué (Istanbul, July 6-7, 1993)
6. 3rd Summit Declaration (Islamabad, March 14-15, 1995)
7. 4th Summit Declaration (Ashgabat, May 14-15, 1996)
8. Extraordinary Summit Declaration (Ashgabat, May 13-14, 1997)
9. 5th Summit Declaration (Almaty, May 11, 1998)
10. 6th Summit Declaration (Tehran, June 10, 2000)
11. 7th Summit Declaration (Istanbul, October 14, 2002)
12. 8th Summit Declaration (Dushanbe, September 14, 2004 )
13. 9th Summit Declaration (Baku, May 5, 2006)
14. 10th Summit Declaration (Tehran, March 11, 2009)
15. 11th Summit Declaration 2010 (Istanbul, December 23, 2010)

For detailed paper visit --> [url]http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff130.pdf[/url] enjoy it :)
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20 years of ECO (Part-II)....
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="3"]TWENTY YEARS OF
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANISATION[/B]

[B]PART-II :[/B] CHARTERS AND DEVELOPMENT[/SIZE]

[B]CO N T E N T[/B][/CENTER]

Preface

[B]AGREEMENTS/ CHARTERS[/B]
1. List of ECO Agreements
2. Economic Cooperation Organization Supreme Audit Institutions (ECOSAI)
3. Charter of ECO Science Foundation
4. Charter of ECO Educational Institute
5. Charter of ECO Cultural Institute
6. Status Report on Agreements/MoUs Signed by the ECO Member States

[B]SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS[/B]
7. Address by the Prime Minister of Pakistan (1992)
8. Inaugural Address by the Prime Minister of Pakistan (1995)
9. Inaugural Address by the Chief Executive of Pakistan (2000)
10. A Brief Review of Trade Creation in ECO Region
11. United Nations Conference on Trade Facilitation and Trade Development Strategy: ECO Experience
12. Gwadar’s Scope as a Free Trade Zone in ECO Region
13. Inauguration of the ECO Demonstration Train on Islamabad- Tehran-Istanbul Route
14. Accord for ECO Reinsurance Company Inked
15. Statement of Secretary General of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
16. The ECO-IRU Silk Road Truck Caravan Arrival Ceremony
17. Terrorism Undermines ECO States’ Economic Progress
18. Need to Galvanize ECO
19. Summit lets Turkey Flex its Diplomatic Muscles
20. Pakistan Ready to Provide Trade Corridors: President of Pakistan
21. ECO’s Trade Corridor
22. ECO Summit
23. Iraq Applies to Join ECO
24. An Analysis of the Pakistan – ECO Trade During 1993-2003
25. Trade Between Pakistan & ECO Countries During (2003-2008)
26. Report of ECO-PIDE Study Project on “Trading Patterns in the ECO Region”
27. Population of ECO Countries
28. Map of ECO Countries

---> [url]http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff131.pdf[/url]

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Drone Attacks and National Sovereignty...
 

[CENTER][SIZE="3"][B]Drone Attacks and National Sovereignty[/B]
By
Shehla Zafar[/SIZE][/CENTER]

A lot has been said against American drone attacks as a violation of sovereignty of Pakistan but the issue is getting more intense by each passing day. When the US drones attack Pakistan’s tribal areas, it is not just the ten, twenty or fifty innocent civilians they kill but it creates the anti-US sentiments in masses and a global feeling of disgust against US. Few stay mum and numb but there is large number of victims who vent their hatred very violently against US and its ally Pakistan. US is insensitive to the fact that civilian killings in these drone attacks provides reason to the youngsters for joining terrorist groups waging war against US and of course Pakistan, for being its closest ally in war on terror.

The drone strikes have pushed militants deeper into Pakistan and gave them an excuse to strike the heart of the country, further destabilizing it. No doubt drone attacks did kill some militants but at what cost?

US killed several hundred innocent Pakistanis and few militants in the tribal region of Pakistan in drone attacks since 2004. Apart from ineffectiveness, legality of these attacks is another major issue. According to New America Foundation the drone war against Al Qaeda’s leaders and, increasingly, their Pakistani-based Taliban allies has been waged with little public discussion or congressional investigation of its legality or efficacy. Current US leadership has not only continued the drone program but expanded it up further. In 2007, there were three drone strikes in Pakistan, 34 in 2008, 53 in 2009 and more than 37 so far in 2010.

One of the cruel facts former intelligence officials have acknowledged is that in many cases, the CIA had little information about those killed in the strikes. In January 2006, US attempted to kill Abu Khabab and Aiman Zawahiri through Drone attack when they were believed to be in Damadola, but instead killed 80 civilians, including half-dozen kids. Who is accountable for those killings?

It is claimed by some US officials that the attacks on Pakistani civilians have been carried out on the request of Pakistani authorities or with their consent but the Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani has categorically said that there is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border. Even President Asif Ali Zardari protested, “It’s undermining my sovereignty, and it’s not helping win the war on the hearts and minds of people.” And, in January, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani told media that there was no agreement between his government and the Americans to allow the strikes. Now CIA has been granted approval by the US government to expand drone strikes in other areas of Pakistan.

Shuja Nawaz, the author of “Crossed Swords” says, “Any drone attack in provinces outside of the tribal regions would be disastrous, totally destroying the American relationship with the Pakistani army.”

Problems with drone attacks are not limited to civilian causalities but now this issue has started turning into a complete volcano for Pakistan’s internal stability. Ideology of revenge is gripping the victims and those who are not in favor of any direct conflict with US are looking towards armed forces for a proper reply. CIA claims that drone attacks have killed ten of al-Qaeda’s 20 top commanders. But what CIA doesn’t tell to the world is the fact that while killing those 10 militants, the US has murdered more than 1400 Pakistanis not involved in any terrorist or extremist activities. Could it not imply that it killed 10 militants and gave birth to another 1400?

Lots of terrorists, who CIA believed, would have been killed in these attacks are still alive in actuality and waging a ruthless propaganda war inside country against armed forces being complicit in these drone attacks. A notable thing is that Pakistan’s Chief of Air Force announced that his force has capability to strike down the US drones and can do so if government directs him so. Public pressure on government is mounting through media and civil society in this regard and recent surge in drone attacks would increase in this pressure even more.

If Pakistan decides to strike down every US drone in the future, what would US do? Situation has already gone out of control for US in Afghanistan now and is forced to engage Taliban through negotiations. Any decision by US to attack Pakistan in retaliation would be disastrous not only for US interests. China and Iran would never like US presence in another neighboring country so they won’t sit quietly. Russians would have the best opportunity to avenge obviously. American public would definitely stand against its own government, this time more aggressively due to poor economy.

In above mention situation Pakistan can make life of Americans in Afghanistan a lot difficult to force US administration to reconsider their drone war in Pakistani tribal areas, only reason why it is not happening right now is presence of a weak, inept and pro-US government in Islamabad. Looking at internal politics and ever mounting public pressure against US drone attacks in Pakistan it would be prudent to assume that political situation would not remain the same in near future.

Current corrupt government has even failed to send a strong message that US must refrain itself from violating Pakistan’s Air space as tolerance level against drone attacks in Pakistani masses is reaching its critical thresh hold.

CIA is pursuing agenda assigned by US administration to protect its own interests and it would continue what it is doing right now with Pakistan’s sovereignty. Question is when Islamabad would realize that it is failing miserably in protecting its citizen and interests? Only workable solutions that grantees accurate drone strikes is to transfer the drone technology to the Pakistani forces so that Pakistani forces can enhance their operational capabilities without creating anti-American sentiments in the local masses otherwise US must get ready to face the consequences in Afghanistan by victims and their heirs and must forget about winning hearts and minds of Afghan or Pakistani people.
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