The Resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan

Although Iraq has been the focus of U.S. foreign policy, the situation in Afghanistan, the original target of Washington's war on terrorism, continues to deteriorate. Some five years after the United States went to war to defeat the Taliban and three years after it declared an end to combat operations, the resurgence of the Taliban is haunting the U.S. military and its allies, and hopes for the emergence of a democratic Afghanistan are faltering. While the political institutions in the form of a constitution, a popularly-elected president, and a national parliament have been in place for some time now, their efficacy is increasingly being challenged by the rising violence and creeping fundamentalism. The present phase in violence is the most intense since the defeat of the Taliban in 2001.

Taliban Forces Assert Power in the South and East

Taliban forces have gained a particularly strong foothold in eastern and southern Afghanistan where the links between the pro-Taliban, ethnic Pashtun tribes in Pakistan and elements of the Afghan Taliban have become stronger in recent years. Despite the stationing of around 80,000 troops in the tribal areas along the border, Pakistan has been unable to prevent al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters from crossing the porous border into Afghanistan and to prevent the radicalization of its own tribal belt. The Taliban has found a particularly hospitable environment in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the border areas of neighboring Baluchistan.

The central government in Afghanistan has also failed in expanding its influence across the country, in particular in the south. The Taliban have used this political vacuum and growing disenchantment with the pace of reconstruction and development to reassert their authority by using suicide bombers, driving out foreign aid groups, and attacking U.S. and N.A.T.O. military forces with greater ferocity. More recently, they killed the governor of a southeastern province and tried to attack the U.S. Embassy.

Drug trafficking and extortion provide them with sources of finance that they are only too willing to exploit. Afghanistan's opium production has increased by nearly 50 percent this year, making the country the source of 92 percent of total world supply. This is despite the fact that an extensive campaign to eradicate opium involving the destruction of poppy fields, seizure of opium shipments, provision of incentives to grow cash crops and the imposition of penalties to deter poppy cultivation has been underway for some time now. The opium trade and narco-trafficking continue to hamper attempts at nation-building and regional stability.

There are reports that the Taliban are now operating in battalion-size units of about 400 men as compared to the company-size units of about 100 men last year. Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice conceded that the Taliban "came back somewhat more organized and more capable than people would have expected." With N.A.T.O. forces taking over for U.S. forces in southern Afghanistan, Taliban fighters may have calculated that they would be able to fight N.A.T.O. forces more easily and may have upped the ante.

Pakistan's Role in the Conflict

After the initial defeat of the Taliban in 2001, many of its members either crossed into Pakistan or dissolved into the Pashtun population of the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. While Pakistan continues to claim that it is doing its best to fight extremists, concerns are increasing about its role in supporting the Taliban. Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (I.S.I.), is seen by many to be helping the Taliban with training, arms, and finances, and most of the senior leadership of the Taliban continue to operate from Pakistan.

The personal commitment of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to the cause has also come under scrutiny with some claiming that he is merely an "opportunist" who is only pursuing Taliban and al-Qaeda militants to the extent necessary to limit U.S. and British pressure. However, Musharraf's personal and political survival is at stake and this has forced him to walk a fine line between his support for the West and his courting of Islamic radicals at home.

Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan have come under severe strain in recent months with the Afghan president openly complaining that Pakistan was not doing enough to defeat Islamic radicals hiding and training in the rugged Afghan-Pakistan border. The differences between the two countries escalated as the Taliban stepped up their attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan, on its part, has reacted strongly to these allegations, asking the Afghan government to put its own house in order and to control its own side of the border.

There are also concerns in Pakistan that rebel leaders in Baluchistan are asking the Afghan government for help in their fight against the Pakistan army. Moreover, India's growing relations with Kabul are something that Pakistan is looking at with great wariness, especially as Pakistan has always looked at Afghanistan for gaining "strategic depth" vis-à-vis India.

Musharraf recently warned that "the center of gravity of terrorism has shifted from al-Qaeda to the Taliban" and claimed that Taliban fighters were being commanded by former Taliban ruler Mullah Omar from a base in southern Afghanistan. Earlier this month, the government of Pakistan signed an agreement with pro-Taliban militants in North Waziristan agency. As part of the agreement, the Pakistani military will cease its unpopular military campaign in the semi-autonomous North Waziristan region. In exchange, the local Taliban militants will halt their attacks on Pakistani forces and stop crossing into nearby eastern Afghanistan to attack Western and Afghan forces hunting al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.

For Pakistan, this was an acceptance of the ground reality that its military would never be able to defeat tribal militants in a region where Pakistan's writ has never extended. For the critics, however, the deal amounts to granting an effective amnesty to the insurgents, allowing them even more freedom to cross into Afghanistan and pursue their militant agenda. While Pakistani officials claim that foreign militants can stay in the region only if they obey Pakistan's laws and stay away from militancy, it is unclear how this can be enforced in a region that has become even more out of bounds for the Pakistani government after this agreement.

Islamabad is now trying hard to mend fences with Afghanistan, and Musharraf's recent visit to Afghanistan was a step in that direction. Yet doubts about Pakistan's real intentions vis-à-vis Afghanistan continue to persist and the recently signed pact with Pakistani tribal militants is not going to help matters. Dismantling the support infrastructure that Pakistan provides to the Taliban insurgents is viewed by most as the first step toward countering the Taliban's resurgence. As long as the military remains the predominant political force in Pakistan, however, this is easier said than done.


N.A.T.O. Faces Major Challenge

These complicating ground realities have made Afghanistan a difficult mission for N.A.T.O. It was only last month that around 10,000 N.A.T.O. troops replaced U.S. forces in southern Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan is important for N.A.T.O. and its credibility. It is not only "the most complex mission N.A.T.O. has ever undertaken," according to the chairman of the N.A.T.O. military committee, but it will also in more ways than one define the post-Cold War role of the Western alliance, being N.A.T.O.'s first operation outside Europe. With this in mind, N.A.T.O. is asking its members to fulfill their pledges of manpower and equipment and its military commander in Afghanistan has called upon member-states to increase the size of their contingents, yet this has proved difficult.

While most N.A.T.O. member-states have initially hoped that they would be acting merely as peacekeepers and would be involved in reconstruction, they are now engaged in a bloody, high-intensity combat against Taliban forces. In their latest offensive, N.A.T.O. forces fought the Taliban in Kandahar, killing more than 500 fighters and also regained control of parts of Helmand province that had been lost to the Taliban. Yet whether such stop-gap offensives will be sufficient in halting the Taliban's resurgence remains to be seen, especially as N.A.T.O. forces continue to suffer from a shortfall of troops, aircraft and other equipment.

Observers warn N.A.T.O. member-states to be cautious in how they approach this crucial mission. There is concern that if N.A.T.O. gives the impression that it does not have the stomach for the long haul, it will embolden the insurgents in Afghanistan and also damage N.A.T.O.'s global credibility.

Conclusion

The situation in Afghanistan remains grim with the United States even warning that Afghanistan risks becoming a "failed state" if the security situation is not handled more seriously by the West. Yet military power is just one of the means that is needed to tackle the resurgent Taliban.

The pace of reconstruction and development also needs to pick up significantly if the international community wants the ordinary citizens of Afghanistan to have some faith in its endeavor to transform social and economic structures on the ground. The political institutions also need to connect better with the demands of the ordinary citizens, and reforms in the security apparatus of the country need some serious attention. The United States and its allies are too bogged down in the day-to-day struggle for security that any long-term reforms will have to take a backseat. This does not augur well for a country that is supposed to be a model state for the war on terrorism.

Drafted By: Dr. Harsh V. Pant
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