DEMOCRACY is a process for governance by popular consent and the peaceful transfer of power. Periodic elections are its instrument. These can, however, at times produce unwelcome consequences.

The ongoing elections in Afghanistan and India are likely to bring to power Abdullah Abdullah and Narendra Modi respectively, whose assumption of office may exacerbate the already difficult regional security environment. The past proclivities of both have been hostile to Pakistan.

Abdullah was a close associate of Tajik warlord Ahmed Shah Masood and an important member of the so-called Northern Alliance which fought Afghanistan’s last civil war against Mullah Omar’s Taliban regime and was used in 2001 by the US as an auxiliary force to oust that regime. During the last and current Afghan presidential elections, Abdullah has sought to broaden his relationship with Pakhtun groups. His support base nevertheless remains the Tajik-led Northern Alliance.

Abdullah has consistently echoed the Kabul refrain that Afghanistan’s internal conflict is the consequence of Pakistan’s support of the Afghan Taliban. Given his roots and legacy, Abdullah will be closer to the Afghan National Army and the National Directorate of Intelligence — both composed largely of Northern Alliance elements. Making peace with Abdullah may prove more difficult than with the erratic Karzai.

Whether Pakistan’s ISI and army have supported the Afghan Taliban — a charge they deny — is now almost irrelevant. The powers in Kabul have acted on their accusations and, as reported recently in the New York Times, openly admit that Afghan intelligence is supporting the TTP’s war against the Pakistani state. The TTP’s nominal leader, Fazlullah, is in a safe haven in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Regular cross border raids continue against Pakistan’s border posts.

Unless this ends, Pakistan will have no alternative but to reciprocate and openly support the Afghan Taliban and other Pakhtun groups hostile to the Kabul regime. With the departure of most US-Nato forces from Afghanistan, the cross-border proxy war is likely to escalate.

However, the electoral outcome in India could complicate Pakistan’s security calculations on its western and eastern borders. Pakistan cannot harbour any illusions about Modi. He is not the cultured Vajpayee, not even the more adversarial Advani. Modi’s antipathy towards Pakistan is visceral; it springs from the hate against Muslims and Pakistan propounded by the RSS from where Modi joined the BJP. The worst epithet in the BJP’s current lexicon is to call someone pro-Pakistan. The BJP’s manifesto commits Modi to building the Ram temple on the site of the destroyed Babri Mosque and rescinding Article 370 of the Indian constitution which accords autonomous status to Kashmir.

A Modi government will continue, if not enlarge, the long-standing operations of India’s intelligence agencies to promote the BLA’s insurgency in Balochistan from Afghanistan and to work with Afghan intelligence to support the TTP’s war against Pakistan. Those in Islamabad who do not see this mischief are burying their heads in the sand.

As the gloves come off, Pakistan’s security forces may be fighting with one hand tied behind their back. Some of Pakistan’s most vocal ‘democrats’ seem to take pride in denigrating their own country’s armed forces while remaining silent or ignorant about the actions of Pakistan’s adversaries. The differences between the civilian and military leadership are out in the open. Most serious among these differences is the divergence on policy towards the TTP.

An agreement is not possible with the disparate amalgam of extremists operating under the TTP umbrella, at least not one that upholds the Constitution or is acceptable to the majority of Pakistanis. How can a deal be made when it is clear that large elements of the TTP are acting as the instrument of Pakistan’s external enemies? Some commentators have conjectured that the insistence on talking to the TTP is motivated by fear of its revenge or political affiliations with its Punjabi components. Both are insufficient cause to compromise national interest.

In the challenging environment emerging in the region, Pakistan needs to evolve a clear plan to preserve its security and safeguard its interests.

The first priority is to militarily defeat and politically divide the TTP and make peace only on terms that respect Pakistan’s Constitution, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both the Afghan Taliban and the Americans should be asked to support this effort or get out of the way.

Second, Pakistan should seek peace with and within Afghanistan. This can be achieved only from a position of strength. Kabul should be asked to end its support for the TTP and the BLA. Pakistan may need to demonstrate its influence with the Afghan Taliban to secure Kabul’s cooperation. Meanwhile, opening a dialogue with the Northern Alliance could lay the ground for a future deal.

Third, the intercession of the US, China and Russia should be sought to build a regional consensus, incorporating Iran and Saudi Arabia, for peace within and around Afghanistan. Despite their escalating rivalries in Europe and East Asia, each of them has an interest in pacifying Afghanistan, not least to counter global terrorism.

Finally Pakistan’s difficult relationship with India will need to be managed through a combination of deterrence and diplomacy. The major powers also have a stake in preventing a major crisis between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. They can be persuaded to temper Modi’s anticipated belligerence.

The success of such a plan can be assured only if Pakistan’s political leaders, security forces and diplomats work cooperatively to realise these national objectives.

ALTHOUGH the world attention is focused today on a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe, it is in Asia that the prospects of global peace and prosperity will be determined. Asia is now the world’s most economically dynamic region.

Within two decades, most of the world’s largest economic and military powers will be in Asia. But, Asia also has vast poverty; it is geographically, ethnically and politically diverse; plagued by numerous territorial disputes; in the midst of multiple transitions — strategic, political, economic, social and cultural. It is thus a volatile and dangerous place.

Many powerful actors play a role in Asia. Yet, the central relationship which will affect Asia, for good or bad, is the one between the US and China.

The US and China are now deeply interdependent for economic growth, national security and global stability. During the past four decades, Sino-US relations have not been confrontational. This could change. There are growing differences on a series of issues: military, political, economic and social. Unless these are wisely addressed, Asia may become embroiled in a cold, or even a ‘hot’, war. Decisions and developments on a number of issues are likely to determine the future of Asia.

First, military postures and deployments. When China was invaded and divided by the European colonial powers, it was the world’s largest economy, as it will be again. China’s desire for military security is understandable. The US is a Pacific and global power. Its presence in Asia is natural. What matters is the nature of the US, Chinese and other military deployments in Asia. Are these threatening and adversarial in nature?

Thus, deployment of forces on borders and sensitive areas; or the deployment of inherently offensive and destabilising military systems, like anti-ballistic missiles, can be seen as threatening and invite responses that could spiral into military confrontation. A Sino-US military dialogue can help to avoid costly mistakes.

Second, military alliances. These are adversarial by definition. There is no need for rival military blocs in Asia. The creation of alliances, formal or informal, by the US with countries on China’s periphery, is likely to create the very outcome sought to be avoided. Asia should learn lessons from Europe’s bad and good experiences and build ‘cooperative’ security.

In this, several Asian powers — India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia — can play a positive role, primarily by eschewing incorporation in rival alliances and building security in Asia’s ‘sub-regions’. Russia too is an Asian power. Its positions will influence Asian events. Given memories of the past, Japan’s more muscular posture is likely to evoke a generally negative Asian response. Australia will need to balance its Anglo-Saxon ties with its economic interdependence with China.

Third, territorial disputes. Each of the numerous disputes afflicting Asia needs to be patiently and constructively addressed, principally by adherence to international law and mutual accommodation. The resolution of the maritime disputes in the East and South China Sea is essential. But it would be counterproductive to try and secure solutions by attempting to ‘isolate’ China.

South Asia also requires strategic attention. The festering dispute over Kashmir and the ongoing Indo-Pakistan conventional and nuclear arms race, in combination, have created the most dangerous nuclear flashpoint in the world today. The nuclear negotiations with Iran can produce a durable solution only if a broad strategic understanding is achieved involving Saudi Arabia and other West Asian powers.

North Korea’s erratic behaviour requires patient management and reassurance regarding regime survival. The six-power forum is also a good vehicle to stabilise the complex relationships in Northeast Asia.

Ironically, combating terrorism provides a promising basis for cooperation among almost all Asian powers. The Muslim world is particularly affected by this phenomenon. But, counterterrorism can succeed only if there is willingness to address the root causes of terrorism. These causes are different in each area; but they are all political in nature. Among these causes are the visible instances of the suppression of Muslim peoples, as in Palestine and Kashmir.

Fourth, trade and development. The recent global financial crisis has led to a visible reversal of globalisation and a revival of state mercantilism. The creation of trade blocs that attempt to exclude China or other major economies will retard progress and exacerbate political and military rivalries. It is vital to re-launch global efforts for trade, financial and services liberalisation through the World Trade Organisation and the UN. Technological progress now offers the possibility, including in the field of energy, to enhance production, consumption and growth on a universal and sustainable basis. Despite the recent slowdown, Asia will continue to be the world economy’s central dynamo.

Fifth, ideology. Now that capitalism has been universally embraced, it is the promotion of democracy and human rights that has become the rallying cry for the West. Democracy versus authoritarianism is the new ideological divide. Realising the common good will have to be achieved by each country and society according to its own circumstances. Attempts to impose Western concepts and practices will continue to be resisted by most Asian powers, promote instability and provoke confrontation.

Last, like other regions, Asia can benefit from effective institutions of cooperation. The institutions created after the Second World War — the UN Security Council, the IMF and World Bank — are now outdated and need to be restructured to reflect current realities, particularly those in Asia. Asia also needs to create its own region-wide economic and political organisations — such as Europe’s OECD and the OSCE — to build cooperative security and prosperity.

Losing the narrative

IN a review of Anatol Lieven’s book Pakistan: A Hard Country, in the Guardian of May 1, 2011, Pankaj Mishra wrote:

“[…] [A]n un-blinkered vision of South Asia would feature a country whose fanatically ideological government in 1998 conducted nuclear tests, threatened its neighbour with all-out war and, four years later, presided over the massacre of 2,000 members of a religious minority. Long embattled against secessionist insurgencies […], the ‘flailing’ state […] now struggles to contain a militant movement in its heartland. It is also where thousands of women are killed every year for failing to bring sufficient dowry and nearly 200,000 farmers have committed suicide in the past decade.” Mishra added: “This country is not Pakistan; it is India.”

The review noted that India has revamped its Western image in a most successful rebranding and through one of “the cleverest PR campaigns.” On the other hand, Pakistan (which both Lieven and Christophe Jaffrelot, in his book The Pakistan Paradox, describe as a country with a surprisingly resilient society and institutions, despite a history of mis-governance) seems to have “lost the narrative”.

The joint statement issued in Ufa is the clearest and most recent confirmation of this unfortunate reality.

Normalisation between Pakistan and India is an imperative. But this can be achieved only if Pakistan pursues an equal relationship with clarity, confidence and persistence.

Normalisation between Pakistan and India can be achieved only if Pakistan pursues an equal relationship.
In recent interactions with India, Pakistan’s political leaders have displayed none of these attributes. They are being played like a fiddle by Modi.

Below are the essential aims Pakistan needs to project and promote vis-à-vis India.

Military balance:

India’s current military build-up poses an ever growing threat to Pakistan’s security and needs to be neutralised, either through arms control or a reciprocal defensive build-up.

To those, like the US, who argue that this is not aimed against Pakistan, it should be sufficient to point out that almost all of India’s capabilities are deployed against Pakistan; its military doctrines are Pakistan-specific; and threats of aggression against Pakistan are persistent and current.

Pakistan should propose bold and specific arms-control measures to India, bilaterally and through multilateral channels. The onus for refusal should rest on New Delhi. Simultaneously, Pakistan cannot be deterred by Western admonishments from taking measures, including short- and long-range missiles, to deter Indian aggression or adventurism.

Kashmir:

Kashmir remains a flashpoint for another Pakistan-India conflict. It cannot be put on a back channel. The ongoing exchanges along the Line of Control can easily escalate. Modi’s policies virtually ensure that, sooner rather than later, there will be another Kashmiri revolt. Islamabad would not be able to restrain support flowing to a new Kashmiri insurgency even if it wanted to. It is for New Delhi to halt its repression and human rights abuses, de-militarise Kashmir and engage in a constructive dialogue with Pakistan. This can avert a Kashmiri eruption and a Pakistan-India crisis.

Terrorism:

Pakistan is the major victim of terrorism in South Asia, with by some accounts 50,000 casualties since the US-led incursion into Afghanistan. Much of this terrorism has been sponsored or supported by India, as admitted recently by BJP leaders. India should not be allowed to adopt the victim’s mantle.

In Ufa, Pakistan should have insisted on reflecting Indian support to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), insisted on an inquiry into the Samjhauta Express incident, and clarified that the legitimate Kashmiri struggle for self-determination does not amount to terrorism.

Trade and investment:

Trade with India can be mutually beneficial, especially in the exchange of natural resources and food, gas and energy supplies (from Iran and Central Asia). In manufactures, India competes with Pakistan and enjoys the advantage of size and a host of protections.

Similarly, the Indian investment regime is far more restrictive than that of Pakistan. The field has to be levelled before bilateral trade and investment can be fully opened.

Transit:

Transit through Pakistan to central and west Asia is a major Indian priority (although it is building an alternate route from Chabahar in Iran). Pakistan cannot provide such transit to India until the issue of Indian subversion through the BLA and the TTP has been resolved. Even after that, Pakistan should pose two conditions: one, that the upgradation of transit facilities involved should be financed by India or the regional countries involved (as China is doing on the Economic Corridor); and, two, that Pakistan should be accorded reciprocal rights for transit to Nepal and Bangladesh through India.

Water:

Access to water is fast emerging as an existential issue for Pakistan (and for India). To avoid food and ecological disasters, and a possible conflict, it has become vital for the two countries to live up to the principle of the equitable sharing of water enshrined in the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan must secure this aim bilaterally and through all available international avenues.

Composite agenda:

It is self-evident that all the issues between Pakistan and India are interlinked and interdependent. Progress on some will facilitate movement on others; and vice versa. The security issue and Kashmir were rightly accorded higher priority when the agenda for the composite dialogue was framed. The rationale for this priority is, if anything, more compelling today. It is purblind to restrict attention to terrorism only.

Foreign policy management:

The foreign policy lapse reflected in the Ufa statement is, unfortunately, not an isolated incident. There have been several other demonstrations of a naïve and simplistic approach to foreign affairs.

As has been noted in the Pakistani media, it reflects a dysfunction. The current complex structure at the apex of the foreign ministry is no doubt a major problem. An even larger problem is the inability of the professional foreign service to render good advice to the political leadership and/or the unwillingness of the leadership to accept it.

It is imperative to ‘normalise’ the structure, restore the primacy of the professional foreign service, integrate the security establishment into policymaking and appoint someone with the experience and independence required to formulate and project a foreign policy that reflects Pakistan’s vital interests and objectives and preserves its dignity.

Source:Losing the narrative
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Published in Dawn, August 2nd, 2015

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