NPT: NUCLEAR NON POLIFERATION TREATY:


Narrative
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is one of the great success stories of arms control. It has made major contributions to global security and economic well being. It has been remarkably successful in achieving its main goals and -- with nearly 190 parties -has become the most widely-adhered to arms control treaty in history. The NPT is an indispensable tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

History

The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the nuclear era. By 1964, there were five declared nuclear weapon states -- the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. Many predicted that the nuclear club could grow to 20-30 countries within two decades. It rapidly became clear that if the many peaceful uses of nuclear technology were to be developed, states needed credible assurances that nuclear programs would not be diverted to military applications.

In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by Ireland calling on all states to conclude an international agreement that would ban the acquisition and transfer of nuclear weapons. In 1965, the Geneva disarmament conference began consideration of a draft nonproliferation treaty. Negotiations were completed in 1968 and, on July 1 of that year, the NPT was opened for signature. On March 5, 1970, the NPT entered into force. The United States, United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union were among the 43 original parties.

Important members of the international community did not embrace the NPT in 1970. There were many questions. Would its terms be honored? Would the inspections of civil nuclear facilities lead to commercial espionage? Would others join the Treaty? Would it provide real benefits?

Over time, the many benefits of the NPT became clear. The NPT establishes a political and legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. That fact alone offered to many states a compelling rationale for joining. The growth in Treaty membership toward universality has been steady over the years. From 43 original parties in 1970 the number grew to 96 in 1975, 132 in 1985, 177 in 1995, and stands at nearly 190 today. Israel, India and Pakistan remain outside the Treaty. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but in January 2003 announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty.

In 1995, the parties faced the critical decision of whether to extend the NPT indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods. A majority decision was necessary. There was some speculation that the international community was not ready to make the NPT a permanent fixture of global security.

However, at the Conference called to consider this issue, it was decided by consensus on May 11, 1995, that a majority of parties supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Direct Security Benefits

There is a strong international consensus that the further spread of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all countries, threaten global and regional stability, and undermine efforts to achieve peaceful solutions to existing problems among states. The NPT, and the norm of nonproliferation that it supports, are the primary reasons why the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than predicted in the 1960s.

The security benefits of the NPT are evident in every region of the world. South Africa's accession to the NPT in 1991 enhanced the security of all African states and opened the way for the negotiation of a treaty to make Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Widespread acceptance of the NPT in Latin America and Southeast Asia has reinforced the desire of nations in these regions to ensure that nuclear weapons do not undermine their security.

There have been challenges to the NPT. Iraq was found to be in violation of the NPT in 1991. Its nuclear program was neutralized through action by coalition military forces in the spring of 2003 following 12 years of Iraqi noncompliance. In Asia, North Korea's failure to meet its NPT obligations, and its action to withdraw from the Treaty, undermine regional and global security. Iran failed to fulfill its obligations under Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement according to reports issued in 2003 by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In November 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors deplored Iran's breaches of its obligations and urged compliance. In the last days of 2003, Libya announced its intention to abandon its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Carrying out this pledge will require Libya to demonstrate full compliance with the NPT and Libya’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In all four cases, the international community responded strongly, insisting on full compliance with the NPT. The NPT is a critical tool in efforts to restrain the nuclear programs of these countries.

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia in 1998 poses a continuing challenge. But the tests by India and Pakistan that year also reinforced the NPT, as nations around the world condemned these actions and reaffirmed the critical importance of the Treaty.

In Europe and Central Asia, great political and economic changes have occurred over the last 15 years as a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In the midst of these massive changes, the NPT has provided stability. All of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union transferred nuclear weapons deployed on their territories to Russia and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states

Safeguards and Security

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957, is the primary mechanism for verifying that parties to the NPT are complying with its terms. The implementation of IAEA safeguards is further evidence of the way in which the NPT strengthens international security. Safeguards under the Treaty, including international inspections, help to deter the use of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes, and thus are an important confidence-building measure.

In light of the lessons learned from Iraq in the early 1990s, the members of the IAEA have taken measures to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. These include a reaffirmation of the IAEA's right to conduct special inspections and the use of new tools for the detection of clandestine nuclear facilities. In 1997, the IAEA adopted a model protocol for existing safeguards agreements under the NPT that is designed to give the IAEA a stronger role and more effective tools for conducting worldwide inspections.

Nuclear Arms Control and Reductions

The NPT's role in checking nuclear proliferation also is critical to reducing existing nuclear arsenals. A vast array of actions has been taken in recent years that meet the objectives of NPT Article VI, which calls for effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the United States and the former Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) have taken many dramatic steps to reduce Cold War stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The U.S. alone has dismantled approximately 13,000 nuclear weapons over this period.

Today, the nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia is over. They have agreed on further reductions in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and on taking other steps to reduce their nuclear weapon infrastructures.

The START I Treaty has significantly cut the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the United States and the former Soviet Union. The U.S.-Russia Moscow Treaty, which entered into force in 2003, calls for reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest levels in decades.

Dramatic reductions have also been made in stockpiles and deployments of shorter-range nuclear weapons. Over 85% of tactical nuclear weapons dedicated to the NATO alliance have been withdrawn over the past decade and the United States has removed nuclear weapons from all surface naval ships and naval aircraft. In effect, these actions have de-nuclearized the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the surface and air components of the U.S. Navy.

The United States halted production of fissile material for nuclear weapons many years ago. More than 200 tons of fissile material have been removed from the U.S. military stockpile and will be placed under IAEA safeguards as soon as practical. The United States and Russia support bilateral and multilateral measures to establish a legally binding halt in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. For example, both countries support in principle the negotiation of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. They also are obligated under a 1997 bilateral agreement not to restart any shutdown plutonium production reactors and not to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons in any such reactors still in operation. They are also working on ways to store safely and to dispose of stocks of fissile material no longer needed for defense purposes.

The United States has not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992, and senior U.S. officials have noted there is no foreseeable need to change that policy. The United States is not producing or developing any new nuclear weapons. Policies are in place designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons through enhancing the role of advanced conventional weapons and developing missile defenses.

Nuclear Cooperation Benefits

The NPT creates a vital and irreplaceable framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation by providing assurances that non-nuclear-weapon state NPT parties will devote their nuclear programs exclusively to peaceful purposes. However, it is important that this Article IV benefit not be abused by NPT parties and that any peaceful nuclear program fully conform with the NPT’s nonproliferation principles. Some NPT parties have violated the Treaty and in doing so should not, in the view of the United States, remain eligible for Article IV benefits. Consistent with its NPT Article IV obligations, the United States has for many years granted preference to NPT parties with exemplary commitments to nuclear nonproliferation when considering U.S. assistance to foreign nuclear programs.

The United States aids nuclear programs through the IAEA by providing a voluntary financial contribution and certain "in-kind" assistance. This assistance supports many IAEA programs that benefit developing countries, which comprise the majority of NPT parties. Among such projects are nuclear applications in the fields of water resources and environmental pollution, nutrition and agriculture, and human health. The U.S. cash contribution for IAEA technical assistance projects from 2000 through 2003 totaled over $85 million, providing approximately 1/3 of the total available resources.

The primary legal vehicle for bilateral U.S. assistance is an agreement concluded under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. There are more than 25 such agreements in force. Hundreds of millions of dollars of fuel, nuclear equipment, and other commodities are exported from the United States to NPT Parties pursuant to these agreements each year. Also, U.S. Department of Energy laboratories have signed bilateral agreements with scientific institutions in several NPT developing countries to promote collaboration on various nuclear technology applications.

Conclusion:

The world is emerging from the Cold War, a period marked by costly and spiraling nuclear competition. As the international community moves into a new era, the NPT will remain critical in a world where security is defined increasingly by the absence of nuclear weapons programs, rather than by their presence, and by the sharp reduction, not expansion, of existing nuclear arsenals.

The NPT is vital for security, arms control and disarmament, and economic and social development throughout the world. By rededicating themselves to the NPT, its parties can ensure that this Treaty will play an even more vital role in the new millenium.

CTBT:



History of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Background

Arms control advocates had campaigned for the adoption of a treaty banning all nuclear explosions since the early 1950s, when public concern was aroused as a result of radioactive fall-out from atmospheric nuclear tests and the escalating arms race. <!--[if !vml]--><!--[endif]-->

Over 50 nuclear explosions were registered between 16 July 1945, when the first nuclear explosive test was conducted by the United States at Alamogordo, New Mexico, and 31 December 1953.

Prime Minister Nehru of India voiced the heightened international concern in 1954, when he proposed the elimination of all nuclear test explosions worldwide.

However, within the context of the cold war, scepticism in the capability to verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test ban-treaty posed a major obstacle to any agreement.

Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963:

Limited success was achieved with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in space. However, neither France nor China, both nuclear weapon States, signed the PTBT.

Non-proliferation Treaty, 1968:

A major step towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons came with the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon States were prohibited from, inter alia, possessing, manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All signatories were committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Negotiations for the CTBT
Given the political situation prevailing in the subsequent decades, little progress was made in nuclear disarmament until 1991. Parties to the PTBT held an amendment conference that year to discuss a proposal to convert the Treaty into an instrument banning all nuclear-weapon tests; with strong support from the UN General Assembly, negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty began in 1993.

Adoption of the CTBT, 1996
Intensive efforts were made over the next three years to draft the Treaty text and its two annexes, culminating in the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 10 September 1996 by the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The CTBT, which prohibits all nuclear test explosions, was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996, when it was signed by 71 States, including the five nuclear-weapon States.

BASIC OBLIGATIONS:

1.Each state party undertakes not to carry out nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.