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Old Saturday, July 09, 2005
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Default India and US Defence Pact

A strategic defence pact
By Afzaal Mahmood (Dawn,9 july)


THE signing of a 10-year defence pact between the United States and India is the culmination of a post-cold war process to strengthen relationship between the two countries which, in the words of the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “goes beyond security, proliferation or regional issues”.

The newly established defence relationship is designed to achieve two main objectives: to help advance America’s strategic goals in Asia and to help India become a ‘major world power’, which may project its military presence beyond its borders.

About 18 months ago, the two countries had agreed on “strategic partnership”, which, according to the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, was based on “common values and common interests”. The defence pact is a logical offshoot of that strategic partnership.

The defence pact, signed by US Secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld and his Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee, stipulates the joint production of weapons and cooperation in missile defence. The pact also calls for increased military ties and for joint defence production and procurement. To meet the criticism that the US is not serious about selling high-tech weapons to India and cannot be trusted as a long-term supplier, the agreement provides for the setting-up of a bilateral “defence procurement and production group” to oversee defence trade and prospects for co-production and technology collaboration. However, at least for the foreseeable future, co-production is likely to mean re-assembling in India of CKDs produced in the US, with little or no technology transfer to the Indian side.

Interestingly, the New York Times has quoted a military analyst as suggesting that the US decision to sell the F-16 plane to Pakistan may have been aimed at inducing India to buy American products. “India would have gone its merry way,” he said. “But the announcement of Pakistan getting the F-16s changes the game. For years, India has coasted on Russian and locally made fighter jets. Now, if its adversary gets real new American planes, it has to have them too.” From the US government perspective, the New York Times adds, “weapons sales to Pakistan and India strengthen the American presence on the Chinese border and open new markets throughout Asia for military contractors, which are looking more to foreign buyers as the Pentagon budget comes under pressure.”

Rhetoric is usually a standard part of almost all joint statements, if one of the parties is a South Asian country; but the use of phrases like “unimaginable” and “unprecedented levels of cooperation” by the new framework for the India-US defence relationship, unveiled in Washington on June 28, is not entirely unjustified.

The defence pact is a clear indication that the US no longer treats India and Pakistan as equal competitors in South Asia and that it has finally accepted India as the dominant power in the region. Pakistan is a valued US ally in the war against terrorism and continues to be even a major non-Nato ally. But the US has a deeper and a more meaningful strategic relationship with India. The defence agreement is a significant development in the context of overall India-US relationship and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s forthcoming visit to the United States from July 18 to 20.

It should be a matter of concern for Islamabad that the US has ignored Pakistani apprehensions that the supply of the latest missile defence system to India will disturb the strategic balance of power in South Asia. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system is a big step beyond Washington’s earlier offer for sale of PAC-2 which India had rejected.

Unlike previous Patriots, which operate by getting close to targets and blasting them out of the sky, PAC-3 interceptors have no explosives, relying instead on kinetic energy (hit to kill concept) to eliminate short and medium-range missiles carrying nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. A PAC-3 system carries smaller but four times more missiles than PAC-2 (16 vs 4) and has a longer range (150 km vs 70 km). Until last year, 175 PAC-3 systems were inducted into the US army.

There is a real danger now that the transfer of PAC-3 to India will lead to an anti-missile race in South Asia, compelling Pakistan to either seek the same or similar anti-missile system for itself. This will necessarily mean an indecent increase in defence expenditure. The Pakistan budget for 2005-2006 has already increased the defence outlay by 15 per cent. A steep rise in military expenditure is bound to wipe away the benefits of economic growth achieved recently by Pakistan and keep the social sector as starved as before.

The price India has paid is in the form of dropping its demand for a UN cover for joint military operations. Beside other things, the defence agreement envisages the deployment of Indian troops in undefined US-led “multinational operations” around the world regardless of whether these are authorized by the United Nations or not. Of course, the text of the agreement does not specify that these operations would be US-led and adds the rider “when it is in their common interest”.

But multinational operations have always meant for the Americans subordination of all participating forces to overall US command and control. This has happened right from Somalia to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Exclusive control over “multinational operations” has been a non-negotiable element of US military strategy. It may be recalled that it was the Congress opposition to India’s joining any multinational operation other than a UN-led “Blue Helmet” force which forced the Vajpayee government to scuttle the proposed deployment of Indian troops to US-controlled Iraq in July 2003. Ironically, it is now the Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh that has agreed to do what it bitterly opposed two years ago as an opposition party.

The US is cultivating India as its lever to realize a goal that has now become fundamental to its strategy: to remain firmly embedded in Asia at a time when the continent is emerging as the world’s new centre of gravity and China as America’s would be challenger. According to an article in The Hindu (July 1, 2005) a senior US official told a closed-door gathering of strategic analysts in New Delhi last month that “the worst outcome for the United States, is an Asia from which we are excluded”.

The key challenge for the US over the past 100 years has been to “remain engaged everywhere and not allow any other industrial power to dominate a given region”. Continuing, he added, “If I were China I could be working on kicking the US out of Asia..... Right now we have a lot of alliances but there is no architecture embedding us in Asia. This worries us.” It appears the June 28 defence pact between India and the United States is seen by Washington as a vital element in the planned architecture.

The new US tilt in South Asia, as reflected by the defence pact, is not a sudden development but the result of a gradual convergence of interests between New Delhi and Washington after the end of the Cold War. The first high level discussion on their strategic interests took place in January 1992 in New Delhi, at the first meeting of the Indo-US army steering committee attended by Lt. General Johnny Corns of the US pacific command from the US side and Lt. General V.K. Sood from the Indian side.

At this meeting the US side reportedly expressed its concern about the spread of “Islamic fundamentalism” in the region. The US side was also of the view that in the most volatile part of the world, which included the Islamic crescent from Turkey to Malaysia, it was only India that could act as a regional stabilizing force.

It may be recalled that during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s South Asian visit a few months ago, India accepted the Chinese offer for a strategic partnership and both sides declared 2006 as “the year of India-China friendship”. India now enjoys the unique distinction of being “the strategic partner” of both the US and China. It will be a feat of Indian diplomacy if it can manage to maintain this contradictory posture for long.

As far as the US is concerned, it will be a net gainer from the defence agreement. Besides advancing American strategic interests in Asia, the defence pact will expand the global market for American defence contractors, especially at a time when the Pentagon budget is coming under pressure. The US arms sales are a highly profitable way of sweetening the overall strategic partnership package negotiated with India. But it is not clear what real good the defence pact will do to India in particular and Asia in general. And have the policymakers in New Delhi taken into consideration the very damaging consequences for South Asia if the hapless region gets sucked into the emerging US-China rivalry?

The writer is a former ambassador.
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India’s defence ties with US
By Ghayoor Ahmed (Dawn ,7 july)


THE United States and India have signed a defence pact which charts a course for defence cooperation between the two countries during the next ten years and will be an element of their broader strategic partnership based on shared strategic interests.

President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would hold a historic summit in Washington on July 18 that would reflect the emerging global partnership between the United States and India.

The defence pact, which is basically aimed at upgrading military ties between Washington and New Delhi, marks a new phase in defence relationship between the two countries. The US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, and his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukerjee, have also said that the two countries have “entered a new era” in their bilateral relationship. Nicholas Bruns, Assistant Secretary of State, during his visit to New Delhi last week, said that “developing a strategic partnership between the US and India is one of the highest priorities for our president. We see India as a rising power in the world, as a democratic power and as a friendly country”.

It may be recalled that during her visit to New Delhi in March this year, the US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, had also said that “the president very much values the enhanced relationship between the United States and India, the fact that we are becoming in many ways important global as well as regional partners”. This statement testifies that Washington recognizes the vitality and importance of India to its long-term interests in South Asia and beyond and is, therefore, keen to develop a strong relationship with that country. Washington also believes that Asia is poised to become strategic centre of gravity in international politics.

Alan Kronstadt of the Congressional Research Centre has also confirmed this assertion, saying that “the US appears to be placing a bigger bet on India”. He has also said that according to many analysts, “India and Pakistan are no longer perceived as equals in Washington. Pakistan is viewed as a middle power and India has the much greater potential down the road. You won’t hear ‘strategic partner’ being used much with Pakistan but you will hear it with India”. It is thus clear that Washington’s foreign policy has now changed in India’s favour and that the doctrine of parity between the two nations of South Asia has been abandoned.

The US-India framework for defence cooperation stipulates an expansion of defence cooperation between the two countries to strengthen their security, reinforcement of their strategic partnership and greater interaction and understanding between their armed forces and defence establishments. Joint exercises, collaboration in multinational operations, when it is in their common interest, expanding collaboration in missile defence, technology transfer and co-production are also envisaged as part of defence cooperation between the two countries.

Washington and New Delhi have also established a defence policy group to serve as the primary mechanism to guide the bilateral strategic defence relationship and to ensure advancement of the US-India defence cooperation. A defence procurement and production group has also been set up to oversee the defence trade and look for technology collaboration between the two sides.

Analysts believe that the US-India defence pact is designed to help India become a “major world power in the 21st century” to contain China which, according to a recent Pentagon report, might emerge as a strategic rival to the United States. It may be interesting to note that when President George W Bush came to power in 2001, he called China a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner”, the term that was used by the Clinton administration.

It is also worth mentioning that in recent months senior US officials, including the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and director, CIA, Porter Goss, have also voiced their concern about the growing Chinese economic and military power. Washington, therefore, fears that its vital interests, particularly in South East and South Asia, could be threatened by China, making it necessary to contain it.

In a statement issued on June 30, a spokesman of the Pakistan foreign office expressed concern over the US-India defence pact, saying that Pakistan had already conveyed its concern to Washington over its negative consequences, in particular, over the induction of new weapons system such as missile defence that would destabilize the strategic balance in the region and may trigger an arms race here. Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri has also spoken in a similar vein.

These statements were, however, rhetorical and not sufficient to match the gravity of the situation and therefore a deeper evaluation of the implications the US-India defence pact for Pakistan’s security is called for, with a view to drawing a strategy to meet this daunting challenge. Washington needs to be told, in clear terms, that its defence collaboration with India, which it has justified on grounds of meeting the global security threats and its perceived strategic interests in South Asia, may not only have a perilous effect on Pakistan, but in the long run, its consequences may turn out to be harmful to the United States itself.

It is rather intriguing that the successive governments in Pakistan blissfully remained unaware of the fact that during the last many years a fundamental transformation in relations between the United States and India has taken place. The US-India defence pact was, in fact, in the offing since January 1995 when the two countries had signed the “Agreed Minute on Defence Relations”.

The defence pact, signed on June 28, only marks the culmination of the process that had been initiated ten years ago and allowed sufficient time to Pakistan to persuade the United States to abandon it. Apparently, this opportunity was lost for some inexplicable reasons which the nation has every right to know.

The writer is a former ambassador.
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Old Monday, July 25, 2005
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US-India nuclear pact
(The Nation,Pakitan)

It took Islamabad a little while to examine the US-India defence and nuclear framework deal and show concern at its implications for the region. General Musharraf told the National Command Authority at a meeting on Saturday that Pakistan did not want to engage in an arms race but would not close its eyes to the induction of advanced weaponry in its neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the overall reaction remained mild, with an unnamed official earlier indicating that the ‘Pakistani government was not much perturbed over’ it. The proposed nuclear cooperation needs Congressional approval that should not be difficult for the Bush administration to secure. It affords further evidence that the US policymakers feel neither constrained by international law nor concerned about the reactions of others, including friends and allies, while pursuing their unilateralist policies. Flying in the face of its international obligations and treaties, the US would, if it so chooses, have no hesitation in bestowing favours on a country that could advance its strategic interests, while at the same time seek to punish others it perceives to be violating these very treaties. The deal clearly goes against the stipulations of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group that was, in fact, formed as a reaction to India’s nuclear test in May 1998 as well as the NPT.
If accepting the hard reality that New Delhi had already demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability was a factor in according it a virtual ‘nuclear power’ status, hitherto restricted to the five nations that possessed nuclear weapons at the time of the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, the US would have shown willingness to treat Islamabad on the same footing. But the assurance given by Secretary Rice to General Musharraf on telephone soon after the deal was struck that the US cooperation was only confined to India’s nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes, and was not against Pakistan or any other country, raised no hope that Washington would be inclined to consider Islamabad for the same privilege. Pakistan should, therefore, be under no illusion that the US would strike a similar deal with it. After all, its relations with India and Pakistan are not a zero sum game, it has repeatedly told Islamabad. However, Pakistani officials have been quoted as saying that talks would be initiated with the US to secure cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. They believed that the Indo-US deal had reduced the chances of a vital pact on advance notification of missile tests that could have been signed during the Indo-Pak nuclear talks scheduled for August 5-6.
Dr Singh’s ranting about Pakistan being an unsafe custodian of nuclear weapons and the earlier tirade accusing it of allowing terrorist training camps on its soil were designed to warn the US against any thought of according it a similar privilege. And should India decide to withdraw from the talks on the Iranian gas pipeline following hopes of meeting its energy needs under this agreement, it is unlikely that Pakistan could go ahead on its own. Washington would not give it exemption from its law that forbids business deals with Tehran beyond a certain amount.
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Old Thursday, August 04, 2005
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Default The shift in US policy

The shift in US policy
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan
August 4,Dawn


THERE has already been considerable comment in these columns on the recently announced Indo-US defence pact and the new US policy on nuclear collaboration with India. The main reason for revisiting these developments is to present a slightly different perspective.

There is an air of deja vu about the Pakistani concern that the sub-continental balance of power has once again been threatened by India’s greatly enhanced access to sophisticated military hardware and nuclear technology from the United States. The alarm bells are ringing partly because there was only a blurred focus on the process that led India and the United States to the present level of strategic cooperation. India was making steady progress in freeing its relations with Washington as, indeed, with other western states, from what George Perkovich, the author of ‘India’s Nuclear Bomb’, once described as that ‘infamous hyphen’ that had connected India and Pakistan in the calculations of outside powers since 1947. Indian diplomacy had increasingly challenged this hyphenated approach to South Asia.

The nuclear tests of 1998 gave a new lease of life to the traditional equation as strategic parity seemed to outweigh growing disparities in virtually all other fields. Perkovich had followed Kenneth Waltz’s criteria to determine if India was a major power and argued that a state’s power can be understood as a combination of its capacity to influence others to behave as it wants them to and, conversely, to resist the unwelcome influence of others. He was not convinced that India had already attained the status of a major power. India’s failure to browbeat Pakistan in the ten-month long military standoff reinforced this perception. India rightly concluded that its ongoing dialogue with the United States had to be intensified to upgrade its conventional as well as strategic capability.

Ever since the nuclear tests, the United States has maintained a continuous though clearly differentiated engagement with New Delhi and Islamabad. Experts like George Perkovich had assumed that India would not be able to radically alter the US stand on the nuclear issue because of the stringent US non-proliferation legislation. They are not exactly thrilled by the latest decision of President Bush.

But Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland has read the dynamics of the US policy in the era of neo-conservative dominance more accurately. Hailing the new “visionary bilateral agreement” on nuclear cooperation with India as “the first important accomplishment of George W. Bush presidency,” he considers the accord as a demonstration of a security strategy that “holds that the nature of regimes, rather than the nature of weapons they possess, will determine their relations with Washington.” Pakistan, he thinks, occupies a difficult and highly dangerous, middle ground for US interests. India now follows Israel in benefiting from this arbitrary interpretation of NPT and the US law.

There have been two dominant trends in the US policy towards South Asia since the Clinton era. In Pakistan’s case, the initial emphasis was on internal political and economic reforms, relations with the Taliban and pressure to get it to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as accept a fissile material cut-off for future. Driven by the need to punish Afghanistan for the great atrocity of 9/11, President Bush enlisted Pakistan as the most committed ally in the war against terror.

The revised policy recognized the need to enhance Pakistan’s military capability — largely in the context of the anti-terrorist campaign. It also attached high priority to cultural and educational modernization to ensure that Pakistan does not become another Afghanistan. This was an intensive but essentially limited engagement with little relevance to the realignment of global power structure.

The decision to help transform India into a major global power had an altogether different context. The ideologues of the Bush era have tirelessly argued that the immense disparity in the military power of the United States and all other ‘major powers’ entitles it to pursue policies of unipolarity and unilateralism, be it the doctrine of pre-emptive intervention, Kyoto Protocols or the International Criminal Court.

It is, however, easy to talk about hegemonic doctrines but much more difficult to limit the dispersal of power, especially of the economic kind. The rise of other states and, more ominously, the increasing disruptive capability of non-state actors make for an unstable hegemony, an inconclusive imperium. Even the United States cannot dispense with the Bismarckian paradigm of the hub and spokes; it needs to ensure that emerging powers do not upset it. India’s self-image as a state that has outgrown the limitations of an Asian sub-region makes it a principal candidate for an alliance with a superpower asserting itself as the most powerful empire of human history.

Condoleeza Rice speaks of the United States’ relations with three major Asian powers—- Japan, South Korea and India as providing the “strategic context” in which Chinese ambitions could be restrained. This is an unfair view of China as it ensures its global eminence not by projecting military power but mostly by its spectacular economic success and its scrupulous adherence to the UN Charter. China’s unflagging commitment to export-led economic development gives it a great stake in international peace and stability.

Nevertheless, the new US policy towards India continues to be justified as an effort to build India as a countervailing power and a potential military ally of the United States in the inevitable confrontation with China. Obviously, the nuclear component of the new India policy would have a smoother passage through the Congress if China was painted as a potential foe.

The crystal ball that one can gaze into at this point of time shows intense competition and rivalry but no Sino-US or Sino-India military confrontation. Taiwan, perhaps the most contentious issue, will become a flashpoint only in the unlikely event of Washington encouraging it to declare independence. The recent Chinese formulation of ‘one country two shores’ strengthens the hands of Taiwanese opposed to severing links with the mainland. Furthermore, the economic interdependence between the US and China has now reached a level where conflict has become almost unaffordable.

Similarly, the Sino-Indian territorial dispute may take time for resolution but carries little risk of a resort to the use of force. Meanwhile, burgeoning trade, expected to increase from the present $12 billion to $ 100 billion, will always militate against India joining any military adventure against China. There is no gamble here on the part of the United States — only well calculated moves to ensure that India becomes an essential pillar of the American strategic architecture for Asia and not a member of a coalition of major powers prejudicial to American interests. The chances are that the US will protect its position by modulating its harsh unilateralism and settling for an acceptable global equilibrium propped up by India, China and other major powers. Pakistan’s real challenge is to find a place in this new order.

If it is a correct reading of unfolding events, it is not very difficult to work out Pakistan’s options. It is probably not open to Pakistan to seek a fundamental review of Washington’s strategic decision to assist India at the expense of India-Pakistan balance of power. Similarly, it is extremely unlikely that the US will extend comparable nuclear-related equipment or technology to Pakistan. It is time to recognize that Washington uses NPT and other international instruments in the nuclear arena selectively. But there is, at this point of time, no need to distrust American assurances that Pakistan’s conventional military needs will be considered sympathetically.

The present balance of power is rather fragile. The army is probably capable of playing a defensive role. When it comes to airpower, India has SU-30 Ks, Mirage 2000s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s strike aircraft and MiG-29 air defence fighters. Pakistan’s Mirage IIIs, Vs and Q-5s and around 30 aging F-16 aircraft cannot provide a balance without the induction of new F-16s and that too if they arrive with the required avionics. Pakistan Navy has not known the baptism of fire that the army and air force have gone through but it has used the limited funds available to it intelligently to maintain reasonable defensive capability with submarines and light guided missile ships.

Pakistan cannot match India’s defence expenditure, especially with open-ended Indian acquisitions from the United States, without accentuating existing distortions in Pakistan’s economy. But a carefully calculated ratio of forces will have to be ensured till India-Pakistan detente takes firmer roots.

Regrettably, there is still a crucial role for strategic deterrence. Pakistan has to free itself of any external veto on research and development on nuclear weapons and delivery system as India is not likely to accept a strategic restraint regime that compromises its major power status. China has countered the possible ABM capability in Taiwan and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region by R&D dedicated to the refinement of its nuclear forces without opting for Soviet style warhead parity. Meanwhile, we have to preserve our faith in the process aiming at neutralizing the historical animosity between the two nuclear-capable neighbours. The difficulties encountered en route should be an argument for re-doubled efforts and not for abandoning the journey.

Notwithstanding its close and somewhat domestically controversial ties with Washington, Islamabad has expended greater energy in diversifying its external relations than in a long time. Admittedly, not all the initiatives have borne fruit as yet. Russia, for one, has not responded adequately to Pakistani overtures. With Iran, where distrust of Pakistani establishment runs deep, there is still a long way to go. Pakistan has to demonstrate, whenever the occasion demands, that it would never be a part of the siege Iran is threatened with. Domestic compulsions of the Kabul authorities and visceral anti-Pakistan feelings of some elements of the erstwhile Northern Alliance will continue to create difficulties but Pakistan has to stay the course in pursuing cooperation with Kabul, and through Afghanistan further afield with Central Asian states.

The kingpin of a long-term policy designed to assure Pakistan’s due place in the eventual global equilibrium — a place defined by its intrinsic strategic importance —- continues to be China. It will be a mistake to take this vital relationship for granted. It too requires proper nurturing. History has shown that an exaggerated Washington-centric policy did not serve Pakistan well. This is the right time to persuade the United States that the high importance that Pakistan rightly attaches to relations with it does not obviate the need for developing ties with other countries some of which may not find favour with it at a particular moment of time.
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Indo-US nuclear agreement
By Najmuddin A. Shaikh
Dawn

MUCH has already been written and said on the nuclear agreement reached between the United States and India in the Pakistani, Indian and international media. In each case, the focus has been different. Our media comment has focused on what this would mean for the strategic balance in South Asia and why this favourable treatment being accorded to India when Pakistan was a key partner in the battle against terrorism etc.

The Indian coverage has focused on the one hand on what concessions the Indians made in other spheres to get this deal and what sort of controls the US and the IAEA would be able to exercise on what had hitherto been a wholly untrammelled nuclear programme and on the other has offered a stout defence of what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had been able to get from the US without compromising the essential independence of India’s nuclear programme.

The western media coverage has focused on the fact that the Bush administration has with this decision driven a coach and four through the non-proliferation regime, particularly the NPT and pointed out the adverse consequences for the current negotiations with Iran and North Korea.

Also highlighted are the American motivation in strengthening India as a counterweight to China whose recent moves on Taiwan and increase in defence expenditures have triggered alarm bells in the Pentagon; the strong opposition the administration would face in Congress to amending American laws to permit such cooperation; the opposition from within the nuclear suppliers group to this move; question marks against how far Indian and US policies on China will coincide; and what would be done with regard to Pakistan and its claim for similar treatment.

From what has appeared, the following dispassionate analysis can be made of the motivations of the parties concerned and its global consequences. The agreement did drive a coach and four through the current nonproliferation regime particularly the NPT but the Bush administration has generally a low regard for formal treaties and regimes, and had bought the view that some nuclear proliferation may even be beneficial. The creation of a counterweight to China in Asia was necessary if the US was to be able to maintain its influence over that continent. Even if Indian and American views on China were not identical there would be Sino-Indian regional rivalry and the Americans would be beneficiaries.

Regarding arguments to be used in Congress, the fact is that on a practical plane, India has nuclear weapon status and this could not be reversed. Letting a theoretical adherence to the NPT stand in the way of the development of the much touted strategic partnership was bad politics. India had a moral claim of sorts on American assistance, since after the passage of the non-proliferation legislation the US had reneged on its agreement to provide low enriched uranium for the US supplied Tarapur reactors. More importantly, India had few indigenous sources of natural uranium and such as did exist, produced uranium at extremely high prices.

Production levels had fallen at most of the Indian power reactors because of the shortage of fuel. While Indian research on extracting fuel from the thorium sands would probably yield positive results after some time, for the foreseeable future India would remain dependent on American and other western sources for its uranium fuel requirements. Moreover, even while India had foresworn unilaterally any further nuclear tests the present agreement would make this a formal binding commitment.

From the Indian perspective negotiations were entered into with the hope — perhaps recognized as vain — that India would secure American endorsement for its entry into the nuclear weapons’ club. Failing that securing access to western civilian nuclear technology while accepting no more by way of safeguards than had been accepted by the Nuclear Club members was acceptable. The need for access to uranium for fuel was desperate if the civilian nuclear programme was to continue.

According to the former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Mr Srinivasan, the old power reactors had reached 85 per cent of full capacity but had to be downgraded because of shortage of fuel. He maintains that “with larger quantities of uranium available at international prices, which are much lower than Indian prices, the operating costs of our older units will go down”. Even more dramatically an Indian official is reported to have told the BBC that “The truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension, our nuclear programme”.

There would be a problem in separating the civilian and military nuclear facilities. Former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has already posed the question of whether such a separation would inhibit India’s ability to decide the nature and size of its nuclear deterrent. The Indians, however, draw comfort from the fact that each nuclear weapon state has negotiated its own language with the IAEA, in the broadly similar safeguards agreements.

An Indian commentator has pointed out that the Chinese safeguard agreement provides that China has only to provide a “list of the facilities” that would come under safeguards, and had the right to “add facilities to or remove facilities from the list as it deems appropriate”, and that it also has the option to “withdraw” materials from the list of facilities under a set of procedures.

A more serious inhibition on the development of a more extensive nuclear deterrent may be the commitment to “continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing” and “working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty” (FMCT). The moratorium on testing could be difficult but the Indian calculation may be that it can continue the development of its nuclear weapons through “cold tests” and that in any case, the US itself appeared to be moving towards a resumption of testing and in that case India could hardly be held to its commitment.

On the FMCT, the Indian response probably would be that in so far as the cut-off treaty is concerned it would be many years before this can be concluded and in the meanwhile India can add enough to its already extensive stockpile of fissile material to meet any foreseeable needs.

Reports from Washington suggest that the administration had not consulted Congress before reaching this agreement with India. It is possible that the original intent may have been to meet India’s fuel requirements particularly for the US-supplied Tarapur plant by using the president’s waiver authority and not to seek amendments in domestic legislation but that the Indians insisted that if they were to make binding commitments on safeguards they needed an assurance of durable supply arrangements that could only come after legislative changes.

Will Congress now agree? There is no doubt that the debate will be intense. The non-proliferation lobby in Washington is girding its loins and there are dedicated non-proliferation advocates in Congress, not least among them Senator Lugar, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The record, however, suggests that in 1979-80, a period when relations with India were at low ebb and the presidency (President Carter) was particularly weak the administration was able virtually in defiance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, to get a last shipment of enriched uranium to India for the Tarapur reactor. Today, the administration is better placed particularly, given the Republican majority in both houses and the legislators’ obsession with China.

The nuclear suppliers group will, despite the proliferation concerns of the public in Europe and elsewhere, happily go along with the American decision. The nuclear industries of France, the UK, Russia etc. all starved for business from indigenous sources, will all be anxious to vie for orders and will salivate at the thought of India raising its nuclear power production capacity from the current 3310 Mwe to the 275,000 MWe that Mr Srinivasan visualizes as the nuclear industry’s contribution to India’s energy mix in 2052.

Where does this leave Pakistan? A recent decision of the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (Ecnec) had approved an energy security plan under which Pakistan would enhance its nuclear power generation from 437-mw to 8,800-mw by 2030. Clearly such an increase is not going to come from indigenous sources even though there is mention in the plan of a project to enhance the capacity of the fabrication capacity of the Pinstech laboratories from 300MWe to 1000MWe.

Assistant Secretary Christina Rocca during her recent visit to Pakistan told journalists that American plans for assisting Pakistan meet its energy needs would, in the nuclear field be a mirror image of what had been done with India. The fact, however, is that once American legislation has been amended, the US would be hard put to deny Pakistan access to civilian nuclear technology. It would probably insist on a longer gestation period so that it could convince itself and the world that Pakistan was a responsible nuclear power.

I would assume that in her conversation with President Musharraf shortly after the conclusion of the Indo-US agreement Secretary Condoleezza Rice may have made the point that, for the moment, Pakistan should not make a demand for similar treatment since this would make it difficult to get congressional approval for changes in the law, but after the changes had been made and Pakistan had made further progress in the battle against internal extremism, the issue could be taken up.

Pakistan should regard it as satisfactory. It will ease the current problems with China on getting Chashma II which can now be more easily grandfathered as predating the Chinese adherence to the NSG guidelines. We have no other immediate problems in the nuclear power generation field nor should we have any insurmountable problems in the future in separating the civilian facilities from the military ones. It would probably be cheaper for us in any case as it is for the Indians to get fuel for our civilian facilities — all fully safeguarded from abroad and leave our limited non-civilian fuel production facilities outside the ambit of safeguards contained in the additional protocol which we, like the Indians, would have to conclude with the IAEA.

This may prove to be an overly optimistic assessment of future developments but even if it is borne out we must recognize that there has now been a concrete manifestation of the new strategic relationship between India and the US.

It has been noted in our media and by analysts in Washington that despite the great interest America is said to have in improving Indo-Pakistan relations, this secured no mention in the joint statement nor was there even a hint that the status India sought internationally would be more easily endorsed if it was seen to be at peace with its neighbours in South Asia. This is a new reality that must be factored into our calculations.
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Responding to Indo-US defence pact
By Mirza Aslam Beg
11 August,Dawn

A SIGNIFICANT geo-political shift is likely to occur, with the signing of the Indo-US defence pact. In fact, not only the interest of Pakistan, but of other Asian nations too will be subverted by this strategic partnership, as it points towards very specific directions, where the intent is to use power to achieve the objective.

The US will be outsourcing its imperial outreach, through India as a ‘competent military power’ to respond rapidly to regional crises. Together, they will fight the war on terror against “the evil ideology, which hates freedom, rejects tolerance and is determined to destroy our way of life.” The US and India would jointly endeavour ‘to curb and counter the increasing military and economic power of China, and fight terrorism emanating from the Muslim world.’

Joint air exercises would be held in occupied Kashmir to validate Indian claim over the territory and project power and influence beyond. US primacy, considered vital for the governance of the world, would be maintained to consolidate control over energy resources, the fulcrum of economic power.

Since the objectives are very precise and the battle lines clearly defined, it makes the job of policy planners in Pakistan relatively easy to determine appropriate responses to the challenges. In fact this “development should be a cause for rejoicing, not despair and the best news for years,” offering tremendous opportunities, to carve out a new destiny for Pakistan. The elements of national power, which could be brought to bear as a response; democracy, diplomacy, deterrence and defiance, fully harnessed together to strengthen national security.

The process of democratization must lead to the establishment of a ‘sovereign parliament’ to glavanize the nation into a cohesive force, to face the threat. Therefore, fair and free elections to be monitored by an independent election commission, is imperative to ensure adherence to the rules of business and the exercise of free ‘will’ of all people. The courts of justice have to protect the Constitution, by “maintaining balance between one, a few and the many.” Political parties and the government have to meet, in the best interest of the country, to evolve a strategy based on consensus for the furtherance of democracy.

Pakistan’s geo-political importance has increased with the signing of the Indo-US defence pact, demanding dexterous diplomatic skill and propriety to safeguard national security interests. Pakistan, therefore must not be drawn into a deal, particularly with China, “to make a parallel kind of carve-out for Pakistan” as the cold war mindset of confrontation and conflict is outdated.

China is the most trusted and reliable friend, and is not expected to be bound by any ‘deal’. Friendship thrives on a reciprocal and symbiotic relationship. In fact Pakistan’s place in the regional order will be defined by its relationship with China.

An exaggerated US-centric policy has not served us well. Therefore our relations with Washington must be maintained on the basis of national self-respect, recognizing the reality that, we need them as much as they need us. Iran-Pakistan relations should be lifted up to a level of deeper understanding, to match that with China, because, we both now realize that, owing to the machinations of vested powers in the past, we have not been able to establish meaningful neighbourly relations.

With the shifting of the centre of gravity of the military power of the US and the allied forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, “for coming to grips with reality, seriously questioning the two-war strategy”, conflict would intensify in Afghanistan, and our borders would become more volatile and insecure. Therefore, we should ensure that unnecessarily we are not drawn into the conflict, at the cost of our defence on the eastern borders. We should also be prepared to engage with the future majority government in Afghanistan, which will be more amenable and accommodative than the present one.

With India we should continue the peace process, relentlessly, hoping that sanity might prevail for peace and prosperity us South Asia. The intensity of resistance in Kashmir is likely to increase, and India will get more and more embroiled in it, raising the threshold of confrontation with Pakistan. Under these circumstances, seeking peace while remaining prepared for war, would be the difficult balancing act of diplomacy.

By joining the war on terror, Pakistan, has earned positive recognition as well as condemnation, hence the need to make our approach more balanced. Peace with all the neighbours must be the guiding principle and can be effectively projected from the forum which provides this opportunity, namely, the Shanghai cooperative organization (SCO). We should strive to become a permanent member of the organization, to play our role more positively. Energy security guarantees must be obtained on the basis of long-term supply and investment agreements with all the oil-producing countries in the region and beyond.

The elements of our national power, which would enhance our capability to actively deter aggression are: conventional military capability, nuclear deterrence and national resilience, working in complete harmony with each other.

Pakistan must not enter into an armed race with India. Deterrence must be maintained by improving operational capability at the cutting edge of strategy, in respect of all the three services — army, navy and air force. This is a difficult demand but not difficult to meet for a professional armed forces, despite several constraints. Pakistan is maintaining minimum credible nuclear deterrence, as part of the ‘nuclear policy of restraint’ since 1989.

It is a bold and pragmatic policy, based on the deterrence value of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) where the number beyond the optimum becomes irrelevant, thus establishing a new relationship between the power of the weapon and the concept of its employment This guiding principle of our nuclear policy must be retained realizing that our nuclear capability does not compensate for the conventional military capability, which functions independently, yet both operate in harmony.

Pakistan’s national resilience and the will to resist aggression and occupation, is an inherent passion. It is to the Americans that after the military takeover of General Ayub Khan, Pakistan joined the Baghdad pact, as part of US doctrine to contain Russia and China. American training teams promptly descended on Pakistan, including the special forces combat team to train Pakistani officers and men at Cherat (NWFP) to create a stay-behind organization, for organizing national resistance against the likely Soviet occupation of Pakistan.

Pakistan was not over-run by the Soviets, but Afghanistan was occupied in 1979 and all the experience and expertise of the Pakistani armed forces, came in handy to organize a formidable resistance movement against the Soviet occupation forces. With America’s and Saudi Arabia’s tacit support, jihadis were welcomed from all over the world. They were imparted motivational training in the madressahs, specially created along the borders.

Madressahs also became nurseries for the training of the jihadis. Around 30,000 to 35000 jihadis from Pakistan, and 60,000 to 70,000 from 60 different countries (according to CIA estimates) took part in the jihad and after the Soviet retreat, some of them joined the on-going liberation movements in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq, thus gaining “a global reach, as the strategic arm of the Islamic resistance.”

Having forced retreat on the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Islamic resistance has put a limit on American aggression in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus, emerging as a strong ‘global deterrent force’ as reported by the CIA think tank, National Intelligence Council: “Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the training and recruitment ground for the next generation of professionalized terrorists, who will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology, inside and outside the ME, Central Asia, SE Asia and Western Europe.” But unfortunately this report does not differentiate between terrorism and wars of liberation. The on-going wars of liberations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir and Chechnya are justifiable under international law. But out of these movements, splinter groups have grown and drifted away, committing heinous acts of terror thus defaming the cause of the liberation movements. These terrorist groups and wars of liberation are different entities.

Terror is a symptom, growing out of the wars of liberation, which needs to be treated first The Islamic resistance, therefore, assumes the status of an important element of national power providing security cover to all Muslim countries. Pakistan, must take into account this new element of national power, in its defence planning.

A growing bond of friendship between Pakistan, Iran and China is the rational concomitant of the Indo-US defence pact. Hopefully, this would lead to an alliance of the three countries — later to be joined by Afghanistan as a formidable force, radiating power, to defy, dater and defeat the forces of aggression without fighting, thus giving a real meaning to the notion of Strategic Defiance, which flows from the ‘Strategic Depth’ of a group of nations, having common perceptions and orientation towards their security and well being. European Union is the best example to follow.

Pakistan’s security is threatened from several directions, posing a serious challenge to national leadership in harnessing the vital elements of national power, as a cohesive force, to meet the threat. Expediency, self-interest, power pressure and false pretensions must be dispensed with, for the greater good of the country. Great opportunities are awaiting our shared response.
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Indo-US strategic alliance
By Talat Masood


INDIA and the United States are natural allies, but India’s Nehruvian philosophy of non-alignment and its aspirations to play a global role in exploiting the capitalist and communist blocs during the cold war kept them apart. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, that barrier was removed and India and the United States started moving closer to each other. It was only after the nuclear tests of May 1998 that this process met a temporary setback.

But it did not take long for the relationship to revive and in hindsight it seems that nuclear testing was seized upon by Washington and New Delhi as an opportunity to optimize their relationship.

Several rounds of Singh-Talbot talks provided that platform. The visit of President Clinton to India in 1999 was the first manifestation of the emerging partnership in the post-nuclear South Asia.

The lifting of sanctions and increased military cooperation, joint counter-terrorist operations and the setting up of several committees to identify areas of mutual interest followed the president’s visit. In January 2004, the US administration and Vajpayee government announced further steps in Strategic Partner Initiative, which included cooperation on missile defence, lifting of ban on civilian space programme and technology transfer from the US.

Now the 10-year Indo-US defence agreement and enhanced cooperation “in the areas of civil nuclear, civil space and high technology commerce” bring about a qualitative change in their relationship with serious implications at the regional and global level. These agreements will give India access to strategic weapon systems while critical technologies provide opportunities for co-production and collaborative research and development, including close collaboration in missile defence.

It will also enable India greater intelligence sharing as well as increased trade in arms. Whereas the nuclear and space cooperation is in civilian areas, India would fully exploit the dual nature of these technologies for a military advantage as has been the case in the past. The nuclear deal combined with the defence agreement and a whole range of agreements has catalyzed the relations between the two countries.

In bringing the two countries close, expatriates, think-tanks, defence industrial complexes and the US and Indian conglomerates have played a significant role in an orchestrated and well-coordinated manner.

America seems committed to transforming India into a world power as a partner, on the lines of Japan, with the expectation that it will compliment its efforts in the quest for shaping the world, particularly Asia, to advance its global interests. India will be allowed to have access to modern weapon systems and technology. It may also become a conduit for outsourcing of low and medium-technology items. In return the US would expect access to Indian military capabilities.

According to a respected think tank in America, “India can take on more responsibility for low-end operations in Asia, which will allow the US to concentrate its resources on high-end fighting missions”. Washington also expects that “India will collaborate with it in dealing with the strategic challenge of China”, notwithstanding the fact that both governments deny that Beijing is a factor in their calculations. But it cannot be denied that both consider China as a potential rival and wary of its growing strength.

Currently China has a balance of about 130 billion dollars annually in its trade with the US, which is a source of friction between the two countries. Recently a retired Chinese general remarked that China would not hesitate using nuclear weapons if the US ever sided militarily with Taiwan in the latter’s bid for independence.

This statement sent jitters in the corridors of power in Washington. Ironically, despite these undercurrents, neither country can afford to have bad relations with China. New Delhi has agreed to a strategic partnership with China and has joined the Shanghai Initiative and its trade with India is fast growing. The United States cooperates with China on a vast range of issues. Nonetheless, New Delhi would like to believe that it has not compromised its foreign policy nor has become too dependent on Washington. It will play the balancing act of emerging as an independent power and yet be a US strategic ally.

Despite the congruence of vital national interests between the two countries, India would not get everything it wants from the US This was manifest in Washington’s opposition to India’ bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, taking the plea that UN reform should take priority.

Although it is very much possible that US may support that India (and China) are brought in the G-8 grouping in the near future.

Moreover, it has to be seen to what extent the aims of the framework agreement will eventually be approved by the legislators, as the devil is in the detail and Indians and Americans are not known for being easy negotiators. There are other major global and regional implications of Washington’s cooperation with New Delhi.

Cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, which India needs for its sustained economic growth, is tantamount to legitimizing its de facto status as a nuclear power.

Cooperation in space and missile defence and sale of sensitive military technologies will weaken Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and conventional capabilities. It would also erode China’s nuclear deterrence with both India and the US. In addition, there are political and psychological ramifications of the relationship.

India will have to swallow a lot of its national ego and pride to act as a second fiddle to the US., in spite of the fact that some analyst have commented that it is “not in India’s DNA to play a subservient role” to the sole superpower.

What then are the options for Pakistan in the emerging scenario? Despite the Indo-US alignment, Pakistan must continue to foster close and friendly relations with the US and expand them in areas of overlapping vital national interests. These include fighting global and regional terrorism and enhancing military-to-military cooperation, including co-production of military hardware, besides developing close economic and trade links and easier access to US markets.

Also important is seeking support in developing education and our technological infrastructure. Having good relations with the US in a unipolar world is by itself a positive factor in international relations.

At the same time, Pakistan should broaden its options by fostering closer relations with China, opening up to Russia, as there are no inhibitions or limitations of the cold war.

As excellent relations already exist with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, we need to build greater economic and trade links with these countries and seek avenues of cooperation in defence production. Islamabad should remove the irritants in relations with Iran and Afghanistan, giving them no opportunity for concern such as the safety and security of Iranians in Pakistan and the safety of Shia community here.

It is important to strengthen economic, political and cultural ties with the two countries and overcome past suspicions so that a new era of relationship based on mutual trust and respect can be built. In particular, ties with Afghanistan must be deepened and their concerns, whether real or perceived, removed through deeper engagement at the government and the people’s level.

These two countries need us as much as we need them. With India too Pakistan should continue to fully support the peace process and the process of normalization without compromising the aspirations of the people of Kashmir.

For Pakistan to gain international respect it is vital that its democratic institutions are strengthened. Democracy and human rights are now global norms and Pakistan will remain at a great disadvantage until democracy is genuinely restored. To face these new challenges the government would need the support of the people. Equally important is strengthening the economy and a sound educational and technological infrastructure.

The foreign policy of a country is closely linked with its domestic situation. A case in point is South Korea, which has a smaller area and less population than us, but is among the twelve largest economies of the world and commands wide respect and can stand up to powerful neighbours.

Pakistan’s geostrategic importance, its unique standing among the Muslim nations and its nuclear capability will have a significant impact if the country is seen to be free of terrorism, is a responsible nuclear state and has a stable democratic system. This may seem a tall order for a faltering society but true leaders are those who convert challenges into opportunities. Surely the fast changing global and regional scenario around us provides us with one such opportunity.
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US-India pact

[Dawn. August 7,2005]


THE US-India 10-year defence pact is a major development in current American foreign policy. The apparent purpose of the pact seems to be the containment of China. The by-products include a measure to sidetrack Indian collaboration with Iran on the gas pipeline issue. Of course, Indian cooperation itself will bolster US trade and ensure protection of US interests in the Indian Ocean, a counter-balance to the US denial of a seat to India in the UN Security Council.

Dr Manmohan Singh’s July 21 statement expressing new doubts regarding Indian participation in the gas pipeline project is seen by many as a step to placate Washington. Moreover, if India succumbs to US allurements and steps out of the gas pipeline project, it will be injuring the very foundations of Indian foreign policy — that of non-alliance and neutrality. Such an Indian step will also offend post-1979 Iran-India friendly relations like never before.

No doubt, the US-India pact has given way to a new Pakistani grievance toward the US, which may at some time in the future, if not now, lead to a slackening of the Pakistani onslaught on terror.
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Indo-US nuclear alliance

In Dawn Oct 29 by Afzaal Mahmood
During his recent visit to New Delhi, the US under-secretary of state, Nicholas Burns, assured his hosts that the US was fully committed to implementing the nuclear deal with India. Addressing a joint press conference with the Indian foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, on October 21, Mr Burns stressed that the United States saw India as a “great power” which would work with it in promoting “peace and stability” in the world.

Acknowledging that the implementation of the nuclear deal was a complicated matter, the Indian foreign secretary affirmed that both countries were committed to completing the task before US President George Bush’s visit early next year.

Before examining the significance of the Indo-US nuclear handshake, it will be worthwhile to briefly look at the real objective of Mr Burns’s mission to India. The purpose of his recent visit was to assess how far India had delivered on some of its commitments under the July 18 nuclear deal with the United States and discuss the modalities of implementing the agreement. During his meetings with Indian officials, clarifications were sought by both sides which would be “reflected upon” and another meeting would be held on the issue “very soon”.

Interestingly, the US under-secretary of state warned Iran on Indian soil that if it did not come back to the negotiating table, there would be another vote against it at the November 24 IAEA meeting. Media reports say many US Congressmen would like to wait and see how India will vote at the November IAEA meeting before approving the Indo-US nuclear deal.

The July 18 nuclear deal represents an astonishing reversal of American proliferation policies towards India. After abandoning its age-old insistence on New Delhi capping or reversing its nuclear weapons programme, Washington, all of a sudden, has expressed its willingness for a nuclear handshake with a country whose growing strategic importance it is keen on harnessing. According to neo-conservatives in the Bush administration, India’s nuclear arsenal does not pose any threat to US power; on the contrary, it can help in the larger game of containing China and foiling any effort to keep the US out of any Asian security architecture.

However, India had to pay a political price for the Indo-US nuclear handshake. To begin with, it had to support the European-US resolution against Iran at the IAEA board meeting last month. But there are straws in the wind indicating that the much-flaunted Indian plans of looking at Iran as a land and energy bridge to reach Central Asia and Afghanistan are now reported to be on hold and will perhaps peter out. Despite New Delhi’s disclaimers, the odds are that the same fate awaits the Iran-India gas pipeline.

In the short span of seven years, US foreign policy towards Asia, particularly South Asia, has undergone a sea change. In 1998, during his China visit, US President Bill Clinton publicly conceded that Beijing had “legitimate interests” in South Asia. With the Clinton visit to India in 2000 began a thaw that led to a softer American policy towards India’s nuclear ambitions, including plutonium production and the development of the Agni missile. It also resulted in the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan and the adoption of separate American policies for the South Asian rivals.

The pro-India policy that began in the last years of the Clinton administration got a further boost with the coming of the Bush administration. The most important change in the American thinking with regard to India, which has since been the motivating force behind Washington’s South Asian policy, occurred in the second Bush term when the administration came to recognize India’s centrality to the balance of power in Asia.

According to the knowledgeable Indian strategic thinker and writer K. Subrahmanyam, “these views of the US, developed and matured during George Bush’s second term, were communicated to India only in March, 2005”. Consequently, an India-US summit was fixed for July 18 to give final approval to the new US policy. Subrahmanyam also says that the US offer to revise its nuclear policy to enable India to have access to international civil nuclear technology came as a surprise to New Delhi, the reason being that when Mr Vajpayee was prime minister, India’s attempt was restricted to getting fuel for Tarapur in exchange for placing some Indian reactors under safeguards.

The most significant gain for India is to get rid of technology denial of various kinds. As a result of the Indo-US nuclear handshake, Russia and Britain have already lifted nuclear sanctions previously imposed on India. The US has already removed India’s reactors from the list of banned entities and New Delhi can now obtain civil nuclear technology from Russia, the UK and France.

The nuclear handshake is only the beginning for India of a highly productive engagement with the United States. President Bush’s visit to India early next year will provide an excellent opportunity for New Delhi to expand and enhance bilateral relationship at various levels. Most experts and analysts agree that the Indo-US nuclear deal has put India in the big league.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has explained the linkage between long term US economic interests and the interaction of these with India as a rising economic power. Until recently, US businessmen were seeing a great potential in India, especially in the services sectors. But now they are seeing India as a base for manufacturing.

Last year, US merchandise exports to India rose by 22.6 per cent over 2003, and imports by 18.4 per cent. More than 50 per cent of the top 500 American companies now outsource some of their information technology needs to Indian firms.

With Sino-US relations deteriorating “fairly rapidly”, having an economic alternative in India gives the US leverage with China on a host of issues. But foreign direct investments in India are still nowhere near China’s, which gets 13 times what India gets. But unlike India, China’s banking sector is in deep crisis which, according to experts, is “technically insolvent”.

When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says India is a counterweighing force against China, she or anyone else in his senses does not mean that the US wants to use India in military terms against China. Washington has neither the capability nor the intention to deal with Beijing in military terms.

To some extent, the Indo-US economic relationship is beginning to look a little like the one between US and China and it is in the economic arena that India can prove to be a counterweight to China in the years to come. The raison d’etre of the Indo-US strategic partnership is based on three points: the US focus on India’s rapid economic growth, New Delhi’s role as an important player in the Asian balance of power, and India’s contribution to American economic pre-eminence.

The US strategy with regard to China is of engagement and building an Asian balance of power wherein India will be an important factor. Unlike the Europeans, the Asian nations, particularly those in South Asia, continue to be pre-occupied by their relations with each other and the emergence of one of them as a ‘great power’ is bound to instil fears and misgivings in the smaller and weaker neighbours. Conditions in Asia are radically different from those in Europe where the emergence of Germany and France as great powers from the ruins of the second World War was welcomed by their smaller neighbours who regard the former as their protectors rather than as predators.

Since gaining independence, India’s ambition has been to acquire the status of a world power and play an increasing international role. Its goals are analogous to those of Britain east of Suez in the 19th century : it will seek to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian Ocean and, with American backing, even in Southeast Asia which China regards as part of its sphere of influence. Under the new Indo-US deal, India’s geopolitical interests may impel it to assume some of the security functions now being exercised by the United States.

It is more than a coincidence that India does not enjoy really friendly and close relations — even tension-free relations — with any of its smaller neighbours, let alone Pakistan. If the history of the past 50 years is of any relevance, it shows that the South Asian giant is seen by its smaller neighbours as a threat rather than as a protector against other predators. Whenever New Delhi adds a new device to its military muscle, its smaller neighbours watch with a high degree of nervousness as most of them have experienced, in one way or another, India’s regional hegemonic aspirations. It is unfortunate that the rise of India as a great power, with American backing, is likely to have a disturbing effect not only upon its neighbours but also the littoral states of the Indian Ocean.
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US-India strategic alliance



HISTORY bears witness to the fact that the United States focused its efforts on building a close relationship with Pakistan only when it deemed it necessary to do so to achieve its limited aims in the region. It did not consider Pakistan important enough to develop long-time relations with.

In contrast, American policymakers have made sustained efforts to develop a cordial and durable relationship with India for the promotion of major US interests in South Asia. This illustrates the dichotomy in America’s attitude towards Pakistan and India.

However, being one of the principal exponents of the non-aligned movement, India preferred to remain politically neutral and in order to attain great power status in the international system it endeavoured to maintain a non-aligned posture. Yet, American policymakers continued to feverishly work to woo India which was seen by them to have strategic possibilities of interest to the United States.

The end of the Cold War, however, brought about a perceptible change in the strategic outlook of India. To all intent and purposes it abandoned its hoary commitments to non-alignment. President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 not only opened a new chapter in US-India relations, it was also heralded as a blueprint for future ties between the two countries. Based on the conviction that US interests required strong links with New Delhi, the Bush administration has been exploring ways of creating a strategic partnership with India since 2001.

Consequently, in 2004, the United Sates and India embarked upon a bilateral programme referred to as the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP). Under the aegis of this programme the United States and India agreed to work on a quartet of security issues that included civilian nuclear technology, civilian space technology, high technology trade, and missile defence.

On July 18, 2005, both, the United States and India formally established their strategic partnership in the furtherance of cooperation in a number of areas of mutual interests, including the nuclear field. Many considerations underlay this “new relationship” between the United States and India, which is, however, predicated on their common desire of containing China’s growing military might and its emergence as a political/economic power. China is perceived by both countries as a potential threat to their long-term interests in the region and beyond.

It is generally believed that President Bush, aiming to boost India as a counterbalance against China, has moved closer to accepting it as a nuclear weapon state notwithstanding his rhetoric of a vigorous non-proliferation policy.

It is important to note in this context that while welcoming Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, to the White House on July 18 last year, President Bush described India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, and said that it should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states were entitled to. The president also said that he would ask Congress and US allies to revise American laws and international laws to allow nuclear trade with India.

One should not, however, be surprised at Washington’s nuclear cooperation with India which, in fact, dates back to the 1950s when, apart from building the Tarapur nuclear reactor and providing heavy water for its reactors, it also allowed Indian nuclear scientists to study at US nuclear laboratories. Declassified American papers also revealed that, in 1961, the United States had contemplated making India a nuclear power as a counterweight to China. That idea, however, had to be shelved at the time because of some problems in its implementation.

It is difficult to believe that while making a decision about a strategic partnership with India that would facilitate its emergence as a powerful entity with considerable political and military clout conferring upon it the status of a regional hegemon, US policymakers would not have taken into account Pakistan’s sensitivities.

Washington is well aware of Pakistan’s serious concerns about the threat to its security, particularly from its eastern neighbour, which leads one to believe that it deliberately ignored this important aspect.

However, it is equally intriguing that policymakers in Pakistan for many years did not know which way the wind was blowing in US corridors of power and, therefore, could not persuade Washington to adopt an even-handed policy towards Pakistan and India. There no point in making hollow noises against the US-India strategic alliance at this stage as it is now a fait accompli.

The US-India strategic partnership may be in consonance with America’s interests but will, however, create serious problems for all countries in the region as they have disputes with their bigger neighbour. It will particularly hurt Pakistan. Political analysts believe that the existing cordial Pakistan-US relationship might come under severe strain and place the present pro-US regime in Pakistan in a quandary if Pakistan’s legitimate concerns about its security are not addressed by the United States in a satisfactory manner.

Having been on the wrong side of history in Afghanistan and Iraq, the containment of China has now commanded President Bush’s attention. He has decided to use India as a conduit for this purpose. He has entered into a long-term strategic partnership with that country, ostensibly, to build closer ties between the two countries in different fields. The scepticism that this ominous development would upset the delicate balance of power between Pakistan and India and undermine the security of the former is well-founded.

A wide body of opinion in Pakistan is of the view that the United States cannot be relied upon as a dependable ally which underlines the need and urgency of evolving a new strategy that would particularly address the security concerns of their country. For obvious reasons, Pakistan cannot abdicate its responsibility for the preservation of its security and national integrity in the aftermath of the recent overtures the United States has made to India.

Unfortunately, however, Pakistan is also suffering from a number of serious political, economic and social problems. Ethnic and regional conflicts have particularly assumed critical proportions and might impinge upon its national security and territorial integrity.

It is, therefore, equally important to put our own house in order by creating national harmony and reconciliation. The need for pragmatism has never been so acutely felt as today.



By Ghayoor Ahmed 29 jan 06
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[COLOR=Blue][B]The best way to predict the future is to invent it[/B][/COLOR]
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