Security in Afghanistan

[SADIA SHAFIQ]

1. Current situation

With NATO/ISAF set to withdraw in 2014, Afghanistan is entering a crucial period. Security has deteriorated across the country, with the highest civilian casualty rates since 2001, and the insurgency is spreading to areas previously considered relatively safe, including the provinces around the capital Kabul. It is looking increasingly unlikely that Afghan forces will be able to assume responsibility for security from ISAF by 2014 unless significant changes are made to international policies and strategies.Crisis Group’s latest report, Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan (4 August 2011), examined how a decade of major security, development and humanitarian assistance has failed to achieve a politically stable and economically viable Afghan state. Despite billions of dollars in aid, state institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population or guarantee human security. The impact of international assistance will remain limited unless donors, particularly the largest, the U.S., stop subordinating programming to counter-insurgency objectives, devise better mechanisms to monitor implementation, adequately address corruption and wastage of aid funds, and ensure that recipient communities identify needs and shape assistance policies.

The international community has since the very beginning favoured short-term solutions over long-term strengthening of the Afghan state. The amount of aid disbursed since 2001 - $57 billion against $90 billion pledged – is a fraction of what has been spent on the war effort, and has largely failed to fulfil pledges to rebuild Afghanistan. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have since 2002 given the military a lead role in reconstruction, but without setting any standards for when they should be shifted to civilian lead or be phased out entirely. The 2009 U.S. troop surge was accompanied by a similar increase in civilian personnel, but without rigorous monitoring and accountability. Donors have pegged aid on short-term military objectives and timeframes, and what little progress has been achieved is in danger of becoming undone as the troop drawdown begins.Poor planning and oversight have affected projects’ effectiveness and sustainability, as have donors’ decisions to largely bypass state institutions, with only 20 per cent of development aid going through the government. This is set to change following the July 2010 Kabul conference, which could lead to more long-term strengthening of government capacity, but years of neglecting state institutions has limited the government’s ability to raise revenues or finance development expenditures. The heavily centralised political and public financial system has also hindered development funds from reaching provinces outside of the capital.

NATO’s transition plan envisions the Afghan government as fully responsible for security by December 2014. In June, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that 33,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn already by September 2012, and transfer of security to Afghan forces officially began in July 2011, although in areas where the insurgency’s influence is traditionally weak. Yet, serious doubts remain about the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to take over from ISAF forces. Despite having received more than half of total international aid, they have thus far proved unable to enforce the law, counter the insurgency or even secure the regions where the transition has already begun. There is no possibility that the Afghan security forces will stabilise the country in the next three years unless there is a significant rethink of international strategies, nor will the Afghan state be able to provide basic services to its citizens by 2015.The failure to strengthen the Afghan state comes amid a backdrop of a severely deteriorating security situation. In July, the UN reported 1,462 war-related civilian deaths in the first half of 2011 – an increase of 15 per cent from the same period in 2010, and the highest death toll since 2001. The insurgency has expanded far beyond its traditional stronghold in the south east, something Crisis Group examined in its report The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland (27 June 2011).Transcending its traditional Pashtun base, the Taliban is bolstering its influence in the central-eastern provinces by installing shadow governments and tapping into the vulnerabilities of a central government crippled by corruption and deeply dependent on a corrosive war economy. Collusion between insurgents and corrupt government officials in Kabul and the nearby provinces has increased, leading to a profusion of criminal networks in the Afghan heartland. Despite efforts to combat the insurgency in the south, stability in the centre has steadily eroded. Yet, with nearly one fifth of the population residing in Kabul and its surrounding provinces, the Afghan heartland is pivotal to the planned transition from international troops to Afghan forces at the end of 2014. Given the insurgency’s entrenchment so close to the capital, however, it appears doubtful that President Hamid Karzai’s government will be able to contain the threat and stabilise the country by then.



2. What should be done; recommendations:

To the International Community, especially the U.S. and other NATO allies and the European Union:

1. Delink non-military assistance from counter-insurgency targets, including by devising mandates and assessing requirements of civilian assistance independently of troop deployment levels.

2. Increase and broaden engagement with the Afghan state beyond Kabul and the Karzai administration to include elected provincial councils and provincial development committees in identifying funding needs, determining funding priorities and monitoring implementation.

3. Improve aid delivery by:

a) prioritising on-budget assistance through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), other multilateral trust funds and ministries and committing to this type of aid beyond 2014; but conditioning the release of such funds on the government meeting clearly defined benchmarks and withholding them when commitments are not fulfilled;

b) limiting the use of private foreign contractors and discontinuing their role for non-infrastructure construction programs, working instead with Afghan and international NGOs in coordination with relevant line departments;

c) working closely with provincial development committees and elected provincial councils to formulate achievable development plans that reflect province needs and developing the elected provincial council’s capacity to monitor the implementation of provincial development plans through regular training and provision of resources; and

d) urging the central government to devolve sufficient funds to the provinces to meet the requirements of provincial development plans.

4. Reduce military involvement in humanitarian, development and reconstruction assistance and, while it continues, improve coordination between military and civilian actors by:

a) harmonising Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ mandates, funding levels and coordination with local Afghan authorities and establishing clear standards for transitioning from military to civilian-led PRTs and then to normal civilian run development structures;

b) limiting and ultimately eliminating the role of donor defence ministries/departments in non-military assistance;

c) ensuring that military resources and personnel are not deployed to provide humanitarian aid unless required by civilian authorities, notably the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, and in accordance with the Guidelines for Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan; and

d) shifting away from quick impact military or civilian stabilisation programs, instead supporting programs such as the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program (NSP) that have proved more effective in building state-citizen relations even in more volatile regions.

5. Work closely with the Afghan government in responding to calls for greater transparency in aid expenditure by:

a) communicating data on funding status and programs regularly to the Afghan finance ministry’s aid management directorate;

b) developing improved vetting mechanisms for contractors that includes consultation with the relevant local/national authorities, and in turn requiring contractors and grantees to report to the relevant donors any indications or allegations of fraud by Afghan institutions receiving donor funds; and

c) promoting Afghan parliamentary oversight of the expenditure of donor funds and development programming.

6. Limit the misuse of aid, including by warlords, criminals and corrupt officials by:

a) vetting personnel in companies bidding for security and development contracts thoroughly and terminating any contracts to private security companies run by former warlords or with criminal links; and

b) urging the central government to properly investigate allegations of fraud in commercial institutions, such as the Kabul Bank.

7. Build the Afghan state’s administrative and fiscal autonomy by:

a) ending the practice of creating separate units within ministries, staffed with international advisers, to implement projects, instead providing line ministries with the requisite training and resource support; and

b) investing in development of the energy, industrial and agricultural sectors, through such funding sources as the Asian Development Bank-managed infrastructure fund, to reduce Afghan dependence on external sources of revenue.

8. Prioritise rule of law programming as the centre of the counter-insurgency strategy by focusing on improving the quality, professionalism and retention rates of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP); supporting judicial reform; and ending support for local militias.

9. Commit to principled aid by holding the government accountable to the international conventions it has signed, especially regarding the rights of women and minorities, including by withholding funds if these obligations are flouted; and protect women’s and minorities’ rights by ensuring that some sectors remain outside government control even as the Afghan state assumes more responsibility over aid.

To the Government of Afghanistan:

10. Enhance transparency of aid expenditure by:

a) engaging with parliament on development aid allocation and program implementation; and

b) providing timely public information on funding status and development programming through the finance ministry’s Development Assistance Database (DAD), the Donor Financial Review (DFR) and the Development Cooperation Report (DCR).

11. Support provincial development and local government capacity building by:

a) devolving authority to the provinces to formulate provincial budgets from locally generated revenue, while continuing to disburse development funds to provinces according to need;

b) amending the 2007 Provincial Council Law to better define and enhance the provincial councils’ mandate, including guaranteeing political and fiscal autonomy and institutionalising their role in overseeing the implementation of provincial development plans; and

c) ensuring that provincial line departments and local authorities, including the provincial development committees and the elected provincial councils, have adequate resources to implement and monitor the provincial development plans.

12. Reduce aid dependency and generate revenue by investing in large-scale infrastructure development, particularly in the energy and agricultural sectors, and prioritise building tax and customs duty collection capacity.


3. Background to the conflict

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda was the latest manifestation of a conflict that had been running for nearly three decades. Afghanistan was first invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979, which withdrew in 1989 after a decade of fighting with anti-communist mujahidin. With continuing factionalism among the mujahidin, the Taliban eventually seized power, controlling about 90 per cent of Afghanistan's territory and permitting al-Qaeda to operate freely from there, until U.S. and allied military action following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

In December 2001, leaders from the Afghan opposition and diaspora met in Bonn, Germany, and drew up plans for a political transition starting with a provisional government structure, which led to the naming of Hamid Karzai as chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) on 22 December 2001. The AIA held a nationwide Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in June 2002, and Karzai was elected president of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan In December 2003, the Transitional Authority held a second nationwide Loya Jirga in Kabul to debate a draft Constitution, which was ultimately adopted in January 2004. After threats of boycott, violence and claims of fraud the first ever direct presidential election on 9 October was largely succesful (Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections). Parliamentary and provincial elections were held in September 2005; exclusion of political parties from electoral process may compromise the strength of the legislature.Militant violence has risen steadily over the past years to reach the worst levels since the 2001 invasion. The Taliban have strengthened their hold of the south and east of the country . The fraudulent August 2009 presidential elections dealt a serious blow to the creidbility of the Karzai government, and the political system, the judiciary and the security apparatus are in need of significant reform

[SADIA SHAFIQ]

Battle Ground Afghanistan English

[Muhammad T S Awan]

AoA

Afghan issues are very important with regard to Pakistan's security and prosperity and it is imperative for a css aspirant to study Afghanistan's situation and Pak-Afghan relations.

This is a good piece of sharing by Sadia Shafique, however, lot more is required for its improvement, am trying to write some lines on recent developments in Afghanistan as under;

The most recent and very important development is recent visit of Afghan President Hamid Karzai to New Delhi and signing of following agreements

• Strategic Partnership Agreement
• MoU on Cooperation in the Field of Development of Hydrocarbons
• MoU on Cooperation in the Field of Mineral Resources Development

All of these agreements/MoUs were to create greater cooperation between both the countries. Of course, Pakistan-being a mutual neighbour- has remained important factor of increasing cooperation between both the countries.

Particularly, SPA (Strategic Partnershipo Agreement) will be providing India an important place in internal and external affairs of Afghanistan in post-International forces withdrawal era. India is endeavouring to achieve a position of regional power and is being backed by the West to increase her influence in countries around her. This SPA will also be instrumental in encircling Pakistan, having a wider ingress of India into Central Asians Republics and for containing China through Afghanistan. And image of Pakistan is gradually detriorating due to its alleged invovlement in terrorism. Both Afghanistan and India are getting benefit of this plea that Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism in both of these countries through militant groups backed by Inter Services Intelligence.

There is a need for Pakistan's diplomatic fronts to counter this strategy by effectivly utilizing its diplomatic channels to dispel the impression that Pakistan in involved in terrorism as well as to increase its influence in Afghanistan, because Afghan soil has always been used to infiltrate/strengthen the dissident groups in Pakistan particularly in its North Western and Western areas of KPK and Balochistan..... .

[SADIA SHAFIQ]

U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan


Ten Years of Afghan War

[Ten Years of Afghan War - Council on Foreign Relations



The Taliban in Afghanistan




The Taliban in Afghanistan - Council on Foreign Relations

Looming Threat to Afghan Women's Rights


Looming Threat to Afghan Women's Rights - Council on Foreign Relations




Independent Task Force Conditionally Supports U.S. Policy in Pakistan, Afghanistan, but Argues for Changing Strategy Absent Progress

Independent Task Force Conditionally Supports U.S. Policy in Pakistan, Afghanistan, but Argues for Changing Strategy Absent Progress - Council on Foreign Relations



The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland



The Insurgency in Afghanistan

Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement

1.Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement - International Crisis Group


2.http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compu...-strategy.html

[SADIA SHAFIQ]

The Durand Line By A.G. Noorani Saturday, 26 Dec, 2009

As the tragedies in Afghanistan unfolded since 1974, deserved empathy for its plight was extended by some to sympathy for its claim to Pakhtunistan.

The record of boundary-making and Afghanistan’s unprincipled behaviour were overlooked. The Durand Line was not an imperial diktat but a fair compromise as impartial authorities acknowledge.

John Griffiths recounted in his book Afghanistan (1967) “an amiable, lengthy and courteous interview” with its prime minister. But he “sparked a flash of anger when I asked him whether he thought any part of Afghanistan should become part of [Pakhtunistan]. His sharp ‘never’ and subsequent rebuke of my ‘irrelevant’ question betrayed, not only strength of feeling, but perhaps also an awareness of the ambiguity and weakness of the arguments for an independent [Pakhtunistan]”.

It is sheer territorial aggrandisement, not a case of self-determination. In January 1960 Pakistani Foreign Minister Manzur Qadri baffled his Afghan counterpart, Mohammed Naim with a proposal for a plebiscite of the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan since those in Pakistan had already voted in a referendum on July 17, 1947. As two-thirds of them lived in Pakistan, it was more rational for the rest to join the majority. Manzur Qadir repeated the offer publicly on March 7, 1960.

The Durand Line was not drawn arbitrarily. It was defined in a brief agreement signed in Kabul on Nov 12, 1893 by India’s foreign secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, and King Abdur Rahman Khan, in the text and the attached map. J.V. Prescott an authority remarked on “the spirit of compromise in these negotiations” which was reflected in the concession Durand made; notably on the Chagai area”.

Demarcation on the ground began in April 1894 and was completed in May 1896. During this period seven sections of the boundary were precisely defined in agreed documents — to wit, on Nov 21, 1894; Feb 26, 1895, March 8, 1895, April 9, 1895, April 15, 1895 and May 13, 1896.

Only two sections remained un-surveyed. Amanullah Khan’s jihad on the firangis accomplished that. He hoped to acquire Peshawar and areas in the Derajat up to the Indus. The peace treaty signed in Rawalpindi on Aug 8, 1919, confirmed the frontier “accepted by the late ameer” and provided for an “early demarcation” of the “undemarcated portion of the West Khyber where the Afghan aggression happened”.

The treaty of Nov 22, 1921 signed at Kabul, confirmed the Rawalpindi treaty and “also the boundary west of the Khyber” laid down by the commission in August-September 1919. By an exchange of notes on Feb 3, 1934, the parties confirmed their agreement of July 11, 1932 on the frontier “in the neighbourhood of Arnawai and Dokalim”. A process that began in 1893 ended 40 years later in 1934.

A note came on June 13, 1947 after Mountbatten’s announcement of the partition plan on June 3, 1947 to overturn all that. Afghanistan now demanded that the terms of reference of the referendum in the NWFP under the plan should be widened to cover independence or accession to Afghanistan. London rejected the demand asserting its rights under the treaty of 1921 and denying “the right of a foreign government to intervene in the internal affairs of those areas”.

At a meeting of the Indian cabinet on July 4, 1947 at which Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan were present, Nehru, as minister for external affairs, said, to quote the minutes, “about a month ago the press and the radio in Afghanistan had started a campaign giving prominence to Afghanistan’s interests in the North West Frontier and the claim was made that Pathans were Afghans rather than Indians and they should have the utmost freedom to decide their own future and should not be debarred, as the proposed referendum would appear to do, from deciding either to form a separate free state or to rejoin their motherland, viz Afghanistan.

These claims had later been taken up on an official level with HMG and the Government of India. The Government of India had refuted this irredentist claim of Afghanistan to the area lying between the Durand Line and the Indus river, and had pointed out that the issue regarding an independent Pathan state was a matter entirely for the Government of India and the Afghan government had no locus standi. HMG’s minister at Kabul had mentioned the possibility that the Afghan government’s object might be to divert public attention in Afghanistan from the internal economic situation which was precarious.”

On July 5 Britain handed the Afghan charge d’ affaires an aide-memoire rejecting demands in respect of “an area which forms an integral part of India and is recognised as such by the Afghan government in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921”. Kabul’s claim that the treaty died with the transfer of power violated international law on state succession.

Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 empowered the governor-general to make orders for bringing the provisions of the act into effective operation after it came into force on July 18, 1947. Leaders of the two dominions concluded an agreement on Aug 6, 1947 which he enforced by a formal order under Section 9 entitled the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order 1947. The agreement was set out in a schedule to the order. Para 3 is relevant: “Rights and obligations having an exclusive territorial application to an area comprised” in either dominion would “devolve upon that dominion”.

Annexure V of the report listed the treaties “which are of exclusive interest” to each country and “those which are of common interest”. Agreements with Afghanistan on Nov 12, 1893 and seven others, cited above defining the boundary devolved on Pakistan exclusively; in short, those relating to the Durand Line.

“The 1914 Anglo-Tibetan Convention, in its operation between the British and the Tibetan governments regarding the relation of Tibet vis-à-vis China and Great Britain” and “the Indo-Tibetan Boundary Agreement of 1914 regarding fixation of Assam-Tibet boundary” commonly known as the McMahon Line devolved on India.

India and Pakistan cannot question, respectively, the Durand Line and the McMahon Line.