An Overview Of American Government

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Governance embodies the most interesting aspects of the conflicting and unrelenting relationship between rulers and people, between citizens and institutions. The subject became particularly relevant to Latin American societies when they began the transition from authoritarian government forms to open, polyarchic ones, albeit insufficiently democratic. Authoritarian governance has never been problematic in scientific or political terms. Its rules are clear. It feeds on fear and repression. Control is exerted by violence or the threat of it. In real life, of course, authoritarian rulers devised their own governing routines: sometimes they tried to compensate for repression with social services for its victims, giving the appearance of reform. But when democracies establish new norms, they have great difficulty redistributing political power and wealth in societies marked by unfulfilled needs and lacking in -depth fiscal, institutional and political leadership. For the opposition, matters become ungovernable when, faced with irresponsibility in public management, patience runs out.

Conceptual approaches try to reconcile these different interpretations by recognizing the many types of relationships between state and society that can emerge under newly-democratic conditions (e.g. when distribution conflicts are resolved by appealing to the majority rule and to the Constitution). (1) But a precondition for democratic governance is the existence of a state and a government that function according to pre-established norms in the first place. This is the first caution we should take when analyzing democracy in Central America. After more than a decade of peace and institutional agreements conducted through elections, observers see significant deficiencies in building and consolidating democratic states, as well as in exerting democratic governance. (2) To social scientists, this reveals fragile institutional norms and insufficient compliance with them, because the institutions have failed to anticipate the multiplicity of conflicts that may actually arise between state and society; and because factors that are external to the rules of the democratic game are affecting them. But how can this observation translate into and inform public action?

Democratic governance implies respect for, and the functioning of, two basic principles: Decisions regarding distribution are adopted following known procedures; and the results of those deliberations are unknown from the start by the actors involved in the process. (3) In a governable democracy, conflicts can express themselves with enough frequency and intensity that they draw the attention of the state; the state then satisfies some needs while keeping others "temporarily" unsolved by promising to pay attention to them in the future. When a democracy is ungovernable, there is a "deficit" of satisfaction or a "surplus" of demands that cannot be institutionally channeled on a constant basis, leading to political crisis. The democratic process can also be a sham, opaque or unfair, with the outcome decided by policy makers before the process has even begun. So in analyzing the effectiveness of democratic regimes, it is important to look at the norms that govern institutions, the way policy makers reach decisions, and the nature those decisions usually take.

But two additional spheres outside of the relationship between state and society seem relevant to me. First, institutions operate under structural limits that can be quite stringent and suffer from constant modifications, especially in societies in precarious, limited development, where natural and macroeconomic catastrophes can become disasters for strictly social reasons. The limits indicate what type of demands can occur, how intense they call be, and when they can be advanced. We are not talking exclusively about economic limits, as stated by a conservative understanding of politics; we are also referring to normative limits as well, as established by a liberal approach where the norm breaks away from the original social interest, conditioning and guiding its future evolution. (4) From this perspective, structural limits can take the form of citizenship rights. Defining them is essential for economic life and for the well-being of the people. They also mark the character of the social commitment, as a product of conflicts and tensions, as well as the character of future aspirations marked by consensus to some extent. Finally, they reflect the strength of the institutions themselves and their ability to implement effective policy and maintain order.

The second sphere is the influence of globalization, and here again, it is not confined to economics: It can influence where political power really lies. (5) Global forces can change the role of the state in society, and introduce new balances and constraints to its actions. When these influences are incorporated into the dynamics of societies, they can take the form of structural limits to the formation of rights. Issues of governance examine whether institutions, their management, the discussion they create and the policies that result can produce social peace and political stability. In some Central American countries, economic reforms have been possible without permanent social resistance. Yet, the positive distributive effects are only promises, while the negative costs have already been realized.

So far, we have established the elements of the governance equation in a rather conceptual way, but governance is above all the result of a complex process of interactions between society, the state and, increasingly, international actors. Understanding this allows us to reject the instrumental notions of governance that establish an easy synonymy between political productivity and good governance. (6) A good government is a necessity, but it is not enough.

The three spheres that condition governance interact differently according to the degree of development of institutional political patterns. One might expect political regimes in transition to be more sensitive to changes in economic structure and to the political influence generated by international actors. It is thus important to establish a relationship between the mechanisms of government, the limits placed on it, and the influence of globalization, specifically looking at the feasibility of strengthening democracy, which has been highly uneven in Central America.

Following Diamond, the dynamics of democratic consolidation involve three facets: democratic deepening, political institutionalization and regime performance. (7) The question of democratic deepening concerns a wider adherence to the legal system and to accountability between powers and towards citizens. Other essential aspects are the reduction of institutional barriers limiting political participation and mobilization of marginalized social sectors; decentralization of power; and securing more space, energy and autonomy for civil society, as well as more effective protection of political and civil rights. Political institutionalization refers to the consistency of political practices and has to do with the predictability of the democratic game. (8) Governing bodies that increase their authority so that norms and laws prevail within efficient, reliable political structures and accepted norms can earn the respect of citizens by allowing for correct mediation of interests and conflict resolution. The question of regime performance cannot be ignored unless we accept the risk of falling for rigid prescriptions of what democracy and governance really mean. The idea of regime performance refers to the economic and social results of political exchange between state and society. Thus, it recognizes the effects of policy outcomes on the stability of the institutional regime. Indications of macroeconomic stability, or data about poverty and inequality, might also reveal to what extent democracy is consolidated and what possibilities Central American societies have for improving governance.

Finally, we must recognize that institutions and political practices are socially conditioned. It cannot be assumed that when conflicts over regime performance end, it is because all problems originating from institutional and normative fields have been solved; democratic regimes can be under constant pressure to prove their legitimacy. Occasionally, social progress actually impedes important institutional reforms that might have improved social institutions, because the regime seeks to avoid at all costs the political and social instability generated when the rules of the game change.

Very often, the globalization process gets an "economic" sticker and as a result, the political and social implications of this world phenomenon are underrated. Let's then begin with a provocative statement: Beyond its effect on economic policy in Central America, globalization is by nature a political, social and cultural process. It cannot be otherwise for a region where until the first five years of the 1990s democracy was the exception amidst authoritarian failures, civil wars and dictatorships, both military and dynastic. Only after the fall of the Noriega regime in Panama and the defeat of the Sandinistas at the polls in Nicaragua were electoral systems in place. Only in the 1990s were political accords to negotiate peace implemented in Guatemala and El Salvador, though it is worth mentioning that despite the accords, deaths by firearms have not been dramatically reduced.

Political democratization in Central America is just opening its doors to more open pacts for good governance and socio- political balance, partly under U.S. pressure for electoral democracy and economic deregulation. In the 1980s, these policies were promoted with counterinsurgency aims. International influence also clearly played a role when elections were threatened. In 1993, it helped solve the institutional crisis generated by Jorge Serrano Elias's self coup d'etat. It also worked in Nicaragua in 2000 during the crisis of confidence caused by the misconduct of the Aleman administration.

Although elections are a key component of the region's quest for democracy, the results have been weak. Electoral participation is poor, especially in the northern countries; in other cases, there are important limitations to fully exercising the political right to representation. Political parties are controlled by a handful of people who profit from running the parties in a patrimonial style. Effective representation has also been limited by narrow prospects for economic reforms. Why has little progress been made? To answer this question, we must return to the strengths of norms and institutions, considering four levels of public capacity. (9) Institutional capacity refers to the formation of rules of the game; technical capacity illustrates the possibilities of macroeconomic control; administrative capacity deals with the quality of services; and political capacity attends to social arbitration and resolution of distribution conflicts.

In Central America, the emphasis on the formation of democracy and the establishment of tight macroeconomic controls has addressed only institutional and technical capacities. Neither the ability to deliver services nor the capacity for solving conflicts has seen meaningful improvement. This has led to surface changes--elections and relative economic stability--but the deeper problems of peoples' welfare and voice in politics remain untouched. To get a general idea of the present situation we must look at data related to the above-mentioned capacities.

Central America has seen periodical elections without the ruptures that afflict other areas of the American continent. As Maihold and Cordova point out, "between 1981 and 1999, there were 56 electoral processes in the Central American countries, with an average of 2.95 per year elections and eight per country ... Multiple elections are an indicator of the settlement of a democratic electoral system in the region." (10) In the 20 years stretching from 1982 to 2002, only one democratically elected ruler has not finished his term. This exceptional case was the self-coup d'etat engineered by Jorge Serrano Elias in Guatemala in 1993. However, the strength of the electoral system contrasts with the debilitated institutional links between the public branches of government and the general frailty of the judicial branch. In Nicaragua, the relationship between executive power and parliaments has resulted in notorious occurrences of dual government. Disputes over constitutional reforms resulted in the country not having an official constitution at all because the Sandinista opposition held on to one text while the government of Violeta Chamorro held on to another. In the case of former president Arnoldo Aleman, an infrequent post-presidential use of power took place. In Guatemala, although the elected president ostensibly runs the executive branch, rumor has it that executive power is actually held by general Efrain Rios Montt, who presides over Congress.

The common interest of local elites, transnational companies and technocrats have impelled Central American governments to improve their capacities to control their economies by fostering schemes of economic growth based on an openness and privatization. Although this has resulted in a significant reduction of inflation levels in all countries with the exception of Nicaragua, the available data indicate meager results regarding fiscal and trade balances. Indicators show a tendency for the worse in the past five years in all countries with the exception of Costa Rica . To observe how the delivery of social services as well as support for production have evolved, I propose two indicators. One is the amount of public revenues in relation to gross domestic product (GDP); this relation makes it possible to surmise the link between economic dynamism and public management. The other is per-capita social investment data in constant dollars. The availability of resources at the hands of governments has been constant in relation to production with the exception of Guatemala, where slight growth has helped to reduce the gap with the rest of the countries in the area . Nonetheless, levels of social investment have been extremely low throughout the decade. They are below the levels reached by Costa Rica, and below the average in Latin America (5).

The evolution of public capacities can be associated with the general process of public decision-making. Although Central Americans clearly prefer democracy over dictatorships, all countries have common evidence that citizens increasingly mistrust government institutions. People question the usefulness of elections and are suspicious of the real motivations behind the decision by political actors to seek elected office. Data from the Latinobarometer Survey show a sound weakening of the citizenship confidence in democratic institutions, as well as a continuing drop in public satisfaction with democratic institutions in all countries since 1997 (6).

In the absence of properly functioning democratic mechanisms, citizens and government officials have tried to use more ad-hoc agreements, or pacts, to create spaces for deliberation to increase civic participation in decision-making, thus improving public capacity to address grievances. (11) The pacts involve two levels of reforms: the adoption of mechanisms of participation by citizens, and democratic decentralization. In Costa Rica and El Salvador, political pacts have resulted in the development of more socially-conscious economic programs. Although they severely hurt some investor groups and some less privileged social sectors, these programs have not been questioned because they appear to have more potential for better returns in the future than the prevailing protectionist system in place until the 1970s. However, the use of political pacts can sour relations between officials and citizens, as they can also mean collusion or connivance. In Nicaragua, for instance, the bipartisan pact is considered a patrimonial channel to distribute jobs and privileges. (12)

The calls for pacts and dialogue and the increasing mistrust towards the traditional forms of partisan politics reveal some of the limits of democracy in Central America. Other limits relate less to the instruments and scope of intermediation and more to social dynamics. As in other regions, the profile of society in Central America has become increasingly heterogeneous as a result of global economic processes, but these changes are not clearly reflected in the entitlement of civil rights. Every country has seen important progress in the areas of universal rights and public freedoms, and there have been advances in the development of political rights as well as possibilities to elect political representatives in fair elections recognized by the contestants and with acceptable results. However, there are still important shortcomings in both cases: Rights linked to the improvement of social conditions of excluded and vulnerable groups are still unsteady. Women, indigenous groups, the elderly, the disabled and in some cases immigrants are still left out.

Nevertheless, the pacts provide an example of a new form of political management still in its infancy. They also reveal the weakening of traditional corporate exchanges between government, state and businesses, and reflect the wear and tear of the traditional means of political representation, especially parliamentary representation. Most relevant for the social and territorial limits to true democracy, the pacts reproduce the centralist biases of decision-making in Central American political culture. Essentially, they are not local dialogues, but national ones, which in the poorest countries also bear the influence of the international community and often have the effect of leaving out the voices of those most in need.

Citizenship rights are a product of the interaction between perceived social needs and their institutional recognition by the state. Norms define the rights; they postulate their possible requirements and illustrate the limits to which they can be debated. Rights are formulated in the framework of the social struggle, and at the same time, the social struggle is defined and limited by them. (13) Rights are essential to deepening democracy in Central America, and it is fundamental to recognize the importance of mechanisms for citizens to demand and protect such rights. From the state side, institutional mechanisms for strengthening and protecting civil rights have been developed, in part because of attention from international organizations (7). Judicial systems have also been strengthened. (14).

From the perspective of society, however, there has always been fertile ground for the proliferation of NGOs to shed light on the shortcomings of these developments. NGOs also underscore the need for recognition, defense and supervision of rights where they do exist. On some occasions, long experience defending human rights by civil organizations could have been undermined by authoritarian practices. However, this was not the case in Honduras, or in other places for that matter. (15) In general, the tendency is for the accusations presented by the people to widen, bearing witness to the use of institutional defense when official decisions are arbitrary--a huge step in a region inhabited by autocratic officials.