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Old Thursday, September 24, 2009
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Kenneth B. Pyle is the Henry M. Jackson Professor of History and Asian
Studies at the University of Washington, Co-Chairman of the Asia Policy
Editorial Board, and Founding President of The National Bureau of Asian
Research (NBR). He is also founding editor of the Journal of Japanese Studies,
a founding member of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation (1981–
1988), and from 1992 to 1995 was Chairman of the Japan-U.S. Friendship
Commission. In 1999 he was decorated by the Emperor of Japan with the Order
of the Rising Sun. His next book, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese
Power and Purpose, will be released in early 2007.
Note • This essay is based on a keynote address that the author gave at the
conference “Pursuing Security in a Dynamic Northeast Asia,” held November
17–18, 2006 in Seattle to launch NBR’s Kenneth B. and Anne H.H. Pyle Center
for Northeast Asian Studies.


Reading the New Era in Asia:
The Use of History and Culture in the
Making of Foreign Policy
Kenneth B. Pyle



The year 1989 was one of the great turning points in modern history.
One international system came to an abrupt and surprising end and a
new one was in the making. Rarely in history had the components of world
order changed so abruptly. Almost no one foresaw the sudden end of the Cold
War system. The end of the bipolar era meant that the international system
was suddenly without a fixed structure and was subject to rapidly changing
conditions. The end of the Cold War in particular opened a new era for Asia.
The center of gravity of the global economy was shifting from the North Atlantic
to the Asia-Pacific region. A region that had been a colonial backwater when
the Cold War began was now the emerging new center of world power and
influence. After being dominated by the Eurocentric world throughout the
modern era, Asia began to come into its own—increasingly subject to its own
internally generated dynamics. For the first time in modern history, Asian
nations acquired the power to adopt active roles in the international system
and to shape their regional order. Asia in the post–Cold War era is in a kind
of interregnum, however, lacking a fixed regional structure or a recognized
legitimate order to cope with its diverse cultural and political systems, and
having vast differences of wealth and population, competition for energy
resources, arms races, border disputes, conflicting historical legacies, rampant
nationalisms, and limited experience with multilateral organizations.
This highly complex new reality in Asia came at a time when the study
of international relations was achieving a new level of sophistication and
could therefore provide analytic tools to apply to this complex region. The
attempt to establish a science of international relations—the systematic study
of patterns of conflict and cooperation among nations—is of relatively recent
origin. It was in the post-World War II United States that the discipline of
international relations flowered. Drawing inspiration from émigré scholars
like Morgenthau, Wolfers, Deutsch, and the young Kissinger and Brzezinski,
the discipline became, as Stanley Hoffman observed, a quintessentially
American social science. Born and raised in the United States, the discipline
of international relations grew up in the shadow of the immense U.S. role in
world affairs. The new discipline focused its attention on the study of order
in international society. “How states create and maintain order in a world
of sovereign powers,” Hoffman wrote in 1977, “has been the fundamental
and so far insoluble problem of international relations.” In the time since
the early postwar period a rich and burgeoning body of theory on the
Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus 106, no. 3
(Summer 1977): 41–60.
[ ]
pyle •
reading the new era in asia
problem of international order has grown, replete with its own controversies
and competing theories on how it is devised, why it breaks down, and how
it is reestablished. The study of great power transitions is one of the most
thoughtfully considered aspects of international relations theory; and in Asia,
we confront the rise of the world’s two new great powers, China and India.
Theoretical sophistication, however, has brought anything but consensus.
For example, Aaron Friedberg has recently described six different theoretical
perspectives on what the rise of China may mean for both U.S.-China relations
and regional stability. The historian John Lewis Gaddis, for one, has been
highly critical of the scientific claims of international relations theory. He
observes that
the efforts theorists have made to create a ‘science’ of politics that
would forecast the future course of world events have produced
strikingly unimpressive results: none of the…approaches to
theory…that have evolved since 1945 came anywhere close to
anticipating how the Cold War would end… If their forecasts
failed so completely to anticipate so large an event as that conflict’s
termination, then one has to wonder about the theories upon
which they were based.
Gaddis quoted approvingly a wry remark made by the distinguished
historian of the Soviet Union, Robert Conquest. When once asked what
lesson people might learn from the surprise ending of the Cold War, Conquest
replied: “If you are a student, switch from political science to history.”
Nevertheless, whatever its limitations in anticipating the future, the field at
its best provides us with perspectives and conceptual tools to apply to our
thinking about the complex reality of the new era in Asia. Asia Policy can
draw upon what international relations theorists tell us about patterns of state
behavior extending across time and space. Theory can sharpen the kinds of
questions we should be asking about the objective conditions that we are
dealing with.
We now have the benefit of a very highly developed range of expertise
on Asian societies that simply did not exist a generation ago. Over the last
generation there has developed in the United States—thanks to a combination
of foundation and government support—a very substantial infrastructure of
Asian studies. This is a remarkable chapter in American higher education.
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International
Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–45.
John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International
Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–93): 3.
Ibid., 3.
[ ]
asia policy
When the United States first became entangled in Vietnam in the 1960s, no
American had studied the history of that country through native sources.
While there were at that time a respectable number of specialists studying
Russia, China, and Japan, their work was still at an early stage. Serious study
of Korea was only beginning in the 1970s.
By the 1990s the number of Asia specialists with language competence
and first-hand knowledge of the countries of this region had greatly expanded.
It was the existence of this area studies expertise, scattered around the country
and beyond, that Senator Henry M. Jackson had discussed with me in the
1970s as a necessary ingredient in the policy process. Jackson believed that
there was a strong need for developing a better informed American foreign
policy toward Asia. He was particularly influenced by his belief that the
American failure to understand the Sino-Soviet split had resulted from the
absence of expertise on China in government. Jackson, who had helped bring
down Senator Joseph McCarthy, blamed McCarthy for driving expertise on
China out of the State Department.
The growth of area studies provided the possibility of giving U.S.
policymakers an understanding of the sources of the international behavior of
Asian countries—something U.S. policymakers had often lacked at very critical
times. One thinks about how we have often misperceived and underestimated
Japan—except for the 1980s when we overestimated Japan.
If, for example, U.S. policymakers had understood Japanese history and
culture better in 1941, they might not have been so confident in the effectiveness
of the oil embargo to change Japanese behavior. In the autumn of 1941 the
U.S. Navy was anxious to avoid conflict with Japan in order to allow time both
for the Navy’s crash shipbuilding program to achieve its buildup sometime in
1942 and for the fortification of the Philippines. But the State Department was
confident that it could bring pressure to bear on Japan and still avoid conflict
during the time period the Navy said was essential for this buildup. Stanley
Hornbeck, the State Department’s principal architect of policy toward Japan,
was contemptuous of the Japanese capacity to challenge American strength.
Who would think Japan would go to war against a country eight to ten times
more wealthy and powerful? He dismissed the fears of a young foreign service
officer by the name of John Emmerson who had just returned from five years
See Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
See Kenneth B. Pyle, “Henry Jackson and the University of Washington’s Jackson School of
International Studies: A Personal Reflection,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 97, no. 1 (Winter
2005/2006): 3–10.
[ ]
pyle •
reading the new era in asia
in Japan with a keen sense of Japanese psychology and a concern that Japan
might initiate war out of desperation over the oil embargo imposed by the
U.S. “Tell me,” Hornbeck said to him, “of one case in history when a nation
went to war out of desperation.” Then, ten days before Pearl Harbor, after
drafting with Secretary of State Cordell Hull a hard-line message to Japan
laying down conditions for relaxation of American sanctions that included
Japanese withdrawal from Southeast Asia and from China (probably including
Manchuria), Hornbeck wrote an internal memo to his colleagues in the State
Department in which he confidently wagered five-to-one odds that Japan
would relent and that war was not imminent. Hornbeck later rued what he
called his “wishful thinking and gratuitous predicting.” But he was not alone
in his narrow vision and failure to understand the Japanese frame of mind.
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt certain that the administration’s
embargo would not lead to war because “no rational Japanese could believe
that an attack on [the United States] could result in anything but disaster for
his country.” U.S. policymakers did not see that they had presented Japan with
“two equally repugnant alternatives,” as Scott Sagan has aptly described the
situation. Japan was confronted not simply by the prospect of war with a
country eight to ten times more powerful than it, but also with the prospect of
accepting a settlement that would deny the very self-image that Japan had of
itself as a great power, the prime goal it had pursued for a century. A reading
of the records of the conferences of Japanese leaders in the autumn of 1941
makes clear that these elites felt their sense of national identity endangered.
It is probably true that “no nation will submit to a settlement…that totally
denies its vision of itself.”10 In the long run Japanese-American conflict was
probably inevitable, but failure to understand the mindset of the Japanese
military leaders may have hastened conflict at a time when the United States
needed more time to prepare. American leaders did not understand Japanese
psychology—nor, of course, one must hasten to add, did the Japanese
understand American psychology.
See James C. Thomson, Jr., “The Role of the Department of State,” in Pearl Harbor as History:
Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1973), 101–02.
Robert J. C. Butow, The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1981), 303; Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1962), 264–65.
Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of the Pacific War,” in The Origins & Prevention of Major Wars, ed.
Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
10 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace,
1812–1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 146.
[ ]
asia policy
A generation later Henry Kissinger greatly underestimated the motivation
and purpose of Japan during the eight years that he guided American
foreign policy. Kissinger himself—in a very rare admission of personal
fallibility—confessed in his memoirs a failure to understand Japan. “When
I first came to office,” he wrote, “there was no major country I understood
less than Japan…I did not grasp Japan’s unique character… Neither I nor my
colleagues possessed a very subtle grasp of Japanese culture or psychology.”11
Before entering government and while still an advisor to Nelson Rockefeller,
Kissinger made his first visit to Japan at the invitation of the Foreign Ministry,
which wanted to introduce him to Japanese culture. It did not come off well.
Kissinger’s Germanic accent and gravelly voice contributed to the cultural
mismatch. He later confided his disdain to the journalist Don Oberdorfer. “I
don’t zink they understand me,” he said to Oberdorfer. “They took me down
to a Japanese inn in Kyoto. Vatever I asked them, they sent a man to press
my pants.”12 During his tenure as National Security Advisor and as Secretary
of State, Kissinger gave short shrift to Japan and its commercial pursuits.
Japan seemed of limited importance in the great power calculus. He detested
invitations to the Japanese embassy in Washington because, Kissinger said,
they always served him Wiener schnitzel.
Even Mao Zedong, in a remarkable exchange that occurred shortly
after President Nixon and Kissinger opened relations with Beijing, lectured
Kissinger on his slighting attitude toward the Japanese. Having spent many
years as a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese invaders, Mao was not disposed
to underrate the Japanese. Kissinger however, persisted in his underestimation.
“The Japanese do not yet think in strategic terms,” Kissinger told Deng Xiaoping
in 1974, “They think [only] in commercial terms.”13 The implication was
that pursuing economic advantage was not a means of strategic pursuit of
power.
Kissinger’s failure to understand Japanese motivation is particularly ironic
for, as the unswerving proponent of founding foreign policy on the principles
of realism, he failed to notice that these very principles were deeply embedded
in postwar Japanese foreign policy. The reason for his obliviousness was that
Japanese postwar foreign policy was characterized by economic realism and
Kissinger had little interest in economics as a source of power. National Security
Council staff members under Kissinger observed that he had a “profound lack
11 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 735.
12 Don Oberdorfer, “Japan and the United States: Reflections of a Diplomatic Correspondent,”
International House of Japan Bulletin 17, no. 2 (Summer 1997).
13 William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, (New York: The New Press, 1998), 276.
[ ]
pyle • reading the new era in asia
of knowledge and interest in economics” and that discussing economic issues
with him was akin to discussing military strategy with the pope.14
After his term as secretary of state had ended and Japan’s economic
power and influence had grown dramatically, Kissinger belatedly came to see
that Japan had as clear a foreign policy strategy as any other power. Indeed, he
recorded that “in my view Japanese decisions have been the most farsighted
and intelligent of any major nation of the postwar era even while the Japanese
have acted with the understated, anonymous style characteristic of their
culture.”15
Senator Jackson was passionate about the importance of understanding
the history and culture of the countries that the United States had to deal
with. In decisionmaking about foreign policy and national defense, the
Senator found the missing ingredient to be what he called “people with good
judgment.” “Judgment,” he said, “is the most valuable of all qualities—the
ability to make good decisions in the face of uncertainty… Study of history is
the foundation of wisdom in decisionmaking. History is the great corrective
for the distortions, exaggerations, bombast, and verbal abuses of the present.”16
“Poor decisions,” he emphasized, “were so often traceable to the failure of
people to comprehend the full significance of information crossing their
desks, their indecisiveness, or their lack of wisdom.”17 As his long-time foreign
policy advisor Dorothy Fosdick later observed, “Throughout his official life,
the Senator drew on a remarkable group of experienced, historically oriented
advisers whom he informally consulted in person, by letter—often by
phone—to get their judgments on issues with fateful international strategic
implications.”18 In his critical role behind the scenes in changing U.S. China
policy, Jackson consulted frequently with Dwight Perkins, Michel Oksenberg,
and other scholars. When Jackson went to China on those long trips (in order
to get a feel of the country he would spend several weeks traveling far out into
the boondocks and backroads), he had these scholars along.
Although Jackson sometimes disagreed with George Kennan about
implementation of containment policy, Kennan represented the kind of
person with the ability to bring a keen historical sense to bear on the policy
process. Kennan’s famous 1946 “Long Telegram,” written from the American
14 Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 211–12.
15 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 324.
16 Quoted in Pyle, “Henry Jackson.”
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
[ ]
asia policy
embassy in Moscow, and his Foreign Affairs article the following year,
anonymously signed “X” and entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” were
a remarkable distillation of history, ideology, and political structure to explain
the fundamentals of Russian motivation. Kennan’s X article not only helped
reshape Washington’s world view but also foresaw with uncanny accuracy
how the Soviet system might suddenly implode and totally collapse. Since the
system had never experienced a “legitimate” transfer of power, Kennan wrote
in 1947, “if…anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of
the Party as political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight
from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national
societies.” 19
Given the vast new sources of knowledge on Asia, the challenge for Asia
Policy is to make the detailed knowledge of the specialist in the history and
culture of Asian nations relevant and accessible to policymaking. But how
should the journal make history—with all its chaos of detail and data—
relevant to policy and accessible to policymakers who scarcely have time for
reading more than one-page memos? Asia Policy can certainly tap into the
new infrastructure of expertise on Asia. But in addressing the fundamental
questions about the future direction and the underlying determination of
relations among nations in this region, I hope that the journal will promote
research that pursues these nations’ sources of conduct, to use Kennan’s
phrase, or what might be called their national style, or their strategic culture.
“Foreign policy,” it has been said, “is the face a nation wears to the world.
The minimal motive is the same for all states—the protection of national
integrity and interest. But the manner in which a state practices foreign policy
is greatly affected by national peculiarities.”20 The behavior of nations, like
that of individuals, is shaped by elements of heredity and environment, which
through history respond to problems and experiences and in time build up
relatively stable patterns of response. These patterns, although persistent,
are by no means immutable, but evolve as a people absorb new experiences
and encounter changes in their environment. They may change gradually
over time, but they are not erased. There is innovation in the patterns as new
challenges are encountered, but there is great conservativeness too. These
recurrent patterns of behavior constitute a distinctive set of national attitudes,
habits, and principles with which a people approaches its problems. They show
19 X (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
20 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Foreign Policy and the American Character,” Foreign Affairs 62, no. 1
(Autumn 1983): 1.
[ ]
pyle • reading the new era in asia
themselves in the nation’s foreign policy and in the interaction the nation has
with its external environment.
As the eminent French authority on international politics, Raymond
Aron, wrote, nations acquire different “styles of being and behaving” that
persist through time. A nation’s style springs in part from intrinsic factors
of geography and the nation’s natural endowments. “A position on the map
imposes upon the diplomacy or upon the strategy of a state,” Aron said
“certain orientations which are likely to be lasting, if not permanent.” Within
that geographical setting, the centuries of experience are transformed over
time into second nature, producing cultural traits which Montesquieu called
“the spirit of a nation.” This esprit crucially influences a nation’s international
behavior and, as Aron said, gives a “relative consistency in the ‘style’ of foreign
policy,” but must not be used as a sufficient explanation of any particular
policy. As Aron wisely observed,
the “spirit of a nation” which Montesquieu speaks of is a notion
as equivocal as that of national character, but perhaps preferable
because it emphasizes the share of culture and the historical
heritage… The French nation was not born as it is now, it has
become what it is as a result of the events which it has lived
through, of the customs which have been slowly established and
of the mode of government. A result more than an origin, the
spirit of a nation renders a destiny intelligible as a particular act,
but it must not constrain investigation; it helps understanding, but
it must be explained.21
As an historian I prefer to believe that the discernment and explanation
of a national style is more art than science. Nonetheless, there is a substantial
body of theory emerging from the study of strategic culture. “There are
consistent and persistent historical patterns in the way particular states (or
state elites) think about the use of force for political ends,” as Alastair Iain
Johnston defines the subject.22 Attention to the strategic culture or national
style or, to use Kennan’s phrase, the sources of conduct, can provide a way
of distilling and making concrete and relevant the distinctive historical
experiences of different nations and elites. In a region as culturally diverse as
Asia, grasping this essence is a critical perspective.
Attributing a nation’s international behavior to national character or
culture sometimes makes scholars nervous. As David Landes wrote in a book
entitled Culture Matters, “culture in the sense of the inner values and attitudes
21 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and
Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 279, 287.
22 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1.
[ 10 ]
asia policy
that guide a population, frightens scholars. It has a sulfuric odor of race and
inheritance, an air of immutability.” Yet, Landes goes on, speaking in this case
about economic development, “Max Weber was right… Culture makes almost
all the difference.”23
Culture is not static. If we think of culture as an “array of formal and
informal rules that guides the members of a society in their selection of
appropriate behavior,” it must be clear that culture is neither immutable nor
is it determinative of behavior. Rather, “it does establish the range of choices
for action.” Understanding the strategic culture of a nation will not ensure
successful foresight, but it is basic.24
Neither will a sense of history provide easy answers about the future.
Policymakers may use history badly, as Ernest May observes. “They may see
the future in terms of mistaken parallels with the past. They may see a trend in
the past and assume that it will follow a straight line into the future.” Framers
of foreign policy may make mistakes because they expect patterns of the past
to repeat themselves. It is probably true, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. once wryly
remarked, that “Santayana’s aphorism that those who don’t study history are
bound to repeat it, should probably be reversed. Too often it is those who can
remember the past who are condemned to repeat it.”25
We historians cannot be too hard on the politicians because professional
historians stumble too when they try to foresee the future. One of the most
gifted of our number, the Yale historian Paul Kennedy, in his bestselling
book published in 1987 chronicling the rise and fall of the great powers over
the last 500 years, hinted at American decline, missed the extent of Soviet
vulnerability, and mistakenly suggested that Japan was about to emerge as the
new world power.26
Whether it is the use of international relations theory, or history, or
cultural analysis, the future is too indeterminate to predict. But Asia Policy
can seek out research that makes intelligent use of all the tools available to
develop an effective methodology. International relations theory can bring
area expertise into focus, compelling it to think concretely and succinctly about
23 David Landes, “Culture Makes Almost All the Difference,” in Culture Matters: How Values Shape
Human Progress, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books,
2000), 2.
24 See Robert J. Smith, “The Cultural Context of Japanese Political Economy” in The Political Economy
of Japan: Volume 3: Cultural and Social Dynamics, ed. Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 13.
25 See May, “Lessons” of the Past.
26 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1989), 467.
[ 11 ]
pyle • reading the new era in asia
its policy relevance. It is the challenge of joining the insights of international
relations theory with the depth of knowledge of the area studies community
and making its research relevant, concrete, and accessible to policymaking
that should be at the foundation of the methodology and purpose that Asia
Policy promotes.
A final characteristic of the post-1989 sea-change—and one that subsumes
all the others—was the sudden need for a new American strategic view of
the U.S. role in Asia. In contrast to 1918 and 1945, when U.S. leaders offered
new formulations of how to recreate international order, there have been few
credible visions of a new strategic role for the United States in post–Cold War
Asia. Some of the best thinking about this subject can be found in Michael
Armacost’s book in which he reflects on his ambassadorship and discusses
a U.S. strategy as an engaged balancer, maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance,
staying on better terms with Asian countries than they are with each other,
and using American power to nurture regional institutions.27 The ability of
the United States to pursue its traditional goals of maintaining a balance of
power, keeping the region open to trade and investment, and pressing for the
expansion of democracy is more constrained because this is now a region in
some ways much more pro-active and resistant to U.S. influence. Nonetheless
the United States does have a window of opportunity to use the power afforded
by the considerable public goods of security and market access that it now
provides in order to foster regional institutions. In this way the United States
may embed its values of democracy, human rights, and free trade and extend
its influence far beyond the time when U.S. power relative to other countries
is as great as it presently is.
27 Michael Armacost, Friends or Rivals? The Insider’s Account of U.S.-Japan Relations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996).
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