Origin
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was set up in 1956 so that
it could participate in the Atoms for Peace programme launched by U.S. President
Eisenhower. In 1960, the U.S. gave Pakistan a $350,000 grant to help prepare the
country for its first research reactor which America agreed to supply two years
later. This reactor, a 5 MW light-water research reactor known as the Pakistan
Atomic Research Reactor (PARR-1), began operating in 1965 at the Pakistan
Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH)in Nilore, near Islamabad.
In 1963, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the foreign minister, carrying his interest in
nuclear capabilities into office with him. He watched with growing concern as
China moved closer to nuclear capability, and in response India's domestic
rhetoric on the subject grew more bellicose. In 1971, the Canadian General
Electric Co. completed a 137 MW (electrical) CANDU power reactor for the
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) which went critical in August 1971 and
began commercial operation in October 1972.1
Weapon development:
Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme was started in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto while he was the Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. In view of the 1965 war with India, the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India and unreliability of Pakistan’s allies during these wars, gave the motivation for Pakistan to start its nuclear programme. Pakistan felt an existential threat from India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" and that gave Pakistan's nuclear programme added momentum. The arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1975 considerably advanced nuclear weapons efforts. Dr. Khan is a Germantrained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies
that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium
enrichment plant in the Netherlands. In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced
enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its
uranium enrichment programme.
Safety measures:
Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme is largely regulated under the IAEA
safeguards and mechanisms. The civilian elements of Pakistan’s nuclear
programme are overseen largely by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
(PAEC) and the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) which was
established in January 2001 in order to have an autonomous oversight
mechanism to ensure the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations.
The PNRA ensures the safety and security of radiological material from the
moment it is imported into the country till its safe disposal after it has outlived its useful life.
The PNRA maintains an updated database of all radiological sources in the
country and carries out periodic inspections to ensure that all material is safely stored, does not pose any hazard to and is not vulnerable to theft or sabotage.
The PNRA has also developed a five-year National Nuclear Safety Action
Plan (NNSAP). Its aim is to protect the public from hazards of radiation in case ofan untoward incident. It has already established its emergency response centre,which works around the clock, and has started training courses with the
assistance of the IAEA, at an academy in Islamabad for the first responders, aswell as border control agencies such as Pakistan Customs.
The PNRA is also responsible to locate and secure orphan radioactive
sources. Orphan sources are defined as “sources not under regulatory control,
either because they have never been under regulatory control or because they have been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred without proper authorization.
National nuclear security regime:

Pakistan’s nuclear security regimen has five pillars:
One, a well-defined, robust command and control system. The National
Command Authority (NCA), the apex decision-making body, works under the
chairmanship of the Prime Minister. It is supported by its secretariat, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands. The NCA exercises control over all aspects including policy, procurement, employment, and nuclear security. The SPD develops technical solutions, Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP), and intelligence capabilities to deal with issues related to nuclear security, non-proliferation, accidents and weapons of mass destruction terrorism.
Two, Pakistan's nuclear security regime is anchored in the principle of multilayered defense for the entire spectrum of any nuclear threat - insider, outsider or cyber threat - and is guided by the concept of five Ds - deter, detect, delay, defend, and destroy. A specially trained Special Response Force ensures the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Besides, an integrated intelligence system
exercises constant vigil to provide depth in defense. Force validation exercises are
carried out regularly to revisit and upgrade the safety and security regime.
Three, a rigorous regulatory regime encompasses all matters related to nuclear safety and security, including physical protection of materials and facilities, material control and accounting, transport security, prevention of illicit trafficking, border controls, and plans to deal with possible radiological emergencies. The
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), an autonomous oversight body,
has developed a sustainable nuclear security regulatory system with established response and recovery capabilities. It works closely with the IAEA.
Four, a comprehensive export control regime. The legislative, regulatory,
administrative and enforcement measures of Pakistan’s export control regime are on a par with the standards followed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group.
Five, international cooperation, consistent with our national policies and interests as well as international obligations.