Syed Ameer Ali [1849-1928]
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]Syed Ameer Ali[/COLOR][/SIZE][/B]
[B][COLOR="Black"][1849-1928][/COLOR][/B] [/CENTER]

Syed Ameer Ali traced his lineage through the eighth Imam, Ali Al-Raza, to the Holy Prophet (S. A. W.). One of his forefathers held office under Shah Abbas II of Persia. Another took part in Nadir Shah's invasion of India. After the plunder of Delhi, his forefathers decided to settle in the Sub-continent and started serving Muhammad Shah. Another of his forefathers fought against Marhattas in the third battle of Panipat. After the death of his grandfather, his father Saadat Ali Khan was brought up and educated by his maternal uncle.

Saadat Ali Khan had five sons, Syed Ameer Ali being the youngest of them. He was born on April 6, 1849. His father, on the advice of some friendly British officers, made a break with the traditions and gave his sons an English education. Ameer Ali was educated at Hoogly College. He was a precocious child and learnt Arabic, Persian, Arab philosophy and history from his gifted father. He graduated in 1867 and became one of the first Muslim graduates in India. In 1868, he passed his MA in history, and law, and in the same year proceeded to England on a government scholarship to pursue his higher studies. In London, he joined the Temple Inn and made contacts with the elite of the city. He imbibed the influence of contemporary liberalism.

He returned to India in 1873 and resumed his legal practice at Calcutta High Court. The following year, he was elected as a Fellow of Calcutta University and was also appointed as a lecturer in Islamic Law at the Presidency College. He was one of the first leaders to clearly visualize that the Muslims should organize themselves politically if they were to have an honored place in Indian public life. With this devotion, he established the Central National Muhammadan Association on April 12 1877. He was associated with it for over 25 years, and worked for the political advancement of the Muslims. In 1878, he was appointed as the member of the Bengal Legislative Council. He revisited England in 1880 for one year.

In 1883, he was nominated to the membership of the Governor General Council. He became a professor of law in Calcutta University in 1881. In 1890 he was made a judge in the Calcutta High Court. He retired in 1904 and decided to settle down in England. This was a fateful decision of his career. Though, due to his influence in government circles, he contributed a lot for the Muslim community of India, while sitting in London, he was away from the main current of Muslim political life. Had he lived in India, he could have filled the gap in Muslim leadership created by the death of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.

He established the London Muslim League in 1908. This organization was an independent body and not a branch of All India Muslim League. In 1909, he became the first Indian to sit as a Law Lord of the Privy Council. In 1910, he established the first mosque in London. His field of activities was now broadened and he stood for the Muslim welfare all over the world. He played an important role in securing separate electorates for the Muslims in South Asia and promoting the cause of the Khilafat Movement.

He wrote a number of books on Islam and Islamic history. His most notable contributions are "The Spirit of Islam", "A Short History of the Saracens" and "Muhammadan Law". His book "Spirit of Islam", to some scholars, was the greatest single work on the liberal exposition of Islam.

He died on August 4, 1928 in Sussex.

Maulana Shaukat Ali [1873-1938] || Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar [1878-1931]
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]Maulana Shaukat Ali[/COLOR][/SIZE][/B]
[B][COLOR="Black"][1873-1938][/COLOR][/B] [/CENTER]

Both brothers, Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Ali were among the architects of Pakistan's freedom. Maulana Shaukat Ali, being the elder of the two Ali Brothers, was deeply interested in Islam and totally committed to the cause of freedom movement.

He was born in Rampur and educated at Aligarh. At Aligarh he became the captain of the cricket team and idol of cricket-loving crowds. He served in the provincial civil service of the United Provinces of Oudh and Agra for 17 years, from 1896 to 1913.

He actively assisted Maulana Muhammad Ali in the publication of "Hamdard" and "Comrade" that played a vital role molding the political policy of Muslim India. In 1915 he was imprisoned along with Maulana Mohammad Ali. In 1919, while he was in jail, he was elected President of the First Khilafat Conference. Upon his release the same year, he was elected Secretary and Chief Executive Officer of the Central Khilafat Committee. In 1921, he was again imprisoned along with Maulana Muhammad Ali and was released in 1923. He attended the All Parties Conference in Delhi in 1929, and the First and Second Round Table Conferences. He helped organize the World Muslim Conference held at Jerusalem, in 1932.

In 1936 he became a member of the All India Muslim League Council and also of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. From 1934 to 1938 he was a member of the Legislative Assembly. From 1936 to 1938, he not only helped the Quaid-i-Azam in popularizing the Muslim League at various levels, but also toured Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United States where he delivered speeches on the Freedom Movement of India and on Islam.


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[CENTER][B][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar[/COLOR][/SIZE][/B]
[B][COLOR="Black"][1878-1931][/COLOR][/B] [/CENTER]

Maulana Muhammad Ali was born in Rampur state in 1878, in a wealthy and enlightened family of Pathans. His father died when he was two years old. He and his family suffered financial problems after the death of his father. Due to the efforts, determination and sacrifice by his mother, he and his brothers were able to get good education. He did his graduation from Aligarh University with honors and then went to Lincoln College Oxford, England, in 1898 to study modern history.

On his return he was appointed Director of Education in Rampur State, and later joined the Baroda Civil Service and served there for seven years. Maulana Muhammad Ali was a brilliant and impressive writer, an orator of the first magnitude and a farsighted political leader. He wrote articles in various newspapers like "The Times", "The Observer" and "The Manchester Guardian".

Maulana Muhammad Ali wrote both in English and Urdu. He launched his famous English weekly "Comrade" from Calcutta in 1911. After shifting to Delhi in 1913, he, in addition to his English weekly, also launched his Urdu weekly, "Hamdard". The "Comrade" became an internationally famous journal and secured many subscribers in numerous foreign countries. He also worked hard towards making M. O. A. College a Muslim University. He assisted in setting up Jami'ah Milliyah Islamia, which was later transferred to Delhi. For four years after 1911, he remained involved in the Kanpur Mosque affair.

Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar was one of the cofounders of All India Muslim League. He attended the first session of All India Muslim League at Dhaka in 1906, and was later elected as its President in 1918. He remained active in the affairs of the All India Muslim League till 1928.


The famous English weekly "Comrade" was launched from Calcutta in 1911
During the Khilafat Movement, Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar led a delegation to England in 1919, in order to present the view of the Muslims. Although the delegation was not successful in its aim, he still kept on working for the Muslims. He also wholeheartedly joined the non-cooperation movement organized by Gandhi. In 1921, after the British refused to honor their promises in regard to Turkey, he toured the whole of India in order to gather support for the success of the non-cooperation movement. At the end of the movement he was arrested and jailed for two years.

In 1924, he renewed the publication of "Hamdard". In 1928, he left the Indian National Congress, opposed the Nehru Report tooth and nail, and supported the Fourteen Points of Quaid-i-Azam. Despite his ill health, he attended the First Round Table Conference in 1930, where he effectively argued the case of the Indian Muslims. He delivered a memorable, fiery speech against the domination of India and in favor of immediate independence. Soon after the first session was over, he collapsed and died in London on January 4, 1931, and was buried in Jerusalem according to his own wish.

A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq [1873-1962]
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq[/COLOR][/SIZE][/B]
[B][COLOR="Black"][1873-1962] [/COLOR][/B][/CENTER]

Popularly known as Sher-i-Bengal, A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq was a leader who, for more than half a century, was in the forefront of all political activities pertaining to the Pakistan Movement. He made valuable contributions towards the political, social and educational uplift of the Muslims of the Sub-continent.

He was born on October 26, 1873, and received his elementary and religious education at home. He learnt the Holy Quran, Arabic and Persian from well-known scholars. Fazl-ul-Haq excelled in his studies. He passed his BA securing honors in physics, chemistry and mathematics, and his MA with distinction from the University of Calcutta.

In 1900, he was enrolled as an advocate in the Calcutta High Court. While practicing law in his hometown, Barisal, he realized that the main cause of the backwardness of Muslims of Bengal was lack of education. Educational uplift and political advancement of the Muslims became the goal of his life.

He slowly began to emerge as a young political leader. Fazl-ul-Haq was one of the four members of the committee that drafted the constitution of the All India Muslim League in 1906. In 1912, he started the Central National Muhammadan Educational Association to help the poor and deserving Muslims. In 1914, he became the leader of the Muslims of Bengal. He attended the Lucknow Pact as the representative of the province.

In 1920, he became the Minister of Education for Bengal. He devotedly worked for the educational advancement of the Muslims. During the Non-cooperation Movement of 1919-1921, he very wisely advised the Muslim students to single-mindedly pursue their studies and not to get involved in politics at that stage.

Fazl-ul-Haq was essentially a man of the masses. As a lawyer he defended thousands of Muslims who were accused of the riot cases before the Partition. He also looked after the interests of the peasantry of Bengal. He was also a delegate of the Round Table Conferences and pleaded the cause of the Muslims to have their proper share in the administrative affairs of the country. In 1937, he was elected as Chief Minister of Bengal. During the All India Muslim League session of March 23, 1940, which was presided over by Quaid-i-Azam, Fazl-ul-Haq rose to move the historic Pakistan Resolution and spoke of protecting the rights of the Muslims of India.

Fazl-ul-Haq migrated to Pakistan and accepted the Advocate Generalship of East Pakistan. At the age of 80, he toured East Pakistan from one end to another. In 1962, his health started deteriorating. He passed away on April 27, 1962 after dominating the political stage of the Sub-continent for half a century.

Liaquat Ali Khan [1896-1951]
 

[CENTER][B][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]Liaquat Ali Khan[/COLOR][/SIZE][/B]
[B][COLOR="Black"][1896-1951] [/COLOR][/B][/CENTER]

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, the second son of Nawab Rustam Ali Khan, was born on October 1, 1896, in a Madal Pathan (Nausherwan) family. He graduated in 1918 from M. A. O. College, Aligarh. After his graduation, he was offered a job in the Indian Civil Services, but he rejected the offer on the plea that he wanted to serve his nation. He married his cousin, Jehangira Begum in 1918. After his marriage, he went to London for higher education. In 1921, he obtained a degree in Law from Oxford and was called to Bar at Inner Temple in 1922.

On his return from England in 1923, Liaquat Ali Khan decided to enter politics with the objective of liberating his homeland from the foreign yoke. Right from the very beginning, he was determined to eradicate the injustices and ill treatment meted out to the Indian Muslims by the British. In his early life, Liaquat Ali, like most of the Muslim leaders of his time, believed in Indian Nationalism. But his views gradually changed. The Congress leaders invited him to join their party, but he refused and joined the Muslim League in 1923. Under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam, the Muslim League held its annual session in May 1924 in Lahore. The aim of this session was to revive the League. Liaquat Ali Khan attended this conference along many other young Muslims.

Liaquat Ali started his parliamentary career from the U. P. Legislative Assembly in 1926 as an independent candidate. Later he formed his own party, The Democratic Party, within the Legislative Assembly and was elected as its leader. He remained the member of the U. P. Legislative Council till 1940 when he was elected to the Central Legislative Assembly.

In his parliamentary career, Liaquat Ali Khan established his reputation as an eloquent, principled and honest spokesman who never compromised on his principles even in the face of severe odds. He used his influence and good offices for the liquidation of communal tension and bitterness. He took active part in legislative affairs. He was one of the members of the Muslim League delegation that attended the National Convention held at Calcutta to discuss the Nehru Report in December 1928.

Liaquat Ali's second marriage took place in 1933. His wife Begum Ra'ana was a distinguished economist and an educationist who stood by her husband during the ups and downs of his political career. She proved to be a valuable asset to his political career as well as his private life. Quaid-i-Azam in those days was in England in self-exile. The newly wed couple had a number of meetings with the Quaid and convinced him to come back to India to take up the leadership of the Muslims of the region.

When Quaid-i-Azam returned to India, he started reorganizing the Muslim League. Liaquat was elected as the Honorary Sectary of the party on April 26, 1936. He held the office till the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. In 1940, he was made the deputy leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary party. Quaid-i-Azam was not able to take active part in the proceedings of the Assembly on account of his heavy political work; thus the whole burden of protecting Muslim interests in the Assembly fell on Liaquat Ali's shoulders. Liaquat Ali was also the member of Muslim Masses Civil Defense Committee, which was formed to keep the Muslims safe from Congress activities and to strengthen the League's mission.

Liaquat Ali Khan won the Central Legislature election in 1945-46 from the Meerut Constituency in U. P. He was also elected Chairman of the League's Central Parliamentary Board. He assisted Quaid-i-Azam in his negotiations with the members of the Cabinet Mission and the leaders of the Congress during the final phases of the Freedom Movement. When the Government asked the Muslim League to send their nominees for representation in the interim government, Liaquat was asked to lead the League group in the cabinet. He was given the portfolio of finance, which he handled brilliantly.

He influenced the working of all the departments of the Government and presented a poor man's budget. His policies as Finance Minister helped in convincing the Congress to accept the Muslim demand of a separate homeland.

After independence, Quaid-i-Azam and Muslim League appointed Liaquat to be the head of the Pakistan Government. Being the first Prime Minister of the country, He had to deal with a number of difficulties facing Pakistan in its early days. Liaquat Ali Khan helped Quaid-i-Azam in solving the riot and refugee problem and setting up an effective administrative system for the country. After the death of Quaid-i-Azam, Liaquat tried to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the Father of the Nation. Under his premiership, Pakistan took its first steps in the field of constitution making, as well as foreign policy.

He presented the Objectives Resolution in the Legislative Assembly. The house passed this on March 12, 1949. Under his leadership a team also drafted the first report of the Basic Principle Committee. His efforts in signing the Liaquat-Nehru pact pertaining to the minority issue in 1950 reduced tensions between India and Pakistan. In May 1951, he visited the United States and set the course of Pakistan's foreign policy towards closer ties with the West.

On October 16, 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated. He had been scheduled to make an important announcement in a public meeting at Municipal Park, Rawalpindi. The security forces immediately shot the assassin, who was later identified as Saad Akbar. Killing the assassin erased all clues to the identity of the real culprit behind the murder. Liaquat Ali Khan was officially given the title of Shaheed-i-Millat, but the question of who was behind his murder is yet to be answered.

Devolution Of Powers And Responsibilities
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]DEVOLUTION OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]Introduction[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Main objectives of Devolution of Powers and Responsibilities were decentralization of political, financial and administrative powers; assigning responsibilities to the quarters it actually belonged; discourage the power brokers and alleviate problems of the general public. The National Reconstruction Bureau published the summary of its objectives on 24th March 2000, starting as following:

“Pakistan’s political history is checkered with many attempts at delivering a better life for the people. The non use, misuse and abuse of our political and administrative systems have lead to a profound institutional crisis. The political system has deteriorated as a result of horse trading and cronyism, the politics of posting and transfers in the bureaucracy and corruption in licences, contracts, taxes etc. The political and administrative systems have collapsed.”

In countries where devolution is in vogue, it was gradually evolved, but in Pakistan it was imposed overnight. Therefore, problems and conflicts are arising which need to be addressed; but, instead of redressing the government tries to defend the existing paradigm. Different functionaries at different levels are not clear about there role in the new system. It has created difference between the local governments and provincial governments and between provincial governments and the Federal Government. Different stake holders have different views, depending on their vested interests. The badly hit District Management Group is bitterly criticizing it and trying to fail the system which did away with the institution of Deputy Commissioner. Police department did not want to be subordinated to district nazims. Despite, introduction of Police Order 2002 and Public Safety Commission which made the police responsible to Nazim to the extent of law and order does not seem to be working well.

The Legislators felt that the local government deprived them of their role in development of the areas. So many of them resigned from their positions and contested elections to become nazims. The nazims are of the view that the elected representatives of provincial and national assemblies should stick to their role of legislation only.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]Historical perspective[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

A few decades ago, governance remained limited to collection of revenue, maintenance of law and order and provision of limited number of services, like railway, telecommunication, health education, etc. As the world started shrinking into a global village, responsibilities of the state became complex and numerous.

Even in Mughal era, institutions like ‘mansabdari’ and ‘revenue system’ were introduced to improve administration of the subcontinent. During the period of Akbar, judicial and executive functions of the state were separated. In the field of revenue collection, fixed proportions of share of the government out of agricultural produce was determined. Rights of the tenants were pronounced in black and white. The British adopted the same revenue system with some changes. Pakistan inherited the same revenue system after independence. The British evolved the system of ‘jagirdari’ and Deputy Commissioner to perpetuate their regime in India. In DC, judicial, executive and revenue power were concentrated and made him the representative of the British Empire. The feudal system and the institution of DC remained intact with the past grandeur till introduction of the instant devolution plan.

Local Government System was introduced in the sub-continent by passing the Punjab Municipal Act of 1867. Initially the members of the local governments were nominated but after introduction of later laws, system of elections was also introduced in the local governments and responsibilities were also enhanced.

In the constitution of 1956, the state was defined as including: “the Federal
Government, the parliament, the Provincial Governments, the Provincial Legislatures, and all local or other authorities in Pakistan”. The local governments were made responsibility of the provincial governments.

In the Constitution of 1962, Electoral College comprising 40000 constituencies was created in each province to elect the President of Pakistan. Though, it was an important function of the local bodies but the Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners were the controlling authorities of the local bodies. In the Constitution of 1962 the terms local governments were not mentioned any where: there was a mention of the provincial governments and the Federal governments. The Federal Government was virtually given all the powers.

In the constitution of 1973, local governments were recognized as the third tier of the state. Article 7 of the constitution described state as: “the Federal Government, the Parliament, the Provincial Government, a Provincial Assembly and such local or other authorities in Pakistan as were empowered by law to impose any tax or cess.”

Martial Law was imposed on 7 July 1977. The local governments continued functioning under administrators till the promulgation of ‘The Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979’. Four elections were held under this ordinance in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1991. The Punjab Local Government Ordinance 2001 repealed all the previous ordinances.

The present government realized that bureaucracy is averse to change and prone to status quo, therefore, the government decided to empower the general public to make its decisions regarding fixation of development priorities. Decision making, earlier, was confined to Planning and Development Department and Divisions and at the level of Provincial and Federal levels. The powers were, thus, devolved to grass root level through Devolution Plan formulated by the National Reconstruction Bureau, with the following objectives:

· Devolution of powers
· Decentralization of administrative authority
· De-concentration of management functions
· Diffusion of power-authority nexus
· Distribution of resources to the district level
· Empowerment of women by giving them 33% seats

According to the plan, certain governmental functions were devolved to district, city district, tehsil, town and Union Council level. The provincial governments promulgated Local Government Ordinance 2001 on the basis of the devolution plan prepared by NRB. No previous civil or military government ever thought of empowering the public in such a big way.
Concepts of ‘good governance’, ‘bad governance’ and ‘decentralization’, ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ have made the public aware of their rights and right type of government.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]Success Stories[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

As there are many failures and ambiguities related to Devolution, still there are many success stories to be told:

· Efficient distribution and expenditure of funds.
· Improvement in health facilities
· Improved educational facilities
· Reduced corruption and inefficiency

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]Problems of parallel system[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Nazims are supposed to be non-political but they are virtually political figures. There is not proper linkage between District Nazim, Municipal Nazim and UC Nazim, except through advice of District Mushawarti Committee which does not carry any force of law.

Devolution was expected to increase coordination and understanding between the functionaries and the representatives of the local governments but nobody is clear about his role.

Inter group rivalries and discrimination between voter and non-voters has hampered unbiased provision of services to all persons. Nazims belonging to opposition parties have been handicapped by the provincial governments by not providing development funds and by stopping the provincial functionaries from cooperating with them.

Area of responsibility of Tehsil governments has been expanding to the whole of Tehsil as against the previous system where it was restricted to Municipal area only. But, proportionate increase in development funds has not been made. Major chunk of funds are being taken away by the Union Councils of rural areas, delivery of service has, therefore, become poor in terms of street lights, sewerage, sanitation, etc. The TMA is provided funds directly from the provincial government while UCs get funds from the District Government. There is duplication of development works done by the TMAs. They are doing such works as well which is exclusive responsibility of the district governments.

The provincial government exercises control over the District Government and Tehsil Municipal Administration functionaries in terms of transfer/ postings and Annual Confidential Reports through the Chief Secretary, Administrative Secretaries and Board of Revenue, etc. Provincial government exercises this authority without having any responsibility.

District Nazims are not accountable in terms of efficiency, effectiveness in service delivery and output. Institutions like District Mohtasib, Public Safety Commissions and public complaint authorities are yet to be in place. People are losing trust in local governments because of their ineffectiveness.

District Nazims think that they should have been devolved the powers of the DC in respect of Cr.PC, Collector and supervision over all departments on behalf of the provincial government. In case of law and order, the Nazim has very limited and obscure powers.

The system was not tested and grey areas removed. People and functionaries have still not familiar with new designations and rules and procedures. Functionaries are not taking interest in their duties.

No rules and procedures are there to fix responsibility in case of disaster management, VVIP visits, protocol duties, wheat procurement, establishment of Ramadan Bazaars and such other functions, which were previously being performed by the institution of District Magistrate. Similarly, the effectiveness other civil departments is no more there in terms of removal of encroachments, price controls, labour laws, spurious drugs, adulteration, pesticides, water theft, etc. Similarly, there is no formal control of Nazim over Irrigation and Power, Food Department, WAPDA, Telephone and other organizations.

The Nazims are not following any laws, rules or ethics in using powers of their subordinate offices. Powers are being used without taking responsibility.

Orders of transfer/ posting are being issued and cancelled under political pressure. Nazims are bypassing the DCOs and directing the EDOs to submit files directly. Development schemes are approved without technical considerations merely to favor or disfavor friends or foes. Areas of political adversaries are being completely neglected. Instead of devolution to grass root level, powers have been concentrated in Nazims. Government functionaries working under nazims are helpless and frustrated. Social justice, merit, service delivery, equitable distribution of resources and rule of law, hence, are badly suffering.

District Management Group and elected representatives of the provincial and national assemblies are against this system and they are always working overtly and covertly to sabotage it.

There is no formal institution for resolution of conflicts between all the tiers of local governments and between the functionaries and members of the local governments except through District Mushawrati Committee and Provincial Local Government Commission. Magnitude of complaints and conflicts is so high that the centralized commission cannot cope with them effectively.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]LAW AND ORDER AND DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

Role of the local government in control over the police is not clear. According to Police Order 2002, District Nazim has control over police except in the internal administration and investigation of cases and prosecution. If the DPO thinks that the directives of the district government are unlawful, he can refer the case to the Public Safety Commission. The local governments have therefore demanded delegation of magisterial powers to the officers of TMA regarding removal of encroachment, hoarding, price control, profiteering, food adulteration and weights and measures, etc. The district governments feel handicapped in implementation of Local and Special Laws in absence of direct control over the police. Similarly, it has adversely affected recovery of land revenue and other taxes collected by the local governments. The District Nazims and the DCOs are of the view that the local governments should be allowed to maintain their own police for implementation of Local and Special Laws and that the Nazim should make entries in the ACR of DPOs relating to his performance in maintenance of law and order.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]Recommendations[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

· Restore the institution of magistracy under EDOs, as envisage in original devolution plan. One may say that it is again combining executive and judiciary; but, the EDOs will use their powers in executive functions like checking the prices, hoarding and weights and measures. If traffic police can impose fine why EDOs cannot! EDOs may be limited to the extent of imposing fine on encroachers and hoarders, etc.

· Local government may be allowed to keep a Municipal Police for assisting the EDO magistrates.

· District Mushawarati Committee may be empowered to review law and order situation every month.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

It is general perception that without control of the District Magistrate, the police have become unaccountable. Despite setting very idealistic objectives in Police Order 2002, police failed to come up to expectation of the public and it did not change their behavior. The Public Safety Commissions are to be set up at the district, provincial and federal levels are expected to keep a check on the conduct of police. Here we shall discuss only the District Public Safety Commission. It will have 12 Members in Lahore district, 10 at range headquarters and 8 in other districts. Half of the members shall be appointed from the elected member of the District Councils and the rest half shall be non-elected members recommended by the districts and notified by the Governors of the provinces.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]Functions of the District Public Safety Commission[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

Approval of Local Policing Plan, prepared by DPO in consultation with Nazim Quarterly evaluation of police performance basing on targets set in Local Policing Plan and submits half yearly report to the Provincial Safety Commission, Nazim, DPO, Provincial Police Officers and the Provincial governments. It will also resolve conflicts between the nazims and the police. It will encourage police-public relationships. Monitor non-registration of FIR; police accesses; get enquiries conducted against police officers through members of the Commission and in case of non-compliance of findings of enquires, report against the DPO to the PPO, Provincial Government or Police Complaint Authority. Conceptually, the idea is very good but there are doubts about its efficacy when it starts working on ground. The Chairman of the Commission will be a local person and the elected and nominated members may be influenced by the district that can use the Commission against police. On the other hand, collusion between the police and the commission members cannot be ruled out. The Commission has not direct powers to take action against the police: it can only send a complaint. There are no criteria regarding experience and qualification of the members of the Commissions.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT AFTER DEVOLUTION[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

The process of planning and progress of development has improved with devolution of planning and decision making powers. Nazim give vision and formulates strategy for expenditure of ADP. 25% funds are allocated to Citizens Community Boards and Works and Services Group in a district plans and executes all schemes.

Planning has become a very technical and professional job. It is beyond the capability of the district governments. Continuous and constant flow of funds and resource cannot be ensured for the local governments, development plans; therefore, long term planning is not possible. District governments are dependent on the provincial governments for funds, which come late. The councilors want to divide the fund amongst them; big projects, hence, cannot be undertaken. Planning is marred by political expediencies. Union Council is a vital unit in planning and development because they receive funds from three sources: own sources, funds from Tehsil or Town Committees, and funds dished out by the district. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, planning and development is done at grass root level. But, unfortunately, things are not moving the way they were envisaged in Devolution Plan. Development schemes of opposition and minority councilors are badly affected.

The developmental role of all the three local governments is confusing and overlapping owing to political designs or unawareness of rules and procedures laid down in the PLGO. Intra district conflicts can be resolved by the District Mushawarati Committee but inter-district problems are difficult to resolve.

District Development Committee, chaired by the DCO and comprising EDOs and Dos, etc., are authorized to pass schemes up to 20 millions. This arrangement was made to keep planning free from political and local biases; but, the Nazims are not satisfied, DDC being non-representative forum. On ground, DDC has become a rubber stamp; because DCOs are subordinate to Nazims.

The Ordinance 2001 envisaged development expenditure through Citizen Community Boards on 20% cost sharing principle. On pressure of the councilors 50% of ADP to be expended by CCBs has been reduced to 25% of ADP. Development through CCB could reduce chances of misappropriation and unnecessary delays and could give sense of participation to the community but the local governments are staunchly opposing this beneficial system.

Local government paradigm has snatched away unauthorized roles from the members of provincial and national assemblies and restricted them to their original role, that is, legislation. Therefore, the legislators are the most ardent enemies of Devolution. Fortunately, Provincial legislators cannot amend the local government ordinance without prior approval of the President of Pakistan.

The Punjab Local Government Ordinance provides for Monitoring Committees, elected by the District Councils, to monitor performance of departments and submit quarterly reports to Nazims. Harassment caused to functionaries by the committee members shall entail dismissal of the member. Performance of local governments in carrying out development remained satisfactory. Their performance can be improved by taking the following steps:

· Timely release of funds by the provincial governments
· Transfer surplus provincial staff, like architects and designers to districts
· Functionaries must be trained in new rules and procedures
· Audit and Accounts rules for CCB should be framed at the earliest
· Development schemes must be allocated without any discrimination
· Overlapping of schemes must be avoided by a consultation mechanism
· The Legislators should focus on their original role
· District Development Committee to scrutinize schemes independent of Nazims
· Local Government (Monitoring) Rules should be framed at the earliest


[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

· Provincial governments should be given some powers to amend the Local Government Ordinance 2001, keeping within certain parameters and the Federal Government should act as mediator and not as a player. The provincial government should own the local governments instead of pitching against them. The Federal Government should set example of devolving powers by giving provinces more autonomy.

· Quarterly meetings at provincial headquarters should be held, involving all stake holders, to remove the grey areas.

· Effective mechanism should be put in place to check and correct maladministration, corrupt practices and misappropriation in local governments. District government should have powers to have such control over Tehsil and Union Councils and the provincial governments should have similar authority over district governments. Role of District Mushawarati Committee should be enhanced to resolve conflicts.

· Enforcement of Police Order 2002 should be completed without further delay and writing of remarks by District Nazims in the ACR of District Police Officers should be ensured. District Public Safety Commission should be further empowered and the District and Session Judge must ensure that recommendations of the Commission are taken seriously. Member of the Commission should be imparted extensive training.

· District and Municipal governments should be allowed to raise their own police for specific purposes and the EDOs should be given magisterial powers. Nazims and Naib Nazims should not be allowed to affiliate with political parties. Legislators should also be given some role in development and a District Advisory Board consisting of MNAs, MPAs, District and Tehsil Nazims should be made under chairmanship of the Chief Ministers.

· Provincial administration should have no control over the local government officials. The local government should be independent in transfer/ postings and retaining officers. Every Union Council may be provided with a Development Officer and a sub-engineer to help them in executing projects.

· Provincial Local Government Commission should be made effective for conflict resolution.

· The Provincial Governments have vast powers in relation to District Governments by way of providing guidelines and rendering advice under Section 127 (3) LGO, 2001, issuing direction in public interest and enforcing the same through Inspector General Police and DCO, if the District Nazim fails to comply under Section 128 (3) LGO, 2001. Similar powers should be available to the District Governments, for issuing guidelines and directions to the TMAs and UCs.

· CPLCs should be set up for bringing the police and the public together.

· An awareness campaign should be launched for the masses to understand Devolution Plan.

Crisis of Leadership in Pakistan
 

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]Crisis of Leadership in Pakistan
Reasons for Failure
Strategy for Future
By
Leadership[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

• No common definition or universally acceptable meaning can be enumerated to explain the meaning of Leadership. It is interesting to note that in spite of its importance leadership lacks a concrete definition.


[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]Who is a Leader ?[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

• ‘Basically a leader is a person who leads a group of people, an organization, an enterprise or a nation towards some definite set of objectives’.

• A leader is defined as any person who influences individuals and groups within an organization, helps them in the establishment of goals, and guides them towards achievement of those goals, thereby allowing them to be effective.

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="darkorange"]Qualities of Leadership[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

• Decisiveness
• Clear Vision
• Deep But Correct Foresight
• Perfect Judgment
• Influencing His Subordinates
• Participative Management
• Better Public Perception
• Progressive Minded
• Character
• Optimism
• Balance
• A believer in Change

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]Crisis of Leadership[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

[B][I][COLOR="Black"]MULTI DIMENSIONAL CRISIS[/COLOR][/I][/B]

• The Crisis of Identity and Ideology
• The Crisis of Law, Constitution and Political System
• The Crisis of Economy
• The Crisis of Foreign Policy
• The Crisis of Civil Society
• The Crisis of National Security.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="DarkOrange"][SIZE="3"]Reasons for Failure[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

These crises haven’t suddenly emerged out of the blue. The inexorable germination and development of these crises was taking place for many years. Now they are all upon Pakistan simultaneously, with greater or lesser intensity. A cursory glance over the political leadership under Civilian and Military Rule from 1947 to 1999 will identify the reasons of failure.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]CIVILIAN RULE
1947-1958[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

• Death of Quaid-I-Azam and Quaid-I-Millat.
• Lack of clear and competent leadership
• Rise of regional and parochial forces
• Political corruption
• Violation and Defiance of democratic/ parliamentary norms.
• Personal ambitions
• Socio-economic strains.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]MILITARY RULE
OCT 1958 – Mar 1969
First Martial Law[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

• Removal of political leadership/ democratic institutions
• Authoritarian Rule
• Guided democracy
• Free hand to the Civil / Military Bureaucracy
• King’s Party
• Economic growth did not bring economic justice or social change.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]SECOND MARTIAL LAW
MAR 1969 – DEC 1971[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

• Credit for holding fair and free elections.
• Failure to deal with post election political problems
• Failure of Military / Political Leadership.
• Military action not solution to the political problem
• Dismemberment of Pakistan.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]CIVILIAN RULE
DEC 1971 – JUL 1977[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

• Civilian Supremacy
• Personalization of power
• Patrimonial system
• Crisis of legitimacy
• Failure to create sustainable political system.
• PPP suffered from ideological disharmony & weak organization.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]MILITARY RULE
THIRD MARTIAL LAW
JUL 1977 – AUG 1988[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

• Constitutional and political engineering.
• Eliminated political opposition
• Crisis of legitimacy
• Civilianization of military rule.
• Constitutional amendments
• Exploitation of religion.

[B][CENTER][COLOR="darkorange"][SIZE="3"]CIVILIAN RULE
NOV. 1988 – OCT 1999[/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/B]

• Economic and political mismanagement
• Corruption and nepotism
• Erosion of National Institutions
• Authoritarian rule under the guise of democracy
• Inefficient / bad Governance.

[B][I][COLOR="Red"]MILITARY TAKES OVER AGAIN… OCT. 12 1999….[/COLOR][/I][/B]

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]FUTURE STRATEGY
How to get out of Crisis?[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

[B][I][COLOR="Black"]Three virtues:[/COLOR][/I][/B]

• Vision
• Courage
• Integrity

[B][CENTER][SIZE="3"][COLOR="DarkOrange"]THE TAPESTRY OF LEADERSHIP[/COLOR][/SIZE][/CENTER][/B]

[B][I]Creating the Weft[/I][/B]

• Vision
•Courage
•Integrity

[B][I]Constructing the Warp[/I][/B]

•Initiative
•Optimism
•Believer of change

The Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan
 

[B][U][CENTER][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"][COLOR="DarkGreen"]The Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan[/COLOR][/SIZE][/FONT][/CENTER][/U][/B]

The Indo-Pakistani dispute over the sharing of the Indus River system has not been as contentious as one would expect it to have been. The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan is cited as one of the few examples of successful resolution of a major dispute over an international river basin. It is the largest, contiguous irrigation system in the world, with a command area of about 20 million hectares and annual irrigation capacity of over 12 million hectares. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 put the headwater of the basin in India, while Pakistan received the lower part of the basin. A serious dispute over the river waters occurred in 1948, when India halted water supplies to some Pakistani canals at the start of the summer irrigation season.

The ensuing negotiations between the two countries did not resolve the problem. The water flow cut off by India affected 5.5 per cent of Pakistan’s irrigated area and put tremendous strains on the new country. After nine years of negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty was finally signed on September 19, 1960, with the cooperation of the World Bank.


[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="darkgreen"][SIZE="3"][FONT="Georgia"]The salient features of the Indus Waters Treaty are:[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]

•Three Eastern rivers namely Ravi, Sutlej and Beas were given to India.

•Three Western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.

•Pakistan to meet the requirements of its Eastern river canals from the Western rivers by constructing replacement works.

•Safeguards incorporated in the treaty to ensure unrestricted flow of waters in the Western rivers.

•Both parties were to regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals and streams.

•A permanent Indus Waters Commission was constituted to resolve the disputes between the parties. The Treaty sets out the procedure for settlement of the differences and disputes. It also provides for settlement of disputes through the International Court of Arbitration.

Thus, future prospects persuaded the two countries to agree to a partition of the Indus Basin waters. Both countries were expected to exploit their respective water shares with the help of an Indus Basin Development Fund to be administered by the World Bank.


[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="darkgreen"][SIZE="3"][FONT="Georgia"]Wular Barrage Issue[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]

Despite the signing of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, another dispute emerged in 1985, when Pakistan learnt through a tender notice in the Indian press about the development of a barrage by the name of Tulbul Navigational Project. The barrage was to be constructed by India on River Jhelum, below the Wular Lake located near Sopore, 25 km north of Srinagar, where the river Jhelum flows into the Lake in the South and flows out of it from the West. For Pakistan the geostrategic importance of the site lies in the fact that its possession and control provides India with the means to intimidate Pakistan. A Dam on that site has the potential to ruin the entire system of the triple canal project within Pakistan namely, the upper Jhelum Canal, upper Chenab Canal and the lower Bari Doab Canal.

According to the Indian Government, the purpose of the Wular Barrage was to construct a control structure, with a view to improving the navigation in the River Jhelum during winters, in order to connect Srinagar with Baramula for transportation of fruits and timber.

India claimed that 90 percent of the Tulbul project would be beneficial to Pakistan, as it would regulate the supply to Mangla Dam, which would increase Pakistan’s capacity of power generation at Mangla, as well as regulate the irrigation network in the Pakistani Punjab through the triple canal system.10 India further suggested that Pakistan should bear the greater share of constructing the Barrage, as it would be more beneficial to Pakistan, and would be especially effective in reducing the flow of water during the flood season.

Pakistan, on the other hand, argued that India had violated Article I (11) of the Indus Waters Treaty, which prohibits both parties from undertaking any ‘manmade obstruction’ that may cause ‘change in the volume É of the daily flow of waters’. Further that Article III (4) specifically barred India, from ‘storing any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers’.

According to sub-paragraph 8(h) of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is entitled to construct an ‘incidental storage work’ on Western rivers on its side:

•only after the design has been scrutinised and approved by Pakistan; and

•Its storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 acres feet of water.

Whereas the Wular Barrage’s capacity is 300,000 acres feet, which is thirty times more than the permitted capacity. Regarding the building of a hydro electric plant, according to the Treaty, India is only allowed to construct a small run-off water plant with a maximum discharge of 300 cusecs through the turbines which are insufficient to generate 960 Megawatts of electricity as planned by India.


[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="darkgreen"][SIZE="3"][FONT="Georgia"]Bilateral Negotiations[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]

Pakistan referred the Wular Barrage case to the Indus Waters Commission in 1986, which, in 1987, recorded its failure to resolve it. When India suspended the construction work, Pakistan did not take the case in the International Arbitral Court. To date, eight rounds of talks have been held. In 1989, Pakistan agreed to build a barrage conditional to Pakistani inspection, which India rejected.

The two sides almost reached an agreement in October 1991, whereby India would keep 6.2 meters of the barrage ungated with a crest level of 1574.90m (5167 ft), and would forego the storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet. In return, the water level in the Barrage would be allowed to attain the full operational level of 5177.90 ft. However, in February 1992, Pakistan added another condition that India should not construct the Kishenganga (390 MW) hydropower-generating unit. India refused to accept this condition.

According to Pakistan, the Kishenganga project on River Neelam affected its own Neelam-Jhelum power-generating project, located in its Punjab province. The issue of Wular Barrage was one of the disputes on the agenda highlighted for the Indo-Pak talks, both at the Lahore meeting in February 1999, and at the Agra Summitof July 2001.


[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="darkgreen"][SIZE="3"][FONT="Georgia"]Implications for Pakistan[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]

[B]The control of the River Jhelum by India through a storage work would mean:[/B]

•A serious threat to Pakistan should India decide to withhold the water over an extended period, especially during the dry season. It would also multiply and magnify the risks of floods and droughts in Pakistan. The Mangla Dam on River Jhelum, which is a source of irrigation and electricity for Punjab, would be adversely affected.

•Provide India a strategic edge, during a military confrontation, enabling it to control the mobility and retreat of Pakistani troops and enhancing the maneuverability of Indian troops. Closing the Barrage gates would render the Pakistani canal system dry and easy to cross. During the 1965 war, the Indian Army failed to cross the BRB Link Canal, due to its full swing flow. India is already in control of the Chenab River through Salal Dam constructed in 1976. Many Pakistanis criticise the conceding of the Salal Dam to India.

[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Wealthy Sindh’s Poor People[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]


[B][SIZE="4"]Sindh at a Glance:[/SIZE][/B]
Area: 140914 km2
Population: 30439893 (as per 1998 census) and 42378000 (approximately as in 2008)
Districts: 23
Talukas (Administrative units within a District): 87
Metropolitan/ Municipal Corporations: 9
Municipal Committees: 31
Town Committees: 116
Army Cantonments: 8
Villages/ Dehs: 5871
Average population per km2: 216
Ratio of urban population (living in Metropolitan/Municipal Corporations, Municipal
Committees and Town Committees) 48.8%
Ratio of rural population: 51.2%
Source: Pakistan Government’s Population Census Organization and Federal Bureau of Statistics

[B][SIZE="4"]Natural Resources:[/SIZE][/B]

[B][COLOR="DarkRed"]Coal:[/COLOR][/B]

Sindh has 99% coal reservoirs of Pakistan. These are located in Lakhra, Soondha, Thar, Meeting-Jhampeer and Badin. Among these, Thar coal reservoirs are the largest in the world.

• Lakhra: 1.328 billion tonnes
• Soondha: 7.612 billion tonnes
• Thar: 78.196 billion tonnes
• Badin: 9.000 billion tonne
• Meeting – Jhampeer: 0.161 Billion Tonnes
Total: 96.297 billion tonnes
Source: Sindh Coal Authority

[B][COLOR="darkred"]Natural Gas:[/COLOR][/B]

There are 10 gas fields in Sindh from where natural gas is extracted. These are: Kandhkoat,Khairpur, Mari (The largest gas field where 20% gas is stored and 18% gas is produced/used), Suri/Hundi, Golarchi, Khaskheli and Leghari. Sindh produces 48% of natural gas of Pakistan.

The Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) daily extracts 986 MMCF of natural gas, 368 tonnes of LPG and 71 tonnes of sulphur. The gas is sold at the rate of 137.96 rupees per MCF.

[B][COLOR="darkred"]Crude Oil/Petrol:[/COLOR][/B]

Sindh produces 62% of oil of Pakistan. OGDCL sales 43642 barrel of oil per day at the rate of 64.79 dollars per barrel.

[B][COLOR="darkred"]Agriculture:[/COLOR][/B]

Agriculture is the backbone of Sindh’s economy. The main crops of Sindh in summer season include cotton, rice, sugarcane, sorghum, millet, sweet corn, and different pulses, while the wheat is the main crop of the winter season. Sindh produces all sorts of vegetables and fruits such as banana, mango, lemon, orange, grape fruit, strawberry, cherry, peach, cheekoo and guava.

[B][COLOR="darkred"]Cattles, Poultry and Fish[/COLOR][/B]

• Cows: 3873883
• Buffalos: 3220094
• Sheep: 2615984
• Goat: 6755234
• Camel: 217853
• Horse: 75850
• Donkeys: 500160
• Mules 5372
• Poultry/ chicken/hens:8797905

[B][I]Source: Pakistan Census of Live Stock 1996[/I][/B]

Fish

1139919 metric tonnes of fish are captured from different water habitats. 64400 tonnes of fish is captured from sea. Pakistan’s fish export is worth 133 million dollars. The entire fish comes from Sindh and Baluchistan.

[B][I]Source: Fish Folk Forum and International Trade Statistics ( ITS)[/I][/B]

[B][COLOR="darkred"]The proportion of different taxes collected by Sindh for the Federal Government:[/COLOR][/B]

• Direct Taxes: 67.65%
o Income Tax: 86.40%
o Wealth Tax: 63.21%
o Capital Gains Tax: 32.60%
o Workers Welfare Fund: 45.53%
• Indirect Taxes: 68.32%
o General Sales Tax (GST): 62.10%
o Federal Excise Duty: 39.40%

[B][I]Source: Planning and Development Department, Government of Sindh[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="4"]National Finance Commission (NFC) Award[/SIZE][/B]

The British Rule introduced the concept of participatory development and they developed the communication, irrigation, education, law and judiciary systems and provided constitution to united India in 1937.

During British Rule, the Sales Tax (GST) was a provincial tax but at the inception of Pakistan, making the emergency conditions as a pretext the Federal government snatched Karachi from Sindh and later on taken 50% of Sales Tax from Government of Sindh in order to control the financial deficit of Pakistan.

The federal government instead of respecting the 1940 Resolution (inter provincial social pact) and giving the provincial autonomy to all its provinces imposed ONE UNIT over 4 provinces just for sake of demonstrating equality to the then largest province, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)

Sindh was made a colony for the immigrants from India in an organized and planned way. Hundreds of thousands of acres of agricultural land were allotted to non-Sindhis (Civil and army bureaucracy) in Sukhar, Gudu and Kotri barrage areas.

After 25 years of Pakistan creation no justice and fair system/ dealings were delivered by the Federal Government towards Sindh.

In 1974, the government of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, instead of returning 50% GST (taken in the 1940s) to the Sindh snatched the remaining 50% and announced it as 100% Federal Tax. GST is never considered as Federal Tax in any part of the world, it always remains as provincial or regional tax.

In 1974, first NFC award was announced after which the military came in to the power. General Zia ul Haque announced two NFC awards in 1979 and in 1985. 1979 commission was never called while 1985 commission did not reach to an agreement. Mr. Jawed Sultan Jappan wala, the then finance minister refused to sign a totally unjustified award.

In 1997, Sindh again went under a ruthless betrayal by an undertaker government which had no lawful, justified and moral right of doing so.

[B][SIZE="5"]Background:[/SIZE][/B]

Up to this point in time, in all seven NFC awards, the distribution of resources has been done on the only indicator, that is population. Nowhere in the world, under a federal government system, the resources are distributed on the basis of only one indicator i.e. population. For example in India NFC award is distributed on 11 parameters. Having majority in population does not mean that the province contribute and consumes more resources. Therefore, this
exercise does not fulfil the criteria of justice and equality. Hence, the distribution of NFC on multiple parameters is very essential.

[B]In 1991 NFC Award, three taxes were under the federal government distribution pool:[/B]

Income Tax (Including Corporate Tax)
General sales Tax (GST)
Central Excise Duty (CED)

Custom tax was under jurisdiction of Federal Government and was not part of
the distribution pool in the NFC award. However, above mentioned three taxes were in that pool.

[B]The following formula was in use for distribution among federal/ central and provinces:[/B]

Federal / Central Government: 20%

Provincial Government: 80%

In 1997 NFC award, the federal Government included the custom duty in to the distribution pool and beside this changed the formula of distribution among centre and provinces:

Central Government: 62.5

Provincial Government: 37.5

As a result of this formula the 2/3 of resources became the property to the central government while the remaining 1/3 came to the share of all provinces.

Apart from NFC, the income generated to the federal government from other resources excluding taxes, the provinces do not get the equal proportion. With reference of foreign loans, grants and development projects, principles of justification and equal distributions are also not followed.

[B][COLOR="darkred"]The share given by provinces in the distribution pool:[/COLOR][/B]

[B]Year 1999-2000[/B]

1. Sindh: 189.461 Billion Rupees, 63.7%

2. Punjab: 77.912 Billion Rupees, 26.21%

3. NWFP: 22.046 Billion Rupees, 7.42%

4. Baluchistan: 7.800 Billion Rupees, 2.62%

[B]On the basis of population census of 1981 and 1998, the share given to provinces from the Federal distribution pool:[/B]

1 Punjab 57.88 Billion Rupees(census of 1981) 58.38 Billion Rupees(census of 1998)

2 Sindh 23.28 Billion Rupees(census of 1981) 23.72 Billion Rupees(census of 1998)

3 NWFP 13.54Billion Rupees(census of 1981) 13.82 Billion Rupees(census of 1998)

4 Baluchistan 5.30 Billion Rupees(census of 1981) 5.07 Billion Rupees(census of 1998)

[B][I]Source: Combined Finance and Revenue Accounts and Finance Division, Government. of Pakistan[/I][/B]

Due to having no provincial autonomy, control and ownership of resources, distribution of NFC award on the population basis let us see where Sindh stands in terms of the social indicators:

[B][SIZE="4"]Education:[/SIZE][/B]

8000 schools of Sindh are closed

3 out of 5 children aged between 5-9 do not go to school

Every 6 minutes 4 children quit the school for good

Overall literacy rate of Sindh is 51%

65% of urban population of Sindh is literate

35% of rural population of Sindh is literate

[B][I]Asian Development Bank and Education Department, Government of Sindh[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="4"]Health[/SIZE][/B]

• Annual budget: 7590000000 (7.59 Billion Rs) - about 3% of provincial budget
• The required number of doctors with reference to population: 30000
• The number of doctors available in the Government. hospitals: 13000
• Additional doctors required in government hospitals: 17000
• Total number of government hospitals: 1366
• No of hospital closed out of 1366: 50%
• 80% of hospitals have no specialist doctor available
• 60% of women are facing psychological/ psychiatric problems
• 53% of men are facing psychological/psychiatric problems
• 40% of province’s total population (42300000 - 42.3 million) is hepatitis positive
• 26% of population do not have access to drinkable water
• 58% of population has no sanitation facility

*There are no medical superintendents in 25 Taluka headquarter hospitals of the province
• The infant mortality rate ( new born mortality rate) is 95 per 1000 births
• Every 20 minutes one woman dies due to the pregnancy or delivery related
complications
• 64% of pregnant women give birth in hands of untrained medical staff
• Only 38% children of the province are fully immunized.

[B][I]Source: Asian Development Bank, UNICEF, Ministry of Health, Government of Sindh, and other resources[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="5"]Employment / Unemployment:[/SIZE][/B]

A minimum of 6% (approximately 2.05 million) of population of province is unemployed of which 25% are educated, graduate, postgraduate, engineers, doctors, accounting and management professionals.

Out of 3000 existing factories of province, only 50 factories belong to Sindhis and the 95% of employed labour is non-Sindhi.

[B][I]Source: Journal of Third World Studies[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="3"]The number of Sindhis in Federal Departments and the Armed Forces[/SIZE][/B]

• 5% of employees working in the federal departments are Sindhis.
• There are only 2% Sindhis in armed forces of Pakistan
• Only 3 Sindhis were working as federal secretaries as on 30/05/2008

[B][I]Source: Journal of Third World Studies[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="4"]Water shortage[/SIZE][/B]

Due to shortage of river water, the agriculture economy has lost 42 Billion rupees in four years time.

[B][I]Source: Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC)[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="4"]Lack of Investment[/SIZE][/B]

6 billion dollars (450 billion Rs) were invested in Pakistan in the last 5 years but industrial areas of Sindh have not benefited from this investment.

[B][I]Source: SPDC and Chairman SITE, Karachi[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="4"]Landless people[/SIZE][/B]

• The 60% (2 million) of families living in the rural areas have no land.
• The land holdings available to 26% rural families in Sindh is on average smaller than any where else in Pakistan.

[B][I]Source: Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC)[/I][/B]

[B][COLOR="DarkRed"][SIZE="5"]Crimes (Year 2007)[/SIZE][/COLOR][/B]

Killings/Murder: 2167
Gang rape: 27
Attempt to murder: 3080
Kidnapping: 1654
Honour killings: 96
Kidnapping for money: 145
Severely injured (quarrel): 889
Children kidnapped: 136
Minor injuries (quarrel): 1823
Suicides: 195
In fights: 3077
Attempt to suicide: 4163
Attacks on police: 1258
Dacoits: 1495
Sexual abuse: 168
Robberies: 4505
Houses burglaries: 2127
Other crimes: 8904

[B][I]Source: Sindh Police, Bureau of Police Research and Development, interior division, Islamabad[/I][/B]

[B][SIZE="4"]Absolute Poverty[/SIZE][/B]

50% of Sindh’s population (42.3 millions) is under poverty line and live a very miserable life. Sindh is target of injustice since the inception of Pakistan; whereas, in real sense Sindh is the creator of Pakistan. The rulers of Pakistan have enormously devastated Sindh by usurping its all resources. Here they use Islam, socialism, democracy and martial law as weapon to exploit Sindh. Military regimes have never ever given any relief to the people of Sindh which continue to occur even during so-called democratic governments.

@ Predator
 

Bundle of Thanks for the shared info....Kindly Post Details/info Regarding

a) BAGLIHAR PLANT ON CHENAB

b) KISHENGANGA HYDROELECTRIC PLANT

Regds

Shah Waliullah
 

[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]Shah Waliullah[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]

Dr. Iqbal, the poet of the East, has charcterized the celeberated Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb as tarkashi maa raa khudangi akhareen (the last arrow in the quiver of Muslim power in India). The anti-Islamic forces which had raised their head during the reign of the irreligious Emperor Akbar and later found their champions in Jahangir and Dara Shikoh, were, to a great extent, checked by Aurangzeb, the most honest, conscientious and able Muslim monarch that ascended the throne of Delhi.

With his passing away in 1707 started the political chaos which later culminated in the distintegration of the Muslim power in the subcontinent. This political disintegration which was the result of spiritual confusion encompassed the socio-economic spheres also. Aurangzeb's successors were too weak and incapable of facing the rebellious forces emerging on all hands. At such a critical period of Muslim history was born Shah Waliullah, one of the greatest religious thinkers produced by Muslim India who contributed immensely to the reintegration of the structure of Islam.

Shah Waliullah was born in 1703 AD four years before the death of Aurangzeb. His grandfather, Sheikh Wajihuddin, was an important officer in the army of Shah Jahan who supported Prince Aurangzeb in the war of succession. His father, Shah Abdur Rahim, a sufi and an eminent scholar assisted in the compilation of "Fataawa-i-Alamgiri"---the voluminous code of Islamic law. He, however, refused an invitation to visit the Emperor and devoted his energies to the organization and teaching at `Madrassa Rahimia'---a theological college which he had established and which, later, played an important part in the religious emancipation of Muslim India and became the breeding ground of religious reformers and `Mujahids' like Shah Abdul Aziz, Syed Ahmad of Bareli, Maulvi Abdul Haiy and Shah Ismail Shaheed. Writing about the teachings of Shah Abdur Rahim and his brother, Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi observes: `The essence of the teaching of the two brothers was the effort to discover a path which could be traversed together by the Muslim philosophers (the Sufis and the Mutakallims) and the Muslim Jurists (Faqih).'

Shah Waliullah received his early education from his illustrious father, who was his teacher as well as his spiritual guide. Being a precocious child with a retentive memory he committed the Holy Quran to memory at an early age of 7 years. On the death of his father in 1131 AH when he was hardly 17 years old, he started teaching in his father's `Madrassa-i-Rahimiya' and carried on the work for 12 years when he left for Arabia for higher studies. He was a brilliant scholar; during fourteen months' stay in Makkah and Madina, he came into contact with the oustanding teachers of Hejaz. His favourite teacher was Sheikh Abu Tahir bin Ibrahim of Madina, from whom he obtained his Sanad (Degree) in Hadith. The Sheikh was an erudite scholar, possessing encyclopaedic knowledge; Shah Waliullah benefitted much from him too and speaks highly of his piety, independence of judgement and scholarly talents.

During his stay at Makkah, Shah Waliullah had a dream in which the Holy Prophet (sws) commanded him to work for the organization and emancipation of the Muslim community in the subcontinent. He, therefore, returned to Delhi on July 9th, 1732 and started his work in real earnest. His was an uphill task in a period when Muslim India was passing through the most critical phase of its history and its entire social, political, economic and spiritual fabric was torn to pieces. On his arrival in Delhi, he started training pupils in diverse branches of Islamic learning and entrusted them with the missionary work of enlightening people with the true nature of Islam. He embarked upon the task of producing standard works on Islamic learning and, before his death in 1762, completed a large number of outstanding works on Islam.

He rose to be a great scholar of Islamic studies, endowed with saintly qualities. So great was his dedication to work that according to his talented son Shah Abdul Aziz: `...he was rarely ill and once he sat down to work after Ishraq (post-sunrise prayers) he would not change his posture till midday'. He was a real genius, an intellectual giant who set himself to the mission of educating the misguided Muslim masses with the true spirit of Islam. His was the task of the revival of Islam in the subcontinent which had been clouded with mystic philosophy and to bring it out in its pristine glory. He was a humble devotee to this cause, who resisted all temptations of personal glory.

His activities were not confined to spiritual and intellectual spheres only. He lived in troubled times and witnessed during his lifetime about a dozen rulers occupying the throne of Delhi. Endowed with a keen political insight, he observed with deep anguish the breaking up of Muslim power in the subcontinent and wrote to leading political dignitaries like Ahmad Shah Abdali, Nizam ul Mulk and Najibuddaula to stop the rot which had set in the political life of Muslim India. It was on account of his call that Ahmad Shah Abdali appeared on the field of Panipat in 1761 and put an end to the Marhatta dream of dominating the subcontinent.

Shah Waliullah was a prolific writer. It is in the realm of Islamic learning that he made a lasting contribution and within a period of 30 years produced more than 50 works of outstanding merit, both in Arabic and Persian Languages. Some of these are still unsurpassed in the whole domain of Islamic literature. His most valuable service to the cause of Islamic learning was that he codified the vast store of Islamic teachings under separate heads. Both in thought and prediction, his works occupy an outstanding place. As a reformer and as a propounder of theories dealing with socialism, he may be considered as the forerunner of Karl Marx.

His works may be classified into six categories. The first deals with the Holy Quran. It includes his translation of the Holy Book into Persian, the literary languages of the subcontinent of those times. According to him, the object of studying the Holy Book is `to reform human nature and correct the wrong beliefs and injurious actions'. The second category deals with Hadith, in which he has left behind several works including an Arabic and Persian Commentaries on "Mu'atta", the well-known collection of the traditions of the Holy Prophet (sws) compiled by Imam Malik. He attached great importance to this collection of traditions by Imam Malik, even greater than those of Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim. He is an outstanding Muhaddith (Traditionist) and links of all modern scholars of Hadith in the subcontinent may be traced to him. Foremost among these modern Traditionalists was his son and successor Shah Abdul Aziz and Syed Murtaza Bilgrami.

Shah Waliullah wrote a number of books and pamphlets dealing with Hadith. The third category deals with `Fiqh' or Islamic Jurisprudence, which includes "Insaaf-fi-bayaan-i-Sabab-il-Ikhtilaaf" which is a brief but a very interesting and informative history of the Islamic Jurisprudence of the last five centuries. The fourth category deals with his works based on mysticism. The fifth category pertains to his works on Muslim philosophy and Ilm-i-Kalam. He also wrote a pamphlet on the principles of Ijtihad (independent interpretation) and Taqlid (conformity). In his "Principles of Ijtihaad" he clarifies whether it is obligatory for a Muslim to adhere to one of the four recognized schools of Islamic Jurisprudence or whether he can exercise his own judgement. In the opinion of Shah Waliullah, a layman should rigidly follow his own Imam but a person well versed in Islamic law can exercise his own judgement which should be in conformity with the practice of the Holy Prophet (sws).

But the most outstanding of all his works "Hujjat-Ullah-il-Baalighah" which deals with such aspects of Islam that are common among all Muslim countries. In its introduction he observes: `Some people think that there is no usefulness involved in the injunctions of Islamic law and that in actions and rewards as prescribed by God there is no beneficial purpose. They think that the commandments of Islamic law are similar to a master ordering his servant to lift a stone or touch a tree in order to test his obedience and that in this there is no purpose except to impose a test so that if the servant obeys, he is rewarded, and if he disobeys, he is punished. This view is completely incorrect. The traditions of the Holy Prophet (sws) and consensus of opinion of those ages, contradict this view.' The sixth category deals with his works on the Shia-Sunni problem which had become somewhat acute in those days. His writings on this subject have done a great deal in simplifying this problem. His theories pertaining to economics and socialism are of revolutionary nature and he may be considered as the precurser of Karl Marx.

Writing about his works in the History of the Freedom Movement, Sheikh Muhammad Ikram states: `Shah Waliullah wrote learned works and initiated powerful and beneficial movements, but perhaps no less important are the invisible qualities of approach and outlook, which he bequeathed to Muslim religious thought in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. His work is characterized by knowledge, insight, moderation and tolerance, but the quality on which he laid the greatest emphasis, in theory and in practice, was Adl or Adalat (justice, fairness). His works and views bear ample testimony to the ways he observed this principle in practice and he lost few opportunities of emphasizing in theory its role in maintaining the social fabric.'

Shah Waliullah introduced several reforms in religious and economic spheres. He was first to translate the Holy Quran in a popular language, a practice which was later usefully followed by others. His own son, Shah Abdul Aziz, translated the Holy Book into Urdu, the language of Muslim masses in India. There had been a conflict between orthodox Islam revived under Mujaddid-Alif-Sani, championed by Aurangzeb and heterodoxy introduced by Akbar and championed by Dara Shikoh. The reign of orthodox Aurangzeb had created aversion to Sufism and had led to the advent of extreme puritanism. Shah Waliullah struck a mean between the two extremes and retained the virtues of both.

He was born in an atmosphere deeply imbued with the spirit of Sufism. His father was a well-known Sufi. In his early age, he came under the influence of Ibni Taimiya, a great religious reformer. During his stay in Hejaz, he came into contact with scholars who were influenced by Wahabism. This provided a check to his blind following of Sufism. But like Wahabis, he did not totally discard Sufism. He was aware of the services rendered by Sufis in popularizing Islam in the subcontinent and the spiritual self developed by the truly Islamic form of Sufism. But he was highly critical of the decadent and traditional form of Sufism which borders on the verge of asceticism and is, therefore, averse to true Islam. In his Wasiyat Nama (Will) he observes: `And the next advice (Wasiyat) is that one should not entrust one's affairs to and become a disciple of the Saints of this period who are given to a number of irregularities'. Shah Saheb had urged for the reform and discipline of Sufism and not its rejection. He wrote several pamphlets on this subject in which he analyzed the evils and virtues of Sufism. `With these books', writes Maulana Manazir Ahsan, `the disputes between the Sufis and the Ulema, provided one is just, come to an end. By giving an Islamic interpretation to the Sufi doctrines, Shah Waliullah removed the distaste which the Ulema had felt for Sufism and the Sufis'. Shah Waliullah has, therefore, not only bridged the gulf between the Sufis and the Ulema but also harmonized the differences prevalent among different sects of Sufis. His principles on the subject were put into practice in the great theological college of Deoband, which had among its patrons such well-known Sufis like Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi.

Shah Waliullah set upon the mission of reforming the social and political order of his day. Being a realist, he diagnosed the ills which had entered into the body politic of Muslim society and suggested remedies. He criticised the un-Islamic customs which had crept into Muslim society due to its contact with Hinduism. He was particularly against excessive extravagance in marriages, festivals and other ceremonies. He advocated the remarriage of widows. He carefully analyzed the factors responsible for the economic degeneration of the Muslim society during his time and proposed radical changes in the economy of the Muslim society. He advocated wider distribution of wealth on socialistic lines and in this way became the forerunner of Karl Marx. In an illuminating chapter of "Hujjat-Ullah-il-Baaligah", he outlined the evils of capitalism which brought about the fall of the Roman and Sassanid Empires.

He is highly critical of the economic exploitation of the poor, which, in the past, had brought about many revolutions and is the root cause of all troubles and unrest in the world. He even criticised the Mughal rulers and nobility for their indolence and luxury. Addressing the rapacious nobility of his time he observes: `Oh Amirs! Do you not fear God? (How is it that) you have so completely thrown yourself into the pursuit of momentary pleasures and have neglected those people who have been committed to your care! The result is that the strong are devouring the (weak) people..... All your mental faculties are directed towards providing yourself with sumptuous food and soft-skinned women for enjoyment and pleasure. You do not turn your attention to anything except good clothes and magnificent palaces.'
Shah Waliullah was of the opinion that intellectual revolution should precede political change. He did not contemplate a change in the political or social set-up through a bloody revolution. He wanted to bring a revolutionary change in the society through peaceful means. In his well-known book, "Izaalat-ul-Khifaa", he discusses the ideology of the political revolution which he envisaged.

No scholar of Mediaeval India had understood the various aspects of civics as had been done by Shah Waliullah. He considered `self-consciousness' as a prerequisite of `political consciousness'. He has dealt in detail the factors which contribute towards the growth of civil consciousness in his immortal work "Hujjat-Ullah-il-Baaligah".

Shah Waliullah was, perhaps, the only Muslim scholar of Mediaeval India who realized the importance of economics in a social and political set-up. He advocated the maintenance of economic equilibrium in the society and strongly criticized the accumulation of wealth which leads to all sorts of evils in the world. He had visualized a social order based on economic equality, fraternity and brotherhood which are the principles governing Islamic socialist practices during the time of the pious Caliphs.

Born in an age of decadence and chaos, Shah Waliullah strove for world of peace and prosperity. He has made a singular contribution to the socio-economic thought of Mediaeval India and visualized a Muslim society in which the individual enjoyed the fullest freedom, consistent with the maximum good of all. In such an ideal Islamic state, the ruler was to be governed by the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. No economic exploitation was to be tolerated in such a state and the individual was free to earn his living by fair means.

His seminary, ‘Madrassa-i-Rahimiya’ became the centre of Islamic Renaissance in the subcontinent, where scholars flocked from the four corners of the country and after being trained, became the torch bearers of freedom movement in the subcontinent. The "Madrassa" in fact, had become the nucleus of the revolutionary movement for the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam. It produced many zealous workers who carried on their preacher's mission with a missionary zeal. Among these were Maulana Muhammad Ashiq of Phulat, Maulana Norrullah of Budhana, Maulana Amin Kashmiri, Shah Abu Saeed of Rai Bareli and his own son, Shah Abdul Aziz who was initiated into the religious and political philosophy of his father.

Shah Waliullah played a vital role in the Indian politics of his times. He was greatly instrumental in forging a united Muslim front against the rising Marhatta power which was threatening the last vestige of the Muslim power in northern India. It was he who wrote to Najibuddaula, and Nizam-ul-Malik and finally invited Ahmad Shah Abdali who inflicted a crushing defeat on the Marhattas in the third battle of Panipat in 1761. His letter to Ahmad Shah Abdali inviting him to take up arms against the menacing Marhatta power in India is one of the most important historical documents of the 18th century. It surveys the political situation in the subcontinent and the dangers which Muslim India faced from different quarters. He had choosen the most vivid, capable and disciplined Muslim leaders of his time for combating the Marhattas. Among these were Najibuddaula, the leader of the redoubtable Rohilas and Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of the brave Pathans. His efforts towards forging a united front against the Marhattas were successful and the defeat of Marhattas in the third battle of Panipat in 1761 provided a turning point in the history of the subcontinent.
Shah Waliullah visualized an ideal state of the days of the Pious Caliphs and strove to it. Analyzing his political thought, Iqbal states:

"The Prophetic method of teaching, according to Shah Waliullah is that, generally speaking, the law revealed by a prophet takes especial notice of the habits, ways and peculiarities of the people to whom he is specifically sent. The Prophet who aims at all-embracing principles, however, can neither reveal different peoples nor leave them to work out their own rules of conduct. His method is to train one particular people and to use it as a nucleus for the build up of a universal `Shariah'. In doing so, he accentuates the principles underlying the social life of all mankind and applies them to concrete cases in the light of the specific habits of the people immediately before him." ("Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam")

The movement of political as well as spiritual regeneration of Muslim India did not die with Shah Waliullah. His talented son, Shah Abdul Aziz, and his worthy disciples and successors, strove for the realization of his mission. The torch of Islamic revival kindled by Shah Waliullah was kept aloft by his worthy successors. The echo of the third battle of Panipat was heard in the battle of Balakot. Both form the landmarks of the same struggle.

Shah Waliullah possessed a many-sided and versatile personality. His real greatness lies in the cumulative effect produced by his writings, by the contribution of persons trained by him and by the achievements of the school of thought founded by him. In religious matters, he struck a mean between extremes; in social affairs he strove to introduce in the Muslim society the simplicity and purity of early Islam; in the sphere of economics he advocated the revolutionary Islamic socialism and in the political field he forged a united Muslim front against the non-Muslim forces which were threatening to storm Muslim India.

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[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="5"][FONT="Georgia"]The Baglihar Dam and the Indus Water Treaty[/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]


The failure of the recent Pakistan-India talks on the Baglihar Dam, being constructed by India on the Chenab river, have brought home to the Pakistanis not only the shortcomings of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty but also the consequences to the whole agricultural sector of the country once the Dam becomes operational.

The public surfacing of the Baglihar Dam issue has also cleared some popular misunderstandings regarding the Indus Waters Treaty, especially the assumption prevailing in Pakistan that the IBRD or World Bank was a guarantor of this Treaty. In fact, this is not the case at all. The fact of the matter is that the Indus Water Treaty is primarily a bilateral treaty with the World Bank only being a signatory ‘for the purposes specified in Articles V and X and Annexures F, G and H.’1 Article V basically relates to the financial provisions of the Treaty while Article X, which relates to Emergency Provision – relating to the completion of the water systems provided for in the Treaty under Article IV (1) – is effectively now redundant. It related to Pakistan making a representation to the Bank before March 31, 1965 that the works stipulated in Article IV (1) would not be able to be completed before March 31, 1971 ‘because of the outbreak of large-scale international hostilities arising out of causes beyond the control of Pakistan,’ which would prevent it from obtaining the necessary materials and equipment from abroad. Interestingly enough, it is just as well that no war commenced between Pakistan and India before March 1965, because this Article would then not have been applicable since it includes the phrase, ‘international hostilities arising out of causes beyond the control of Pakistan.

While the World Bank, under the Treaty, does have an obligation to appoint a neutral expert, under Annexure F, there is no legal mechanism whereby the findings of this expert can be implemented forcefully by the World Bank against the wishes of one of the Parties. Of course, the terms of the Treaty are binding on the signatories and, therefore, the decision of the neutral expert also falls in this category; but then India has violated the terms of the Treaty itself – so, who will ensure that it accepts the findings of the neutral expert?

Annexure G relates to the setting up of an Arbitration Court, with lists of members and Chairmen already identified within the Annexure. Annexure H basically focuses on transitional arrangements and has now lapsed. It seems that once the neutral expert decides that the issue in question is not merely a technical issue but a dispute, then the arbitration procedure can be activated.

Obviously India had done its homework on the Indus Water Treaty far better than us. By going for a neutral expert through the World Bank when the Baglihar Dam project is almost complete, we are not going to get much. Even if the expert rules in our favour, who will make India undo the Dam physically? Certainly not the World Bank, which has quite correctly stated that it is not a guarantor of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960.2 So it is strange to find the sovereign state of Pakistan having surrendered the rights to the use of its three Eastern rivers (Beas, Sutlej, Ravi) in return for the rights over the waters of the three Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), with no international guarantees to stop India from eventually seeking to deny Pakistan access to all its river waters.

Under these circumstances, if Pakistan had opted for the neutral expert much earlier, as soon as the construction had started on the Baglihar Dam and before it was almost complete, it could have sought international political leverage to pressurise India into abiding by the Treaty provisions. After all, there is nothing that prevents states from pursuing two parallel tracks on any one issue, so dialogue on the overall issue would not have been foreclosed simply because a neutral expert was looking into the technical aspects of the Dam issue.

In fact, Pakistan had initially sought to use the neutral expert provision of the Treaty as early as 2003, but the Indians sought to delay this by asking Pakistan to hold technical level talks. When that failed the Indians sought to continue to delay Pakistan seeking the intervention of the neutral expert by suggesting bilateral meetings between the two countries’ water and power secretaries. And throughout this period, the work on Baglihar continued. Clearly the Indian intent was to keep Pakistan engaged in a meaningless dialogue on the issue while the project neared completion so that Pakistan would eventually be presented with a fait accompli.

It seems highly unlikely that anyone would be able to compel India to undo the transgression of the Treaty by its construction of the Baglihar Dam. At best, we may arrive at a moral victory and be forced to conclude a new accommodation based on the new realities of the Dam. So much for the Indus Water Treaty. In some ways the present situation relating to the Baglihar Dam reminds one of the Atlantique case3 when we should have realised the limitations of ICJ jurisdiction, and therefore should have used the political fora of the UN to morally and politically condemn India for its act of wanton aggression.

Although the issue came to a head in 2003 with Pakistan demanding that India stop the illegal construction of the Dam, Pakistan has been raising the Baglihar issue with India since May 1992 when India first supplied it with information regarding the Dam. Pakistan raised objections in August 1992 and since then the issue has been raised at the various meetings of the Indus Waters Commission (IWC) and through exchange of letters (see a chronology of events on the issue in the Annexure). But Indian intransigence on this issue has resulted in the present near-conflictual situation. India has also tried to enmesh the issue with the issue of Kashmiris getting access to sufficient electricity, whereas the two are not linked at all.

The Indus Water Treaty does allow India the right to hydroelectric power generation from the Western rivers but only by run-off river installations without affecting the volume and direction of water. What is clearly not allowed is building storage capacities on the Western rivers, which directly impede the flow of the waters (Article III (4). In order to safeguard against interference with the flows of these rivers by the upper riparian (India) plant designs have to conform to criteria laid down in Annexure D of the Treaty.

At the last meeting between Pakistan and India to resolve the issue, Pakistan sought satisfaction on five major points of concern to it:

That the project design should be based on low-level weir since the run of the river projects do not require a ‘high head’ of 475 feet.

That the calculations of ‘pondage’ and ‘firm power’ in the design was inconsistent with the Indus Water Treaty, while the level of ‘intake’ in the project design was low and contravened the Treaty.

According to the Treaty requirements, the design should be based on ‘un-gated’ spillways. The Indian design was contrary to the Treaty requirements. India had to also ensure that gates were at the highest level as provided for in the Treaty.

The Treaty criteria need to be fulfilled for the provision of calculations and justification of ‘free board’.

Arrangements needed to be made to monitor and inspect the site at the time of plugging of the low-level tunnel.

The Indians maintained their posture that the Treaty did not restrict the construction of a high dam and that the ‘pondage’, ‘firm power’ and the level of intake and ‘free board’ being developed by India were premised on sound techno-economic considerations. In fact India evaded the issue of whether all these points of concern raised by Pakistan were contrary to the Treaty, and refused to respond to Pakistani objections on the basic design. Pakistan’s basic argument remains that the Treaty permitted construction only of a ‘run of the river plant’ on the Chenab and not a high dam of 475 feet.

In the light of the total lack of a satisfactory response from India on this crucial Baglihar Dam issue, Pakistan finally approached the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert, although many in Pakistan feel this is too late to do much good since India has announced that it will continue to complete the project.

Additionally, India has also shown intransigence on other related water issues coming under the purview of the Indus Waters Treaty. For instance, the Indians are pursuing the Kishanganga hydroelectric power project, as well as maintaining the stalemate on the Wullar Barrage. The former project is nearing completion with a 22-km tunnel to divert the waters of the Neelum river to Wullar Lake. The Neelum is an integral part of the river Jhelum – again one of the three Western rivers – and, therefore, the Kishanganga project also contravenes the Indus Waters Treaty because it impacts the flow of the waters of the Western rivers to Pakistan. Not only will the flow of the water be affected but also Pakistan’s prior rights for its proposed 969 mw Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project in Azad Kashmir.

Indian lack of concern over observing international Treaty commitments has surfaced once again with an announcement of three more dam projects in Occupied Kashmir.4 The new projects are again on the Western rivers – the Uri-II project is on the Jhelum river in Baramulla district, and Pakal Dul and Burser, both on the Marusundar, a tributary of the Chenab river in Doda district. The Indian Ministry of Power has already approved these projects and it seems apparent that India may well be headed towards reneging on the Indus Water Treaty totally if Pakistan asserts its rights under the Treaty.

All in all, the Indus Waters issues not only highlight the very real security dimension of the Kashmir issue for Pakistan but also Indian efforts to pit the Kashmiris against Pakistan on the false claims that Pakistan wishes to deny the former access to hydroelectricity from the waters that flow through Kashmir. Unless Pakistan exposes Indian designs and the absurdity of its claims to the Kashmiris, Pakistan will find itself not only moving towards desertification of the rich plains of the Punjab but also may find itself facing an increasingly hostile Kashmiri population across the LOC.


[B][U][CENTER][COLOR="DarkGreen"][SIZE="3"][FONT="Georgia"]Annexure

Baglihar Dam: Chronology of Events
1992 – January 2005 [/FONT][/SIZE][/COLOR][/CENTER][/U][/B]

[B]20 May 1992[/B]

*Information supplied by India

[B]12 August 1992[/B]

*Pakistan raised objections

[B]7 May 1993 –[/B]

[B]*28 September 1999[/B]

*Exchange of arguments on the design of the plant and request for the Indus Waters Commission’s (IWC) meeting on the issue

[B]6 – 11 January 1996[/B]

*Site inspection – no work at site

[B]29 – 30 March 2000[/B]

*84th Meeting of Commission – Pakistan asked for additional data; discussion on design

[B]29 May – 1 June 2000[/B]

*85th Meeting of Commission – India promised data

[B]29 May – 1 June 2001[/B]

*86th Meeting of Commission – Agreed for discussion under Article IX(1)

[B]10 January 2001[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – asked about status of work progress

[B]15 October 2001[/B]

*Pakistan’s letters – stop work and have meeting to resolve the issue

[B]15 January 2002[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – stop construction pending resolution 6 March, 2002
India’s reply – no obligation to stop work under the treaty

[B]4 April 2002[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – ‘Question’ sent to India under Article IX(1)

[B]28 May – 1 June 2002[/B]

*87th Meeting of the Commission – India sought Pakistan’s reaction on particulars of change on 24 May, 2002

Particulars of change conveyed by India on 13 July, 2002

Pakistan’s letter – Objections were maintained

[B]31 July 2002[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – for meeting to resolve the issue under Article IX(1)

[B]29 August 2002[/B]

*India’s reply – waiting for comments internally (from within its own set up)

[B]6 September 2002[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – urged for immediate meeting

[B]16 September 2002[/B]

*India’s letter – not received comments internally; refused stoppage of work

[B]17 September 2002[/B]

*Pakistan urged for meeting – stated it would proceed to the next step in the Treaty, if no positive response from India

[B]27 September 2002[/B]

*India’s letter – will revert in coming weeks – denied suspension

[B]28 September 2002[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – asked for meeting in October

[B]18 October 2002[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – urged for meeting in October and to suspend construction

[B]7 November 2002[/B]

*India’s letter – inability to meet in October

[B]18 November 2002[/B]

*Detailed letter to the Indian Commissioner for the next meeting & suspension of work

[B]11 December 2002[/B]

*India’s letter – suggested meeting in January 2003

[B]13 December 2002[/B]

*Pakistan’s reply – proposal accepted

[B]4-6 February 2003[/B]

*Meeting at Islamabad – India refused to discuss ‘Questions’ under Article IX (1)

[B]8 May 2003[/B]

*Pakistan Commissioner Indus Waters (PCIW) notice for the appointment of a Neutral Expert

[B]28-30 May 2003[/B]

*Annual meeting held – could not prepare ‘statement of points of difference’

[B]20 June 2003[/B]

*PCIW’s request to the two Governments for the appointment of a Neutral Expert

[B]4 July 2003[/B]

*Government of Pakistan (GOP) Note Verbale – modalities for appointment of Neutral Expert

[B]7 July 2003[/B]

*Government of India (GOI) Note Verbale – suggested bilateral discussion

[B]18 August 2003[/B]

[B][U]GOP Note Verbale – asked for[/U][/B]

i) Suspension of work
ii) Site visit
iii) Time-bound resolution

[B]19-23 October 2003[/B]

*Site inspection of the Plant – work was going on as per Indian design

[B]24 November 2003[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – construction contravenes the Treaty, in view of site inspection

[B]6 December 2003[/B]

*GOP Note Verbale – reminded for suspension and time-bound resolution

[B]18 December 2003[/B]

*GOI Note Verbale – suggested Commission-level meeting

[B]27 December 2003[/B]

*GOP Note Verbale – accepted proposal to have meeting to discuss & resolve under Article IX (1)

[B]13 January 2003[/B]

*GOI Note Verbale – meeting to be held under Article VIII (5) and not IX (1)

[B]15 January 2004[/B]

*Pakistan’s letter – Article VIII (5) not relevant; meeting to discuss under Article IX (1)

[B]15-19 January 2004[/B]

*Special Meeting of the Commission – India refused to discuss ‘Question’ under Article IX (1) – ended on deadlock

[B]26-29 May 2004[/B]

*Annual meeting – India urged bilateral resolution; Pakistan maintained its position for suspension and time-bound resolution

[B]3 June 2004[/B]

*Meeting between Indian Minister for External Affairs and the Pakistan High Commissioner at New Delhi – Proposal for Secretary-level talks was finalized

[B]22 June 2004[/B]

*Secretary-level talks were held at New Delhi – A time-bound resolution agreed to

[B]6 July 2004[/B]

*GOP Note Verbale – to confirm proceedings of Talks and to confirm understanding reached between the Water Secretaries

[B]10 August 2004[/B]

*GOP Note Verbale – initiated process for time-bound resolution

[B]10 September 2004[/B]

*GOP Note Verbale – reminded to start process for time-bound resolution

[B]13 September 2004[/B]

*GOI Note Verbale – proposed another round of talks

[B]10 October 2004[/B]

*GOP Note Verbale – to expedite starting of time-bound resolution as per Talks

[B]24 November 2004[/B]

*Meeting of Prime Ministers of the two countries at New Delhi – decided to hold one more meeting at Secretary-level on the issue of Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant/Dam as a last attempt to resolve the issue

[B]25 November 2004[/B]

*Indian Commissioner’s letter – referring to the first Secretary-level meeting; anticipated to supply all possible information by mid-December, 2004

[B]27 November 2004[/B]

*GOP Note Verbale – proposed to hold the final meeting between Water Secretaries of Pakistan and India on 6th December 2004

[B]1-2 December 2004[/B]

*GOI Note Verbale & letter from Indian High Commission at Islamabad – Talks between Secretaries of Water Resources would be more effective after Pakistan has examined relevant data provided by India and suggested the meeting could take place in end December, 2004

[B]11 December 2004[/B]

*Pakistan’s Prime Minister chaired an informal meeting of all relevant Ministries – instructions were issued for holding the last meeting with India

[B]15 December 2004[/B]

*GOI supplied requisite data/information through Indian High Commission; Islamabad data has been examined by all relevant departments/organisations. Pakistan’s objections on the design of Baglihar Plant are maintained and even further substantiated with new data supplied by India

[B]3 – 7 January 2005[/B]

*Meeting as agreed between the two Prime Ministers was held at New Delhi at the level of Water Secretaries of Pakistan and India

Wash Aathke
 

PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS: A NEW CHAPTER, A NEW THEATER

Mahrukh Khan *


The U.S. has adopted a proactive policy towards Pakistan in the post-Musharraf era. Its primary strategic objective remains the same, i.e., ensuring greater Pakistani participation in the war against the Taliban - especially the Afghan Taliban that attempt to find sanctuaries in South and North Waziristan. Consequently, it supports the democratically elected coalition government in Islamabad that is dominated by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and has offered enhanced assistance for economic and educational development while also maintaining traditional relations with the army. Such assistance is manifest in a calibrated flow of military aid and equipment to Pakistan.

Pakistan holds strategic importance not just in South Asia but also in the global arena. Because of its strategic position in the war on terror, it has increasingly been viewed by American officials, in the context of the situation in Afghanistan, as a major partner in the campaign to destroy Al Qaeda and the Taliban network.

Pakistan, however, faces serious dilemmas regarding its partnership with the U.S. Its security situation is deteriorating day by day, suicide bombings and indiscriminate terrorist attacks show no signs of abating, and this raises the bar of its partnership with the U.S. Pakistan perceives a potential threat to its own stability due to additional troop deployment by U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. This may pose multiple challenges to Pakistan’s counter-terrorism offensive as the Afghan Taliban seek to evade American pressure by attempting to take refuge on the Pakistani side of the border.

Though the U.S. and Pakistan share decades of friendship, the relationship has remained unstable. Misgivings regarding events in the past generate anti-American sentiments which are widespread among the masses, and also prevalent in certain pockets of the ruling elite. Consequently, the growth of an effective relationship between the two countries requires a deep understanding of the needs of Pakistani leadership, army, civil society as well as the common people.

The Obama administration’s lengthy review of the war on terror has produced the ‘Af-Pak’ terminology – signifying two countries but a single common enemy. This has also involved the notion of U.S. commitment to “destroy, disrupt and dismantle Taliban and Al Qaeda.” The Af-Pak strategy focuses on goals that the U.S. wishes to achieve in the region. After an approval of 30,000 more troops for Afghanistan, there is no doubt that a much stronger partner in Islamabad is needed if the strategy is to be successful. Washington has thus maintained considerable pressure on the PPP-led government, hoping to align the strategy being followed in Pakistan with the overall U.S. approach to the war.

Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is another concern for Pakistan that causes suspicion to rise against the U.S. Pakistan believes that it is facing a two-front situation - with India, its traditional rival on its eastern border and a potentially unwelcome regime in Kabul on the west; its security is deemed to be under constant threat. Moreover, India’s growing strategic relations with the U.S., as manifest in a civil nuclear deal and America’s indirect encouragement to regional powers in its plans for Afghanistan, is also worrisome for Pakistan.

The arrival of further troops in Afghanistan, the consistent pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’, and a tacit approval of the increase of drone strikes in the country’s tribal land are all prominent issues that show the limits of the alliance.

The question of U.S. withdrawal and how it is going to actualize is another alarming concern raised time and again. Pakistan fears that after the withdrawal, it will have to choose between the devil and the deep sea. In both cases it will likely face huge losses and bear the brunt of potential chaos. Things have certainly not been looking upwards – in 2009 alone, the country witnessed 173 suicide attacks killing hundreds of innocent civilians and armed forces personnel. Needless to say, it is already paying a heavy price for its involvement in the war on terror, one part of which has been its military operations in South Waziristan.

Since 2001, Pakistan has received approximately $10.6 billion from the U.S.; out of this, sixty per cent fell under the Coalition Support Funds (CSF), thirty per cent shared equally by security assistance and budget support programmes, and the remaining ten per cent has been for development assistance. Despite the financial help, Pakistan remains stressed, with problems of rising poverty and unemployment becoming ingredients for militancy and Talibanisation. Matters are not helped when a perception of encirclement – with India to the east and an Afghanistan allied with the U.S. and India to its west – fuels skepticism and wariness of American intentions.

Obama’s war policy on Pakistan and Afghanistan

President Obama first announced his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009. This broadly underlined counterinsurgency efforts and also affirmed significant economic development assistance for Pakistan which had largely been ignored earlier. The greatest challenge to have emerged since then has been to plan for both short- and long-term stability by providing physical and socio-economic security to as much of the population as possible by using available resources efficiently.

U.S., Pakistan and the war on terror

The importance of a stable U.S. and Pakistan relationship can be measured from the large network of cooperation between the military outfits and the governments over many decades. Pakistan’s military leaders remain essential partners in the U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, and General Kayani, the current Chief of the Army Staff, has shown strong commitment to fighting the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda militants along the border shared with Afghanistan.

The main vehicle for bilateral military cooperation is the Defense Consultative Group (DCG). Moribund since 1997, it was reestablished during President Musharraf's visit to Washington in 2002. With the Obama administration coming to office, military relations have become even stronger. Both parties agreed that separate but conducive military operations would be carried out in the war on terror. This would involve intelligence sharing and also had the additional dimension that collective secret operations would be carried out if necessary.

Although General Kayani clearly recognises that Pakistan’s national security faces a near-term threat from militants within the country, India continues to be seen as the enduring threat. India's cooperation with Kabul and the reciprocal friendly attitude has in a way undermined U.S. and Pakistan cooperation since many defence strategists and army officials view the India-Afghanistan relationship with suspicion.

Pakistan has been busy fighting the war on terror, providing support to U.S. aims in the region. Even though the military has made good progress in its offensives in South Waziristan, many militants have fled to other parts of the country - including major cities such as Karachi and Lahore. In addition, Pakistan has assisted the U.S. and its NATO allies in many ways. It has offered bases for patrolling, reconnaissance and rescue operations, extended logistical support to troops operating in Afghanistan, and provided intelligence and air space for strikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda targets.

Despite such collaboration, however, another serious concern for both the U.S. and Pakistan is the increasing armed violence on several fronts including the rise of militant groups in the Punjab. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer, in an interview to Newsweek in its issue dated October 21, 2009, said that the Punjabi Taliban, who are heavily influenced by the Afghan Taliban, are now a more serious concern. Their ability to band together with the Taliban into a single jihadist outfit is raising grave new challenges in the region.

The rising phenomenon of suicide bombing has also remained unaddressed. In 2006, there were only six suicide bombings; in 2007, the number went up to fifty, and 2008 saw at least sixty-one such attacks. Reportedly, the initial missions were led by Arab and Al Qaeda zealots, but this has subsequently been taken over by members of the Haqqani network as well as by close associates of Baitullah Mehsud, including Qari Hussein.

U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in a recent visit to Pakistan has offered to provide the country with unarmed, unmanned surveillance planes. The deal would give Pakistan 12 Shadow UAV unarmed surveillance drones that can be used to spy on militants. In an interview to foreign journalists, General Kayani said: “We’re talking to the U.S. and [NATO forces]. We are interested in getting more involved in training of the Afghan national army. It is good for short term and long term.”

However, despite Pakistan’s relentless support to U.S. in its war on terror, it remains under scrutiny in the Western media and among policymakers as its commitment towards defeating Taliban and Al Qaeda elements is questioned time and again.

Obama’s second review of war policy

Terrorism has become a global phenomenon with multilayered transnational connections among militants. Had the U.S. not abandoned Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal at the end of the Cold War, and instead paid more attention to the rebuilding and reconstruction of the country’s socio-economic and governance structures, the situation today could have been much better.

In his second review of war policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Obama administration has attempted to ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated. By aiming ‘to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan,’ President Obama has adopted what has been called the ‘McChrystal light’ strategy, so-called after the commander of the ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The basic concept of the strategy is sound – it calls for an increased focus on protecting Afghan civilians to reduce the space in which the Taliban can operate, and endorses capacity-building of the government.

By promising to bring an end to the war, the Obama administration faces a distinct challenge since it is not simply a question of turning the page on the previous regime’s years of neglect and misguided policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Obama has made it clear to Kabul that “there will be no open cheques and no open-ended commitment.” He emphasizes that America has paid a tremendous price and cannot afford a prolonged war in Afghanistan; this has caused much alarm in Kabul. Moreover, there is a U.S. pledge to start bringing back its forces from the middle of 2011.

The central idea behind publicly announcing this potential withdrawal was to put pressure on the Afghan government. The hope is that this will cause the regime to address the main issues of governance, including corruption, and to concentrate on developing Afghan forces for national security.

Even though the second review of the Afghan war covered most elements in and around Afghanistan and Pakistan, it failed to address the concerns of Indian involvement, interest and influence in Afghanistan. Moreover, with its enhanced relations with Washington, New Delhi is more capable of achieving its goals in Kabul.

New Delhi’s influence in Kabul, and on Washington, can provide India the opportunity with which to enter into and manipulate international coalition forces that are fighting in Afghanistan, and this could ultimately lead to their placing Pakistan on the hit list. There are two emerging trends in the war that can perhaps give credence to such a notion. Firstly, the trend of suicide bombing that target civilians as well as government and army personnel, and secondly, the disguised attacks by the Taliban and Al Qaeda on high-profile U.S. military officers.

According to a report published by the Department of State’s office of the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan on a regional stabilization strategy, a major focus of the President’s review was the importance of Pakistan to American efforts in Afghanistan, regional stability, as well as U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

Key features

Surge

The war policy has a central aspect of a ‘surge’. While traditionally attributed to an increase in troops on the grounds, this concept has a multidimensionality that needs to be examined. This represents surges on several fronts.

Civilian surge: A substantial influx of troops as per the surge policy is also accompanied by a ‘civilian surge’ that addresses ineffective and corrupt governance structures and introduces population-centric ground strategies. This will lead to an increase in the number of diplomats and experts in many socio-economic fields such as reconstruction of infrastructure, health, education and agriculture

Contractor surge: Prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a contractor surge was not deeply incorporated in wars and contractors’ presence was felt only on an ad hoc basis. However, with a troop surge, a contractor surge has also occurred. Reportedly, as many as 56,000 contractors have been hired separately. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the types of services they provide are similar to those in Iraq, including logistics, construction, linguistic services, and transportation.

Militia surge: This refers to the ‘mini’ surge in support of local Afghan militias that could aid in the fight against terrorists.

Twin troop surge: A twin troop surge means that the policy is not only meant to rout the Afghan Taliban militarily, but there are also efforts to strike a political deal with the enemy. Seeing that military might is not posing serious threats, the U.S. has now turned towards pursuing indirect talks with Taliban leaders.

CIA and Special Forces surge: By sending spies and carrying out covert operations in tribal areas of Pakistan, this policy seeks to ensure that the surge mentality in Afghanistan is replicated on the other side of the border. Pakistan consequently faces two main challenges that need to be overcome:

1. A troop surge near the border will, in all likelihood, result in a Taliban spill-over into the already troubled province of Balochistan in addition to complicating the military offensive in South Waziristan, and
2. Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan after U.S. withdrawal are also affected; a Pakistan-friendly government in Kabul is desired in order to reduce Indian influence in the country.

Expansion of drone strikes

A significant escalation of drone attacks inside Pakistani tribal region has also been accompanied by the yet unfulfilled idea of expanding the attacks to areas of southern Punjab where militant leaders are reportedly taking shelter. Such an approach may also include other parts of the country; for instance, Balochistan; where the Quetta Shura led by Mullah Omar is still reportedly active. The issue of drone attacks has become a sour point in relations between Washington and Islamabad since they have resulted in heavy civilian casualties – an issue that complicates Pakistan’s role in America's war on terror.

Between 2004 and 2009, there have been 99 drone strikes in Pakistan with 506 reported deaths, including both militants and civilians. Given that the Taliban insurgency has grown in recent years, especially in parts of Punjab and Balochistan, the new strategy of war pushes the idea of drone strikes in these areas. Drones attacks for now are the primary method for targeting militant hideouts in the northwestern part of the country. U.S. defense analysts and policymakers believe that their positive effects are measurable and that they avoid coalition casualties. They are also credited with creating a sense of insecurity among militants and constraining interaction among their networks.

However, open-source reports from Pakistan suggest that attacks since early 2006 have killed around 14 militant leaders and over 700 civilians - over fifty civilians for every militant killed. According to a report published by the New America Foundation, there are three major ‘strategic concerns’ in relation to drone strikes inside Pakistan:

1. They can be legally challenged,
2. They do not constitute a strategy, but rather a reactionary tactic,
3. Their unpopularity with the people of Pakistan is increasing at an alarming rate.

To be more precise, a New America Foundation report mentions 115 strikes in the northwest since 2004, including 19 in 2010 that have killed between 837 and 1,221 individuals, of whom around 552 to 854 are described as militants. In effect, the civilian fatality ratio comes out to be a rather embarrassing 32 per cent if these reports are to be believed. Due to such inefficiency, drone strikes come under constant criticism and their unpopularity is acting as a catalyst for recruitment to extremist groups.

The ‘do more’ dilemma

In the wake of the war on terror, Pakistan emerged as a frontline partner to the U.S. Since then, it has played a critical role in helping reduce the operational capabilities of Al Qaeda and Taliban elements in and around its border with Afghanistan.

However, there are concerns of how the collaboration works in this process. Pakistan is in fact still unable to decipher (decode) President Obama’s war strategy completely. It was expected that besides the announced approach, President Osama’s West Point speech would include guarantees that India’s increasing influence and presence in Afghanistan would be curtailed. Islamabad has handed over more terrorists and suspects to the U.S. than any other coalition partner and remains fully committed to the war, although many questions have been raised regarding its interests. Thus, it feels that its concerns regarding India have been undermined by the U.S.

This combination of several factors has created a situation in which many Pakistanis are skeptical about the need for combating militancy and supporting the American cause. Though the ruling political elite seem to be comfortable in accepting what U.S. has to offer, media and parliamentary debates reflect an opinion more reflective of the general population, i.e., the United States is making unreasonable demands of the Pakistani governing and military structures.

Going by the course of military action witnessed during most of 2008, it becomes obvious that U.S. and NATO forces are chasing Al Qaeda and the Haqqani- Hekmetyar networks in the border regions, while Pakistani forces have been tasked with hunting down the Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber Agencies. As a result, Islamabad has been pushed to deliver more, while it is cornered into a situation where it can deliver less. Washington is mounting immense pressure on Pakistan to expand its operation to North Waziristan and target the Haqqani network and other militants active in the region. However, the military is tied up in an offensive in South Waziristan and cannot afford to engage its forces on another front.

Many analysts in the U.S. policymaking circles believe that the army is reluctant to move into North Waziristan since it still considers the Taliban as a ‘possible good’ against a ‘possible evil’, the latter being India. The U.S. needs to revive a partnership with Pakistan’s leaders and its people, and address a full range of human security challenges that plague the country if it is to succeed in its Afghanistan-Pakistan war.

U.S. exit strategy and Pakistan

The U.S exit strategy from Afghanistan has met severe criticism. Critics have insisted that that the Taliban would simply wait out the withdrawal period, living up to their idea of ‘you have the watches, we have the time!’ For Pakistan, it is a matter of concern that has alarmed military officials as well as politicians. Though the strategy itself was cautiously welcomed by many partners in the war, Pakistan was perhaps the only ally that did not endorse it at all.

A decade of instability in Afghanistan has without a doubt resulted in a militant spill-over in the border areas. A greater threat is likely to arise if the U.S. abandons the country following potential withdrawal starting in 2011, leaving Pakistan high and dry as it has done in the past. Needless to say, however, an exit strategy plan during an active war being fought on the ground is not as simple a concept as it may seem since there are long-term strategic goals in Afghanistan for the U.S. as well.

The U.S. sees Afghanistan as a platform from where it can extend its influence in Central Asia, the greater Middle East and also try to neutralize China. Many Pakistanis believe that the U.S. strategically uses the country according to its requirements, abandoning it when the immediate utility passes. Any quick reversal of the policy being followed could be disastrous for regional security since it would most likely infuse fresh life into a dormant, but not dead, militancy.

U.S. policymakers tasted remarkable success in the beginning of the military operations in Afghanistan soon after 9/11 when they overthrew the Taliban regime and introduced a democratic government. But, over time, ineffectiveness has seeped in and policies have not worked in their favor; it was this poor planning that led to troubles in Afghanistan and hence the scaling down of a mission mid-way as the U.S. marched towards Iraq.

This turned out to be one of the biggest slip-ups of American policy since it gave the Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives a chance to regroup, recruit and rearm against Western forces. Many fear that the Taliban will now wait out and hide during enhanced troop presence or simply cross the border into Pakistan. The exit strategy has also raised the stakes for the Pakistani military and there are fears that it is not a viable idea since the militants will simply bide their time and wait until the foreign forces are gone before seeking power once again.

Additionally, Pakistan places little trust in President Karzai, whose government is marked with corruption charges. There are also doubts regarding the capability of the Afghan army to defend the country after the U.S. and NATO forces leave. Hence, the exit strategy in question has served to raise tensions tremendously.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan can be severely counterproductive. The dominant regional narrative – which is that the United States will abandon its friends without compunction – is likely to be reinforced if the strategy fails. Not only will it force Pakistan to reevaluate its position, Afghanistan will similarly be placed under further stress from the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Chances are that a civil war will ensue as a weak government, a disengaged population and a corrupt political and socio-economic system fails to address the most important issues in the country.

Economic assistance

Despite million of dollars worth of aid and assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. is still seen as an unreliable ally. Only one-tenth of all the aid given in the past few years has been spent on education, health care and other socio-economic projects. The rest is directly invested in the military operations through coalition support funds.

On September 24, 2009, the U.S. Congress passed a new bill that was signed into law by President Obama on October 15 the same year. The Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) as it was named under the Enhanced Partnership Act 2009, attracted severe opposition and criticism in Pakistan despite the fact that it aimed at improving the civilian sector and socio-economic conditions.

The bill was compared to the controversial and unpopular Pressler Amendment of 1985. Because of its language and attached conditions, it gave the impression of attacking Pakistan’s sovereign status and humiliating its army’s efforts in the war on terror. The U.S. has defended the KLB by portraying it as an effort to cultivate long-term commitment with Pakistan on a civilian platform. Regardless of its meaning and purpose, it clearly chalked out anti-American sentiments and a continuing trust deficit even though it aims at long-term ties with Pakistan.

The main agenda of the KLB is to reach directly to the people and invest funds to their social development. It seeks to shift focus from military assistance to public expenditure, assuring improvement across multiple sectors including education, health, providing livelihood and building new public institutions. Hence, it is a distinct step since aid in the last decade has largely been dominated by defence expenses.

U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue 2010

President John F. Kennedy once stated that “the only thing worse than being an enemy of the United States is being an ally.” This can easily be applied to Pakistan as the two have shared an off-again, on-again relationship. Over the last decade, Pakistan has played a vital part in the fight against terrorism, suffered tremendous casualties, and witnessed worsening security conditions as well as a deteriorating economy. Compared to any other nation involved in the war, its physical and material sacrifices have been immense.

However, with the aforementioned issues straining ties between the two countries, there was a need felt to engage in a ‘strategic dialogue’. Despite the fact that Pakistan and the U.S. have held such meetings in the past, the controversial strategic dialogue of March 2010 was characterized as an updated version that was more concerned with Pakistan’s concerns. It was also significant since it was the first strategic dialogue to be held at the ministerial level.

The dialogue attempts to offer a new format for engagement by bringing in a transparent mechanism and attempting to ensure timely results. The framework also allows for a follow-up with a multi-track approach. The meetings were seen as a chance to reduce the trust deficit that has existed for so long, and gave an opportunity to address misconceptions among people from both countries.

The basic agenda of Pakistan revolved largely around four focal points:

1. To get a deal similar to the civil nuclear deal the U.S. has offered to India,
2. The transfer of both missile-launch and surveillance drone technologies as well as F-16 combat aircraft,
3. To receive timely payments from the Coalition Support Funds, and
4. Minimising Indian involvement in Afghanistan.

Another fifty-six pages with a list of priorities was presented by Pakistan. This included widespread issues related to national security concerns, Indian role in Afghanistan, long-term military modernization, provision of military hardware and economic development. More specifically, it asked for an expanded export market for agriculture, infrastructural development, market access and trade concessions, relief on textile tariffs, assistance in energy programmes, thermal power station rehabilitation projects, a multi-year security assistance package as well as social protection needs among other areas of concern.

Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan remained the subject of intense scrutiny between military officials. Reconciliation with the Taliban and reintegration of insurgents also covered much time of the talks. Concerns were raised by the Pakistani military regarding U.S. withdrawal and this led to reassurances that a substantial military presence will remain in Afghanistan long after withdrawal begins in 2011. Assurance was also given that Indian involvement in Afghanistan would be minimized.

With such a broad agenda, and the fact that some of Pakistan’s key concerns were addressed, the dialogue was largely hailed as a success. Both Pakistan and the U.S. saw it as an opportunity to engage directly on a full range of issues and mutual political, economic and social problems that require a shared responsibility came to the forefront. Hillary Clinton remarked in a press conference that the U.S. was happy to “listen and engage with Pakistani partners on whatever issues the delegation raises.” And, by and large, this undertaking was adhered to.

The U.S. remained silent, however, on the issue of civil nuclear technology as this would effectively confer legitimacy on Pakistan as a nuclear power. This was a subject of great scrutiny, and among General Kayani’s top agenda items. The U.S. made no clear statements, stating that this was a question for greater debate, and officials remarked that such an agreement would realistically be ten or fifteen years away. There are two possible reasons for this reluctance; one, the continued discomfort in Washington over Dr. A. Q Khan’s proliferation record, and two, it may not be seen to be in the long-term interest of the U.S. to make similar deals with both Pakistan and India.

Among the specific agreements, there was an announcement by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) that it would help Pakistan upgrade three thermal power plants. Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. Lew and Pakistan’s Finance Secretary Salman Siddique signed a letter of intent regarding cooperation in the construction of priority roads in the reconstruction of the Malakand region. The project will cost $40 million to upgrade two key roads: the Peshawar Ring Road and another road from Kanju to Madyan in Swat, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

There was also an agreement to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan for which the U.S. promised $125 million, and it is hoped that this money is not taken out of the controversial Kerry-Lugar Bill. The U.S. has also offered 400 megawatts of energy to Pakistan to build thermal power stations; however, this is a very small amount, given the magnitude of the energy crisis prevailing in Pakistan.

Both sides also agreed to establish a ‘Policy Steering Group’ which will take care of many common interest areas such as energy, defense, law-enforcement, counterterrorism, science and technology, education, health, agriculture and water. On the water issue, a separate sectoral dialogue track was also announced which will take care of issues such as water conservation, U.S. assistance in water projects and construction of dams and bridges.

It is naïve for Pakistan to expect any big breakthroughs overnight but it is hoped that a continuation of these talks will bring a new level of partnership with the U.S. However, Pakistan should realise that whatever the U.S. has committed to as a result of the dialogue will be subject to Congressional approval which is a long process. Much depends on Pakistan’s own progress in fighting insurgencies along its Afghanistan border, as well as on the parallel fight of NATO forces in the upcoming Kandahar operation.

As expected, there was no concrete outcome of the strategic dialogue, but it does to some extent present a framework that had been missing before. The talks also emphasized Pakistan’s position in front of U.S., and sensitive issues that were earlier left untouched, came to the forefront. However, the success of the meetings can only be measured when they translate into results and long-term progress.

In short, the strategic dialogue was neither a complete success nor a failure. It is time for Pakistan to realise that it should not place its dealings with the U.S. at the cost of its relations with regional countries. Iran has offered 2,200 MW of energy assistance to Pakistan which is half of all its energy requirements. The current electricity shortage in the country is now at 5,000 megawatts and what the U.S. has offered does not amount to much. Besides, the promises that the U.S. has made will eventually come at a cost; and Pakistan needs to define its policies more effectively for a secure and stable future.

The Indian angle

Apart from its progress in Afghanistan, the greatest challenge facing the U.S. in the region is its handling of a perpetual India-Pakistan rivalry. The U.S. role in this scenario has increased since Pakistan’s relations with India are now seen from an Afghan perspective. India and Pakistan have always competed to achieve strategic agendas in Afghanistan; while the former considers its influence and presence in Afghanistan as a strategic geopolitical constraint on Pakistan as well as a gateway to Central Asia, the latter has deep cultural and historic ties because of a common border with a Pashtun ethnic majority on both sides.

Over the years, both India and Pakistan have provided assistance to Afghanistan where the main focus has been infrastructure development. India is the second largest aid provider and has promised $750 million over the next few years. Pakistan on the other hand has committed $200 million and also hosts the largest number of Afghan refugees. However, while Pakistan has been an all-weather friend, its role has been greatly disregarded and misjudged; but India, due to its close ties with the former Northern Alliance members in the Karzai government, enjoys a much more active role in Afghanistan today.

After the events of 9/11, India provided intelligence, naval escorts through the Strait of Malacca, and diplomatic and political support to the United States. Plus, its ties with the Northern Alliance were a significant factor in its future activities in the country since the Northern Alliance is anti-Taliban, and by default hostile towards Pakistan due to its Taliban contacts.

Pakistan, for its part, has time and again attempted to pursue a healthy relationship with India after the Mumbai attacks, but certain elements in India have prevented any progress on this front. The differences are immense and have made it difficult for the international community to become a bridge between both countries. Suspicion of each other’s intent through involvement in Afghanistan has also not helped matters. The Obama administration has made it clear that it will not directly mediate between India and Pakistan, but would instead help bring them together to address their common issues including terrorism and Kashmir.

Afghanistan and India blame Pakistan for harbouring militants and terrorists on its soil. Their officials have often referred to Pakistan as a “significant enabler for insurgency” in the region. Pakistan, on the other hand, blames Afghanistan for its negligence towards a burgeoning arms and drug trade, while also holding India responsible for running covert operations against Pakistan.

Pakistani officials have strongly denied that they continue to hold relations with Taliban elements either in Pakistan or in Afghanistan. Due to successful operations in South Waziristan and the arrest of some key militants, it has to some extent shown its sincerity to the cause. It has even contributed to the creation of an intelligence establishment in Kabul to monitor its border areas with Afghanistan along with the Afghans and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

However, according to many analysts, the close relationship between the U.S. and India is also a factor that hinders progress on the Pakistan-U.S. front. Washington sees India as a source of stability in Afghanistan since it has made heavy investments over the past few years. However, Pakistan’s Military Intelligence (MI) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials also often allude to the “invisible Indian hand” in creating unrest in Balochistan and damaging gas power infrastructure worth several billion rupees.

These views have not been totally ignored. Clifford May at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said in an interview to Voice of America News that the U.S. needs to put some pressure on India to ensure that it is helpful in every regard. This should be done keeping in mind the importance of Pakistan in the war on terror since it is very important that Pakistan be reassured that it faces no threat on its eastern borders.

India-U.S. relations over the years have developed a new paradigm. They have strengthened in many areas, but specifically it is the military ties where enhancement has been most significant. Hence, while their ties have expanded vertically as well as horizontally, numerous difficulties have been created for Pakistan in the process.

Reconciliation – issues and dilemmas

Desperate to save a faltering military campaign, U.S. policy is coming another full circle as Washington prepares to strike deals with ‘moderate’ factions of the Taliban. The real question, though, is regarding the shape and content of any such negotiations. It is also imperative that the costs and benefits of the approach are worked out at the outset. The process is likely to involve three groups of the Afghan population: the high-level Taliban or the leaders, the medium-level Taliban or the operators, and lastly, the locals.

Strategies and tactics

1. National reconciliation: This involves the introduction of a broad national reconciliation programme which includes equal representation of minorities.
2. Paying soldiers an incentive: Designed to effectively buy friendship, the idea is that if enemies cannot be defeated, they can be bought. This involves paying Afghan tribes and local or middle-ranking Taliban leaders to give up fighting in return for cash. In the Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, the Shinwari tribe has, for instance, agreed to fight against the Taliban for which it will be paid $1 million.
3. Positive religious motivation.
4. Jobs, education and socioeconomic opportunities: Millions of dollars in foreign aid are funneled to villages that organize neighbourhood watch programmes to help with security issues. This will later also help avoid civilian confrontation when foreign forces leave Afghanistan.
5. Induction in government representation.
6. Humanitarian programmes.


London conference; Karzai’s six-point ‘action plan’

In the wake of the London conference in January 2010, President Hamid Karzai presented his six-point ‘Action Plan’ for Afghanistan. He announced it as the Taliban Reintegration Plan, with the stated aim to “offer an honourable place in society” to those insurgents who are willing to renounce Al Qaeda and who abandon violence and pursue their political goals peacefully in accordance with the constitution.

The plan largely frames six main agendas that can influence or manipulate the so-called ‘good’ or ‘moderate’ Taliban. As a token of support, Western leaders pledged $140 million for the first year with further finances to be determined according to the success of the initial plan. The six points refer to the following:

1. Peace and reconciliation,
2. Security,
3. Good governance,
4. Addressing corruption,
5. Regional cooperation, and
6. Economic development.

Recommendations

Pakistan’s history has been punctuated by an on-again, off-again partnership with the United States. Given widespread dissatisfaction among people at large, cooperation becomes even more limited and there remains a considerable gap between public sentiment and actual policy.

What is lacking is an action agenda that helps develop an approach which directly and positively impacts the population. Such an approach would allow the U.S. and Pakistan to collectively identify sectors and areas that need reforms and assistance in both long and short terms. One of these could, for instance, be terrorism. The Pakistani political establishment has come to recognize the danger of jihadis and identified the Taliban and Al Qaeda as a real threat to the future of Pakistan’s own stability just as the U.S. sees them as a major global issue.

NATO and U.S. should alter their strategy altogether in order to achieve long-term success in Afghanistan. They need to address the issue of Pashtun alienation, since behind the Taliban façade is a distinct Pashtun ethnicity. Foreign military occupation has helped unite, motivate and win support for disparate elements that we label the Afghan Taliban. NATO and U.S. do not openly admit the involvement of other actors in the region which include, among others, Uzbeks and Tajiks, who are not ethnically Pashtun but are continued to be labelled Taliban.

A strong Pakistan-U.S. alliance is critical for the stability of South Asia and the world at large. Washington must realise that Pakistan is not just a means with which it can dictate its foreign policy but has its own national interest, domestic and political imperatives and geopolitical concerns. Pakistan, on the other hand, must realise that it has to do more to settle its multifaceted internal crises. It has to fight the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other militant organisations in order to restore its credibility as an anti-terrorist State. Some of the steps that could be taken towards a long-term and stable relationship are:

1. Addressing immediate energy, water and related economic crises through short-tern humanitarian assistance.
2. Improving local police forces in counterterrorism and technical fields.
3. Controlling narcotics and drugs in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan since these are the biggest source of income for extremists to purchase weapons and other material.
4. Controlling opium and poppy cultivation in the Pak-Afghan region.
5. Reaching out to different political parties, including those with limited regional constituencies, which could offer a means to enhance U.S.-Pakistan cooperation at the sub-national level.
6. Reforming the existing educational structure in rural and urban areas with the help of provincial governments to counter anti-U.S. sentiments among younger population, effectively preventing militant groups from capitalizing on their vulnerabilities.
7. Stabilising Afghanistan through peace talks and agreements with the Pashtun tribal leaders and with the Taliban who are willing to come to the negotiating table.
8. Developing the tribal areas on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border so that insurgents are unable to find sanctuaries and support bases.
9. Addressing the Kashmir issue by getting India and Pakistan to negotiate. The U.S. should encourage changes in the dynamics of the Indo-Pakistan relations to reduce tension on both sides.
10. Providing better salaries and specialized counterterrorism training to the Pakistani police force.
11. Broadening the anti-militant campaign nationwide, especially in rural areas of Punjab and in the Afghan-Pakistan border region.


Conclusion

Pakistan is going through a long-drawn-out internal crisis; a coalition government struggling with a difficult situation inherited from the previous regime is facing uncertain relations with its neighbours as well as with its allies in the war on terror. It confronts issues of rampant inflation, increased terrorist activity nationwide and a dire energy shortage. Dramatic reforms are needed in almost every sector to restore economic and political stability.

Pakistan is also concerned about Indian penetration in Afghanistan. Being a strategic partner, the U.S. should take responsibility for restraining India’s activities, especially in areas close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. With its crucial position in South Asia, its long-running enmity with India and its porous border with Afghanistan, any threat of potential failure in Pakistan represents the greatest strategic threat facing the current international system.

There is an urgent need for broader dialogue between Pakistan and the U.S. at the strategic, political, diplomatic and economic levels. Constructive and productive opportunities should be created to cultivate the relationship and improve the image of the U.S. as a reliable ally. America needs Pakistan in order to fight and defeat its enemies, but Pakistan, being a frontline ally, has already suffered heavy losses. It is necessary for the U.S. to assure its commitment to the Pakistani society, civil-bureaucratic leadership and the army, and ensure that this time the relationship is going to last.

Washington has since the events of 9/11 reacted to events in and around Afghanistan under the pretext of Islamist extremist and anti-West terrorism. This fails to assess the relevance of the situation according to regional dynamics and thus in shaping an appropriate response.

The rise of insurgencies in Afghanistan and a politically weak and corrupt government have left political and psychological scars on the country. The West needs to remember that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were joint products which the U.S. and Pakistan produced to counter the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The path ahead must be multi-prolonged to deal with the challenges at hand. Both Pakistan and the U.S. should design assistance programmes on military as well as civilian platforms to empower the relationship, overcome the trust deficit and eliminate anti-American perceptions. This is essential to reach goals that are broadly compatible with the interests of both countries and enable them to defeat a common enemy.

v nice work. COuld you plz post the source of the article about Pak - US relations.

thanks

Wash Aathke
 

@rose-pak
[url]http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=523[/url]

Iran's Nuclear Program
 

[SIZE=7][COLOR=DarkRed]Iran's Nuclear Program[/COLOR][/SIZE]
Author: Greg Bruno

1. Introduction
2. Atoms from America
3. Second Thoughts on a Nuclear Iran
4. Known Capabilities
5. Unanswered Questions
6. Sanctions and Saber Rattling
________________________________________
Introduction
Iran's leaders have worked to pursue nuclear energy technology since the 1950s, spurred by the launch of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. It made steady progress, with Western help, through the early 1970s. But concern over Iranian intentions followed by the upheaval of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 effectively ended outside assistance. Iran was known to be reviving its civilian nuclear programs during the 1990s, but revelations in 2002 and 2003 of clandestine research into fuel enrichment and conversion raised international concern that Iran's ambitions had metastasized beyond peaceful intent.
Iran has consistently denied allegations it seeks to develop a bomb. Yet many in the international community remain skeptical. Despite a U.S. intelligence finding in November 2007 that concluded Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Bush administration warned that Iran sought to weaponize its nuclear program, concerns the Obama administration shares. Nonproliferation experts note Iran's ability to produce enriched uranium continues to progress but disagree on how close Iran is to mastering capabilities to weaponize.
The September 2009 revelation of a second uranium enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom--constructed under the radar of international inspectors--deepened suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions. The West's fears were confirmed in mid-February 2010 when the IAEA released a report that detailed Iran's potential for producing a nuclear weapon, including further fuel enrichment and plans for developing a missile-ready warhead.
Atoms from America
Iran's efforts to develop nuclear energy trace to 1957, in connection with a push from the Eisenhower administration to increase its military, economic, and civilian assistance to Iran. On March 5 of that year, the two countries announced a "proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy" under the auspices of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. The deal was intended to open doors for U.S. investment in Iran's civilian nuclear industries, such as health care and medicine. The plan also called for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to lease Iran up to 13.2 pounds of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for research purposes.
Two years after the agreement was made public, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ordered the establishment of an institute at Tehran University--the Tehran Nuclear Research Center--and negotiated with the United States to supply a five-megawatt reactor. Over the next decade the United States provided nuclear fuel and equipment that Iran used to start up its research. Gary Samore, President Obama's top expert on weapons of mass destruction, told CFR.org in 2008 that the cooperation was meant to assist Iran in developing nuclear energy while steering Tehran away from indigenous fuel-cycle research. On July 1, 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the day it opened for signature. Six years later Iran completed its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
By the 1970s, France and Germany joined the United States in providing assistance to the Iranian nuclear program. Regional wars and predictions of a looming energy shortfall prompted the shah to explore alternative forms of power production. In March 1974, he established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and announced plans to "get, as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts [of electricity] from nuclear power stations." By the mid-1970s, Iran had signed contracts with Western firms--including France's Framatome and Germany's Kraftwerk Union--for the construction of nuclear plants and supply of nuclear fuel.
Second Thoughts on a Nuclear Iran
Despite the early and sustained flow of nuclear technology to Tehran, Western governmental support for Iran's nuclear program began to erode ahead of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In August 1974, a U.S. special national intelligence estimate (PDF) declared that while "Iran's much publicized nuclear power intentions are entirely in the planning stage," the ambitions of the shah could lead Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, especially in the shadow of India's successful nuclear test in May 1974.
"If Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other [partner] countries." - P.J. Crowley, U.S. State Department spokesman
This concern led Western governments to withdraw support for Iran's nuclear program. Pressure on France, which in 1973 signed a deal to build two reactors atDarkhovin, and Germany, whose Kraftwerk Union began building a pair of reactors at Bushehr in 1975, led to the cancellation of both projects. After the Islamic Revolution, the seizure of U.S. hostages, and termination of diplomatic relations in 1979, U.S. opposition to Iran's nuclear efforts increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Washington blocked nuclear deals between Iran and Argentina, China, and Russia. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in Columbia University's Journal of International Affairs in 2007 that Washington's shift away from supporting Iran's nuclear energy program left Tehran with little choice but to be discreet in its nuclear activities (PDF). "To avoid the [U.S.-led] restrictions and impediments," Zarif writes, "Iran refrained for disclosing the details of its programs."
Known Capabilities
The withdrawal of Western support after the Islamic Revolution slowed Iran's nuclear progress. And a confluence of factors--opposition to nuclear technology by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the exodus of nuclear scientists, and the destruction of Iraq's nuclear facility by Israel in 1981, which removed an immediate threat--sent Iran's nuclear program into a tailspin. But many nonproliferation experts believe Iran became interested again in a nuclear program by the mid-1980s. Leonard S. Spector, deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, writes there is evidence Iran received assistance from Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khanas early as 1985, though it wasn't until the death of Khomeini in 1989 that Tehran's efforts reached critical mass. [Khan, speaking to a Pakistani television journalist in August 2009, confirmed that his network assisted Iran (PDF) in contacting suppliers of nuclear technology].
Unlike his predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei held a more favorable view of nuclear energy and military technology, and set out to rebuild Tehran's program. Analysts also believe the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as a growing U.S. presence in the region, pushed Tehran to ramp up its research. In a boost to the civilian nuclear effort, Russia in January 1995 picked up where Germany left off, signing a contract with Iran to complete two 950-megawatt light-water reactors at Bushehr (with fuel supplied by Russia). In September 2008, the Russian company building the power plantreiterated its commitment (AFP) to finishing the project, while Moscow has said it hopes to fire up the reactor by the end of 2009 (Press TV). Iranian officials have also announced that the Darkhovin project has resumed, and plans call for a 360-megawatt reactor to be operational there by 2016. Iran--which has also turned to China, Pakistan, and North Korea for nuclear technology and assistance--claims it wants to build nuclear power plants to diversify its energy portfolio.

With an eye toward fueling these facilities with domestically produced fuel--and, many experts say, to develop a weapon--Iran has built a vast network (PDF) of uranium mines, enrichment plants, conversion sites, and research reactors. Of these facilities, about a dozen are considered major nuclear sites (PDF). For instance, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center employs as many as three thousand scientists and is suspected of housing Iran's weapons program, according to the U.S.-funded nonpartisan Congressional Research Service. Isfahan is also the location of Iran's uranium-conversion efforts, where approximately 366 tons of uranium hexafluoride has been produced since March 2004. This so-called feedstock is fed into centrifuges at another central site: the Natanz enrichment facility.
At Natanz, first-generation centrifuges (IR-1) purchased from Pakistan spin uranium hexafluoride at great speeds to increase the percentage of uranium-235, the principal ingredient for both power production and weapons capability. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent of the uranium-235 isotope, and generally, light-water power reactors require enrichment levels of 3 percent to 5 percent (levels of low-enriched uranium, or LEU). Weapons-grade uranium--also known as highly-enriched uranium, or HEU--is around 90 percent (technically, HEU is any concentration over 20 percent, but weapons-grade levels are described as being in excess of 90 percent). According to the IAEA, Iran is capable of enriching to about 4.7 percent.
David Albright, an expert on Iran's nuclear program and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, estimates Iran is producing roughly 2.77 kg of LEU per day (PDF), a rate that has remained consistent throughout 2009. Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, says if Iran were to stockpile sufficient LEU they would be able to produce 25 kg of weapons-grade uranium for production of a single bomb "within a couple of months," a timeline Albright agreed with during a February 2009 interview with CFR.org. Iran is using centrifuges to enrich uranium hexafluoride gas, increasing the concentration of uranium-235. Senior American officials, speaking on background, told reporters in September 2009 that a second enrichment facility under construction near Qom could hold about 3,000 centrifuge machines. "Now, that's not a large enough number to make any sense from a commercial standpoint," the official said. "But if you want to use the facility in order to produce a small amount of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a bomb or two a year, it's the right size."
Unanswered Questions
International skepticism of Iranian intentions was first aroused in August 2002 when a London-based Iranian opposition group disclosed details about a secret heavy-water production plant at Arak, as well as the underground enrichment facility at Natanz. In May 2003, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the disclosure of Arak and Natanz raised serious questions about Iran's nuclear intentions. "We believe Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons," Boucher said, "using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant)." These revelations, coupled with subsequent admissions from Iran that it has concealed aspects of its program, prompted the IAEA to intensify inspections.
"Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues ... which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear program." -- IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
While international inspectors have never found concrete evidence linking Iran's nuclear program to weapons development, Iran's concealment of its program--like the partially constructed enrichment facility near Qom, which Western officials say was under construction for years before Iran's disclosure in the fall of 2009--has fed concerns. In a June 2003 report (PDF), IAEA inspectors concluded that Iran had failed to meet obligations under its Safeguards Agreement signed in 1974. Failures included withholding construction and design details of new facilities, and not reporting processed and imported uranium. Some undeclared shipments dated to 1991, the IAEA said.
International pressure following the revelations led Iran to temporarily cease its enrichment-related activities, and in late 2003 Tehran signed an Additional Protocol allowing the atomic agency greater access to nuclear sites. Negotiations with members of the European Union quickly followed (PDF). But on August 8, 2005, Iran announced it was resuming uranium conversion at Isfahan. By early 2006, IAEA inspectors confirmed that Iran had once again resumed its enrichment program. Today Iran operates thousands of IR-1 centrifuges-the majority at Natanz-though the total number of operational devices is unclear. [An August 2009 IAEA report found that 8,308 centrifuges were either enriching uranium or installed at the facility]. Construction of a commercial-scale facility at Natanz, which will house over fifty thousand centrifuges, is also under way.
Under the terms of the NPT, signatories have the "inalienable right" to produce fuel for civilian energy production, either by enriching uranium or separating plutonium. But the United States and other Western governments accuse Iran of failing to abide by NPT safeguards, and of pursuing technology to produce nuclear weapons. Paul K. Kerr of the Congressional Research Service wrote in a August 2009 report (PDF) that the principal proliferation concern is "Tehran's construction of a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility " at Natanz. Experts say enrichment of uranium hexafluoride gas is of particular concern, because producing weapons-grade fuel (HEU) is considered the most difficult aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. Kerr also counts Iran's construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak--which contains plutonium in its spent fuel--as another proliferation concern.
Albright, of ISIS, says Iranian enrichment capabilities are improving, a troubling development given Iran's continued refusal to answer IAEA questions about past activities. In February 2008, the IAEA presented Iran with intelligence collected by the United States that U.S. officials say proves Tehran worked to develop nuclear weapons in the recent past. The intelligence is believed to have been smuggled out of Iran on a laptop computer in 2004 and handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The data included (PDF) alleged evidence of the so-called Green Salt project, a secret uranium-processing program; high-explosives testing; and design of a reentry vehicle "which could have a military nuclear dimension," the IAEA says. Iranian officials claim the data is fake. But the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that while Iran likely halted its weapons program in fall 2003, "Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" in the future. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, speaking in September 2009, said Iran continues to be uncooperative on many fronts, making it impossible to determine Tehran's intent. "Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues," he said, "which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear program."
Sanctions and Saber Rattling
The United States has imposed unilateral economic sanctions on Iran for nearlythree decades (Arms Control Today), but international efforts to cripple Iran's nuclear program have coalesced more recently. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed an "absence of confidence (PDF) that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes." Five months later, the board voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council, and in December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted the first of a series of resolutions imposing sanctions to punish Iran for continued uranium enrichment. Resolution 1737 initiated a block on the sale or transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. Subsequent resolutions--the most recent in September 2008, which reaffirmed past mandates--added financial and travel sanctions on Iranian individuals and companies. In June 2008, the European Union imposed its own set of sanctions, freezing the assets of nearly forty individuals and entities doing business with Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank. Western officials have accused Bank Melli of supporting Iran's nuclear and missile programs.
Now some members of Congress are backing a bill that would authorize the White House to penalize foreign companies for selling refined petroleum to Iran. Some analysts support this approach, but former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton suggests only the threat of force (WSJ) can prevent an Iran nuclear bomb. CFR's Micah Zenko says Israel may be prepared to act (LAT) in that regard if the United States doesn't.
Despite increasing calls for a military solution, international diplomacy continues apace. In mid-2008, the European Union resubmitted a 2006 offer of incentives for Iran to give up its enrichment activities. In October 2009, talks between Iran, the United States, and other world powers ended in failure as Iran's leadership rejected a plan to send its uranium to the West (NYT), hours after Iranian negotiators agreed to the deal.
Iran continues to send mixed signals (PDF) regarding cooperation with the IAEA, though considerable evidence suggests Iran's defiance. In November 2009, the Iranian government approved ten new uranium enrichment plants (WashPost). In February 2010, escalation mounted when Iran announced plans to heighten the enrichment levels (CSMonitor) of existing uranium stockpiles and Ahmadinejad declared (NationalPost), on the Islamic Republic's thirty-first anniversary, Iran to be a "nuclear state." These developments and Iran's continued intransigence led the IAEA's new director general, Yukiya Amano, to publicly announce IAEA fears that Iran was working on nuclear weaponization. A February 2010 report read, "Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
Russia and China traditionally have resisted calls for a fourth round of UN sanctions, but in March 2010 President Medvedev signaled that Russia was warming (Reuters)to the possibility of sanctions. China, however, continues to resist stronger sanctions, and its foreign minister announced in early March (Reuters) that sanctions will not solve the Iran nuclear issue.
U.S. officials remain committed to a bilateral, dual-track approach of both international sanctions and incentives. An example of this tactic is the March 2010 decision to allow the export of internet services (NYT) like instant messaging and file sharing to Iran. These services are intended to facilitate the free flow of information and undermine the regime's control over the media and communications.

Extremism and Pakistan.
 

In Pakistan, the relation between Islam and state has been a matter of great controversy. From the time of its inception, the opinion in the country has remained divided as to whether Pakistan is to be an Islamic/‘shariah’ state or a ‘modern’/‘secular’ Muslim-majority state.
The roots of this controversy could be traced to the various statements of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, which he gave during the independence movement and at the time of the emergence of Pakistan.
For example, in his 1940-article entitled “The Constitutional Future of India”, Jinnah stated:
“The British people, being Christians, sometimes forget the religious wars of their own history and today consider religion as a private and personal matter between man and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and Islam, for these religions are definite social codes which govern not so much man’s relations with his God as man’s relations with his neighbor. They govern not only his law and culture, but every aspect of his social life, and such religions, essentially exclusive, completely preclude that merging of identity and unity of thought on which Western democracy is based, and inevitably bring about vertical rather than the horizontal divisions democracy envisages.” [1]
In marked contrast to the opinion expressed in the above-mentioned article, Jinnah as the designated Governor-General stated in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947:
“ . . . You may belong to any religion or caste or creed . . . that has nothing to do with the business of the state . . . We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.” He added, “. . .you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in political sense, as citizens of the state.” [2] The ‘two-nation theory’ had served its purpose and was duly repudiated. The two ‘nations’ __ Hindus and Muslims ___ were once again to be regarded as two ‘communities’ after independence.
Jinnah’s pronouncement of 11 August 1947 explicitly envisaged creation of a secular state in Pakistan. In doing so he was representing religious diversity of Pakistani society and plurality of Pakistani culture.
But the Ulema (Clergy) considered it a betrayal of the cause for which the South Asian subcontinent was partitioned into two sovereign states. Since then the ‘Objectives Resolution’ of 1949, the 22 Points of the Ulema framed in 1951, the anti-Ahmediya agitation of 1953, the ‘Islamic’ provisions of the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973, including the declaration of the Ahmediya community as being outside the pale of Islam through a constitutional amendment in 1974, General Zia’s ‘Islamization’ program and the ‘jihadi’ culture have reflected the conflicts and compromises between the adherents of diverse opinions as to the role of Islam in Pakistan.
Notwithstanding popular aspiration to establish some form of Islamic polity___ a legacy of the freedom struggle ____ the ethos of Pakistani society did not reflect religious extremism, at least till 1979.
In fact the society was prepared to accept many liberties in every-day life that the strict observance of Shariah would have denied it.
With economic development and exposure to foreign influences, it was opening up to modernism and adopting many western values. Ayub Khan’s period would be particularly known for this trend, for he had a penchant to modernize Pakistani society and his Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 is a testimony to the fact.
One has nostalgia for the social scene of the 1960s. There was no bar on performing arts, provided the presentations were apolitical.
The cinema halls offered latest Pakistani, Indian and Hollywood movies that as a part of urban culture were watched by families in decent environment.
Almost every urban locality had its wine shops and some sort of mini clubs for the youth. For the elite, the gymkhanas and nightclubs in the cities offered good venues to enjoy liquor, gambling and dancing.
There used to be prominent advertisements of floorshows with semi nude photographs of foreign performers in the newspapers. The racecourses attracted a lot of people on weekends.
The rich organized New Year parties without any hinder. Musical shows and functions without any impediment. Foreign tourists thronged the market places in the cities. Co-educational institutions were mushrooming.
The programs of Qawwali, (a form of recitation of Sufi poetry in the traditions of Hazrat Amir Khusro-the renowned Mystique and inventor of this form of religious rendition in praise of Allah, Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), and religious saints), was quite normal and used to draw huge audiences. Besides, rendition of Urdu Poetry in the well entrenched form of Mushaira was built into our lives and used to be a great form of _expression of our culture and traditions. The city life, particularly big cities like Karachi and Lahore, were known for these traditional forms of _expression of our aesthetic values.
The Coffee shops were built in to our day to day lives and were venues of diverse political, social and cultural debates, discourses and discussions. In short, there was no transformation in urban or rural culture that could have been specifically attributed to the creation of Pakistan in the name of Islam. Alas the traumatic events of 1971, culminating in the abject surrender of Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan, did jolt the nation. Since the military ruler of the time, General Yahya Khan, and some of his close associates were notorious as drunkards and womanizers, the people blamed their waywardness as responsible for the disaster.
In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, the unruly mobs attacked and burnt wine shops, nightclubs and cinema houses to vent their shock and grief. In this passing phase, there was much talk about the East Pakistan catastrophe as being a divine retribution for nation’s sins in deviating from the path of Islam and the dire need to revert back to what was popularly perceived as the real raison d’etre of Pakistan. With East Pakistan gone, Pakistan lost much of its religious diversity. Under pressure from the religious parties, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who assumed power after the East Pakistan debacle, agreed to declare Islam the state religion of Pakistan in the Constitution of 1973.
He used the Islamic Summit Conference held at Lahore in February 1974 to project himself as one of the foremost leaders of the Islamic world. He also consented to declare the Ahmediya community as non-Muslim through a constitutional amendment in September 1974 after serious riots broke out on the issue.
By adopting such measures, Bhutto wanted to strengthen his Islamic credentials vis-à-vis ethno-regional and religious parties and compensate for his failure to deliver on economic front. But despite all this, Bhutto was never averse to cultural permissiveness and the ethos of Pakistani society did not undergo any change on that count.
His social liberalism was anathema to religious parties and the Casino, which Bhutto planned to construct on the Clifton beach, became a symbol of Bhutto’s cultural openness.
Considering himself firmly entrenched in the office, Bhutto advised President Fazle Elahi Chaudhry in the first week of January 1977 to dissolve the National Assembly and appoint 7 March as the date for next general elections.
In no time the hitherto divided opposition joined hands to form the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to confront Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party from a single platform.
In his desire to secure two-third majority that could have enabled him to amend the Constitution, Bhutto and his erstwhile colleagues and the then administration went for the overkill and the elections were massively rigged.
The PNA declined to accept the results and demanded resignation of Bhutto and holding of fresh elections under the supervision of the judiciary and the armed forces. The PNA picked up the slogan of ‘Nizam-i-Mustafa’ to infuse religious fervor in the movement that it launched to remove Bhutto.
The call for establishment of ‘Nizam-i-Mustafa’ became a rallying point and the urban populations, especially the bourgeois classes, were mesmerized by the romanticism of the utopia offered.
The workers of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the pupils belonging to the madrassahs of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)) spearheaded the PNA agitation to remove Bhutto from power.
With the involvement of foreign hand, the movement gathered momentum and the government became ineffective in maintaining law and order. Even the use of troops failed to stop the processions chanting slogans of ‘Nizam-I-Mustafa’ that daily poured out from the mosques. As a last resort, Bhutto agreed to introduce ‘Islamic system’ in the country and announced ban on gambling, wine, floorshows and the like.
There was to be no more racecourse or nightclub culture in the country. He declared Friday ___ the Muslim equivalent of Sabbath ___ as the weekly holiday.
Bhutto’s announcement to introduce ‘Islamic’ measures was taken as his weakness and a last ditch effort to save himself. Ultimately, as a result of the negotiations that had been in progress, the PNA and the PPP came to terms on holding of fresh elections in October 1977.
The agreement to this effect was to be signed at noon on 5 July; but in the early hours of that date the Chief of Army Staff, General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq, imposed martial law on the country.
In his very first address to the nation on 5 July 1977, General Zia stated:
“I must say that the spirit of Islam demonstrated during the recent movement was commendable. It proved that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.” [3]
General Zia had no qualms in exploiting the fair name of Islam for his political ends, i.e., survival at all cost; and JI had no scruples in supporting the most ruthless military ruler of Pakistan in his design to self-perpetuate himself.
In JI’s view, he was a messiah or Saladin destined to redeem the country that had gone astray after independence. With mosque and military as his constituencies, General Zia played havoc with the state institutions and the civil society during his eleven-year stint.
Commenting on General Zia’s rule, The Encyclopedia of Pakistan observes:
“In attempting to restructure . . . state and society into a theocracy, the government undertook two kinds of initiatives:
First, measures designed to (be) subordinate to executive authority, institutions of state and civil society such as the judiciary and the press, which if allowed to function independently could check governmental power.
“The second set of measures towards a theocratic state sought to inculcate obscurantist views and induced a narrowing of the human mind. It involved a suspension of the sensibility of love and reason underlying the religious tradition signified in Pakistan’s folk culture.” [4]
Retracting from his solemn pledge to hold elections in October 1977, shrewd, cunning and deceitful, General Zia initiated a process of so-called accountability of politicians and sought legitimacy in his ‘Islamization’ program, which was more cosmetic than substantial.
In February 1979, General Zia fixed a fresh date for holding of general elections and promulgated the so-called Hudood Ordinance 1979 (a unfair, unjust, un Islamic and intrinsically a draconian law) that dealt with the offences of drinking, adultery, theft and false allegations.
After a trial that lacked transparency and procedural propriety, Bhutto was sent to gallows in April 1979 on the false charge of ordering the murder of a political opponent.
Once the purpose of eliminating Bhutto was achieved, the general elections scheduled for November 1979 were postponed indefinitely.
Simultaneously, General Zia unleashed a reign of terror against his detractors and publicly flogged the PPP workers, students, journalists and lawyers who opposed his draconian measures.
In 1979, General Zia also promulgated Zakat and Ushr Ordinance that authorized the government to deduct what may be referred to as Islamic wealth tax at the rate of 2½ % from bank deposits that fall under the category of savings. The amount so deducted was to be distributed amongst the needy through some 32,000 zakat committees.
Those who became members of these committees developed a vested interest in prolongation of Zia’s rule.
In line with his ‘Islamization’ program, General Zia constituted in 1980 a Shariat Bench in each of the High Courts with the power to declare as repugnant to Islam any existing law, excluding fiscal laws.
Subsequently, in the same year, a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established to replace provincial Shariat Benches probably to simplify the structure of the judiciary and avoid pronouncement of conflicting judgments on matters related to shariah.
The FSC also had appellate jurisdiction in cases decided at lower levels under the shariah laws. The final judicial authority in the shariah matters was to be the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court.
This brought about great elevation in the position of the ulema and they reached the corridors of power.
Husain Haqqani, who had once worked with Zia, observes:
“To serve alongside Western-educated jurists, Zia nominated representatives of the Islamic parties as judges of the Federal Sharia Court, the first time traditionally educated ulema had held that position since the introduction of English common law under British rule.” [5]
Under the instructions of General Zia, the performing arts were discouraged and strict censor was imposed on cinema and TV programs. The women artists and anchors on TV were to cover their head with dupatta (Hijab) and wear dresses that were not sexually attractive.
The themes of drama were changed to depict conservative values. The number of programs presenting Hamd (praise of Allah), Naat (praise of the Holy Prophet P.B.U.H.), Tilawat (recitation of the Holy Quran) and Tafseer (explanation and exegesis) were, qualitatively and quantitatively increased.
The radio and TV started airing the Azan (call for prayers) regularly. Advertisements in newspapers and on hoardings were not to carry photographs of women that may be considered obscene. Women were banned from participating in sports before the male crowd.
The Zia Administration issued directives to its various departments to arrange for observance of prayers and take break for that purpose.
Special sites were spared for observance of congregational prayers in government and semi-government offices and public places, including airports, railway stations, parks, markets, hospitals, educational institutions etc.
The sanctity of the month of Ramdhan (Holy month of Fasting) was strictly observed. The cafes and restaurants remained closed during the daytime. Even hawkers were not allowed to sell eatables during fasting hours.
For this purpose, Ehtaram-i-Ramazan Ordinance was promulgated in 1981, which prescribed punishment for violation of Ramazan’s sanctity.
With effect from 1 January 1981, the banks were required to introduce profit and loss sharing accounts that were claimed to be interest-free.
Subsequently, Banking and Financial Services (Amendment of Laws) Ordinance, 1984, was promulgated that introduced various concepts of so-called Islamic banking, including mark-up, hire-purchase, rent-sharing, licensing, leasing, musharika, modaraba etc.
In the field of education, the Quranic verses were used to describe natural laws and phenomena in textbooks of physical sciences.
The subject of Pakistan Studies became a vehicle for creating hatred towards the Hindu community and the students were indoctrinated in so-called ‘ideology of Pakistan’, for which truth was compromised and history murdered. [6]
The textbooks of Islamiat became a source of controversy between various sects of Islam. The isnads (degrees) conferred by madrassahs were made equivalent to university degrees, on the basis of which appointments were made in educational institutions.
There was talk of opening of separate girls’ universities. Urdu was made medium of instruction in government schools that effectively closed the minds of students by placing constraints on their access to knowledge.
General Zia’s ‘Islamic’ measures appear to be hypocritical. He never attempted to introduce the substance of Islam i.e., social and economic justice. Instead, the feudal lords and industrialists were given free hand to exploit the people. Unlike Bhutto’s time, the gap between the haves and have-nots increased rapidly under Zia.
As expected, General Zia’s program of ‘Islamization’ became controversial and imparted irreparable damage to the social fabric.
In Islam, there are various versions of shariah known as fiqahs since more than a thousand years. There are also several sects or maslaks (schools) that differ on beliefs of secondary nature but quarrel as if these differences are related to the fundamentals of Islam.
Often the ulema hailing from these various maslaks do not hesitate from issuing the fatwa (religious decree) of takfir (infidelity) against the rivals.
During the freedom struggle, Jinnah had taken due precaution not to get involved in sectarian issues. [7]
Zia’s legislative measures purportedly conformed to Sunni-Hanafi school of Islam and were at once resented by the minority Shia community that adhered to fiqah-i-jafaria.
As early as April 1979, an All Pakistan Shia Convention was held at Bhakkar to discuss the implications of General Zia’s legislative measures for the Shia community. It was on this occasion that Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafferia (TNFJ) was founded under the leadership of Mufti Jaffer Hussein, which became the most representative of Shia organizations.
Encouraged by the Iranian revolution of 1979, Pakistan’s Shia community adopted a tough stand on the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1979 and refused to allow the government to deduct any amount from the deposits of Shia account holders.
On the call of Wifaq-i-Ulema-i-Shia (Federation of religious Clergy of Shia) Pakistan and Imamia Students Organization, the Shias converged in Islamabad on 5 July 1980 and virtually seized the capital city until the government conceded their demand of exemption from zakat deduction.
Under the Islamabad Agreement signed on the occasion, the government also promised to prescribe separate courses of studies in Islamiat for the Shia students.
Imam Khomeini played an important role in resolving the issue and obtained assurance from General Zia that the Shia demands would be met. (8]
The Iranian Revolution had inspired Muslims throughout the world by successfully confronting the United States and presenting a practical example of Islamic polity. Its radicalism was a threat to anachronistic regimes of the neighboring countries where despots ruled without popular participation or consent.
Pro-American Saudi monarchy particularly felt threatened from the trend set by the Iranian Revolution and feared that its spillover effects might destabilize the region. The show of strength by the Shias in Pakistan disturbed the Saudi dynasty and soon the Saudi government decided to counter Shia influence in Pakistan by supporting Sunni jihadi organizations that had been emerging since 1979 in the backdrop of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
In August 1983, Mufti Jaffer Hussein died and TNFJ faced split in its ranks. One faction of the party called a conference at Bhakkar in February 1984 and elected Allama Syed Arif Al Husseini as its President.
Allama Syed Arif Al Husseini was able to secure support of Imam Khomeni and was appointed the Imam’s representative in Pakistan. [9]
Since the Islamabad Agreement had not been fully implemented, the TNFJ under Al Husseini resorted to agitation in which several shias were killed in July 1985 and the situation became very tense. The politics of TNFJ was seen with misgivings by the Sunni ulema.
In September 1985, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangwi, Maulana Ziaur Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesarul Haq Qasmi and Maulana Azam Tariq, all known for their anti-Shia views, founded Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sahaba, which was subsequently renamed as Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).
Apart from sectarian differences, the emergence of the SSP represented class conflicts. An analyst has observed, “A feudal system has been operative in jhang (a District of Southern Punjab) for a very long time and most feudal landlords in this area belong to the Shia sect.
Opposed to this the majority of investors, industrialists and businessmen of the area are Sunnis. Divergence of interests led to confrontations in Jhang and Chiniot.” He has further claimed:
“Independent sources and police records confirm that Anjuman-i- Sipah-i- Sahaba was created by a group of eighteen businessmen from Jhang and discussions were held with Maulana Jhangvi to set down the outlines and goals of the organization.
The businessmen wanted to give a religious outlook to the organization so that the sympathies of the majority Sunni public could be gained against the Shia feudals.” [10]
Another theory is that the SSP was founded at the behest of General Zia who wanted to wean away popular support from the PPP in Punjab and simultaneously intended to counter the growing influence of Iran.
The SSP accused the TNFJ and other shia organizations of receiving financial assistance from Iran with a view to convert Pakistan into a Shia state. It alleged that the Shia ulema insulted the companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) in their sermons and publications, which could not be tolerated.
The SSP claimed that it wanted to institute Khilafat in Pakistan and demanded that the country should be declared a Sunni state.
Apparently the SSP received Saudi funds and enjoyed backing of Pakistani agencies, or the elements within, those were averse to the growing influence of Iran in the country.
Within a short period, the SSP managed to establish a large number of madrassahs in the length and breadth of Pakistan that indoctrinated their pupils against the shias, claiming that the shias were non-Muslims and should be suppressed or even killed for showing disrespect to prominent sahaba (Companions of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), in particular the first three Khulfa-i-Rashideen.
To counter the SSP, the shias founded their own militant organization Sipah-i-Mohammad in 1993. The leaders of the SSP went a step further and created several terrorist outfits, including Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Al-Farooq, Al-Badar etc.
Although the conflicts between the TNFJ (or TNJ, as it was renamed), and the SSP and their respective offshoots failed to instigate Shia-Sunni riots at popular level except in Jhang, Chiniot and some nearby places, they resorted to target killings of prominent persons, including professionals, and planned attacks on mosques and Imam bargahs that have led to innumerable casualties during last the two decades.
Violence begets violence and it is a pity to note that apart from the commoners, a large number of Shia and Sunni ulema lost their lives in sectarian killings.
The legacy of General Zia continued to haunt even after the Providence removed him from the scene in August 1988.
The period 1988-1999 witnessed some of the worst spate of sectarian killings. After 9/11, the Musharraf government outlawed the TNJ, the SSP and various terrorist-sectarian organizations operating under them.
Even these measures have failed to eliminate the phenomenon. There is no escape saying that the sectarian violence in Pakistan began largely due to the short-sightedness of General Zia’s policy of so-called ‘Islamization’ of laws without first evolving a national consensus. Subsequently, the Shia-Sunni conflict was further flared up and sustained by the turf war between Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the two archrivals vying for influence in the region.
General Zia’s policy also strained relations between the various maslaks of the Sunni sect. He was particularly close to the Tableeghi Jamaat and attended its annual congregations.
At popular level, the Dawat-i-Islami, representing the Barailvi maslak, and the Tableeghi Jamaat are viewed as staunch rivals.
Pakistan government’s support to Deobandi, Wahabi and Ahle Hadith outfits in the wake of the Afghan jihad enabled the followers of these maslaks to increase their say in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and they were also embolden to take over many mosques belonging to Barailvi maslak.
This led to the creation of the militant Sunni Tehrik in 1990 to safeguard Baraivi interests.
Apart from sectarian conflicts, another manifestation of religious extremism in Pakistan is in the form of militancy or jihadi culture. Its origin is well known and may be briefly summed up.
On 17 July 1973, Sardar Muhammad Daoud toppled the government of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan and declared the country a Republic. He raised the issue of the Durand Line ____ the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan ___ and supported the cause of Pakhtunistan, a concept of self-governing or independent homeland for Pakhtuns, comprising Pakistan’s North-Western Frontier Province and northern parts of Balochistan.
At that time a nationalist insurgency was going on in Balochistan and Daoud’s policy posed a threat to Pakistan’s security. Prime Minister Bhutto decided to counter Daoud’s move by supporting the militias of Jamiat-i-Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and of Hizb-i-Islami led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar.
These organizations had links with Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami and the Middle East’s Muslim Brotherhood. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was made responsible for the conduct of the covert operation designed to strengthen the Islamists in Afghanistan. [11]
Concerned with this unpleasant development in the region, the Shah of Iran used his good offices and persuaded Bhutto and Daoud to commence dialogue.
While negotiations were in progress, General Zia seized power in July 1977 due to which the dialogue was disrupted. After a short break, the negotiations began between General Zia and Daoud and it was expected that the differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Durand Line and the Pakhtunistan issue would be amicably resolved [12].
However, before that happen Daoud was killed on 27 April 1978 in a coup staged by the Afghan Communists under Nur Muhammad Tarahki.
The establishment of a Communist regime in Afghanistan changed its traditional character of a buffer state between Russia / the Soviet Union and the South Asian Subcontinent. In December 1978, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which contained provisions concerning defense and security.
India had already concluded a similar treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. Iran was also in turmoil where the fall of the Shah looked imminent. In this backdrop, General Zia sought to revive Pakistan’s military ties with the United States, which were in the doldrums because of Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program.
Simultaneously, Pakistan decided to enhance its assistance to the Islamists who led the resistance against the Communist rule.
Pleading Pakistan’s case forcefully, General Zia stated in an interview to Klaus Natrop of Frank-furter Allgemeine Zaituny:
“The Soviet Union signed a Friendship Treaty with India in 1971 and later Pakistan was dismembered and Bangladesh was created. The Soviet Union went into a Treaty of Friendship with Ethiopia and Somalia was threatened . . . . The Soviet Union went into a Treaty of Friendship with Vietnam and Kampuchia is gone. The Soviet Union has now entered into a Treaty with Afghanistan. I do not say Pakistan will go but it certainly creates a threat to Pakistan.”
General Zia contended that the guerilla movement in Afghanistan “should get support it needs from China, from America, from Western Europe. Of course, it has to pass through Pakistan but Pakistan at the moment is not in a position to give them the support they need, because Pakistan will only be burning its own fingers that way.” [13]
As the resistance against the Communist regime in Afghanistan became strong with Pakistan’s covert support to the Islamists and the country plunged into a civil war.
Thousands of Afghans began crossing the Durand Line to take refuge in Pakistan. On 16 September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, the Afghan Prime Minister, captured power in a coup that led to the assassination of Tarahki. He too failed to control the situation in face of stiff resistance.
Not satisfied with Amin, on 27 December 1979, the Soviet Union moved its troops into Afghanistan and installed Babruk Karmal at the head of the government at Kabul.
Confronted with grave threat to Pakistan’s security, General Zia made loud appeals for American assistance to strengthen Pakistan’s defense and to force the roll back of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
With half-hearted commitment, U.S. President Carter offered an aid of $400 million to Pakistan, which General Zia rejected as a ‘peanut’. In the American Presidential elections of 1980, the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan was successful.
With Reagan as the US President, a new era of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States dawned and the United States offered Pakistan a package of $ 3.2 billion over next six years.
Together General Zia and Reagan decided to use Islam as a weapon against the Soviet occupational forces in Afghanistan and thus began the biggest covert operation in the history of CIA.
For the success of joint CIA-ISI venture, it was necessary to promote religious extremism or jihadi culture in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this they did.
With the American financial and military assistance, Pakistan became a conduit of arms supplies to Afghan counter revolutionaries who were now called mujahideen.
Western Europe, Japan, China, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also provided funds to carry on guerrilla war against the Soviet occupational forces in Afghanistan.
Initially these mujahideen were recruited from Afghans and Pakistani Pashtuns. As the scope of jihad widened, the Arabs, the Chechens, the Uzbeks and others joined the resistance.
Pakistan government encouraged the Deobandi ulema belonging to JUI to establish madrassah network in the Afghan refugee camps and Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
JI recruited warriors from the NWFP and cities of Punjab and Sindh where its cadres were strong.
By mid 1980s, several jihadi outfits were operating in Afghanistan and they enjoyed sanctuaries in Pakistan. Abdullah Azzam, the mentor of Osama Bin Laden set up his office in Peshawar to assist in jihad and was at a later stage visited by Bin Laden himself.
The madrassah and the mosques inspired the youth to participate in jihad.
Even the children were mentally prepared for the great cause. Highlighting the tactics used by the United States to indoctrinate the Afghan children for future role, Kathy Gannon states:
“The United States also pumped out inspirational literature of its own for the Afghan refugee camps, where U.S.-printed school books taught the alphabet by using such examples as: J is for Jihad, and K is for Kalashnikov, and I is for infidel. Mathematical problems would be something like: ‘If you had fifty Communist soldiers and you killed ten, how many would you still have?’ ” [14]
After the introduction of U.S stringer missiles on the part of the mujahideen, the Soviet Union fully realized that it could neither win the war nor bear the cost of the military adventure.
In the end, the proximity talks that had been taking place between Pakistan and the Communist regime of Afghanistan came to fruition in the form of the Geneva Accords under which the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by February 1989.
Once the Vietnam War was avenged and ‘the Evil Empire’ defeated, the United States lost its interest in Afghanistan. It unceremoniously ditched the jihadis and showed cold shoulder to Pakistan.Although General Zia was no more at the helm of affairs when the Soviet withdrawal was completed, but his Legacy that was well entrenched had, a vision of having strategic depth for Pakistan by controlling Kabul through some proxy and to have access to Central Asia. They were also driven for strategic depth owing insecurities and living under constant threat from its neighbor with whom it had full scale wars and its eastern flank.
They were also encouraged by success in Afghanistan to expand the jihadi network to Indian Occupied Kashmir.
In Afghanistan, the Communist government of Najibullah survived till April 1992. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, its fall seemed only a matter of time.
Despite Pakistan’s best effort, peace remained elusive in Afghanistan, where different jihadi organizations fought among themselves.
Pakistan failed to see Hikmatyar ___ its man ___ at the head of government in Kabul. In the absence of strong central authority, the writ of the Afghan government remained confined to Kabul and virtually innumerable warlords controlled Afghanistan’s territory.
The situation deteriorated to a point where different warlords imposed taxes on movement of goods and people through their respective domains. The Taliban were born in 1994 as a reaction to this highhandedness of the warlords. [15]
Although the emergence of the Taliban was accidental, they proved their mettle in a short span. Fortunately for Pakistan, many of them had received religious education in Deobandi madrassahs run by the JUI.
The ISI had first-hand experience of the Taliban in October 1994, when it helped recover a Pakistani trade convoy that was destined to Central Asia. In the Taliban, the ISI could see the potential of fulfilling Pakistan’s dream of strategic depth and access to Central Asia.
With the support of the ISI, the Taliban were able to take over nearly 90% of Afghanistan’s territory, including Kabul, by 1996.
In Indian occupied Kashmir, the ISI successfully orchestrated a jihadi campaign based in Azad Kashmir and Pakistani territory. By the late 1990s, the ISI-sponsored low intensity war in Indian occupied Kashmir engaged nearly seven hundred thousand Indian law enforcement personnel and regular troops.
The drain on Indian economy from this low intensity war in Kashmir was enormous and Pakistan hoped to bring India to a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute or bleed it indefinitely.
Pakistan’s Afghanistan and Kashmir policies made it imperative that the jihadi culture remained strong in the country.
The mosques and madrassahs sermonized on the importance of jihad and the JI and JUI, with their close nexus with the Pakistan armed forces, continued to recruit young people for the jihad in Kashmir. To train the recruits, necessary facilities were set up in Azad Kashmir, the tribal belt and the NWFP.
Although various individuals and institutions made huge contributions, one could routinely see the stalls of jihadi out fits distributing jihadi leaflets and collecting donations after Friday prayers.
Several daily, weekly and monthly publications were brought out with ISI sponsorship to propagate jihad. A large number of foreigners who had stayed in Pakistani tribal belt after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan also joined the mujahideen in Kashmir.
The 9/11 changed the entire scenario. After the Taliban refused to handover Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect of attack on the World Trade Center, Pakistan had to ditch its erstwhile ally and join the so-called American war on terror.
Since then Pakistan government has handed over to the United States scores of Taliban and Al Qaeda supporters, including several prominent Al-Qaeda figures.
Pakistan has also periodically launched very costly military operations in its tribal belt to eliminate militants and check cross-border incursions into Afghanistan from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements.
However, Pakistan cannot afford to allow a pro-India government in Kabul or to go on suppressing its tribal people for an alien cause.
In view of its strategic interests in Afghanistan and internal, existential societal, religious and political ground realities, Pakistan can ill afford burning its boats and has, of necessity to have a discreet nexus with the Taliban and politico-religious parties, JUI and JI.
Simultaneously, the jihadi infrastructure for Kashmir needs to be kept in tact to be reactivated if India drags its feet on the Kashmir issue too long.
The question to ponder over is not only how the jihadi outfits manage to recruit people or how do they operate. The question also is why the Muslims opt for jihad? Why so many young Muslims offer to become suicide bombers?
Is it not surprising that those who participated in attack on the World Trade Center were not madrassah students?
The answer is to be found in the arrogant and rogue behavior of the United States and Israel. It is to be found in the blood of innocent Palestinian Muslims that is being shed daily in Gaza and the West Bank and now the massacre of innocent Lebanese, mostly defense less infants, children elderly people, women in the name of taking on Hizbullah.
It is to be found in the American protection to dictatorial regimes that rule the Muslim countries. It is to be found in the ruthless suppression of the Kashmiri, Chechen, Uighar and Moro Muslims.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has lost all sense of propriety in dealing with the Muslim world. It has stationed its forces in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Gulf Emirates with the ‘permission’ of unrepresentative regimes.
It has occupied Iraq and Afghanistan and routinely, on daily basis, resort to indiscriminate killing of the innocent people of these countries.
It is threatening Syria and Iran without any justification. Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and Batgram prisons have become symbols of its savagery and barbarity. These acts cannot go unanswered.
What the West calls ‘terrorism’, Islamists call it jihad. And the jihad would continue if the United States and Israel do not vacate aggression from the Muslim land.
Presently, Pakistani society is a divided entity. There are those who find great attraction in the pop music, cable TV and consumerism, and yearn for a life of peace, comfort and enjoyment.
They would like Pakistan to be another Egypt or Turkey. For them religion is confined to a few rituals and that’s all.
At the other end are those who can never ignore the fact that the West is bent upon destroying Muslim ethos. Some of them revert to pacifist tradition of Islam. They recoil and withdraw, and attend the congregations of Dawat-i-Islami and Tableeghi Jamaat in the hope that better days would come.
For them, their maslak and fiqah is everything. But there are elements that consider jihad as ‘farz-i-ain’ and suicide bombing a legitimate war tactic.
They would continue to respond to the call of jihad. And yes, there are still others whose hatred for the United States and Israel accepts no bounds, but they think that without first equipping the Muslim World with science and technology and the art of modern ware-fare, the jihad in the form of qital is premature. [16]
While concluding it may be noted that there is no denying the fact that the ground realities those are confronting Pakistan and the eventual compulsions, in the after math of 911, those exacted the diametric changes in Pakistan’s policies were in keeping with the diktats of the time and our objectives.
Hence the people at the Helm of affairs did the best that they could.
Having said that, it may be pointed out that there is much that needs to be done in terms of changing the internal dynamics of society in Pakistan.
It could be achieved by formulating and executing long and short term policies those could result in catering to the conventional and non-conventional polar extremities in the society and those could build bridges and arrive at a new social contract that articulates our societal behavior in harmony with the changing internal, regional and global environment in league with Pakistan’s Ideological aspirations of finding and place in the comity of nations as a Muslim, democratic and economic power.
The civil society in Pakistan needs to rise to the occasion and contribute towards bridging the polarity gap by “throwing up moderate enlightenment from within and not imported enlightened moderation.
CONCLUDED.
About the author: Amicus is the pseudonym of Mohammed Yousuf advocate, a Lawyer based in Karachi. He has written extensively on current affairs, with reference to South and Central Asia. He can be reached on [email]mohammedyousuf@hotmail.com[/email]
Notes and References

great
 

mr alizai adding headings will put more charm to your efforts..anyhow keep it up.

[B]well done predator and Riaz..can any member convert all above notes in PDF format or in a compressed zip folder???[/B]

[SIZE="7"][COLOR="RoyalBlue"]MUSLIM RENAISSANCE MOVEMENTS IN
INDO-PAK SUB-CONTINENT
[/COLOR][/SIZE]
[SIZE="4"][B]A. MUJADDID ALF SANI [/B][/SIZE]
(Saviour of Islam During Second Millennium)

Shaikh Ahmed of Sirhind (1564-1624)

Born: 26-06-1564 Died: 15-12-1624



1. Background:

1.1. Akbar’s Din e Ilahi (reconciliation of religions: Islam and Hinduism + Christianity) adulterated Muslim polity, society and religion

1.2. Un-Islamic practices and beliefs introduced by Akbar & continued during Jahangir’s reign

2. Evils of Muslim Society:

2.1. Social: adulteration with socio-religious practices of Hinduism
2.2. Political: Sovereignty concept (zill-e-Ilahi) prostration
2.3. Spiritual / Ideological: Wahdat-ul-Wajud (Creator – creatures one)

3. Revival Movement:

3.1. He did not enter into direct political conflict with rulers but instead wrote letters to prominent personalities in Akbar’s (subsequently Jahangir’s) Court viz. Abdur Rehman Khan-e-Khanan, Khan-e-Azam Mirza Abdul Aziz, Mufti Sadr-e-Jahan – reminding them their religious duty
3.2. Sent disciples to different corners of India for preaching – basic concepts of Islam, shariah sunnah – to expose Akbar’s din-e-ilahi

3.3. In the court of Jahangir – raised voice against the practice of prostration – imprisoned in Gawaliar (1619-20) but later released and made religious advisor of Jahangir

3.4. In prison he converted many inmates to Islam and brought reformation among the Muslim prisoners

3.5. He preached true spirit of Islam among the troops of Mughal army; raised their moral and prepared them to perform their duties towards Islam and the State;

3.6. Ideological war –

3.6.1. Wahdat-ul-Wajud* (Unity of Wajud (Being): Creator – creatures one) – propounded by Ibn-al Arabi (1165-1240 AD - an Arab Muslim sufi mystic and philosopher); and

3.6.2. Wahdat-ul-Shahud* (Unity of Shahud (experience / feelings): Creator – creatures are one by experience / feeling but separate Beings) – propounded by Shaikh Alaud Daula Simnani (1261-1336 AD – an Irani opponent of Ibn-al Arabi) – but further propagated by Shaikh Ahmed in Indo-Pak.
*[For details visit: [url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahdat_ul-wujud]]Error[/url]

3.7. Mujaddid’s thought did not find much popularity in the sub-continent as:

3.7.1. Chishti traditions of Wahdat-ul-Wajud were too strong;
3.7.2. His theory of Wahdat-ul-Shahud was orthodox religious approach which gave set back to Sufis to create harmony between Hindus and Muslims.

4. Influence on the history of Muslim India:

4.1. First person who propounded the idea of Muslim nationalism in India

4.2. Advocate of Muslim separatism – distinctive image

4.3. Akbar’s heterodoxy –> Aurangzeb’s orthodoxy rather than laissez faire policy of Babur / Humanyun – gradual transformation -

4.4. Akbar was a liberal – Aurangzeb was a fundamentalist (imposed jizyah on non-Muslims)

4.5. The movement was taken forward by Shah Waliullah and Syed Ahmed Shaheed – ultimately head way to destination of Pakistan movement.

5. Conclusion

5.1. The movement restored Shariah;
5.2. Islam became a symbol of Muslim unity;
5.3. His movement influenced future movements and shaped the destiny of the Muslims of India;


[B][SIZE="4"]B. SHAH WALIULLAH (1703-1762) /[/SIZE][/B]
[Qutbuddin Ahmed] Born: 21-02-1703



1. Background

1.1. Departure of Aurangzeb (1707) – adverse impacts on Mughal Empire + Muslims of India (their hegemony / dominance over Hindus / non-Muslims started waning)

1.2. Political ascendancy of Muslims under Aurangzeb vanished after him – impacted economic interests of Muslims

1.3. Muslim society was assimilating (absorbing) Hindu ideas / traditions / practices

1.4. Ignorance of the basic principles of Islam & conflicts over minute / insignificant details

1.5. Internal deterioration – sectarian differences (shias & sunnis)

2. Family / Spiritual Background

2.1. Born in 1703 to Shah Abdur Rahim – a theologian (religious / spiritual leader) and mystic (sufi) at Phulat (UP) – who endeavoured to reconcile the conflicting philosophies of theology and mysticism.

2.2. Successor of Mujaddid Alf Sani in preservation of religious belief and Muslim identity

3. Reformist Movement:

First of its kind - aimed at social, political, religious and economic reformation of the degenerated Muslim community in India.

3.1. Religious:

3.1.1. Sectarian differences – nobles grouped into ‘Turani’ and ‘Irani’ - euphemisms for Sunni and Shia – soldiers and common men were also affected.

3.1.2. His book ‘Izalat-ul-khifa an khilafat-il-khulafa’ ( ) removed misunderstandings between shias and sunnis.

3.1.3. Sunnis were divided on minute details of the interpretation of Quran and Sunnah. Minor issues created divisions in the society.

3.1.4. He adopted a balanced approach, translated Quran in Persian to make it understandable and wrote ‘al-fauz-u’l kabir fi usul-it-tafsir’ ( ) highlighted the broad principles for interpretation of Quran.

3.1.5. In order to create balance among four schools of (Sunnis) thought he wrote ‘al-insaf fi bayan sahib al ikhtilaf’ ( ).

3.1.6. Ijtihad (progressive interpretation of Islamic law) was vigorously adopted – in a society which had closed doors for further interpretation

3.1.7. He tried to reconcile the divergent views of Ibn-ul Arabi and Mujaddid Alf Sani on the concepts of Wahdat-ul-Wajud (Creator – creatures one) and Wahdat-ul-Shahud (Creator – creatures are separate).

3.2. Social:

3.2.1. Deep crisis of public morality and character in Muslim society – presented Islam in a rational manner and urged Muslim masses to mould their lives accordingly.

3.3. Economic:

3.3.1. He pointed out that social and economic factors had created fissures in the society – groups (nobility / clergy) responsible for well being of the general public had become parasites on public exchequer;

3.3.2. He raised voice against inequitable distribution of wealth in the society – working / poorer classes were being exploited and were unable to meet basic needs, while nobles, ulemas and soldiers were receiving money from public exchequer without performing their duties effectively.

3.3.3. He appealed upper classes to realize their responsibilities. Besides, emphasized upon the working classes to cultivate habits of hard work, honesty and efficiency.

3.3.4. He laid utmost emphasis on justice and equilibrium without which society / economy could not endure / sustain.

3.4. Political:

3.4.1. Marhattas and Jats had made the life of Muslims miserable in India.

3.4.2. He organized Muslims for Jihad against Marhattas and Sikhs.

3.4.3. Invited Ahmed Shah Abdali of Afghanistan and motivated Najib uddawlah Chief Rohillah (North West of India) to help him to save the Muslim community from Marhatta subjugation (Abdali attacked nine times) – triumph of Panipat (1761) was culmination of his political efforts.

3.5. Implications / Impact:

3.5.1. Religious reformation;
3.5.2. Social regeneration
3.5.3. Political ascendancy

4. Conclusion:

4.1. None before him attempted to integrate whole Islamic structure

4.2. It was very influence of Shah Waliullah’s movement that the movements of Syed Ahmed Shaheed and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan flourished and further consolidated Muslims in India.


[SIZE="4"][B]C. DARUL-ULUM DEOBAND (Founded on 14-04-1866)
[/B][/SIZE]

1. Introduction

1.1. Brain-child of Haji Mohammad Abid and toil of Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautvi (Founder Principal)

1.2. Deoband movement was launched to counter Aligarh Movement which reconciled with British rulers and Western civilization.

1.3. It was struggle for welfare and renaissance of Muslims through orthodox religious teaching.

1.4. Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) was mentor (guru) of the movement – Shah Abdul Aziz and Syed Ahmed Shaheed were other pioneers (in philosophy).

2. Credo of Deoband Movement:

2.1. In initial stages, it concentrated on diversity of thought among various sects and on purifying the traditions of Islam from alien influences / unhealthy practices.

2.2. Maulana Qasim had come in conflict with the British during War of 1857 – he objected Western thoughts. The institution / movement was committed to religious nationalism in India.

2.3. The pioneers were orthodox ulema, whose credo was the defence of religion as the only panacea to save the distinct identity of Indian Muslims.

2.4. The movement adopted a moderate posture and was neither extremist nor ultra orthodox. Spread religious education commendably

3. Other Personalities:

3.1. Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani extended his services without remuneration

3.2. Shaikh ul Hind Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hassan was very dynamic (he was instrumental in bringing Aligarh and Deoband closer by minimizing differences)

3.3. Haji Imadullah and Maulana Mahmood Hassan were of high caliber but lacked public appeal / popularity (they were only teachers – did not join the movement)

4. Influence / Impact of Deoband:

4.1. Education:

4.1.1. Attracted large number of students from various parts of India and abroad – in 1931, enrolment was 900 from UP, NWFP, Bengal and Bukhara

4.1.2. Educational standard was maintained that soon it was rated as the most prestigious seat of Islamic learning after Al-Azhar University, Cairo.
4.2. Religious:

4.2.1. The plan was to train enough ulema to be able to spread Islamic philosophy – Th movement produced:

4.2.1.1. Maulana Ashraf Thanvi, 4.2.1.2 Maulana Ehtisham ul Haq Thanvi
4.2.1.3 Maulana Ubedullah Sindhi

4.2.2. Quran, Hadith, Arabic, Islamic jurisprudence, philosophy and Islamic history were main disciplines – fatwas of Deoband Ulemas were considered authentic in the sub-continent.

4.3. Administrative

4.3.1. The institution provided administrative guidance to other educational institutions in syllabus, conduct of examination and teaching techniques – it had acquired the status of an informal university – this further facilitated spread of Islamic education in India.

4.4. Political

4.4.1. Leaders of the movement aimed at closer relationship with Sultan of Turkey.

4.4.2. Maulana Ubedullah Sindhi and Maulana Mahmood Hassan supported Turks and Afghans against British in WW-1.

4.4.3. Madni Group under Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni aligned with Congress

4.4.4. But another group under Maulana Ashraf Thanvi and Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani counteracted the influence of Congress on Deoband – helped Quaid-e-Azam in Pakistan movement – they were more popular among masses.

4.5. Social

4.5.1. Like Aligarh, successfully awakened social consciousness of Muslims through religious education.

5. Deoband versus Aligarh

5.1. Deoband Ulema were very effective in combating anti Islamic missionaries but could not provide any solid leadership (unlike their mentor – Shah Waliullah)

5.2. On the other hand Sir Syed Ahmed Khan revitalized and re-evaluated the ideas of Islam in the light of the progressive philosophy of Shah Waliullah and became successful in resolving intellectual crises created by traditional thinking and fundamentalism. He provided effective and solid leadership to the community.

5.3. Aligarh movement, unlike Deoband, was very popular and instrumental among the Muslim masses

5.4. The two movements had philosophical cleavages – widened gulf between them from the beginning. The authorities of the two institutions remained engaged in controversy.

5.5. While Sir Syed forbad Muslims to join Congress, a group of Deoband ulema, led by Maulana Madni joined Congress.
5.6. Sir Syed was reconciliatory while Deoband Ulemas were deadly against Britih – they even established their own government in their areas of influence for some time. Political tension existed between the two until 1947.

6. Conclusion

6.1. Deoband had a limited sphere of influence due to its narrow approach and selected adoption of the philosophy of its mentor.

6.2. The most progressive tool (ijtihad) of Shah Waliullah was adopted by Sir Syed who became popular among the rulers and the Muslim masses.

6.3. Deoband Ulema remained wavered and grouped themselves with conflicting credos (aligning with Ottomans against British in WW-1 on the one hand and joining Hindu dominated pro-British Congress on the other) – Thus they lost appeal of masses.


[SIZE="4"][B]D. THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT[/B][/SIZE]

1. Introduction:

1.1. Brain child of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) and toil of his followers – Hali, Shibli, Nazeer Ahmed (Syed Amir Ali, author of ‘Spirit of Islam’ – which was new interpretation of Islam, though not a member, but contributed largely to the goals of Aligarh Movement)

1.2. Characteristics of Muslim community soon after 1857 War – education was bleak (illiteracy rampant), religion an obsession (traditional thinking, religious fanaticism) and politics was an enigma (puzzle / mystery).

1.3. Movements of Shah Waliullah and Syed Ahmed Shaheed reduced animosities (hostilities) from among the Muslim community but created over obsession towards religious thinking. This fanaticism was a barrier in the renaissance and regeneration of the community after War of Independence – British hegemony and Hindu domination.

1.4. A cultural movement aimed at regeneration of liberal values – literature, social life and religion.

1.5. Education was the foundation on which Sir Syed build a super structure of his religious, social and political ideas for Muslims


2. Highlights of the Movement:

2.1. The movement acted as social, political and psychological panacea for betterment of Muslims in India.

2.2. British loyalty and confidence was also the programme of the movement

2.3. The Educational Aspect:

2.3.1. Aim: groom and quip Muslims with Western education to become intellectually and politically sound to play role effectively in the development of India

2.3.2. Sir Syed visited England in (1869) to study English educational institutions

2.3.3. Established Mohammedan Anglo Oriental (MAO) College, Aligarh (1875) – later became Aligarh Muslim University - centre of cultural activities for Muslims

2.3.4. Mohammedan Educational Conference (1886) – spread message through conferences, seminars, public meetings, etc.

2.3.5. Translation Society at Ghazipur (1864) later became Aligarh Scientific Society – translated modern works from English to Persian and Urdu, published a journal ‘Aligarh Institute Gazette’ (1866) bridged gulf between British and Muslims.

2.4. Religious Role:

2.4.1. Sir Syed wrote many books on Islam to establish that it was a progressive religion – no conflict with Modern world, science and development

2.4.2. He gave a befitting reply in the form of detailed essays to William Moor’s blasphemous book – ‘Life of Mohammad’

2.4.3. Attempts were made to rationally interpret Islamic ideas and concepts

2.4.4. Emancipated the Muslims from centripetal tendencies of religion by recommending extensive use of Ijtihad.

2.5. Political Contribution:

2.5.1. Policy of the movement was to remain away from politics (Aligarh was apolitical!)

2.5.2. However, the movement safeguarded the political interests of Muslims of India by educating them to face better educated and more prosperous Hindus

2.5.3. To promote better understanding with the British, Sir Syed wrote a pamphlet – ‘The Causes of the Indian Revolt’

2.5.4. He highlighted services of the Muslims and defended them in ‘Loyal Mohammadans of India’.

2.5.5. The movement championed Muslim nationalism cause when Sir Syed advised Muslims not to join Congress – thereby provoked the to establish a separate political party [critical]

2.5.6. He was first to propose idea of ‘separate electorate’ for Muslims – did not believe in Westminster democracy (majority rule) in India – [critical]

2.5.7. Pleaded inclusion of Muslims in the Legislative Council to represent their community;

2.5.8. The movement was bastion (fortress) of Two Nation Theory – Sir Syed was the first to formally propagate the idea after being disgruntled with Hindu attitude and advocated separate and distinct identity of Muslims with different culture, religion, civilization, etc. He was the first to formally call Muslims ‘a nation’

2.6. Social Role:

2.6.1. Reawakened Muslims with social consciousness

2.6.2. ‘Tahzibul Ikhlaq’ ( ) magazine played positive role in improving morality / moral values.
3. The Impact of the Movement:

3.1. Immediate:

3.1.1. Transformed the Muslim community from pessimism of the post 1857 war days to optimism - gave a new hope to the Muslims

3.1.2. bridged the gulf between the British and Muslims (their loyalty no more challenged)

3.1.3. provided an opportunity to catch up with Hindus / other Indians

3.1.4. Produced graduates to fill up senior government assignments

3.2. Long Term / Far Reaching:

3.2.1. Infused new spirit in the dormant Muslim community raised it to a level of a separate and independent nation in India

3.2.2. Gave political wisdom and offered new horizons to the Muslims which ultimately paved way for establishment of All India Muslim League.

3.2.3. Under the influence of MAO Aligarh, Islamia College Peshawar and Islamia Collge Lahore became nucleus for Muslim educational and political activities

3.2.4. Aligarh Movement indeed spearheaded Pakistan Movement!

4. Conclusion:

4.1. Some argue that Sir Syed’s political philosophy of cooperation with British had serious limitations; while others contend that his acceptance of Western values could not build a nation with distinct identity and values; some critics even consider his religious concept narrow and un-philosophical

4.2. But at a critical juncture of the history of Indian Muslims his movement and philosophy provided opportunities and saved Muslims from the inertia, stagnation and even annihilation

“People say Sir Syed set up a college, nay, he made a nation” - Dr. Maulvi Abdul Haq

4.3. The movement provided new zeal and vigor to the Muslims of India

4.4. Pakistan would not have been possible without the Aligarh Movement

[SIZE="4"][B]E. NADWA-TUL-ULEMA, LUCKNOW[/B][/SIZE]


1. INTRODUCTION:

1.1. Nadwa was an outcome of prominent Muslims who wanted to adopt a middle path between Deoband (old and traditional patterns) and Aligarh (modern knowledge).

1.2. Established by leading Muslim Ulema, under the leadership of Shibli Nomani, Maulvi Abdul Ghafoor (Deputy Collector) and Syed Mohammad Ali of Kanpur in 1894, at Lucknow.

1.3. Syed Mohammad Ali was the founder and Administrator

1.4. Shibli Nomani, initially a teacher of Persian in Aligarh, left it and joined Nadwah. He believed that Aligarh was only producing youth for clerical jobs and had lost its purpose.

2. THE OBJECTIVES:

The objectives were to:

2.1. Reform maktabs, develop religious learning, improve morals and behaviour;
2.2. Resolve and settle difference of opinion among the ulema and observe restraint on expression of divergent views;
2.3. Devise ways and means for general welfare of the Muslims but keep them away from politics and affairs of the state;
2.4. Establish a magnificent academy of learning where technical education could be provided along with academic education;
2.5. Spread Islam through tableegh and to establish department of ufta (to give fatwas).

3. THE MOVEMENT OF MODERATION:

3.1. The modern educational system was reorganized and Shibli Nomani became the Principal of Nadwa in 1908. He introduced English and Islamic subjects of learning in the curriculum.

3.2. At Nadwa the preachers were trained to carry out these objectives and were sent to different parts of the sub-continent for the ‘missionary work’.

3.3. Al Nadwa, monthly magazine (1904) under the editorship of Maulana Shibli and Maulana Habib-ur-Rahman Sherwani, attempted to harmonize Islamic thought with modern science.

4. ROLE IN PAKISTAN MOVEMENT:

4.1. Allama Sulaiman Nadvi played an important role before and after the creation of Pakistan was a product of this institution.

4.2. Other prominent personalities included Maulvi Abdul Haque, Maulana Abdus Salam Nadvi and Maulvi Abu Zafar. They played very important role in imparting religious knowledge and creating political consciousness among the Muslims.

5. CRITICAL APPRECIATION:

5.1. All the efforts of Nadwa did help ulema to retain their hold on the Muslims. However, the compromise they made hardly aided the new progressive trends in Islam; but their new approach certainly gave them a new lease of life.

5.2. Nadwa being a compromise between the two systems never gained the popularity and importance which Deoband had in religious circles and Aligarh acquired in modern education.

5.3. However, Dar ul Musaniffin (Academy of Authors) established by Nadwa played important role in the field of research and published a large number of books and valuable literature on Islam.

6. DEOBAND VS. NADWA:

6.1. Deoband was anti-British and gave the idea of removing the British by supporting Hindus / Congress. A large section of Deoband Ulema opposed Pakistan and were in favour of united India. On the contrary, Nadwa believed in the unity of Muslims and was against the Congress. Nadwa students worked for the creation of Pakistan.

6.2. Deoband only appreciated religious teachings (Qoran, Hadith, Fiqh) while Nadwa encouraged English along with Islamic teachings.

The role of sufis and ulema in spreading islam
 

[B][SIZE="4"]THE ROLE OF SUFIS AND ULEMA IN SPREADING ISLAM[/SIZE][/B]


[B]1) INTRODUCTION:[/B]

a) Muslim nationalism in India would have never seen the reality of the day had there been no Sufis or Ulema behind its scene;

b) The view that ‘Islam was spread by the sword’ lacks the understanding of the history;

c) Islam indeed spread by means of its pragmatic ideals – humanitarianism, piety, justice, tolerance and peace – fostered by great Sufis and Ulema through their teachings and practical life;

d) They converted large number of Hindus to the fold of Islam – sword never played decisive role in this respect.

[B]2) JUSTIFICATIONS:[/B]

a) If ‘sword’ of Muslim Kings / Sultans had been the driving force then one would naturally expect largest proportion of Muslim population in Delhi, Agra, Luknow – seat of power;

b) This not true and the percentage of Muslims in these areas is very low as compared to other areas constituting Pakistan and Bangladesh;

c) Arnold, a European writer of Indian history, states: “There are instances on record where isolated families were converted under political pressure, but they were few. The vast majority converted not through any Governmental pressure but by slow and patient process of missionary work”.

d) Maclagen and Qanungo, two eminent non-Muslim scholars, studied spread of Islam in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and came to the conclusion that Sufi saints added to the numerical strength of Muslim population by encouraging conversions to Islam through peaceful and non-violent means in these areas;

e) Had Islam been spread by sword / force, 1000 years of Muslim rule would have been sufficient to bring the entire sub-continent under the sway of Islam – which is not the case;

[B]3) CONTRIBUITION OF SUFIS AND ULEMAS[/B]:

a) The contribution of Ulema and Sufis was instrumental;

b) In cities, where upper class of Muslim society lived, Ulema were custodian of religion;

c) In far flung areas where masses lived, Sufis played major role not only to preserve the inner spirit of Islam among the Muslims but to win thousands of converts;

d) Sufism was ‘a great spiritual movement in Islam which sought mystic realization of Almighty Allah’. It traces origin to Qoran and Hadith.

e) Organization: organized themselves in ‘silsilahs’ (orders) and established ‘khanqahs’
f) Four ‘silsilahs’ are worth mentioning:

i) Chishtiyah –Khwaja Abu Ishaq Shami (940 AD)
ii) Qadiriyah – founder Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani (1077-1166 AD);
iii) Suhrwardiyah –Shaikh Najibuddin Abdul Qadir Suhrawardi (1169 AD);
iv) Naqshbandiyah – founder Khwaja Bahauddin Naqshband (1388 AD);

[B]4) THE ROLE OF CHISHTIYAH ORDER:[/B]

i) The silsilah was brought to the sub-continent by Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti Ajmeri (1141-1236 AD) – converted many Rajputs to Islam;

ii) His eminent disciples – Shaikh Hamiduddin (converted many Rajputs in Nagaur Rajputana) and Shaikh Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki (welcomed by Iltutmish but declined and carried out peaceful missionary work) – further popularized the order;

iii) Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj Shakr, Khalifah of Bakhtiar Kaki, produced galaxy of Sufi preachers who further spread message of Islam;

iv) Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliyah (1238-1325 AD), Ganj Shakr’s eminent disciple, produced many Sufis who propagated Islam and converted thousands in Bengal, Deccan and Gujrat;

v) Shaikh Salimuddin (16th C AD) a contemporary of Akbar, continued his Mission with the emperor;

[B]5) SERVICED OF QADIRIYAH ORDER:[/B]

i) The order was introduced in the subcontinent by Niamatullah and Makhdoom Mohammad Jilani by mid 15C AD;

ii) Shaikh Abul Maali of Lahore and Mulla Shah of Badakhshan were renowned saints;

iii) The order established firm hold in Punjab and Sindh;

iv) Shaikh Abdul Haq Muhaddis Delhvi, a celebrated Sufi scholar and Miyan Mir rendered services in Delhi and Sindh [Shah Jahan and Dara Shikoh held Miyan Mir and Mullah Shah in high esteem];

v) The order did not make much headway in the sub-continent during Delhi Sultanate;

[B]6) TH ROLE OF SUHRAWARDIYAH ORDER[/B]:

i) Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariyah was the founder of most popular order of Sufis in sub-continent (Khanqah in Multan) – thousands including Chiefs from Multan, Lahore and Sindh embraced Islam;

ii) His son Sadruddin Arif succeeded him in Multan while disciple Syed Jalaluddin Bokhari (1213 AD) founded strong suhrawardi centre in Uchh Sharif – converted many tribes to Islam in Uchh;

iii) Shaikh Jalaluddin Tabraizi established his Khanqah at Deomahal in Bengal where Hindu and Budhist tribes flocked, converted to Islam and became his disciples;

[B]7) REVIVAL OF ISLAM BY NAQSHBANDIYA ORDER:[/B]

i) Khwaja Baqi Billah introduced this order in the sub-continent and his celebrated disciple Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi (Mujaddid Alf Sani) rendered valuable services to the purification of Islam during and after the reign of Mughal Emperor Akbar;

ii) The heretic ideas of Wahdatul Wajud were dispelled by him; he stood up against the un- Islamic practices of Akbar’s era, refused prostration in Jahangir’s ‘darbar’;
iii) Ma’sum, son of Shaikh Ahmed, followed his father. Aurangzeb Alamgir, as prince, used to attend his lectures and later as emperor translated Shaikh Ahmed’s ideas into action;

[B]8) OTHER MUSLIM RENAISSANCE MOVEMENTS:[/B]

i) Shaikh Ahmed’s cause was furthered by Shah Waliullah, whose time was of great turmoil and anarchy of Muslim society – shia sunni rift and divisions among sunnis; Ijtihad was put in cold storage and shariah being misinterpreted; Shah Waliullah regenerated the Muslim society and revived the spirit of Shariah;

ii) Jehad Movement was spearheaded by Sayyid Ahmed Shaheed in NWFP and the Punjab. He waged a holy war against the sikh fascist forces and established supremacy of Islam; he was martyred in Balakot along with his comrade Shah Ismail and others;

iii) Similarly, many other movements were launched with the twin purposes – establish supremacy of Islam and fight against fascist forces in various provinces;

iv) These include Faraizi movement in East Bengal by Haji Shariatullah.

[B]9) CONCLUSION:
[/B]
i) It is established from the above discussion that Islam spread in the subcontinent by peaceful means through missionary work of Sufis and Ulema;

ii) A few movements were launched at the end of the Mughal rule to check the advance of fascist forces to crush Islam and Muslims but these were in defence of faith and not really for spread of Islam.

[SIZE="4"][B]FARAIZI MOVEMENT[/B][/SIZE]



[B]1) THE FARAIZI MOVEMENT:[/B]

i) The Muslim revivalism in Bangal during early 19th Century was a local manifestation of the contemporary trend for the return to orthodoxy, felt throughout the subcontinent. The first such movement, Faraizi movement, drew its inspiration from the principles of Wahabism in Arabia.

ii) Faraiz, meaning injunctions of God and the holy Prophet (PBUH).

iii) Like other revivalist movements the Faraizis prescribed strict observance of the principles of Islam and abhorred any deviation form them, especially shirk (polytheism) and Bid’ah (innovation).

iv) Social equality was emphasized and social discrimination and caste practices of any kind disapproved.

v) Most distinguishing feature of the movement was that its followers refused to attend the juma and eid prayers. They argued that according to Hanafi School of law, to which they belonged, these prayers could only be performed in the presence of a Caliph or his agent. To them British India was Darul Harb (a land of enemy), and not Darul Aman (land of peace). They resumed these congregational prayers only after creation of Pakistan.

vi) Haji Shari’atullah (1781-1840) the founder of this movement devoted his attention mainly to religious reforms.

vii) His son Dadu Mian (1819-1862) was less a religio-moral preacher and more a politico-military activist.

viii) Supporters of the movement were mostly depressed Muslim cultivators, oppressed by their mainly Hindu landlords or new class of European indigo planters who treated their native labourers almost as plantation slaves.

ix) Developing as a mass movement the faraizi assumed the form of a socio-economic reform movement.

x) Dadu Mian’s confrontations with these landlords brought him into conflict with the British authorities, who as founders of the permanent settlement of land revenue of 1793, always favoured the landlords upholding freedom of contract and laissez faire liberalism.

xi) During his life time Dadu Mian set up an elaborate underground organization with an administrative hierarchy discharging various responsibilities;

xii) Titu Mir (1782-1831) was another political militant, who initially followed Haji Shariatullah but, later became militant as Dadu Mian.

[B]2) INFLUENCE OF THE MOVEMENT(S):[/B]

i) The religio-political activism generated by the movement contributed to the general transformation of the Indian Muslims from a religious community into a political force, later to be utilized by the Ulema and political elite in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

ii) The movement, along with similar movements, helped to create necessary momentum which brought about a measure of social unification and removed the internal social and cultural barriers that existed within the community.

iii) Another after effect was the activation of religious sentiment among the Muslims and reorientation of their attitude towards the Hindus.

iv) The revivalism succeeded in purging the Indian Islam of many Hindu practices and re-established teachings of early Islam in Arabia.

v) Wider social and religious contacts between Muslims of different regions reduced differences and opened new channels of communication. This resulted in further religious activities and sponsoring of institutions and organizations. The Islamisation efforts of the reform movements gradually generated a sense of solidarity across the social divisions of the community.

Hi YOUNIS MARRI,
I need outline for other PA's topics also...could you please help me??

Thanx
 

Thanx dear Xeric and Younus marri and others
i was searching these notes from a long time. u solved my this problem.

Highly Appreciated

Great work thanks for sharing

Dear can you share one file link for these notes. Thanks

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Pakistan Affais Notes by Mushtaq Mahindro
 

Here is the link for CSS Pakistan Affairs Written by Mushtaq Mahindro
[url]https://solvepk.blogspot.com/2020/03...-pakistan.html[/url]

[QUOTE=Pakistani Physicist;1108861]Here is the link for CSS Pakistan Affairs Written by Mushtaq Mahindro

[url]https://solvepk.blogspot.com/2020/03...-pakistan.html[/url][/QUOTE]Link is not working

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Please send me notes in pdf file through email.

[QUOTE=Rimsha Sarir;1124852]Please send me notes in pdf file through email.[/QUOTE]

Well. This member predator has shared all his/her notes here in this thread. But go through first four pages of this thread and you will find these notes. Don't know which notes you are asking for though. If they are the ones by predator,then they are here already available to everyone.

Regards.

Political Instability: A case study of Pakistan
 

Political instability has become a serious and threatening
problem especially in developing and underdeveloped
countries. It is creating massive problems and hindering
the development of these countries. The theme of this
article revolves around the problem of political stability in
context of identity and legitimacy crisis in Pakistan.
Political stability plays an important role in keeping society
integrated and in maintaining legitimacy within the state. It
is a prerequisite for the economic development, social
integration, and supremacy of law in a state. The stability
of political system has direct effects on the processes of
nation and state building. These both require stable
political systems for their growth and flourishing. The
development of nation and state without firm and
organized system of politics is not possible and
government becomes only a tug of war amongst various
interest groups.