THE following excerpts beg comments from all those who have been or are now occupying the power seats of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

From Mohammad Ali Jinnah`s presidential address at the All-India Muslim League session in Delhi in April 1943: “The minorities are entitled to get a definite assurance or to ask: `Where do we stand in the Pakistan that you visualise?` That is an issue of giving a definite and clear assurance to the minorities. We have done it. We have passed a resolution that the minorities must be protected and safeguarded to the fullest extent, and as I said before, any civilised government will do it and ought to do it. So far as we are concerned, our own history and our prophet have given the clearest proof that non-Muslims have been treated not only justly and fairly but generously.” (Rizwan Ahmed, ed., Sayings of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah , Karachi: Pakistan Movement Center, 1986, p. 30.)

While discussing Pakistan in an interview given to a representative of the Associated Press of America on November 8, 1946: “Hindu minorities in Pakistan can rest assured that their rights will be protected. No civilised government can be run successfully without giving minorities a complete sense of security and confidence. They must be made to feel that they have a hand in government and to this end must have adequate representation in it. Pakistan will give it.”

(Ahmed, Sayings , p. 65.)

In Jinnah`s interview given to a Reuters correspondent on May 21, 1947, he assured the minorities of Pakistan “that they will be protected and safeguarded. For they will be so many citizens of Pakistan without any distinction of caste or creed.” He had no doubt in his mind that they “will be treated justly and fairly and the collective conscience of parliament itself will be a guarantee that the minorities need not have any apprehension of any injustice being done to them.”

(Sailesh Bandopadhaya, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan , New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1991, p. 326.)

From Jinnah`s address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947: “We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community — because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on — will vanish. Indeed if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls, in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time, but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has got nothing to do with the business of the state…. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country, and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the nation. Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.” ( Dawn , Independence Day Supplement, August 14, 1999.)

Jinnah`s interview with a Reuter`s correspondent on October 25, 1947: “Every citizen is expected to be loyal to the state and to owe allegiance to it. The arm of the law should be strong enough to deal with any person or section or body or people that is disloyal to the state. We do not, however, prescribe any schoolboy tests of their loyalty. We shall not say to any Hindu citizen of Pakistan: if there is war would you shoot a Hindu?” (Ahmed, Sayings , p. 42.)

Jinnah`s broadcast to the people of Australia on February 19, 1948: “The great majority of us are … members of the Muslim brotherhood of Islam in which we are equal in right, dignity and self respect. Consequently we have a special and a very deep sense of unity. But make no mistake: Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds and we welcome in closest association with us all those who, of whatever creed, are themselves willing and ready to play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan.” (Ahmed, Sayings , p. 69.)

Abstract


1. Introduction

Sectarian issue in Pakistan is a major destabilizing factor in the country’s political, social, religious and security order. While causing unrest, disorder and violence in society, the sectarian conflict in Pakistan for the last 27 years resulted into thousands of deaths from suicide attacks, bomb blasts, assassinations and other terrorist acts. The state actors, instead of seeking the management and resolution of a conflict, which has divided Muslims on sectarian grounds, tried to exploit the issue for political objectives. Regardless of scattered events of Shia-Sunni discord, sectarian harmony in Pakistan was a model of tolerance and brotherhood amongst different sects in the religion of Islam.

While Shias constitute roughly 15-20% of the population of Sunni dominated Pakistan, that community lived in harmony and peace until early 1980s when a series of events triggered sectarian violence. If viewed historically, the Shia community struggled side by side with the Sunni majority in the anti-Ahmadi movement of 1974. While the Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslims by the Parliament of Pakistan, the Shia community observed with eagerness the central role played by the clergy of Iran in the massive popular uprising against the Shah. The Islamic Revolution of February 1979 was a watershed in mobilizing the Shias of Pakistan for an assertive role in state and society.

From any standpoint, the history of sectarian conflict in Pakistan is as old as the existence of this country. Yet, the intensification of sectarian divide in Pakistan was observed during late 1970s and early 1980s because of domestic political changes and the implications of Islamic revolution in Iran and the subsequent adverse reaction in some Arab countries to the assumption of power by clergy operating from the holy city of Qom. The military regime of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, which seized power on July 5, 1977 pursued a policy of using religion for political purposes by unleashing a process of ‘Islamization’ resulting into the deepening of sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiiates on the one hand and among different Sunni groups on the other. As rightly argued by an analyst on conflict and dispute resolution, “he (Zia) followed a policy of Sunni sectarianism, which witnessed mushrooming of madrassas all over Pakistan. In 1984 when the Saudi Arabian government demanded that the Pakistani army replace Shia soldiers in Pakistani army units based in Saudi Arabia with Sunni soldiers, General Zia-ul-Haq decided to withdraw the entire contingent of Pakistani troops from that country”. Yet despite almost two decades of the post-Zia era, there is no end to sectarian polemics and hatred, which under the state patronage of Zia-ul-Haq weakened the national unity of Pakistan.

This paper attempts to analytically examine the important dynamics of sectarian conflict in Pakistan by responding to following questions:-

1. What is Sectarian conflict and how it has permeated in Pakistani society?
2. What is the background of sectarian divide in Pakistan and how sectarian polarization between the Sunni and Shitte communities impacted on state and society?
3. How the phenomenon of religious extremism and intolerance led to the emergence of sectarian violence in Pakistan?
4. Why the state of Pakistan failed to curb sectarian conflict and how polarization at the societal level promoted the forces of religious extremism?
5. What is the role of external factors in augmenting sectarian divide in Pakistan and why foreign forces got a free hand to launch their proxy war in Pakistan on sectarian grounds?
6. What plausible strategies should be formulated to deal with the challenge of sectarian violence in Pakistan?

Pakistan as the second largest Muslim country of the world is facing an uphill task of curbing intolerance, hate, extremism and violence targeting Shia or Sunni communities. Sunni population in Pakistan is 75-80% of the total population while the Shia population is roughly 20%. Since early 1980s, when sectarian violence got an impetus in Pakistan till today, thousands of people have been killed in sectarian violence in different parts of the country. Countless suicide attacks at the religious sites of Sunnis and Shiites not only deepened religious schism but also led to the assassination of hundreds of professionals from the two sides. Sectarian groups, which emerged during 1980s and early 1990s, pursued a policy of annihilating each other. The worst part of sectarian violence in Pakistan is periodic attack on each other’s mosques and religious schools by various extremist Shia and Sunni groups. By late 1980s, as a result of sustained violence against each other, a stage came when some Sunni and Shia groups began to declare each other as non-Muslims. By attacking each other’s religious beliefs, various Sunni and Shiite leaders augmented instability and crisis at the societal level.

According to the Brussels based International Crisis Group (IGC), “sectarian conflict in Pakistan is the direct consequence of state policies of Islamization and the marginalization of secular democratic forces. Instead of empowering liberal, democratic voices, the government has co-opted the religious right and continues to rely on it to counter civilian opposition. The political use of Islam by the state promotes an aggressive competition for official patronage between and within the many variations of Sunni and Shia Islam, with the clerical elite of major sects and sub-sects striving to build up their political parties, raise jihadi militias, expand madrassa networks and, as has happened on Musharraf’s watch, become a part of the government.” According to the IGC report, “like all other Pakistani military governments, the Musharraf administration has also weakened secular and democratic political forces. Administrative and legal action against militant organizations has failed to dismantle a well-entrenched and widely spread terror infrastructure. All banned extremist groups persist with new labels, although old names are also still in use. The jihadi media is flourishing, and the leading figures of extremist Sunni organizations are free to preach their jihadi ideologies. The banned groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Siphae Sahaba and the Jash-e-Mohammad appear to enjoy virtual immunity from the law. They have gained new avenues to propagate their militant ideas since the chief patrons of jihad, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, have acquired prominent and powerful roles in Musharraf’s political structure.” The IGC report blaming the state of Pakistan of promoting sectarian violence is contrary to the claims made by Islamabad that the Musharraf regime is deadly against sectarianism and has taken numerous measures to cut various sectarian groups to their size. Particularly since September 11, 2001, the government has launched a massive crackdown on various religious extremist groups, including sectarian groups and is pursuing a policy of ‘enlightened moderation.’ Have the policy makers of Pakistan took any notice of the findings of IGC’s report was its deliberations were ignored by them because to a large extent the state structures of this country are not receptive to ideas and suggestions which can bring qualitative change in the society. Following a policy of divide and rule is their age-old practice and any deviation from such type of an approach is considered by the people at the helm of affairs as detrimental to their interests.

External factors like the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Saudi role of promoting Wahabi sect of Islam and the involvement of hard-line religious groups of Afghanistan in Pakistan’s internal politics further complicated the sectarian conflict. The support rendered by Iran, Saudi Arabia and some other Muslim countries to various Shiite and Sunni groups of Pakistan resulted into the outbreak of sectarian proxy war. One needs to contemplate how the menace of sectarian polarization and violence in Pakistan could be tactfully handled and why the fault lines in sectarian conflict have not been properly dealt so far? If the state of Pakistan and its apparatus seriously try to weed out the terrorist and violent elements from various Sunni and Shiite groups and curb external hand in fanning sectarian feelings, much can be done to sort out things which cause and promote sectarian violence in the country. Why the state of Pakistan couldn’t redeem the ramifications of its Afghan policy during the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan when hundreds of thousands of local and foreign Jihadis following strict Sunni teaching were given a free hand. The post-Soviet military withdrawal period in Afghanistan witnessed the mushrooming of various Wahabi groups who preached hatred against Shiias not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.

II. Dynamics of Sectarian Divide

Internal dynamics

According to a well-researched study on Sectarian conflict in Pakistan with a case study of Jhang district in the province of Pakistan, Mutktar Ahmed argues that the, “nature of Shia-Sunni violence under the British was radically different than it had been under the earlier Muslim empires or caliphates. Previously, it was always a conflict either between the established Sunni authorities and anti-status quo Shia denomination (that is Ummayeds/ Abbasides vs. followers of Fatimidas dynasties) or between the Sunni-Shia dynasties or caliphates (that is, Mughals vs. the Shia dynasties of Deccan and Abbasides vs. Fatmides in Egypt). Unlike the alien rule of the British, the conflict declined to communities’ level, involving the general public and theologians alike in sectarian violence. The role of the government was limited to that of arbiter, enforcer of law or manipulator, if so required, in the larger colonial interests. However, the state was secular and largely unrepresentative and, therefore, the use of sectarian idiom was limited to the purpose of self-identification” But, after the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, the Shia-Sunni relations were not ideal but shrouded with mistrust and suspicion against each other. Muslims from India, who migrated to Pakistan after the partition of August 1947 brought with them the baggage of sectarian bias and hatred. Yet the two communities lived side by side and there were very few incidents of sectarian violence causing physical casualties of the two sides.

It was only after the controversial process of Islamization unleashed by the military ruler of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq that sectarian conflict took a violent turn. Zia’s policy to introduce Islamic Sharia, which is termed as a radical brand of Sunni Hanifi system of jurisprudence, shattered the bond of unity between Shias and Sunni communities. The imposition of Zakat in Pakistan by the regime of Zia-ul-Haq in 1980 was vehemently resisted by Shia leader. An important Shia cleric, Mufti Jaafar Husain (1916-1983) argued that if Pakistan was to have Islamic law, the Shi’a should be allowed to follow their own jurisprudence known as Jaafariya fiqh after the sixth Shi’a imam Jafar al-Sadiq. The sectarian lines were clearly drawn as the Shias in Pakistan inspired by the Iranian Islamic revolution refused to subscribe to the Sunni based Shariah laws and demanded that their identity as a separate sect in Islam must be recognized.

The Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan has more economic rationale than religious or political. Particularly in the district of Jhang of Punjab, the worse phase of sectarian bloodshed was the outcome of grievances held by the peasants belonging to the Sunni sect and the feudal landlords belonging to the Shia sect. The economy of Jhang was primarily controlled by the feudal Shias. “The primary economic move against the Shias assumed sectarian and cultural dimensions when entrepreneurs of Sunni movement of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi emphasized on the cultural differences between the Sunnis and Shias. The Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Army of the companions of last Prophet (PBUH) which was formed in reaction to Thereek-e-Fiq-e-Jafariya (Movement for the Implementation of Shia law) in early 1980s demanded that Shias should be declared as non-Muslims. Another Shia organization called as Sipah-e-Muhammadi Pakistan (SMP) was formed which also pursued a militant course against the Sunni community. Laskhar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) an anti-Shia militant Sunni organization with its base in Jhang was formed in 1995 as a break-away faction of SSP.”

Prior to that, on September 6, 1985, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a Deobandi alim (scholar) of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) (F) founded Anjuman Sipha-i-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP) later renamed as Siphah-I-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in Jhang. It was the first organized Sunni Party with an overt objective to defend the honor of Sahaba and counter what Maulana Jhangvi perceived as the increasing Shia activism under the impact of the Iranian revolution. He formally demanded the Pakistan government to declare Shias non-Muslims. He also asserted that Pakistan, with majority Sunni population, be declared a Sunni State, as, Shias with Shia majority Iran was a Shia State. He resented that, while in Iran no Sunni was allowed under the constitution to hold key state officer, no such restriction was placed on Shias in Pakistan.” According to Dr. Mohammad Waseem, a Pakistani political scientist, “the social base of sectarian conflict has significantly expanded because of the following factors:

1. The use of print media.
2. Accessibility to the means of electronic communications.
3. Better transport services which have increased mobility of sectarian activists. It helps people from district areas to join sectarian networks, generate funds and plan concerted political activities at the provincial and national levels.”

With substantial motivation, funding, training and networking various sectarian groups in Pakistan were set for a show down. Incidents of sectarian killings became a common feature in Pakistan since mid-1980s. Those killed in Shia-Sunni violence in Pakistan included, religious leaders, prominent personalities, lawyers, doctors and even small children. A Deobandi cleric, Maulana Saleemullah Khan, founded Sawad-e-Azam Ahle-Sunni (Greater Unity of the Sunnis) in 1980, demanding that Pakistan be declared a Sunni state and that the Shi’a be declared non-Muslims. Soon after, sectarian riots broke out in Karachi and Sawad-e-Azam followers attacked Shi’a houses and religious gatherings. The Sawad-e-Azam created a major Sunni Sectarian group, Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (ASS) or Society of the Army of the Prophet’s Companions. 11 SSP centered its struggle to confront with Shias and to declare them a non-Muslim minority like the Ahmadis. General Zia’s regime saw the SSP as a check on the rise of Shia influence and gave it a free hand. Soon covert links were established between SSP and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which managed official Pakistani support of Jihadi operations in Afghanistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir. Therefore, the deepening of Shia-Sunni polemics had taken place during the initial and middle era of Zia’s material law but it can also be argued that if Shia militancy in Pakistan was the outcome of Zia’s controversial policy of Islamization, the Sunni militancy was in reaction to Shia assertion backed by Iran. Yet, one cannot exonerate the faulty approach of the regimes of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf as all the three instead of establishing the writ of the state in areas badly affected because of sectarian violence, tried to cover up things. Predictably, sectarian groups crossed the thin line between political struggle and terrorism and resorted to worst kind of killings and various terrorist acts.

External Dynamics

The assertion of militant Sunni and Shia Islam is also the outcome of external factors. Iran and Saudi Arabia were held responsible for fighting their proxy sectarian war in Pakistan. The imposition of Fiqah-i-Jafria in Iran by Ayotullah Khomeini and the fear of a revolution spillover in the neighboring countries led the Arab world, particularly Iraq and Saudi Arabia, to a confrontational path with Tehran. This perceived fear engaged Iran and Saudi Arabia in a proxy war for religio-political influence and clout in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the newly independent Muslim republics of Central Asia. In 1998, a new sectarian group called as Sunni Tehrik (movement) was established in Karachi under the leadership of Maulana Saleem Qadri. It needs to be mentioned that in a deadly suicide attack in Karachi in a religious gathering organized by the Sunni Tehrik on April 11, 2006, it entire leadership was wiped out. According to a Pakistani analyst now based in the United State,

The Iranians were, most likely, assisting Pakistani’s Shi’a with money and Ziaul Haq invited the Saudis to help Sunni sectarian groups. The Afghan Jihad had already resulted in the free flow of arms and military training for Sunni Islamists. Soon, some of these Sunni militants were attacking the Shia’a in an effort to purify Pakistan of their heterodoxy. Shi’a militias emerged to fight the Sunni extremists with similar tactics. During the last twenty-five years, nearly two thousand people have been killed, and thousands more maimed, in attacks by zealots of the rival sects in Pakistan. Between 1989 and 2004, 688 people were killed in 1,837 reported incidents of sectarian conflicts. In 2005, sixty-two incidents resulted in 160 deaths, and in the first three months of 2006, six incidents occurred in which 136 people were reportedly killed.

Therefore, the two external events, which had a substantial role in shaping the dynamics of sectarian conflict in Pakistan were the anti-Soviet Jihad launched by a conglomeration of Afghan Mujahideen groups and second the Iranian revolution which overthrew monarchy but established a Shi’a ideological state. Nevertheless, “the Iranian revolution had a multifold impact. The First seizure of power by an avowedly Islamist group in an Islamic revolution brought Iran’s Shi’a clergy to power and energized Shi’a all over the Middle East, particularly those in the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia’s monarchy was wedded to Wahabism, and the Sunni rulers of all the Gulf states had suppressed their Shi’a minorities since the emergence of the modern Middle East.” Furthermore, “the Iranian government threatened the Saudis and their allies with its rhetoric of exporting the Iranian revolution. The Iranians also provided overt and covert assistance to Shi’a organizations and movements. The Gulf states retaliated by emphasizing the heresy of Shi’ism in an effort to mobilize their Sunni and Wahabi base. When Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussain invaded Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies supported him as a defender of Sunni Arab interests in the face of Shi’a Persian threats. Sunni Islamist groups in the Gulf forgave Hussein’s past attacks on Islamic observance and his repression of such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood.” Iran challenged Saudi Arabia’s pre-eminent position and status in the Muslim world. This led to large-scale pan-Islamization attempts by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, as well as by Libya and Iraq, to export Sunni-Wahabi Islamism to other parts of the Muslim world. Pakistan was called as a main battleground in Iran-Saudi battle.

In 1984, the Deobandi scholar Muhammad Manzur Numani wrote a tract asserting that the excesses of the Iranian revolution proved that Shiism was un-Islamic. The preface to his work was written by Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, rector of the Nadwatul Ulema and recipient of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal Prize for Service to Islam. Another pro-Saudi religious leader in Pakistan, Asrar Ahmed went so far as to argue that Shiism, which originated soon after the demise of Prophet Mohammad, was part of an early Jewish conspiracy against Islam.” Unfortunately, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two Muslim countries, but following different sects of Islam, failed to understand that their political confrontation would create instability in other Muslim countries and endanger the sectarian harmony. Iran-Iraq war, which continued for eight long years further, weakened the position of Muslim countries and inducted an element of sectarianism. The fallout of the Iran-Iraq war was also to be seen in Pakistan, which became a battleground of Sunni-dominated regime of Saddam Hussain and the Shiite state of Iran. Both countries were able to fund their proxies in Pakistan who used sectarian card so as to accomplish their vested interests. Furthermore, Pakistan became an easy battleground of Iran and Saudi Arabia of supporting their respective sectarian groups with money and political indoctrination while the state of Pakistan miserably failed to prevent foreign intervention resulting into the outbreak of sectarian violence in the country.

The Shi’a clergy of Iran and Pakistan were linked historically, but these links became politicized only after the Iranian revolution of 1179. The changing role of the Shi’a Imamia Student’s Organization (ISO) provides an example of the new reality. Before 1979, the group began offering scholarships to Shi’a students to study in Iran. The increased contacts between Pakistani Shi’a students and clergy and their Iranian counterparts created a cadre of politicized Shi’a leaders. TNFJ founder, Jaafar Husain, was succeeded as the leader of the Pakistani Shi’a by Allama Arif Hussan al-Husani (1947-88), who had studied at Shia’s academies in Najaf, Iraq and Qom, Iran. Husaini had come into close contact with Ayatollah Khomeini in both places. When Sunni sectarian terrorism began during the 1980s, Iranian diplomats in Pakistan were among its targets. In the minds of Sunni sectarian militants, Pakistan’s Shi’a groups and Iran were closely linked. The end of Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the internal power struggle in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal, the emergence of hardcore Wahabi Taliban and their seizure of power in 1996 and other subsequent events transformed the sectarian conflict in Pakistan. The level of polarization at the sectarian level augmented with the rise of splinter groups of various Shia and Sunni religious organizations. External factor is still relevant as far as sectarian violence in Pakistan is concerned, but its intensity has decreased. In the recent past, Iraq has emerged as a major battleground of Shia and Sunni communities with the alleged involvement of Iran in support of Iraqi Arab Shia groups growing with the passage of time.

The new paradigms of sectarian conflicts

Since 1980s onwards, Pakistan has experienced sustained sectarian violence resulting into the killing and injury of thousands of people. Four important flashpoints, which emerged since 1980s in the context of sectarian violence in Pakistan are:-

1. Karachi
2. Jhang
3. Quetta
4. Lahore

Some of the facts discussed below may provide shocking information about the havoc played by the menace of sectarian violence in Pakistan.

• --In March 2005, 43 Shias were killed in a bomb blast in Fatehpur. On May 27, 2005, twenty people were killed in a suicide bombing in Pakistan targeting the Sufi Shrine of Bari Imam, Islamabad. In May 2005, six employees of a fast-food restaurant were burnt to death in Karachi during a riot that followed a suicide attack on a mosque. Shiites set on fire the restaurant after the mosque attack in which at least five people were killed.

•-- The year 2004 was one of the bloodiest on record in terms of sectarian violence in Pakistan with more than 200 killings. 15 people were killed in a Karachi Shia mosque attack in May 2004. On May 30 in Karachi an elderly Sunni cleric Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai was shot dead; 30 people were killed in a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in Sialkot in October 2004. A car bomb killed 40 Sunnis in Multan in October 2004. On October 10, a Shia mosque in Lahore was the target of a terrorist attack. A bomb was blasted at the entrance of the Husaini Hall mosque when a suicidal bomber detonated a device as people had gathered for evening prayer. The incident killed two security guards and four others including a boy of 13 years old. On May 14, six members of a Shia family were shot dead.

•-- July 4, 2003 in Quetta, Balochistan, fifty-four Shias were killed in an Imambargah in Quetta. In October 2003, Islamabad faced a spell of violence when a prominent Sunni leader, Maulana Azam Tariq, the leader of Milat-e-Islamiya was gunned down. Around 100 people were killed in Sectarian violence during the year 2003.

According to the BBC news report of September 28, 2005, around 4,000 people have been killed in the past 25 years of sectarian violence in Pakistan.

III. The Way Out?

It seems the sectarian divide in Pakistan cannot be removed without pursuing a policy of pragmatic realism. A policy of peaceful coexistence and reconciliation is essential so as to manage, if not resolve, sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. What strategies should be formulated and adopted in order to deal with sectarian violence in Pakistan and to bridge the gap between the two major Muslim groups? What should be the role of state in dealing with the sectarian conflict and how civil society can play a viable role to end sectarian polarization in the country?

In the last twenty-six years, sustained violence resulting into the killing, injury and material losses of both Sunni and Shia communities seem to have made the task of sectarian reconciliation difficult. Not only militant sectarian groups happen to further divide the Shia and Sunni communities, but external factors also fuel sectarian conflict in Pakistan. Yet, some of the strategies, which could be helpful in controlling sectarian violence are as follows:-

1. There should be a constitutional provision to declare promoting sectarian hatred and violence a serious crime by awarding severe punishment.
2. In the syllabi taught in different educational institutions, particularly in schools, all such materials which promote hatred and biases on the basis of religion, sect, sex, ethnicity and culture must be removed from textbooks and other sources of reading.
3. The state apparatus must be neutral as far as dealing with Shia and Sunni conflict is concerned. State should not favor any sectarian group.
4. The media, both print and electronic, must be instructed to do responsible reporting on Sectarian matters.
5. Those sectarian organizations, which have been banned by the government, should not be allowed to reappear under a different name.
6. External intervention in sectarian matters must be effectively checked.

Some of the recommendations presented by the IGC in its report entitled, “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan” 18 April 2005 are:-

1. Recognize the diversity of Islam in Pakistan, reaffirm the constitutional principle of equality for all citizens regardless of religion or sect, and give meaning to this by taking the following steps:

• Repeal all laws, penal codes and official procedures that reinforce sectarian identities and cause discrimination on the basis of faith, such as the mandatory affirmation of
• Repeal the Hudood laws and blasphemy laws.
• Disband privately-run Sharia courts in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and take action against religious organizations operating them
• Do not use zakat or other sources of government funding to finance the activates, educational or otherwise, of any sect; and
• Purge Islamic Studies textbooks of sectarian material that promises or undermines specific sects.

2. Disband, in furtherance of Article 256 of the constitution, all private militias, including those organized for sectarian and jihadi causes.

3. Make curbs on sectarian leaders and extremist groups more affecting by,
Implementing the laws against hate speech and incident of communal violence; leaders responsible for verbal or written edicts of apostasy.

• Taking legal action against the administration of any mosque or madrasa or religious leader responsible for verbal or written edicts of apostasy.
• Take legal action against the administration of any mosque or madrasa whose leader calls for internal and external jihad.
• Publicizing the evidence for banning Jihadi groups.
• Canceling the print declarations (licenses) of jihadi publications and prosecuting the publishers
• Closing down madrasas run by sectarian and jihadi organizations.
• Ending registration of new madrasas until an new madras law is in place, and registering all madrasas under this new law; including those currently registered under the Societies Act.
• Appoint prayer leaders and orators at mosques and madrasas run by the Auqaf Department (the government department of religious endowments) only after verifying that the applicant has no record of sectarian extremism, and dismiss those sectarian leaders who are employees of the Auqaf Department.
• Guarantee the physical security of judges presiding over cases of sectarian terrorism.

IGC’s recommendations to manage and reduce the intensity of sectarian violence in Pakistan are useful provided the state and societal actors take notice of the seriousness of sectarian conflict and ensure law in order to prevent all those forces, whether domestic or foreign who are responsible for causing sectarian hatred and violence. Most important, there is a need to create sectarian harmony at the grassroots’ level by including reading materials at the school level, which can ensure sectarian tolerance and goodwill. Civil society must not sit idle and watch the erosion of sectarian harmony. Various civil society groups must unleash the process of sectarian tolerance by launching campaign in media and also seeking the support of trade unions, students, teachers, lawyers, political parties, women organizations and traders in curbing sectarian violence and creating tolerance in society so that violence and terrorism practiced by various sectarian groups is reduced. Before it is too late, the state and non-state actors of Pakistan must effectively deal with the menace of extremism. The Red mosque episode in Islamabad is a reminder of how fragile Pakistani society is while dealing with a group of religious extremists who want to impose their parochial beliefs and way of life on others.

The lessons which one learns from more than two decades of sectarian violence in Pakistan is the level of tolerance which has gown down. For the management and resolution of any conflict, it is imperative that the parties who are engaged in that conflict must express political will, accommodation, flexibility, maturity and tolerance with each other. Unfortunately, because of the mismanagement of the sectarian conflicts in Pakistan, neither the state nor the society could prevent the emergence and strengthening of those groups who carried a mission to annihilate each other. As a result, the sectarian divide in Pakistan is not peaceful, as it used to be earlier but is marred with hatred and violence against each other. Perhaps, the recommendations suggested in this paper to effectively and professionally deal with the sectarian issue in this country may help restore religious harmony and coexistence one the one hand and curb militancy, extremism and terrorism.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Pakistani political elite took no less than 23 years to hold the general elections in the country. However in the intervening period people went to the polls many a time. The provincial elections in the Punjab and NWFP were held in 1951 and shortly afterwards the same exercise was repeated in Sindh and East Pakistan. Those elections did not contribute in any tangible measure to bring about the development of political institutions in Pakistan. When in October1958 Ayub Khan promulgated Martial Law at the behest of Iskander Mirza, the process of political transition reverted-back to square one. The forces of centralization got strengthened beyond measure in a plural country like Pakistan. In this paper electoral reforms and the elections held during the 1950s and 1960s has been critically analysed. The creation of election commission and its role as envisaged in the first two constitutions (1956 & 1962) has also been brought into focus.

It has been cited by many scholars that the provincial elections held particularly in West Pakistan during the 1950s were ‘farce, a mockery and fraud upon the electorate’. The party in power deployed all sorts of wholesome and illegal tactics to retain its hold on the three provinces. However, in East Bengal Muslim League had been discredited so thoroughly that United Front almost swept it out of existence from the region. That happened despite Central Government’s unequivocal support for the former. Contrariwise, as Yunas Samad argues, the Central Government ceased to be neutral and non-partisan in the elections, held in the Punjab, NWFP and Sindh respectively. It was contended that the state functionaries at the bidding of the Central Government interfered with the free exercise of ballot. Nomination papers of the opposition candidates were rejected ‘on most fanciful and flimsy grounds and in some cases seconders, proposers were kidnapped.’ Political opponents were harassed and thrown into prison on the pretext of being dangerous to the State. These anomalies, when reported in the press, triggered very serious doubts in the minds of the general public, making thereby the credibility of those elections doubtful. Ostensibly in order to dispel those doubts and to restore confidence among the masses as regards the rule of democracy, the newly installed Central Government appointed an Electoral Reforms Commission on 19th October 1955. Hence in this paper, the electoral reforms commission, the Franchise Commission and the elections held during Ayub regime would be the focus of our study.

The Electoral Reforms Commission consisted of the Chairman and two members. The Chairman of that Commission, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan assumed office on 22 October whereas the two members, Chaudhry Fazl Ilahi and Mr. Akkas Ali Khan joined Chairman at Lahore respectively on 4th November and 23rd November. Lahore was designated as Commission’s Headquarter. Commission was supposed to suggest the ways and the means to revise the electoral laws and rules so that not only ‘free and fair’ elections could be secured but also ‘to prevent malpractices from any source at any stage of an election so as to ensure freedom and secrecy of the ballot in order that a true representation of the people shall be achieved.’ Commission, after gathering information from the public at large and then studying the existing laws and regulations in Pakistan as well as in other countries was meant to submit its report in three months. Commission drew up questionnaire comprising thirty one questions of varying nature and published it. It was given the widest possible publicity through radio and the other means of information like press and its copies were sent to important political parties, organizations and groups. Besides, Commission conducted extensive tours of all the major cities for eliciting public opinion on the conduct of the elections. Commission members also interviewed and examined large number of people including party representatives. Fairly large number of opinion gathered, was of the view that method employed ‘for superintendence, direction and control of the preparation, publication and revision of the electoral rolls and the conduct of the elections to the Legislature’ was deficient in the extreme. It had been the privilege of the provincial governments to appoint Election Commissioners to oversee the conduct of the elections. Therefore they could be influenced by those who had the power to appoint them. It was therefore recommended by the Reform Commission:

“It is a fact beyond dispute that the existing machinery for superintendence, direction and control of the preparation, publication and revision of the electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to the Legislatures is absolutely unsatisfactory, and that it has totally failed to achieve a true representation of the people. We, therefore, suggest that the matters just referred to above should be wholly vested in a Commission, known as the Election Commission. The said Commission should consist of the Chief Election Commissioner, and such number of other Election Commissioners as the President of Pakistan may from time to time determine. The appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner should, subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by the Parliament is made by the President in his discretion and when any other Election Commissioner is so appointed, the Chief Election Commissioner should act as the Chairman of the Election Commission. Before each general election to the parliament and the Legislative Assembly of each province, the President may also appoint, after consultation with the Election Commission, such Regional Commissioners as he may consider necessary to assist the Election Commission in the performance of the above functions. Subject to the provision of any law made by the parliament, the conditions of service and tenure of office of the Election Commission and the Regional Commissioners should be such as the President may determine, provided that the Chief Election Commissioner would not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a judge of a High Court, and the conditions of service of the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment. Provided further that any other Election Commissioner or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed from his office except on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner.

The Head of the State or the Governor of a Province, should, when so requested by the Election Commission, make available to the Election Commission or to the Regional Commissioner such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of the above-mentioned functions of the Election Commission.”
That recommendation notwithstanding, one must not loose sight of the fact that the provision to that effect had already been made in 1956 Constitution. The Election Commission, as provided in the Constitution had following duties:

1. to prepare electoral rolls for election to the national Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and to revise such rolls annually; and.
2. to organize and conduct elections to the National assembly and the Provincial Assemblies.

The Election Commission of Pakistan was created on 23rd March 1956 under the Article 137 of the Constitution of 1956 with the Chief Election Commissioner as its head. The First Chief Election Commissioner was appointed on 25th June 1956. Mr. Khan F.M. Khan was the first incumbent who remained in that position until 28th October 1958. Ironically his services were not invoked as there had been no elections during his tenure as Chief Election Commissioner. The Election Commission of Pakistan was conceived as an independent and autonomous constitutional body charged with the function of conducting transparent, free, fair and impartial elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. However on very few occasions in the entire history of the Election Commission, transparency and impartiality of the elections could be ensured. The holding of elections to the office of the President and the Senate were the functions of the Chief Election Commissioner. Under the existing laws the conduct of Local Government Elections is also the responsibility of the Chief Election Commissioner.
Constitution of 1956

After nine years, Pakistani ruling elite was eventually successful in framing a constitution in 1956. The Constituent Assembly adopted it on 29 February, 1956, and it was enforced on 23 March, 1956. Pakistan's status as a dominion ended and the country was declared an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thereupon the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan became the interim National Assembly and Governor General Iskander Mirza was sworn in as the first President of Pakistan. That constitution was lengthy and detailed; it contained 234 articles divided into thirteen parts and six schedules. It provided for federal system with the principle of parity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan despite former was a majority province. The Centre was invested with such powers as to take unilateral action in emergency and it could influence the provincial autonomy. Regarding one unit Katherine Adney observes ‘Despite the relative homogeneity of its units, Pakistan pursued a strategy that made the units less homogeneous, merging the province its Western wing into one unit in 1955.’9That merger gave rise to intra-regional dissentions in the days to come. In Sindh and NWFP the political ambience started reeking with anti-Punjabi feelings. Baluchistan was no exception either, in that particular regard.

The Constitution provided for the parliamentary form of government, where real executive authority was vested in a cabinet presided over by the Prime Minister, which was collectively responsible to the legislature. Parliament according to that Constitution would be unicameral therefore it consisted only of the National Assembly and equality between the two Wings (i.e., East Pakistan and West Pakistan) was established in it. It was to consist of 300 members. National Assembly was to meet at least twice a year with at least one session at Dhaka. Now the President was the head of the state instead of the Governor General to be elected by an Electoral College comprising members of the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies.

The democratic rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech and expression, of assembly and association, of movement and of profession were all provided in the Constitution, with the usual qualifications. With regard to civil rights, familiar rights such as rights of life, liberty and property were granted, again with the usual qualifications and safeguards. The judiciary was given power to enforce the fundamental rights and the courts were to decide if a law was repugnant to any provisions of the fundamental rights. As per the Constitution, Urdu and Bengali were made national languages while English was to remain the official language for the first 25 years. After ten years' passage of the Constitution, the President was to appoint a commission with the task to make recommendation for the replacement of English as the official language. ‘Linguistic communities were not accommodated at the provincial level or at the centre under the 1956 constitution with the belated exception of the recognition of Bengali as a state language on par with Urdu. Pakistan did not recognize the legitimacy of provincial languages.’

Along with other Islamic provisions in the Constitution, the President was required to be a Muslim of at least 40 years of age. The Objectives Resolution was, however, only made the preamble of the Constitution and not included in its main text. The President had the discretionary powers to make the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Election Commission, Delimitation Commission and Public Service Commission. He also had the power to appoint the Prime Minister from amongst the members of the National Assembly. However, his appointee had to take a vote of confidence from the Assembly within two months of his appointment. The President also had the power to remove the Prime Minister if he felt that the Prime Minister had lost the confidence of the majority of the National Assembly members.

The Constitution offered direct elections under adult franchise. Every citizen of Pakistan with minimum age of 21 was allowed to vote in the elections. The provincial structure was no different to the one in the center. The pattern for the center-province relations was the same as it had been provided in the Government of India Act, 1935. There were federal, provincial and concurrent lists of subjects. There were 30 items in the federal list, 94 items in the provincial list and 19 items in the concurrent list. The federal legislation was to get precedence over provincial legislation regarding the concurrent list. Residuary powers were vested in the provinces. In case of a conflict between center and provinces or between the two provinces, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was to act as the mediator.

Some positives in that Constitution notwithstanding General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the mighty Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces had strong reservations regarding that document. In his book Friends Not Masters, he castigates it as ‘a document of despair’ and ‘no better than a bundle of unworkable compromises.’10 He flays Chaudhry Muhammad Ali by saying ‘The Prime Minister (Chaudhry Muhammad Ali) was so anxious to go down in history as the author of a constitution that he was prepared to accommodate all point of view. What the country got was not a constitution but a hotch potch of alien concepts which had already brought enough confusion and chaos to the country. The Constitution, by distribution power between the president, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and the provinces, destroyed the focal point power and left no one in a position of control.’11 According to him Iskandar Mirza was shrewd enough to see how the constitution could be used to promote political intrigues and bargaining.’12 The Constitution of 1956 proved to be short lived as on October 7, 1958, Marital Law was promulgated and the constitution was abrogated. The coup detat was in fact Sikander Mirza’s brain child however he was summarily ousted from the position of power by Ayub Khan. Hence new era in the history of Pakistan was ushered in wherein the controlled version of democracy was introduced.

Cities--Total votes--Ayub Khan--Miss Fatima Jinnah--Other Candidates--Invalid--Total cast of votes
Karachi-----1907------837---------1049-------4------13------1903
Hyderabad-----406------201---------201-------0------0------405
Lahore-----1210------819---------371-------1------17------1208
Lyallpur-----397------274---------123-------0-----0------397
Rawalpinid-----319------202---------106-------2------8------318
Peshawar-----521------299---------215-------0------6------520
Dacca-----558-----199---------353-------1-------2------555
Chittagong-----334------181---------151-------0------2------334
Khulna-----283------167---------113-------2------0------282
Comilla-----287------156---------128-------0------2------286
Total-----6221------3335---------2809-------10------54------6208

Source: Ibid p. 35

Ayub Era(1958-1969); With Ayub Khan’s arrival on the political stage in 1958, the System of Basic Democracy system was introduced in which ‘the voters delegate their rights to choose the president and the members of the national and provincial assemblies to 80,000 representatives called Basic Democrats.’

At the lowest level were the Union Panchayats, each containing ten elected and five nominated members. Each elected member was to represent from 1000 to 1500 people. They primary responsibility was to oversee the judicial police and developmental functions pertaining to their areas. The next tier was the sub district council called teshil council in West Pakistan and Thana council in East Pakistan. These councils comprising presidents of union panchayat and officers of development departments had been entrusted with development activities with in their respective areas. The other two tiers namely the district council was being presided over by deputy commissioner and divisional councils by the commissioners. These councils had members equally divided into official and non officials. Election to union panchayat was to be held on the basis of adult franchises.

Ayub has put the constitutional clock back to the days of Lord Mayo and Lord Ripon – the late nineteenth century --- when democratic experiments were initiated by putting life into the existing indigenous local institutions and creating other wider organs of local government like the district boards and the Municipal councils Ayub experiment also indicates the sort of government that is likely to work in an Asian country. Democracy in Pakistan according to Ayub should be a government for the people by the bureaucratic elite. Whether this bureaucracy will evoke support in East Pakistan, particularly when both the army and civil service are dominated by west Pakistanis remains to be seen.

The public meetings held to face the electorate were joint affairs, held under the chairmanship of the District Magistrate or some other civil service functionary. All candidates sat on the platform and each was allowed the same number of minutes in which to address the audience. The audience was not restricted to the Electoral College, but members of the general public were admitted and could ask questions along with the others. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the election passed off in a largely tranquil atmosphere.

The first elections to be held under this system were scheduled to run during the end of 1959 and the early 1960. Cabinet advised Ayub to seek the vote of confidence from the 80000 members of elected Basic Democrats. The Basic Democratic gave him an overwhelming vote of confidence. The ballot was held on 14 February and the result was announced on 15 February 1960. I received conformation in 95.6 per cent of the approximately 80,000 votes cast.18 B.D system however failed to produce a class of new leaders, insightful and independent in their outlook. They were subservient to the Ayub regime because the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, had given enough powers to the bureaucracy to control these institutions. Moreover, due to fear of victimization and the desire to win favour, the members did take steps to displace the bureaucrats associated with these institutions.

Despite Ayub’s depiction by Huntington as an innovator who through the device of Basic Democracies sought to transform the institutional basis of Pakistan’s politics, he was the paternalist of the Raj’s non-regulation provinces. He reintroduced the nineteenth century ideas of political tutelage through indirect election and official nomination of representatives. However, like the paternalistic Punjabi colonial officials, Ayub discovered that while this model of governance would work in a static society, it was found wanting in a period of Rapid socio-economic change. Just as the development of the canal colonies in colonial Punjab threatened bureaucratic governance as was seen in 1907 disturbance so the process of migration and urbanization unleashed by the green revolution and industrialization put an increasing strain on the Ayub system in the post 1965 period.

The Basic Democrats collectively formed the Electoral College which affirmed Ayub Khan as president in January 1960. The ballot showed 75084 votes in favour and only 2829 against. They similarly reelected him as president in 1965 following his election contested against Miss Fatima Jinnah. The Basic Democrats also chose the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies in the party-less election of April 1962.

According to Ayub Khan, by the beginning of 1962 people had begun to realize the utility and effectiveness of basic democracies and it was becoming obvious that I intended to give them political function. The new constitution was announced on first march 1962 the basic democrats then proceed to elect the representative of the people to national assembly in April 1962 and to the provincial assembly in May 1962.

Prior to these election “I issued an Order authorizing the election commission to take all necessary measure to ensure that the elections were conducted honestly, justly and fairly and that corrupt practices were eliminated. .. it was interesting to see the many of those who had publicly criticized and discredited the system eating their wards and approaching democrats for support. The masters were going to household servants and elite to turbaned natives for votes. It was a fitting nemesis.”

The first session of the national assembly elected in 1962 was held on June 8, 1962. Soon after that it became obvious that political groupings started emerging in the assembly. Ayub Khan realized that “Election” and “Assemblies” necessitated the existence of political parties. The formation of his own party or the adherence to one already existing, therefore, became inevitable for him. Thus one of the earliest bills to be passed by the national assembly was the Political parties Bill which became law on July 16, 1962. It permitted the revival of political parties although in a very truncated and restricted manner. On May 23, 1963, Ayub Khan became a member of the Pakistan Muslim League (convention), which was founded in September, 1962, at a convention in Karachi and almost immediately became the official government party. In December, 1963, Ayub Khan assumed the presidency of the Pakistan Muslim League, thus giving the finishing touch to his control of the country politics and political activities.

Under the constitution, a Presidential election was to be held within 120 days before the expiry of the incumbent’s term of five years. Since the date for the election was fixed for 2 January 1965. Ayub was nominated as Presidential candidate for re-election by the Convention Muslim League. He was, however, anxious to know whom the opposition would nominate as his opponent.

The opposition parties in the National Assembly had already joined forces to oust Ayub from power, under the banner of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP). This group included the Council Muslim League, led by Khwaja Nazimuddin and Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana; the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman; the National Awami Party, led by Maulana Bashani; the North West Frontier group of the National Awami Party, led by Wali Khan, son of the famous Abdul Ghafar Khan; the Nizam-i-Islam Party, led by Chaudhry Mohammad Ali and Farid Ahmad; and the Jamaat-i-Islami, led by Maulana Maudoodi on 16 September 1964, it was announced, after much confabulation, that the Combine Opposition Parties had invited Miss Fatima Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam , to be their candidate, an invitation she accepted although she had been virtually inactive in politics since her brother’s death.

On November 21, 1964, the Electoral College was duly elected; and, the following day, its members were called upon to elect a President, which, according to article 165 of the constitution, they had to do before March 7, 1965. The Election Commission had been set up on October 21, 1964, with G. Mueen al-Din as Chief Election Commissioner and Justice M. R. Khan and Justice Sardar Muhammad Iqbal as members. The last date for filling nomination papers was November 26, 1964.

In lieu of the elections of 965 combined opposition parties alleged that Ayub Khan as Field Marshal he was being paid by the government, which according to the constitution made him ineligible to stand for any election. This plan if it had succeeded would have created quite a predicament for Ayub Khan. But he came to know of it beforehand, and maneuvered to regularize his position through order issued with retrospective effect. However, even these orders bearing a weak rationale, where no less embarrassing for him.

The opposition parties from the very outset had been apprehensive that the general election would not be fair and free. That alleged that the previous few by –election had been marred by uninhibited official interference and hence there was no basis for them to believe that this interference would not be restored by the ruling party in the coming election. They demanded that the various measure of political control like the press and publication ordinance, the loudspeaker ordinance, and the public safety acts should be withdrawn, all political prisoners should be released, steps be taken to ensure that section 144 of the Penal Code would not been forced during the election campaign to curb their political activity and that the official machinery would not be misused to their detriment.

Opposition alleged that the delimitation of constituencies for election to the Electoral College had not always been done on the basis of the provisions laid down in the Electoral College Act, 1964. It was alleged that principles like territorial contiguity and the population limit of 1072 voters for each unit were often flouted by the Election Commission authorities in order to bestow special advantage to some persons with utter disregard to the convenience of people. Constitutional petition were filed in high courts and statements were issued to the press in which specific instance of breach of the provisions of the Electoral College act were cited.

Faulty voter’s list
The opposition was also of the view that the registration of voters had also been done with mala fide consideration. It charged that the names of persons who had been thought to be antagonistic to the party in power had been omitted form the voter list whereas fictitious names had been included in them to enable bogus voting in favor of the ruling party.

It was alleged that in East Pakistan many intending voters, who went to the registration office in Dacca during the week following the day the Electoral College Act, 1964 was amended were told that no instruction had been received by the East Pakistan Election Authority for further inclusion of names in the electoral rolls from the Chief Election Commissioner. The official concerned, therefore, refused to register their names. Those individuals suffered the most by that anomaly, who wanted to file their nomination for the election to the Electoral College but could not do so since their names had been omitted from the voter’s lists.

Bogus Voting
Yet another source of grievance to the opposition parties was the practice of the Bogus voting during the Electoral College polls. It was alleged that the procedure laid down for the Electoral College election were not fool proof. The procedure suffers from certain built in loopholes permitting large scale bogus voting and all manners of corrupt practices. Firstly, it was not required of the voters to sign his name or give his thumb impression before receiving his ballot paper from the presiding offices and secondly, identity of the voters was justified by a polling agent of any of the candidates after which he was accepted as prima-facai voter in the unit. Although the identity of a voter could be challenged by another agent, the challenged vote, however, was taken into account for the purpose of counting.

Another factor that had been attributed to the victory of the Ayub Kan was the dubious role of Maulana Bhashani. He was a staunch supporter of the Miss Fatima Jinnah but remained inactive during the election campaign in East Pakistan. The rumor was that immediately before the elections Bhashani had been won over the Ayub and a deal had been worked out between them. 33But that contention is corroborated by Iftikhar Ahmad who states ‘the refugees in Khulna and Rajshahi division who tended to support Ayub, especially since Bhashani who had considerable support in Rajshahi division did not campaign actively for Miss Jinnah.’

The PML secured a thumping majority 120 seats in those elections. The opposition could clinch only 15 seats. Combined Opposition Party (COP) won 10 seats whereas NDF bagged 5 seats in East Pakistan and 1 in West Pakistan. The rest of the seats went to the independents. The most unexpected victory was that in West Pakistan of Miss Jinnah’s candidate Hassan A Sheikh, who routed Siddique Dawood a leading industrialist, sitting MNA and PML treasurer by a convincing majority. One unusual feature of the elections was the large number of teid seats three of them prestige seats. One minister and 24 sitting MNAs lost their seats. Although the PML won 80% of the seats, it secured only 54.8% (East 49.64%; West 61.31%) of the total votes cast, the opposition secured a little more than 25%, the rest being secured by the independents.

The voting trend during these elections indicated that the voters were more influenced by the individual rather than parties and their manifestos. It is however significant to note that the independents supported largely by the opposition secured 51.22% of the votes in West Pakistan and the independents and the opposition together obtained 61.7 % of the votes in East Pakistan. Another trend that emerged from the presidential and Assembly elections was that while the majority of the MEC favoured the existing regime, they were extremely unpredictable on some matters. Their unpredictable disposition is manifested by the fact that a massive 63.3% votes were cast to the PML in the presidential elections whereas 51.8% of votes went to PML in the National Assembly polls and 42.24% in the Provincial Assembly polls. This inconsistent voting pattern demonstrated flexibility on part of at least one third of the MECs based upon theories of discretion and conscience.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

If you read India Today, you are left with the impression that India is an English-speaking land of billionaire businessmen, larded squabbling politicians and scandal-prone movie stars all living in fabulous houses. If you visit the country, one whiff of the air outside your air-conditioned city hotel dispels the myth.

August 15 is India’s Independence Day. Pakistan, the little country that thought it could but couldn’t, pipped it by one day and celebrates on August 14. It is now 63 years since Independence, so what have these countries achieved aside from destructive wars within and against each other and a standard of living that is by any measure about the worst in the world with the exception of certain blighted regions of Africa.

To make a point, on Pakistan’s Independence Day, Balochis attacked and killed a dozen and more non-Balochis in Balochistan province. It is both a spillover effect from the war in Afghanistan and the resentment they feel in the use of their own resources — natural gas and minerals — by the rest of the country while development in Balochistan is neglected. Continuing along the border with Afghanistan, the Pashtuns’ sympathy lies with their brethren on the other side. And as the Pakistan military tries vainly to assert control, attacks and bombings in major population centers have mushroomed.

India fares little better. Far from celebrating Independence Day, the Kashmiri Moslems were out demonstrating in tens of thousands despite recent killings of protesters. It’s nothing new as estimates of civilians killed since the troubles began range from 40,000 to 100,000. Things are quieter on the Pakistani side as those residents do not feel discriminated against. But quite probably, the Kashmiris would rather be rid of both and have an autonomous State of their own.

Kashmir is not the only insurrection India faces. What started forty-three years ago as a peasant rebellion in Naxalbari, West Bengal is now a full-fledged guerrilla war led by the Maoist faction of the Communist Party of India. It affects twenty of India’s twenty-eight States though the worst killings — by government supported militias and Naxalites (Maoists) of local farmers caught in between — have been occurring in Chattisgarh and Jharkhand. The cause? Quite simply a land grab by powerful industrial corporations who claim they will bring development and jobs.

Tell that to a farmer in a land with rich soil earning twice the national average. Now his own master, uneducated but with knowledge of farming in his bones and love of his land, he would be exchanging this freedom for life as a lowly servant subject to the whims of his masters. He has chosen to fight … and die if need be; not unlike the Kashmiris, the Balochis, the Pushtoons and others across the Subcontinent. Is Nepal a harbinger in this context?

The stupidity and ridiculous nature of the India-Pakistan conflict is highlighted by a current simple fact. The present Prime Ministers of both countries are ethnic Punjabis. It means they can speak to each other in their mother tongue. However, the people from other provinces in their respective countries would not be able to understand them. As Punjab constitutes a large part of Pakistan, Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister, is understood by a vastly larger proportion of Pakistanis than Indians! The problem, the countries face, is a religious sectarianism encouraged by the British in India similar to the French “solution” in Lebanon and what we have recently done in Iraq.

The economic picture for either country is also not particularly rosy, especially in comparison with neighbors other than Bangladesh and, of course, Afghanistan. India has the lowest life expectancy; Pakistan only slightly better. Their similar GNI per capita is roughly half that of Bhutan or Sri Lanka and one seventh of Malaysia, also a former British colony; it is also a third that of China (perhaps even less as the Chinese currency is undervalued). What is more significant is the virtually new infrastructure in China, the trains, roads, ports, etc. — interesting to observe also that while India is becoming a call-center hub offering relatively low-skilled jobs, China is already the world’s factory generating well-paid manufacturing jobs for its people.

Whereas the Olympic Games hosted by China demonstrated the nation’s emergence as a superpower-to-be, the almost farcical preparation for the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, coming this Oct. 3rd, is in stark contrast. The enterprise is beset by corruption scandals, cost overruns of an order of magnitude, inefficiency, incompetence and burreaucratic infighting. It is sad and painful to watch. Of course, Pakistan would not have fared any better — just look at the response to the floods.

These floods in Pakistan, devastating as they have been, do offer an opportunity for India to extend a helping hand. The $5 million contribution to the relief fund is a good start. But it is an intangible swamped in the pool of aid from other countries. Imagine India providing direct and immediate relief in the form of food, tents, helicopters to ferry sorely needed supplies, and volunteers, even the military, who will be seen by Pakistanis as helpers in this catastrophe rather than in the familiar role of enemy. It would dramatically alter the Pakistani mind-set, and assuage the anger at the treatment of their Kashmiri brethren. Of course it is going to take many more confidence building measures by both sides before the nukes no longer stand ready for mutual annihilation.

What of the future? One can easily visualize the Indian Subcontinent in a political and economic model not unlike the European Common Market. In such a scenario, a semi-autonomous Kashmir might well finesse the whole thorny problem of who it belongs to. Listening to the grievances of their minorities, listening to each other, would lay the foundation for stability in the region. Otherwise, the two countries will continue to waste resources on military spending and to muddle through, lagging further and further behind colonial contemporaries like Malaysia.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Pakistan’s demographic dilemma
By
Michael Kugelman

Pakistan’s 2011 census kicked off in April, but less than three months later, it is embroiled in controversy. Several members of the Sindh Census Monitoring Committee have rejected as “seriously flawed” the recently completed household count. They allege that census workers, directed by an unspecified “ethnic group,” have counted Karachi’s “inns, washrooms, and even electric poles” as households in an effort to dilute the city’s native “Sindhi” presence.

These Census Monitoring Committee members are not the only Pakistani politicians to be concerned about the census. Pakistan is experiencing rapid urbanization; while a third of the country’s people have long been rurally based, at least 50 percent of the population is expected to live in cities by the 2020s. Pakistan’s political leadership draws much of its power from rural landholdings, power that could be greatly reduced if a census confirms this migration toward cities.

This politicization underscores the perils of census-taking in Pakistan. In many other nations, it is a routine process completed regularly. Yet in Pakistan, myriad factors — from catastrophic flooding and insufficient funding to the turbulent security situation and intense political opposition — have conspired to delay it for three consecutive years, making the country census-less since 1998.

Accurate census data enables governments to make decisions about how to best allocate resources and services. In Pakistan, such decisions are critical. Consider that its current population, estimated at about 175 million, is the world’s sixth-largest. It has the highest population growth, birth, and fertility rates in South Asia — one of the last regions, along with sub-Saharan Africa, still experiencing young and rapidly rising populations. Additionally, with a median age of 21, Pakistan’s population is profoundly youthful. Two-thirds are less than 30 years old, and as a percentage of total population, only Yemen has more people under 24.

According to some demographers, these conditions present opportunities. If a large, youthful population enters the workforce in droves, it can spark economic growth and free up state resources to be used for social welfare. In an era of endlessly bad news about Pakistan, it is tantalizing to envision the effects of attaining this “demographic dividend” in the country. Imagine a million new employees flocking to Pakistan’s burgeoning IT industry, a scenario economist Shahid Javed Burki predicts could generate $20 billion in export earnings. Or visualize a new generation of engineers and scientists unlocking the potential of Pakistan’s massive underground mineral reserves, estimated to be valued in the trillions of dollars.

Such cheery thoughts, however, overlook the dreadful state of Pakistan’s school system and economy. If Pakistanis are to enter the workforce, they will need to be properly educated — yet a staggering 40 million out of Pakistan’s 70 million 5-to-19-year-olds are not in school. Additionally, if Pakistanis are to be gainfully employed, the economy must be large enough to absorb them, no simple feat in a labor economy that at present creates only a million new jobs a year, yet could face 175 million potential workers by 2030 (current unemployment runs at about 15 percent, and underemployment is substantial as well). Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s Planning Commission deputy chairman estimated last year that in order to employ Pakistan’s nearly 100-million-strong under-20 population, GDP growth will need to soar to 9 percent (it is currently mired at 2.4 percent).

The most likely and devastating consequence of Pakistan’s demographic dilemma is natural resource scarcity. Pakistan is already desperately short on water and land. Water availability has plummeted from about 5,000 cubic meters per capita in the 1950s to less than 1,500 today — perilously close to the 1,000 cubic meters per capita level designated as water-scarce. Meanwhile, according to one striking estimate, Pakistan loses nearly three acres of good agricultural land every 20 minutes. Given Pakistan’s population density of roughly 230 people per square kilometer, such shortfalls put immense pressure on remaining supply. Finally, as illustrated by Pakistan’s constant blackouts, the country’s energy grid is already under major pressure, a problem that will only grow worse with demographic pressure if no action is taken.

Compounding these constraints is Pakistan’s poor resource governance. At least 90 percent of Pakistan’s water resources are used for agriculture, yet the country’s farming sector is ravaged by water wastage. Flood irrigation is used much more than water-saving drip irrigation, while sugar and wheat — some of the world’s most water-intensive crops — dominate Pakistan’s agricultural mix.

Then there is leakage. Water expert Simi Kamal calculates that simply plugging the country’s leaky canal system would free up 10 times more water than would be generated by a large dam. Islamabad, however, not only builds large dams, but also constructs gigantic water fountains and leases large swaths of farmland to foreign investors for large-scale agricultural production. This all adds to the strain on precious water and land supplies.

Unless Pakistan’s natural resource governance takes a dramatic turn for the more judicious, resource scarcity could soon be more reality than threat. Here, it is instructive to juxtapose Pakistan’s future population projections with those of natural resource supply. According to the U.N. Population Division’s newest mid-range estimates, Pakistan’s population will rise to 275 million by 2050. However, this estimate optimistically assumes an eventual drop in Pakistan’s total fertility rate (TFR), which now registers at about 3.6 children per woman. Assuming TFR remains constant — by no means an unlikely prospect, given that the country’s contraceptive prevalence rate hovers at only 30 percent — the projections soar to nearly 380 million people.

Meanwhile, as early as 2025, Pakistan’s total water demand is expected to exceed availability by 100 billion cubic meters. This deficit represents five times the amount of water that can presently be stored in the reservoirs of the vast Indus River system. Put differently, in less than 15 years, Pakistan’s chief water storage source could fall far short of satisfying demand for humanity’s lifeblood.

To overcome its demographic (and concurrent resource) challenges, Pakistan will need to revamp its educational system, enlarge its economy, and expand access to family planning services. These represent herculean tasks in the best of times, and Pakistan is experiencing one of the more traumatic periods in its history.

Yet this all amounts to putting the cart before the horse. Pakistan cannot expect to make progress on population policy until the nation is willing to accord priority to population issues, which starts with having accurate data about the country’s population. “At no point,” according to Zeba Sathar, one of Pakistan’s most respected demographers, “has serious attention been devoted to studying Pakistan’s large population numbers, their distribution, and the implications they hold for the country’s development, politics, and ultimate stability.”

This must change. To its credit, Islamabad has signaled its intention to bring demographics to the policy front burner. It has christened 2011 as “Population Year” and has declared — in the words of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani — that “all hopes of development and economic prosperity would flounder if we as a nation lose the focus and do not keep [the] population issue in the spotlight.”

The first step is to complete that census. The Population Census Organization estimates that assuming all goes well, data collection will be completed by the end of the year. Here’s hoping that natural disasters take the rest of 2011 off, political point-scoring abates, financing proliferates, and security improves just a bit — so that Pakistan can take an initial step toward tackling what may well be its greatest development challenge.

Michael Kugelman is the South Asia associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and lead editor of “Reaping the Dividend: Overcoming Pakistan’s Demographic Challenges.”

Source: Foreign Policy

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

India has started construction of some of the planned dams on western rivers, thus posing a serious threat to the agriculture and hydel projects of Pakistan. India’s think-tanks have been working on river diversion plans with a view to creating acute water shortage in Pakistan, which could lead to acute shortage of wheat and other crops and also stoking inter-provincial conflicts over distribution of water.

The Indus River Basin has been an area of conflict between India and Pakistan for about four decades. Spanning 1,800 miles, the river and its tributaries together make up one of the largest irrigation canals in the world. The division of the river basin water has created friction among the countries of South Asia, and among their states and provinces. In Pakistan, accusations of overdrawing of share of water made by each province have arguably resulted in the lack of water supplies to coastal regions of Pakistan. Whereas Pakistan media has been highlighting internal political squabbles, it never paid attention to India’s efforts to dry Pakistan and failed to launch a sustained offensive though construction of Indian dams on western rivers, which is posing a direct threat to Pakistan’s national interest.

On 1st April 1948, India had stemmed the flow of tributaries to Pakistan and discontinued water to the Dipalpur canal and main branches of Upper Bari Doab Canal. Pakistan wanted an equitable allocation of the flow of Indus River and its tributaries between the India and Pakistan. Negotiations had started from 1951, and the treaty was signed in 1960 that gave Pakistan the right to receive unrestricted flow of the western rivers, and it was obligatory on the part of India to allow the flow of water unimpeded with minor exceptions. It was provided in the treaty that in case of a dispute, the World Bank would appoint a ‘neutral expert’ whose decision would be final. Pakistan had taken the issue of Baglihar Dam with the United Nations, and verdict was given by the neutral expert suggesting amendments. Had India taken Pakistan’s objections to the project seriously and not tried to ride roughshod intransigently, both would have avoided the embarrassment of facing a neutral expert to adjudicate their dispute.

One does not have to be an agricultural scientist to know that water is indispensable to agriculture. It is a critical input into agriculture of a country especially when it is situated in an arid or semi-arid zone. Having all said, if Bhasha dam is not constructed within next five to 10 years, Pakistan will not be able to produce enough food-grains to meet the needs of the growing population. Loss of storage capacity due to sedimentation is causing serious drop even for existing agricultural production. Food shortages and energy shortfall have already blighted Pakistan with the result that industry in all the provinces is only partially running and could come to a grinding halt. Previous governments had not taken timely action and did not take up the matter with the UN or International Court of Justice. The present government and opposition parties seem to be too preoccupied with their power-sharing or power-grabbing plans and do not have time to focus on the problems faced by the nation. It was in this backdrop that Muttehida Kisan Mahaz had blamed the government for its apathy to their problems.

International community must realize that water issue between India and Pakistan could be a source of conflict and war between two nuclear states would not only endanger the region but the world at large. The People of Azad Jammu and Kashmir should also raise their voice against Indian water aggression. The Indus Basin comprises the River Indus and five main rivers, namely Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. The total area of the Indus Basin is roughly 450,000 square miles, most of which lies in Pakistan. In Pakistan there exists one of the most highly developed canal irrigation system and approximately 37 million acres of land is dependent on the flow of Indus water. At the time of independence, though major portion of the Indus Basin (31 Million Acres) formed part of Pakistan, however the control of most of existing structures on the rivers of Indus Basin fell into the Indian hands, being upper riparian. The consequences of such an unfair demarcation surfaced soon after when India started interfering with the waters flowing downstream by stopping waters on rivers Ravi and Sutlej (irrigating 1.6 Million Acres in Pakistan) from 1 April 1948.

The stress, which subsequently mounted in the region was felt around the globe, and in 1951 World Bank offered its good offices for resolution of the issue. The efforts ultimately culminated into an agreement between Pakistan and India in the shape of Indus Waters Treaty signed in 1960. As per Indus Waters Treaty, India got the complete rights on the eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas) whereas Pakistan was given the rights on western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) with some specific provisions for use of water by India from these rivers.

The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 is being implemented through and institutional arrangement, that is, Permanent Indus Commission comprising of two Commissioners, one from each country. Currently, the Commission is involved in resolution of three major water disputes, which included Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant, Kishenganga Hydroelectric Plant and Wuller Barrage. As stated above neutral expert gave the verdict and some of Pakistan’s concerns were addressed, though Pakistan still has reservations about the verdict. The information about Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant, located on River Chenab, was communicated by India in 1992. Failing to resolve the issue bilaterally at the Commission and government levels, the issue of Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant was referred to the World Bank upon which the determination by a Neutral Expert who upheld Pakistan’s objections on freeboard, pondage and level of power intake.

However, the Neutral Expert’s determination regarding location of spillway gates and concession to India to draw-down 17 meters below the Dead Storage Level surpassed not only his given mandate, but also was neither an issue nor a question presented to the Neutral Expert. Pakistan thus reserves the right to refer the determination regarding “draw down”. The Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant was commissioned in 2008, and during its initial filling, India again violated the clauses of the Treaty by not filling the dam in stipulated timeframe and by not ensuring requisite inflow at Marala Head works of Pakistan causing loss to Pakistani farmers.

India is obliged to provide information of their projects to Pakistan six months before starting construction. In all instances, India started work without providing requisite information. Also, the information, whenever provided, is normally incomplete. India stalls resolution process on the plea of more discussions at the level of the Commission while the construction continues. This leads towards a fait accompli situation when Pakistan approaches for resolution of issues to the institutions (World Bank/Court of Arbitration). India terms the flow of water recorded by Pakistan as under-reported. Without any prejudice to the stand taken, Pakistan has suggested the installation of Telemetric System for measurement of flow of Indus System of Rivers, particularly on the western rivers to ensure the transparency in recording the flow of water. India should bear in mind that it cannot dry Pakistan through water terrorism, and it continued with its sinister designs, Pakistan would not sit just to watch its destruction.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

As terror once again struck Mumbai on July 13, killing 21 people and injuring more than 140 others, Indian leaders mostly avoided pointing a finger at Pakistan, for the first time in the history of both the nations. Loss of lives and property is condemnable in the strongest words but this new trend will go a long way in reducing trust deficit between both the countries having a hostile record. Just before a fortnight from Pakistan and India foreign minister-level talks in New Dehli, the well-coordinated attacks might be a planned conspiracy to derail the resumption of peace process but this softening tone and tenor of the politicians might have buried the dreams of Indian fanatics.

Besides, the timing of the serial blasts raised suspicion over whether these blasts were engineered by right-wing extremists to disrupt the rapprochement gesture. In the meantime, Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna’s ‘mature’ statement that the talks will take place as scheduled foiled this conspiracy of ‘extremists’. Similarly, Indian Home Minister Chidambaram also avoided to put blame on any terror group besides saying that the probe will not be based on any “pre-determined assumptions”. Avoiding a blame game, in an effort to avert reaching hasty conclusions on the latest Mumbai blasts, would prove to be an upright development. A number of times in the past, Pakistan and India peace process had been spoiled by such acts committed by the extremists. The same mistake should not be repeated now and the talks must go on to take the Thimpu spirit ahead.

In this regard, outgoing Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao’s statement that Indian disengagement with Pakistan after 2008 Mumbai terror attacks was a mistake, also reflects a change of mind. Ms Rao’s views are indicative of a consensus within the Indian establishment to push the peace process forward. This seems to be a departure of typical Indian mindset to level baseless allegations against Pakistan and spread negative propaganda which was agreed upon by the foreign secretaries of both the neighbors in their recent meeting in Islamabad. On the other hand, this attitude shown by the Indian politicians has clearly disappointed the US hawks who wanted to exploit these attacks and keep Pakistan, already under immense pressure after Osama bin Laden raid, fulfilling their demands on their terms.

This American frustration can be seen in a leading editorial published in the New York Times (NYT) named ‘More horrors in Mumbai’. Reading behind the lines, the NYT actually tried to urge the Indian politicians not to react in a responsible way as it is the high time to manipulate the situation. Indians are treading carefully but the US tried to convey a veiled message to the Indian establishment to point finger at Pakistan, saying ‘if Pakistanis were behind this latest horror, Islamabad must ensure that they are brought to justice this time.’ If Indians take a leaf out of America’s book, their investigators may establish a link of any terror outfit involved in the attacks with Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), to set ‘terrorism’ as main agenda of upcoming talks which would likely to cast a negative impact on the peace process.

This would also be assumed as an effort to put the Kashmir dispute on the backburner in the talks’ agenda. It must be understood in the clearest of terms that any talks without keeping Kashmir dispute at the centre will fail to get some concrete results. Indian authorities should properly investigate these attacks to reach any credible conclusions on the basis of solid evidences. The Indian government should also tighten the noose around Indian-based militant groups which had been found involved in such attacks in the past. Both the countries have to work together to wipe out cross-border terrorism and this can only happen if Pakistan on its part brings the culprits of 2008 Mumbai terror attack to justice. The process of avoiding negative propaganda and blame game can be the first major step in this long and bumpy road to bury the hatchet between both the arch rivals.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Two new developments could hurt the India-Pakistan dialogue, which was restored barely three months ago after a hiatus of more than two years.

First, the three blasts that rocked Mumbai on July 13 have come just when the dialogue seemed to be headed in the right direction, and barely two weeks before the foreign ministers of both countries were set to meet in Delhi. The timing has prompted sections of the media and strategic community to suggest the attack could have emanated from Pakistan.

As a result of this latest incident, the same old questions about whether India is doing the right thing by even carrying on with the dialogue are bound to come to the fore again – should India have seriously considered an Operation Geronimo-like assault to dismantle terrorist camps in Pakistan? Is peace with Pakistan only a dream? Such questions are sure to put the Manmohan Singh-led UPA government in a tight spot.

Singh’s policy of engaging with Pakistan has already been criticised by members of the ‘strategic enclave,’ who say his quest for peace with the latter is futile. And, in all probability, the appetite for peace with Pakistan will dwindle even further for a number of reasons. First, as in the aftermath of 26/11, some members of the business community have come down heavily against the government for not being serious enough in making India terror free. This is one issue the government can’t afford to ignore. Also, with Uttar Pradesh elections around the corner, the opposition BJP (itself in total disarray) will be happy to resort to jingoism and to play the terrorism card.

The government, meanwhile, isn’t exactly at the peak of its popularity. Indeed, it has been dubbed one of the most corrupt governments in post-independence India (although headed by one of the most honest prime ministers). On top of this, the lacklustre Cabinet reshuffle on July 12 has only worsened things for the UPA, with a tiny minority of members, such as Mani Shankar Aiyar of the Congress Party, calling for an uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan.

The other development that could hurt engagement between India and Pakistan is the not so judicious reaction of Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna to the US scrapping of aid to Pakistan. Krishna showed uncharacteristic alacrity in welcoming this step, telling journalists: ‘With reference to the special circumstances between India and Pakistan, and how India has consistently taken the view that it is not desirable that this region be heavily armed by the United States, which will upset the equilibrium in the region itself, to that extent India welcomes this step.’

Was this the right thing to say, and right now? With this latest engagement just a few months old, couldn’t the aged but dapper Krishna have been more nuanced in his response? If he was really itching to say something and earn US brownie points, he could have been a bit more precise by suggesting that India isn’t averse to aid being granted to Pakistan, but only for development purposes.

While Krishna may have thought his statement would be correctly interpreted by the civilian establishment in Islamabad, he must understand that the civil-military balance is heavily tipped in favour of the latter. And anyway, his comments will have irritated even the civilian leadership, weakening them on all issues, including negotiations with India. While factually Krishna may be spot on, foreign policy doesn’t hinge merely on facts and intentions.

India’s foreign policy mandarins are faced with balancing the twin aims of improving ties with both the United States and Pakistan. It’s not impossible, but it’s a mammoth task for sure.

Source: The Diplomat

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Nearly 64 years after the partition of India, there are individuals in both India and Pakistan who fervently believe that faith is responsible for all the acrimony prevalent between the two nuclear states. In the aftermath of 9/11, fissures between the ‘Islamic’ and ‘non-Islamic’ world — a categorisation which is rather nebulous — have only ‘vindicated’ the claims that faith is a cause of conflict between both countries.

This, however, is merely one side of the story, and just as there is an incomplete understanding of Indo-Pak history, so is there an incomplete understanding of some contemporary positive events. In the last six years, Sikh pilgrims have been paying obeisance at historical religious shrines in Pakistan, such as Nankana Sahib and Panja Sahib. These pilgrimages have not been disrupted even during times of tension. Pilgrims, who are apprehensive before they visit Pakistan, return with a different opinion, as they are warmly received by the Pakistani public.

Of late some interesting ideas for enhancing religious connectivity between India and Pakistan have been gaining ground. First, the movement for the Kartarpur corridor has been gaining ground both in India and abroad. For those not familiar with the term, Kartarpur (now in Pakistan) is the place where the founder of the Sikh faith, Guru Nanak, spent the last 18 years of his life and had both Hindu and Muslim followers. Kartarpur, which falls in district Narowal, is home to the Sikh shrine Darbar Sahib, and this shrine is barely three kilometres from the Indian border. Before the Indo-Pak war of 1965, it is said that there was a bridge on the Ravi that Sikh pilgrims could cross over and visit Darbar Sahib. During the 1965 war, however, this bridge was destroyed; it might be mentioned that the relationship between the two countries became more tense in the aftermath of this war and visa regimes became stricter with the passage of time.

For a long time — nearly a decade — Sikhs, predominantly settled in the Indian Punjab, have been demanding visa-free access to Darbar Sahib. One of the individuals who have been tirelessly working for this cause is Kuldeep Singh Wadala, a well-respected leader of Indian Punjab.

The Pakistani side has been quite upbeat about this demand and the minister for religious affairs and minorities in the previous Musharraf government, Ijazul Haq, announced that the Pakistani government would have no objection to Sikh pilgrims crossing over to the Pakistani side to pay obeisance without a visa, provided they return the same day. Even the present government has been quite encouraging in its response and has in fact started constructing a road that would make the pilgrimage smoother. This is a significant development, given that it has taken place in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks and when relations have been rather topsy-turvy.

The Indian government has been promising that it will look into the issue but there has not been much progress. The earlier Indian external affairs minister and present finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee, visited the Indian side of the border — Dera Baba Nanak — in June 2008, which is also home to a Sikh shrine and promised the Sikh community that the government is looking into various ways of going ahead with the visa-free pilgrimage from Dera Baba Nanak to Kartarpur. In the meanwhile, the Mumbai attacks happened and things slowed down, though a resolution was passed in the Indian Punjab assembly, in October 2010, for going ahead with this project.

Interestingly, a former US diplomat, Ambassador John McDonald, who runs an NGO called the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), has also been lobbying for the cause ever since he visited the site in June 2008. IMTD brought out a feasibility study in 2009, and has recommended that this site be declared a peace zone. McDonald, who was shocked to see the barbed wire that separated Dera Baba Nanak from Kartarpur, has been lobbying hard with diplomats from India and Pakistan and officials in the US government.

Like Indian Punjab, Indian Kashmir too yearns for more porous borders and IMTD, which first mooted the idea for the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, has also recently proposed a bus service from Muzaffarabad to Hazratbal. It is crucial for central governments on both sides to take these and other proposals for boosting religious tourism, as India and Pakistan are both home to historical religious sites of numerous faiths.

Including such initiatives in Indo-Pak negotiations between foreign ministers or foreign secretaries will hyphenate them to the overall relationship, whereas religious tourism can actually be promoted jointly by the ministries of tourism and culture and minorities affairs, with assistance from the concerned religious organisations and state governments. Some of the issues that can be examined are the difficulties pilgrims currently face in securing visas and increasing connectivity to religious shrines through rail/bus or, wherever possible, by land.

Promoting initiatives such as the ones discussed above is a reminder of the common South Asian past, an integral component of people-to-people contact. It will also be beneficial for the economies of both countries, more so the Pakistani economy, which is in a desolate condition.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins

Designer foreign policy
By
Ayesha Siddiqa

It seems that Pakistan will now have a flow of foreign designers such as Hermes (which makes the Birkin handbag), Prada and others coming to the country to set up shop. Their interest, it seems, is ignited by another rumour that Delhi is considering handing over Kashmir to Hina Rabbani Khar rather than Pakistan due to her suave dressing (Indian leaders are not worried that she may give the territory to Pakistan since her feudal-landowning background may not allow her to do so). The new foreign minister has dual ownership by both the political government and the establishment, and it is a great idea to have her there to sweep foreign leaders off their feet.

It’s hard to beat the Pakistani establishment’s innovative and creative instincts. Quite a few years ago, a prominent general of the Musharraf team had claimed about a certain female, who was being launched as the establishment’s new intellectual missile, that a few more like her would make the world change its perception about Pakistan. The media hype in India around Hina Rabbani Khar’s visit will probably make some people happy, especially those who decided to invest in the new foreign minister. It’s certainly a good choice since it helps in bringing the political government and the establishment together, especially in terms of ownership of the minister. While she owes her promotion to her political masters, Khar is quite adept at surviving through different regime types, a quality that will take her a long way. For the sceptics who compare her with Shah Mahmood Qureshi, they must remember that the young Khar’s presentability is comparable to that of the former foreign minister vis-à-vis his expensive Armani suits. Furthermore, like him, she will build her way into the party and the establishment.

Good presentation and outlook (which includes the capacity to conduct oneself well, speak in a foreign language and seem visibly intelligent) are the traits which the establishment keenly looks for in a foreign minister. He/she does not have to be imaginative or inspired by the idea of making any original contribution to foreign policy. We continue to operate in the prism of a foreign policy which was jointly manufactured by the military establishment and the political government of the 1970s. Over the years, foreign ministers are expected only to conduct the orchestra rather than write the symphony themselves.

As far as India is concerned, there is very little that a dashing foreign minister is expected to do. I remember a dinner at the Pakistani High Commission in London on the occasion of Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s first visit to the UK after being sworn in as foreign minister. During his keynote speech, he expressed great enthusiasm for solving all outstanding issues with India and taking the relationship forward. Interestingly, the army and naval attaches sitting in a far-off corner in that very room whispered to each other and other guests on their table and presented a totally different worldview. With time, Qureshi learnt to listen more intently to the establishment that he was always a part of rather than go the way the political government initially intended.

Hina Rabbani Khar is intelligent and knows how not to rock the boat. She stuck to the draft as far as her visit to India was concerned. In any case, she represents a political government which is currently caught in a bind and cannot make original contributions to foreign policy, certainly not in terms of relations with India. She will not try to get original either as her main constituent — the establishment — would want her to stick to cosmetics.

It is a good sign that the two neighbours are talking to each other and are being civil. Otherwise, things are pretty much at a standstill. The Indian military won’t budge from Siachen without a joint agreement to map the existing positions first. On Sir Creek, the Pakistan Navy has gone back yet again to solving the issue on the basis of an old 1914 map rather than through other innovative ways. There is no movement on trade either.

Surely this is just the beginning of yet another chapter in India-Pakistan peace talks. Hina Khar was of the view that the flow of peace initiatives will not be reversed this time. Being foreign minister, she probably has greater insight. But the fact is that it’s not her words but the mood of the establishment that will be the evidence of whether the time has come for the two states to seriously talk peace. Meanwhile, we should suffice with Hermes and Prada.

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When Problems are so Big & Your Strength is no Longer enough to CaRRy them, Don't Give uP; Because where your Strength Ends the Grace of Almighty ALLAH Begins