Friday, March 29, 2024
11:08 AM (GMT +5)

Go Back   CSS Forums > CSS Compulsory Subjects > Pakistan Affairs

Reply Share Thread: Submit Thread to Facebook Facebook     Submit Thread to Twitter Twitter     Submit Thread to Google+ Google+    
 
LinkBack Thread Tools Search this Thread
  #1  
Old Monday, June 20, 2011
Utmanian's Avatar
Member
 
Join Date: May 2011
Location: Islamabad
Posts: 29
Thanks: 75
Thanked 10 Times in 9 Posts
Utmanian is on a distinguished road
Question pakistan foreign policy

Assalam u Alaikum...
kindly members give me complete nots or article related to pak,and USA foreign Policy...thanks
Reply With Quote
  #2  
Old Monday, June 20, 2011
SADIA SHAFIQ's Avatar
Senior Member
 
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Heaven
Posts: 1,560
Thanks: 1,509
Thanked 1,417 Times in 749 Posts
SADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant futureSADIA SHAFIQ has a brilliant future
Default

links

"We predicted it" - George W. Bush - Salon.com


Blinded by scandal - Salon.com



http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/n...206sep17.story

Pakistan Christian Post

Special Coverage: NEWS & POLITICS | AlterNet

this is the congressional research .....hope it will help you


Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and
Considerations
John Rollins, Coordinator
Specialist in Terrorism and National Security
May 5, 2011


Summary

The May 1, 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) by U.S. forces in Pakistan has led to a range of views about near- and long-term security and foreign policy implications for the United States.Experts have a range of views about the killing of OBL. Some consider his death to be a largely
symbolic event, while others believe it marks a significant achievement in U.S. counter terrorism efforts. Individuals suggesting that his death lacks great significance argue that U.S. and allied actions had eroded OBL’s ability to provide direction and support to Al Qaeda (AQ). For these
analysts, OBL’s influence declined following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to a point where prior to his death he was the figurehead of an ideological movement. This argument reasons that a shift of terrorist capability has occurred away from the core of AQ to affiliated organizations. Still
others argue that OBL pursued a strategy of developing the AQ organization into an ideological movement thus making it more difficult to defeat. They contend that, even if OBL were no longer involved in the decision-making apparatus of AQ, his role as the inspirational leader of the organization was far more important than any operational advice he might offer. As such, his
death may not negatively affect the actions of the ideological adherents of AQ and as a martyr hemay attract and inspire a greater number of followers.Individuals suggesting that his death is a major turning point in U.S. counter terrorism efforts contend that OBL remained an active participant in setting a direction for the strategy and operations of AQ and its affiliates. In addition to disrupting AQ’s organizational activities some
believe his death may serve as a defining moment for the post 9/11 global counterrevolutionary as current and potential terrorists, other governments, and entities that wish to threaten U.S. interests will take note of the U.S. success in achieving a long-held security goal. The death
of OBL may have near and long-term implications for AQ and U.S. security strategies and policies.


The degree to which OBL’s death will affect AQ and how the U.S. responds to this event may shape the future of many U.S. national security activities.

Implications and possible
considerations for Congress related to the U.S. killing of OBL in Pakistan are addressed in this

report. As applicable, questions related to the incident and U.S. policy implications are also offered. They address:
• Implications for AQ (core, global affiliates, and unaffiliated adherents)
• Congressional Notification
• Legal Considerations
• National Security Considerations and Implications for the Homeland
• Military Considerations
• Implications for Pakistan and Afghanistan
• Implications for U.S. Security Interests and Foreign Policy Considerations
The death of OBL is multi-faceted topic with information emerging frequently that adds perspective and context to many of the issues discussed in this report. This report is based onopen-source information and will be updated as necessary.


Implications of the Death of Osama bin Laden
Issues and questions related to the killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) are multifaceted and may have operational, regional, and policy implications. Operational policy issues include congressional notification, legal considerations, and current and future military activities.Congressional Notification1The chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees have stated that they were briefed on OBL’s whereabouts during the past few months including, according to Representative Mike Rogers, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, some details regarding the Abbottabad
compound. The Senate Majority Leader, Senator Harry Reid, has also indicated that he had been briefed on the plans to confirm OBL’s location and take action. Charmian Rogers indicated that the entire “Gang of Eight” had been briefed on the plans although not all were briefed at the same
time. The Gang of Eight refers to the eight Members of Congress (the Speaker, House Minority Leader, the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, and the chairmen and ranking members of the two intelligence committees) who, by statute, must be presidential Findings of covert actions (along with other members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the President). A finding is an official determination by the President that a specific covert action is in the national interest A covert action is an activity to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad where the role of the U.S. will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.4 In aPBS News Hour interview on May 3, CIA Director Leon Panetta stated, “this was what’s called a‘Title 50’ operation, which is a covert operation, and it comes directly from the President of the United States who made the decision to conduct this operation in a covert way.” He added that,consistent with Title 50, he commanded the mission but it was carried out by Vice Admiral William McRaven, the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command.

Possible Questions


Notwithstanding the notification process that was carried out with this particular operation, other considerations and questions may still emerge. For example,

• In retrospect, was congressional notification overly restrictive? When was the written Presidential Finding (required by 50 USC 413b(a)(1)) reported to the several members of the Gang of Eight? Has the written Finding now been shared with all members of the two intelligence committees?

• Did the operation necessarily constitute a cover action? Could it have been considered a traditional military activity? Was the role of the CIA Director essential to carrying out the operation? Could it have been carried out by the Secretary of Defense? Other than the role of Director Panetta what was the contribution of CIA officials to carrying out the raid?

• Should there be statutory provisions requiring that the Armed Services
committees (or their respective leaderships) be advised of activities such as Abbott raid?

Legal Considerations

The death of OBL appears to have little, if any, immediate consequence for the legal framework governing the conflict with Al Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates. Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40), which authorized the President:to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.By conferring authority “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against entities involved inthe 9/11 attacks, the AUMF is understood to not only authorize the use of force against such groups, but also to permit other fundamental incidents to the waging of war, including the detention of captured enemy belligerents to prevent their return to hostilities. Pursuant to this authority, the United States has engaged in military operations against AQ, the Taliban, and associated forces located in Afghanistan and other locations, and it has detained belligerents captured in these operations at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other locations.Due to OBL’s position in AQ’s command structure, along with his role in the 9/11 attacks, the reappears to be clear consensus that he constituted a legitimate target under the AUMF at the time of his death. Additionally, the AUMF does not restrict the exercise of the authority it confers to particular geographic location. Accordingly, at least for purposes of domestic law, 7 the fact tha tOBL was killed outside of Afghanistan, where U.S. operations against AQ have primarily occurred, does not appear to affect the lawfulness of his targeting.While OBL was a legitimate target under the AUMF, his death does not result in the termination of the authority conferred by the act. The AUMF authorizes the use of force against all “nations, organizations, or persons” determined to have been involved in the 9/11 attacks. OBL’s demise would not appear to affect the AUMF’s continued application to AQ and any other entity believed to have “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 attacks or harbored such persons or groups, so as to prevent any future terrorist attacks by such entities against the United States.Even though OBL’s death does not have the immediate legal consequence of modifying the authority conferred by the AUMF, it is nonetheless possible that his demise may inform future deliberations by policymakers as to whether to alter the legal framework governing U.S. policy towards AQ and its affiliates.

Military Considerations

The successful U.S. military operation against OBL carries with it possible military implications for the future. In terms of U.S. adversaries, it can be argued that the operation can serve as powerful deterrent to both current and aspiring terrorist leaders. The search for OBL took almost
a decade to develop and execute, spanned two very different Administrations with the operation conducted in a sovereign nation, apparently without their knowledge or consent, against a target
that was considered by some analysts as well hidden and protected. Some contend that this sends the message that no matter how long it takes and how difficult the circumstances, the U.S. will ultimately kill or capture senior terrorist leadership. While this could convey a potential deterrence message, it also suggests that in the future, more concerted measures will need to betaken by terrorist organizations to protect their leadership, which could make military operations against them more difficult.Another implication is that the U.S. military has demonstrated a highly refined and sophisticated ability to locate, track, and interdict high value targets anywhere in the world. While this capability has been associated with counter terrorism efforts, there are also implications for counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) efforts as well as other national security-related efforts. These capabilities could also affect physical security planning and measures of adversarial countries or non-state actors that either aspire to or possess WMDs.

Command and Control of the Operation

During the President’s May 1, 2011 address to the nation about the killing of Osama OBL, denoted that, “and so shortly after taking office, I directed Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA, to make the killing or capture of Osama bin Laden the top priority of our war against Al Qaeda.”
During later briefings, it was revealed that the operation was carried out by U.S. Navy Seals from the U.S. Special Operations Command. These and other briefings seem to suggest that the military operation to kill OBL was commanded by the CIA as opposed to the more traditional military chain of command. While this would not be unprecedented, it can be considered unusual and Congress might wish to clarify the operation’s actual chain of command with the Administration. There could also be concerns that this arrangement might have been a less than optimal arrangement and that there could have been undo friction between the CIA and the Department of Defense (DoD), resulting in a negative impact on mission planning, resourcing,and execution. On the other hand, if this arrangement proved to be highly successful and relatively problem-free, the CIA/military command arrangement might serve as a model for
future operations of a similar nature.

Possible Questions

Reports that the CIA commanded the operation, suggest a number of considerations that might merit further examination. For example:

• Why was this particular command arrangement chosen over a more traditional CIA commanded/CIA conducted operation or a military commanded/ military conducted operation?

• Was there a legal basis for this command arrangement or were special authorities or arrangements required?

• If the command arrangement is seen as a model, do current U.S. laws and policies support this type of arrangement, to include legal provisions pertaining to congressional notification and oversight?Al Qaeda, Regional, and Country Implications The killing of OBL nearly ten years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States poses many questions about the continuing destructive capabilities of AQ, the effects on regional affiliates and U.S. policy implications in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Implications for AQ, Affiliates, and Unaffiliated Adherents

Ascertaining the near- and long-term implications of OBL’s death on AQ operations will be the subject of much analysis and debate for U.S. policymakers. Those implications may differ forbore AQ leaders,13 their global affiliates,14 and non-affiliated ideological adherents15 of Around the world. In describing the significance of OBL’s role in AQ government leaders and analysts offer a variety of perspectives. Some argue that OBL’s role in AQ at the time of his death was largely inspirational as his ability to communicate with followers and offer strategic and operational guidance and support had increasingly been degraded since the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan. Others argue that OBL remained an active participant in both the strategic direction and operational activities of all aspects of the AQ movement.16 With the death of OBL and U.S.seizure of documents and electronic data devices from his compound some analysts suggest further disruption to global AQ related activities may be expected, including infighting between the remaining leaders of core AQ, lack of cohesion in and between the affiliated organizations,and fewer individuals recruited or radicalized to support AQ’s goals. Should these events materialize, U.S. security agencies and international partners may have an opportunity to exploit vulnerabilities with the goal of hastening the demise of AQ and its affiliated organizations.However, some analysts may argue that the regional global affiliates are the least likely AQ entity to be affected by OBL’s death.In December 2010, National Counter terrorism Center (NCTC) Director Michael Lester offered the following assessment of the relationship between core AQ and its affiliates:affiliates have no longer simply relied upon their linkages to al-Qaida senior leadership in
Pakistan but they have in fact emerged more as self-sustaining, independent movements and organizations. Now, they still have important tentacles back to al-Qaida senior leadership—I don`t want to downplay that—but in many ways, especially in the case of al-Qaida and the Arabian Peninsula, operate with a greater level of independence. And, frankly, they opera teat a different pace and with a different level of complexity than does al-Qaida senior leadership, and that has complicated our task significantly.
Implications of OBL’s Death on AQ’s Global Affiliates
The potential impact of OBL’s death on AQ’s global affiliates remains uncertain, in part because the specific operational ties between regional groups and core AQ elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not well understood outside of the intelligence community. In many instances, both operational and ideological ties appear to be limited, and most regional affiliates appear to have operated largely autonomously. The most common reported type of linkage between the core and global affiliates has taken the form of pledges of ideological fealty by regional affiliates to OBL,along with mutual statements of support for shared goals. A second, more opaque link between the core and the global affiliates are reported periodic exchanges for strategic planning between the core and affiliates and, in some cases, the exchange of financing or the deployment of technical experts to the affiliates by the core group.To the extent that the killing of OBL disrupts the organizational cohesion of the core group, these
pledges and apparently limited exchanges may decline in frequency and scope. That possibility may be magnified if post-OBL leadership succession within the core group is contested—as implied by some analyses suggesting that Ayman al Zawahiri may be viewed unfavorably, for various reasons, by some core group elements. Such ties may also decline if intelligence gleaned from the operation targeting OBL spurs follow-on operations resulting in core group leadership killings, arrests, or other disruptions.
Weakened core-regional ties may also lead global affiliates to become even more operationally and autonomous and diverse, and potentially more politically differentiated as well. Global affiliates may see a need to rely more on local financial, human, and technical resources and may focus increased attention on local political grievances and social dynamics. Alternatively, in the short term, affiliates may re-orient their current local operations to respond to OBL’s death, for instance, by moving up the timeline for planned attacks or by changing the terms of on-going hostage negotiations that would have transnational implications. Another possibility is that one or more affiliates might eclipse or replace the core Afghanistan-Pakistan based leadership, whether intentionally or due to the course of events.

The success of the U.S. operation targeting OBL may also motivate an increased U.S. operational emphasis on targeting key leaders of regional groups, especially if post-OBL field assessments of the core group indicate that its operational capacity has been degraded and if, as a result, the
perceived threat posed by global affiliates takes on relatively greater importance. Increasing autonomy and differentiation among regional affiliates may, however, make tracking and targeting these groups and their members more difficult, as operations to do so may require increasingly focused, specialized, and dedicated expertise and human and intelligence assets. If global affiliates become more insular, this could prompt a decline in communications and resource exchanges between the core group and global affiliates, and thus a relative decline in opportunities to exploit or interdict these connections.The findings from future assessments of core and affiliated AQ capabilities may have significant global policy implications for the United States. While the consequences of OBL’s death are
unknown at present, U.S. actions leading up to and after his death may have implications for numerous U.S. policy issues.PakistanmOBL was located and killed in the mid-sized Pakistani city of Abbottabad, a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in a compound one-half mile from the country’s premier military academy. The location and circumstances of OBL’s killing have exacerbated Washington long-held doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to ostensibly shared goals of defeating religious extremism, and may jeopardize future U.S. assistance to Pakistan. The news of OBL’s whereabouts led to almost immediate questioning of Pakistan’s role and potential-complicity in his refuge; a senior Administration official expressed being “very concerned” that OBL was inside Pakistan and indicated that the U.S. government would carefully question Islamabad in this regard. President Obama’s chief counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, told reporters it was “inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system” in Pakistan.The development has made much more acute already existing doubts about Pakistan’s role as aU.S. ally in counter terrorism (CT) efforts. In the representative words of one senior, U.S.-based nongovernmental expert on AQ and OBL,It stretches credulity to think that a mansion of that scale could have been built and occupied
by OBL for six years without its coming to the attention of anyone in the Pakistani Army.

The initial circumstantial evidence suggests that the opposite is more likely—that OBL was effectively being housed under Pakistani state control. ... Perhaps the circumstantial evidence in the OBL case is misleading; only a transparent, thorough investigation by Pakistani authorities into how such a fugitive could have lived so long under the military’s nose without detection would establish otherwise. That sort of transparent investigation is unlikely to take place.Given this, contends another leading analyst, some Americans feel that they have seen their worst suspicions confirmed by the fact that Osama bin Laden lived in a large, protected right under the Pakistani military’s nose. Either Pakistan’s intelligence service is terribly incompetent, fatally compromised, or both, raising questions about its utility as a partner.Thus, for a wide array of observers, the outcome of the years-long hunt for OBL leaves only two realistic conclusions: either Pakistani officials were at some level complicit in hiding the fugitive, or the country’s military and intelligence services were exceedingly incompetent in their search for top AQ leaders. In either case, after many years of claims by senior Pakistani officials—both civilian and military—that most-wanted extremist figures were finding no refuge in their country,Pakistan’s credibility has suffered a serious blow Although relatively subdued in their responses, Pakistani leaders welcomed the news of OBL’s death as a major victory in the battle against terrorism. Pakistani President Asif Zardari penned May 2, 2011, opinion piece in which he claimed for his country partial credit for the elimination of OBL, reiterated the suffering and loss of life Pakistan has endured in combating terrorism, and called media suggestions that Pakistan has lacked determination or sincerity in this effort “baseless speculation,” declaring, “Pakistan has never been and never will be the hotbed of fanaticism that is often described by the media.” Such claims, already considered dubious, are now widely viewed as lacking credibility by most independent observers.

Implications for the U.S.-Pakistan “Strategic Partnership”

Pakistan is praised by U.S. leaders for its post-2001 cooperation with U.S.-led CT and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment tosome core U.S. interests. A mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from Pakistan’s territory. In his nationally
televised address of May 1, 2011, President Obama stated that OBL had been found hiding “deep within Pakistan,” and he reiterated again his longstanding intention to “take action within Pakistan” if OBL was located there. While giving no hint as to the extent of Pakistani cooperation
in the specific operation, the President said that, “going forward, it is essential that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.” Subsequently, other top Administration officials have emphasized the need for close cooperation with Pakistan.These sentiments track well with the view of many independent observers that—despite ample reasons for discouragement and distrust—the United States has no good options other than continuing to engage Pakistan in what one analyst calls “the geo strategic equivalent of a bad marriage.” These experts contend that a U.S. disengagement from Pakistan would likely only
facilitate greater extremism and anti-American sentiment there, and that a sustained effort to assist in improving Pakistan’s political, economic, and security circumstances is the best strategy.There are hopes among some analysts that the circumstances of OBL’s death will inspire soul searching
in Pakistani leaders and perhaps more robust cooperation with the United States in the future. At the same time, Pakistan’s main international rival, India, is now set to increase its long-existing efforts to convince Washington to more intensely scrutinize its relationship with
Islamabad.Some senior Members of Congress have voiced the opinion that present circumstances call for“more engagement [with Pakistan], not less.”Yet Capitol Hill has also been the site of sometimes pointed questioning of the wisdom of continued engagement with a national
government that may at some levels have knowledge of OBL’s whereabouts, with figures fromboth major parties expressing disbelief at Pakistan’s allegations of ignorance and calling forgreater oversight and accountability for future U.S. assistance to Pakistan.

Questions About U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan

Although there is considerable agreement in U.S. government circles that disengaging from Pakistan is an unwise course, intensive congressional scrutiny of U.S. assistance to Pakistan is already underway. In the post 9/11 era, Congress has appropriated more than $20 billion in foreign assistance and military “reimbursements” for Pakistan, placing that country among the top recipients of U.S. financial support over the past decade.The Obama Administration has requested nearly $3 billion in further security- and development-related assistance to Pakistan forFY2012, along with more than $1 billion for continued reimbursements to the Pakistani military.As the incidence of Islamist militancy spread in recent years, anti-U.S. and anti-Western terrorist plots increasingly were traced to Pakistan-based extremist groups, and the Afghan insurgency continued to benefit from “safe havens” in western Pakistan, many in Congress began to question the efficacy of major aid disbursements to a country that was making little or no progress towardlongstanding U.S. goals ostensibly shared by Islamabad. Such questioning sharpened in late 2010and early 2011, especially with the acrimony surrounding the early 2011 Raymond Davis affair,in which a CIA contractor shot and killed two Pakistani men in Lahore and was imprisoned forseven weeks before his mid-March release.35
In the wake of revelations that the world’s most-wanted terrorist had apparently been living for years in a comfortable home in a relatively affluent city and only one kilometer away from Pakistan premier military academy, congressional skepticism about the continuation of large aid
disbursements to Pakistan has deepened even further. On May 3, 2011, , the Pakistan Foreign Aid Accountability Act, was introduced in the House. The Act would prohibit future foreign assistance to Pakistan unless the Secretary of State certifies that the Pakistani government
was not complicit in hiding OBL. Depending on the course of Pakistan’s future policy statements and levels of cooperation with the United States, Congress may choose to adjust current assistance funding levels. Such funding flows are already hindered by U.S. concerns about
corruption and lack of transparency in Pakistan’s implementing partners Questions About Bilateral Security and Intelligence Cooperation
U.S. government suspicions about some level of official Pakistani complicity in protecting wanted terrorists pre-date the 9/11 attacks. Obama Administration officials have at times been explicit in expressing such suspicions, perhaps more strongly than did their predecessors. The
developments of May 1 appear for many to strongly vindicate these kinds of concerns. The U.S.government is now likely to ramp up pressure on Islamabad to locate and capture OBL’s deputy,Ayman al-Zawahri, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, both of whom are widely believed to be in Pakistan.No intelligence on the May 1 operation was shared with Pakistan;only after the raid were Pakistani leaders briefed on the results.Lead U.S. counter terrorism advisor John Brennan hasstated that there is no evidence Pakistani officials knew of OBL’s whereabouts, but that the United States is not ruling out the possibility.39 Unnamed Pakistani intelligence officials initially claimed that the raid was a joint operation “based on intelligence input from” and carried out“primarily” by the ISI, with some going so far as to say the operation could not have succeeded without Pakistani involvement. They later conceded that no Pakistanis participated. Yet some analysts are suspicious of the timing of the operation, noting that Pakistan has a record of producing high-value terrorist suspects at seemingly opportune moments and perhaps “played theosophy card” just as U.S.-Pakistan relations were at an acutely low ebb.Among the key questions yet to be answered in the wake of OBL’s killing is what response the Pakistani government gives to the covert U.S. mission on its territory. The Pakistani military and intelligence services are now under pressure to explain how the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks was able to stay so deep inside Pakistan near a military academy. Whatever the answer—incompetence or complicity—the dynamics provide the U.S. government new leverage in pushing Pakistan to take more positive steps, though some argue that they also point to the limitations of what intelligence cooperation can be expected to achieve. To the extent that official Pakistan is subdued in its criticism or even implicitly accepting of the development, most analysts believe intelligence cooperation can continue and even improve, perhaps with the United States recalibrating incentives and disincentives for Pakistan’s security services. Such a course could reverse some of the damage seen in the bilateral intelligence relationship in recent months,especially following the early 2011 Raymond Davis episode (noted above).Increased bilateral acrimony remains a possibility, however. In what is described as an effort to recover from an initial day of confusion and paralysis, Islamabad stiffened its stand on the May 1events, with the Foreign Ministry expressing “deep concerns and reservations” about the manner in which the U.S. government carried out the operation “without prior information or authorization” from Islamabad:This event of unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. The Government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state,including the U.S. Such actions undermine cooperation and may also sometime constitutethreat to international peace and security.Islamabad is in the difficult situation of having to balance a need to maintain appearances of strength and competence with a need to avoid antagonizing the United States, a key partner and foreign aid donor. The Foreign Ministry statement also includes extensive discussion of Pakistan alleged intelligence prowess—even as related to surveillance in Abbottabad—and of its ability to protect Pakistani territory and airspace from foreign intrusion. While it is an open question whether Pakistan will take an increasingly adversarial position going forward, current signs are that Islamabad remains fundamentally committed to cooperative efforts in combating terrorism and militancy, although perhaps not to the point desired by U.S. officials.Implications for Existing Anti-American Sentiment in Pakistan

Anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remain rife among ordinary Pakistanis. Many across the spectrum of Pakistani society express anger at U.S. global foreign policy, in particular when such policy is perceived to be unfriendly or hostile to the Muslim world. Pakistani citizens were already angered by U.S.-launched drone strikes and perceptions of
unilateral U.S. intelligence operations on Pakistani territory. Such anger is likely to spike in the wake of an apparently unilateral U.S. commando raid deep inside Pakistan.To date, the tone and tenor of Pakistani media reporting on OBL’s death has been seen as largely positive. The information minister’s emphasis on OBL’s status as a foreigner was widely reported
in a positive light. Yet some outlets have harshly questioned the apparent absence of a Pakistani government role in the operation and a perception that it had permitted the country’s sovereignty to be violated. Much anger was expressed that Pakistan’s leaders had allowed the country to be
embarrassed and shamed. Some high-profile critics of the United States declared that OBL’s death removed all justification for a continued U.S. presence in the region. Still, no media outlets are known to have openly expressed sympathy for OBL, and in only a single instance was his death
referred to as “martyrdom.”OBL did have a size able contingent of supporters in Pakistan, although many or most of these had favorable views rooted more in his embodiment of anti-American resistance than in his violent jihadi methods. Yet the numbers of Pakistanis willing to take to the streets in OBL’s honor we requite few; two notable rallies took place immediately following the killing (in Quetta and Karachi), and these were comprised of perhaps 1,000 participants each.Possible Implications for Pakistan-India Relations The circumstances of OBL’s death could affect the course of relations between Pakistan and its historic rival India. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called the killing “a significant step forward” and expressed hope that it would represent a decisive blow to AQ and other terroristgroups. The Indian External Affairs Ministry hailed the “historic development and victoriousmilestone in the global war against forces of terrorism.”47 India’s foreign and home ministers bothtook the opportunity to focus on the new evidence that terrorists find sanctuary in Pakistan, andconcerns were raised that reprisal attacks could come in Indian Kashmir. Still, most analysts do not foresee the development as derailing New Delhi’s recent decision to reengage a robust peacedialogue with Pakistan, even if such dialogue is made more complicated by May 1’s events.At the same time, however, there may be some apprehension in New Delhi that the development could hasten a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in ways that could be harmful to India’s foreignpolicy interests. India is averse to seeing a Kabul government too friendly with Islamabad in thefuture and has a keen interest in precluding the resurgence of Islamist extremist groups in
Afghanistan, which it fears could be the case if the Pakistani military has excessive influence on the anti-Taliban campaign’s endgame.49 New Delhi also sees the discovery of OBL in Pakistan as an opportunity to more energetically press its demands that Islamabad extradite the allegedperpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba figures believed to be in Pakistan, as well as other most-wanted anti-India terrorists such as Dawood Ibrahim.Possible Implications for Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations The ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan and its connection to developments in Pakistan remain matters of serious concern to U.S. policy makers. NATO remains reliant upon logistical routes through Pakistan to supply its forces in Afghanistan, and these landlines of communication regularly come under attack by militants. It is widely held that success in Afghanistan cannot come without the close engagement and cooperation of Pakistan, and that the key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to improve the longstanding animosity between Islamabad and Kabul.Pakistan’s relations with its western neighbor have warmed in the past year, but remain tense given historic differences over Pashtun nationalism and contending accusations about crossbordermilitancy and terrorism. Afghan officials have stated flatly that Pakistan’s security services“should have known” about OBL’s whereabouts. Afghan President Karzai claimed that OBL’s
killing inside Pakistan vindicated his government’s opposition to increased U.S.-military operations in Afghanistan, saying the “war on terror” should focus on “the safe havens of terrorism outside Afghanistan.” Some Afghan officials are wary that OBL’s death would provide justification for a “premature” U.S. disengagement from the region At the same time, OBL’s death could ease Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions if it leads Islamabad to
reevaluate its more direct efforts to shape the outcome of Afghan political reconciliation. There-has been concern in Washington DC and other Western capitals that Pakistan had in 2010 begun to take a more aggressive and even unilateralist approach to shaping the course of peace
negotiations and potential reconciliation in Afghanistan. This was seen in its arrests of certain Taliban figures in Pakistan who were pursuing reconciliation with the Karzai government and in Islamabad purported protection of the hard line insurgent faction of Jalaluddin Haqqani in North Waziristan.

Issues in Pakistan’s Domestic Setting

OBL’s demise could have significant political and security ramifications for Pakistan. Islamabad’salready fragile civilian government—widely viewed as unable to govern effectively andoverwhelmed with mere survival—will see its standing further complicated. In the daysimmediately following the death, a dearth of official Pakistani responses—in particular from its
military and intelligence services—was taken as an indication of national shock andembarrassment. Early official government statements emphasized U.S. action and refrainedfrom portraying a Pakistani role, possibly in an effort to avoid antagonizing extremistorganizations already promising revenge attacks, and also to direct public anger away from the
federal government and toward the perceived infringement of Pakistani sovereignty by a foreign power.With official Pakistani acknowledgement that the raid was a wholly U.S. operation and that
Pakistani leaders had not been consulted beforehand, the government and security services, alike,were placed in the awkward position of having to defend against new accusations that they areunable to stand up to foreign powers and protect Pakistani territory and interests. Such
accusations are especially stinging in the wake of the Raymond Davis imbroglio and anincreasingly unpopular U.S.-led drone campaign in western Pakistan. This means that even therelatively well-respected Pakistan army is coming under intense criticism for either knowing ofOBL’s whereabouts or not, a significant embarrassment for them in either case.Pakistan is also bracing for an expected wave of revenge attacks from AQ and its numerous
affiliates based in the country. A statement from a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (“Pakistani Taliban”)spokesman vowed retaliation for OBL’s killing, saying, “President Zardari and the army will beour first targets, America will be our second target.” Intelligence agencies reportedly have warned
that Pakistan could see a steep rise in domestic terrorist attacks in the near-term, with U.S.diplomatic missions named as primary targets, along with Pakistani government and military
facilitiesAfghanistan58The death of OBL may have profound implications for the U.S. and NATO mission inAfghanistan. Following a strategy review, President Obama, in a major speech on Afghanistan
policy at West Point on December 1, 2009, defined the mission in Afghanistan as follows:Our overarching goal [in Afghanistan] remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeatAQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten American and ourallies in the future.With OBL now dead, some argue that this overarching goal has now been accomplished, and thatU.S. forces can now be withdrawn from Afghanistan. Others argue that AQ’s network of
operatives and supporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains robust, in spite of the loss of itsnominal leader. The death of OBL occurred as the Administration was already debating the sizeand scope of an initial drawdown, to begin in July 2011 as per the West Point speech discussed
above, of the 99,000 U.S. forces currently in Afghanistan. Press reports quoting Administrationofficials say these officials recognize that the death of OBL could increase U.S. public pressurefor a more rapid drawdown in Afghanistan than might have been considered before.Others, reportedly including those in the U.S. military who recommended current policy, believe
that the death of OBL is likely to have minimal effect on the threat profile in Afghanistan, andthat the U.S.-led mission there would be jeopardized by a rapid withdrawal. Although the statedgoal of U.S. policy focuses on eliminating safe haven for terrorist groups, preventing reinfiltration
of terrorist groups into Afghanistan is predicated on establishing durable security and capable andeffective governance throughout Afghanistan. The death of OBL, and potential weakening of AQ,does not, in and of itself, accomplish these objectives. As noted in Defense Department reports,
the most recent of which was released on May 3, 2011, security is being challenged by aconfluence of related armed groups whose tactics continue to evolve based on experiences fromprevious fighting.Of these groups, AQ has been among the least materially significant to the fighting in
Afghanistan, but may pose the greatest regional threat and transnational threat to the UnitedStates and its allies. Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta said on June 27, 2010, that AQfighters in Afghanistan itself might number 50-100.60 NATO/ISAF officials said in October 2010,
that AQ cells may be moving back into remote areas of Kunar and Nuristan provinces,particularly in areas vacated by U.S.-led forces. A targeted effort against AQ operatives in thoseareas in April 2011 killed a leading Saudi AQ operative. Press reports in April 2011 added thatsome AQ training camps might have been established inside Afghanistan. Top U.S. and NATO
commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, said that although the AQ presence inAfghanistan remains small at “less than 100 or so,” and in his view, operations to stabilizeAfghanistan are necessary to prevent a broader reinfiltrationThere is broad agreement among experts and U.S. officials that the core of the insurgencyremains the Taliban movement centered around Mullah Umar, who led the Taliban regime during1996-2001. Mullah Umar and many of his top advisers remain at large and are reportedly running
their insurgency from safe haven in Pakistan. They are believed to be primarily in and around thecity of Quetta, according to Afghan officials, thus accounting for the term usually applied to
Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). Some believe that Umar and his inner circleblame their past association with AQ for their loss of power and seek to distance themselves fromAQ. Other experts see continuing close association that is likely to continue were the Taliban
movement to return to power. Other insurgents, particularly fighters associated with long-timecommander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, remain a potentially less reconcilablethreat to the Afghan government, and the Haqqani faction has long had close ties to AQ.
It is unclear if internal Taliban debates might be affected by the death of AQ founder OBL. Somewithin the movement might argue that OBL’s removal from the regional picture might lesseninternational military pressure on all Afghanistan militant groups, and that continued associationwith AQ carries fewer costs than when OBL was still at large. Others in the Taliban movementmight argue that his death leaves AQ weakened and therefore of little value to the Taliban effort.Still others say that the personal relationship between Umar and OBL has become irrelevant now
that OBL is dead, and removes this as a factor in continuing to associate with AQ.Other experts and Administration commentary offer an alternate interpretation of OBL’s death.According to some, the death of OBL might facilitate a political solution to the conflict inAfghanistan.63 Under a “reconciliation” initiative originated by President Karzai in 2009 and
generally backed by the United States, there have been informal talks between Afghan officialsand those close to or purporting to represent the Taliban movement, or at least parts of it. Some
believe that the U.S. killing of OBL, which demonstrates U.S. reach to find and strike Pakistanbasedmilitants directly—coupled with the pre-existing pressure from the 2009-2011 “surge” ofU.S. forces in Afghanistan—could prompt key Taliban leaders to engage in serious settlement
negotiations.

Possible Questions

A number of key questions and indicators about U.S. policy in Afghanistan may be considered in
the wake of the death of OBL, including:
• How might the Afghan government react to signs of U.S. domestic pressure toaccelerate a withdrawal from Afghanistan? Will the Afghan government try tomore closely align with other powers, such as China and Russia, if it feels itisabout to be “abandoned” by the United States?

• Within Afghanistan, could the perception of an accelerated U.S. drawdown causesome Afghans to give support to the Taliban-led insurgency, believing theinsurgency likely to prevail in the absence of U.S. forces? Does the death of OBLmake a Taliban role in a future Afghan government more palatable to some
Afghans?

• If there is a U.S. decision to accelerate talks with the Taliban or withdraw fromAfghanistan, how will key segments of the Afghan population react? Forexample, will women’s groups oppose negotiations with the Taliban, fearingbacksliding of their rights if the Taliban is given a share of power? How will theethnic minorities of the north and west, who fought the Taliban regime during1996-2001, respond to accelerated negotiations with Taliban figures?

• Discussions about a more rapid transition to Afghan security leadership mighthinge on the quality and quantity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Howcapable are they? If there were a decision on a more rapid transition, to whatextent could these Afghan forces be expanded and trained more quickly? WhatU.S. financial requirements would be involved in a more rapid expansion of theAfghan forces than has been planned to date? How will the Afghan governmentbe able to financially and materially support forces trained to date?
__________________
"Wa tu izzu man-ta shaa, wa tu zillu man-ta shaa"
Reply With Quote
The Following 2 Users Say Thank You to SADIA SHAFIQ For This Useful Post:
khuhro (Monday, June 20, 2011), Utmanian (Monday, June 20, 2011)
Reply

Thread Tools Search this Thread
Search this Thread:

Advanced Search

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Trackbacks are On
Pingbacks are On
Refbacks are On


Similar Threads
Thread Thread Starter Forum Replies Last Post
General Knowledge For PMS Miss_Naqvi PCS / PMS 135 Thursday, April 04, 2019 02:42 PM
Pakistan's Nuclear Pro gramme alternative scenarios maverick786 Essays 0 Thursday, March 31, 2011 10:21 PM
The search for peace - pakistan and india Tassawur Pakistan Affairs 0 Tuesday, January 04, 2011 11:49 AM
The Foreign Policy Of Pakistan MUKHTIAR ALI International Relations 4 Tuesday, September 04, 2007 06:16 PM


CSS Forum on Facebook Follow CSS Forum on Twitter

Disclaimer: All messages made available as part of this discussion group (including any bulletin boards and chat rooms) and any opinions, advice, statements or other information contained in any messages posted or transmitted by any third party are the responsibility of the author of that message and not of CSSForum.com.pk (unless CSSForum.com.pk is specifically identified as the author of the message). The fact that a particular message is posted on or transmitted using this web site does not mean that CSSForum has endorsed that message in any way or verified the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any message. We encourage visitors to the forum to report any objectionable message in site feedback. This forum is not monitored 24/7.

Sponsors: ArgusVision   vBulletin, Copyright ©2000 - 2024, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.