an important article on water crisis in pakistan

[hafiz ishtiaq ahmad]

The partition of the South Asian Subcontinent on 14 August 1947 into the dominions of India and Pakistan gave birth to a host of problems, including that of the sharing of waters of the mighty Indus River System. The issue was of concern to Pakistan because the head works of the rivers that irrigated Pakistan’s Punjab province mostly went to the Indian side.

On 30 December 1947, Pakistan and India concluded a ‘Standstill Agreement’ for a three-month period under which Pakistan continued to receive water supply from the head works of Madhopur on River Ravi and Ferozepur on River Sutlej, the two tributaries of River Indus.

As the interim arrangement ended on 31 March 1948, the next day the Government of Indian Punjab stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from the Madhopur headwork, affecting, according to one estimate, 5.5% of Pakistan’s irrigated area.

Pakistan raised the issue at the Inter-Dominion Conference held on 3-4 May 1948. India dismissed Pakistan’s claim over water, from the head works on its side as a matter of right but agreed to release water as a provisional arrangement. It was thus abundantly clear that slowly and gradually the quantity of water would be reduced.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, who had formerly served as Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and as Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, undertook a research tour of Pakistan and India for writing a series of articles.

In one of his articles, he opined that it would be very beneficial for the region if the two countries cooperated to jointly develop and operate the Indus Basin river system. He further suggested that the World Bank might play its role in bringing India and Pakistan to agree on some plan to develop the Indus river system for mutual benefit.

President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, picked up the idea and offered his good offices to resolve the issue of water sharing between India and Pakistan. The two neighbors welcomed the initiative and after tough bargaining during the protracted negotiations that spread, over nine years arrived at the contours of the agreement.

Broad parameters thus settled the work of drafting began. Finally, in September 1960, President of Pakistan Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan and Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru signed the Indus Water Treaty in Karachi.

Under the Indus Water Treaty:

1. Pakistan surrendered three eastern rivers, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas to India with some minor rights to Pakistan.
2. Largely three western rivers namely Indus, Jhelum and Chenab remained with Pakistan.
3. India was allowed to use water from the western rivers for irrigation of 642,000 acres of land that were already being irrigated from these rivers along with an entitlement to further irrigate 701,000 acres for crops.
4. India was also given specified entitlement for ‘other’ storages, including, power and flood storages i.e., storages for non-consumptive purposes.
5. Pakistan was to meet the requirements of its eastern river canals from the western rivers by constructing replacement works.
6. Both parties are bound to, regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals and streams.
7. A permanent Indus Water Commission, with one Commissioner from each side, was to be set up to resolve issues.
8. The procedures were set out for settlement of ‘questions’ ‘differences’ and ‘disputes’ bilaterally and through neutral experts and International Court of Arbitration as the case might be.

Since Pakistan required considerable time to build necessary infrastructure to divert water from western rivers to eastern rivers and their canals on its side, India was to allow the ‘historic withdrawals’ on the part of Pakistan during the transitory period.

According to the Treaty, two dams (Mangla on River Jhelum and Tarbela on River Indus) were to be built. It also envisaged five barrages Marala and Qadirabad on River Chenab, Sidhnai on River Ravi, Rasul on River Jhelum, Chashma on River Indus and Mailsi on River Sutlej.

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Besides, one siphon and seven link canals (Rasul-Qadirabad on Rivers Jhelum-Chenab, Qadirabad-Balloki on Rivers Chenab-Ravi, Balloki-Suleimanki II and Sidhnai-Mailsi on Rivers Ravi-Sutlej, Chashma-Jhelum on Rivers Indus-Jhelum and Trimmu-Sidhnai on Rivers Indus-Ravi), to be constructed in Pakistan.

To meet the financial cost, India was to pay a fixed amount of US $ 62.060 million over a period of ten years. An international consortium pledged US $ 900 million. The World Bank was to administer The Indus Basin Development Fund.

The Indus Basin Project was completed despite all hurdles those included opposition and reservations from many quarters in Pakistan who felt that Pakistan’s rights as a lower riparian state had been compromised. This amounted to a successful resolution of a major dispute over the world’s largest, contiguous irrigation system with a command area of about 20 million hectares.

Although the Indus Water Treaty has been a remarkable success story, lately some projects undertaken by India in Occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir – from where the western rivers flow into Pakistan – have become major irritants and raised serious concerns in Pakistan:

Wullar Barrage (The Tulbal Navigation Lock)

In 1985, India started construction of a barrage some 439 feet long and with a lock at the mouth of Wullar Lake, the largest fresh water Lake in Indian occupied, disputed and held territory.

Purportedly but not so innocently, the stated purpose of the barrage was to make possible navigation in 22km stretch between the towns of Sopore and Baramula, during the lean winter season by regulating the flow of River Jhelum.

Pakistan raised objection to this project and the construction work halted in 1987. Pakistan contends that India cannot store water in excess of 0.01 MAF as ‘incidental storage’ on River Jhelum.

Pakistan also apprehends that the Wullar Barrage may cause damage to its own project of linking Jhelum and Chenab with the Upper Bari Doab Canal. One important concern of Pakistan, which is extraneous to the Indus Water Treaty but squarely a security issue, is that in case of war between the two countries, India would take advantage from its ability to control the flow of water and make the crossing of the river easy or difficult according to strategic and tactical military requirement.

India, as usual, but erroneously contends that the Wullar Barrage would regulate the flow of water into Jhelum and control the floods. It would not reduce the overall quantum of water flow rather increase it during the lean winter season. All fair weather pretension and an obvious ruse, to get away with an extremely hurtful project to Pakistan.

The project’s impact, India asserts, would be beneficial to Mangla Dam in power generation and to Pakistan’s triple canal system due to regulated flow of water. The matter remains unresolved.

Kishanganga Project

Outrageously the Kishanganga Project the Indians hawk on the premise that it will ostensibly bring water from River Kishanganga to Wullar Lake, where a hydroelectric power station is proposed.

The project envisages construction of a channel and a tunnel for this purpose. Simultaneously to build a dam, near the place where River Kishanganga crosses the Line of Control to enter Pakistan-administered Kashmir, where it is known as Neelum.

Here Pakistan plans to construct 969 MW-capacity Neelum-Jhelum Power Plant with Chinese assistance. The Pakistani project is to going to be completed in 2017, due to delay in construction work. Pakistan is genuinely concerned and fears that the Kishanganga Project would lead to a shortfall of water flow into Neelum, reducing its power generation by an estimated 9%.

The Indus Water Treaty does not bar any party from storing water for power generation as per entitlement. However, there is the principle of ‘prior appropriation’ enshrined in the Treaty.

India intends to complete the Kishanganga Project by 2016 to avail the opportunity of diverting Kishanganga’a water to Wullar Lake before Pakistan is able to invoke the provision of prior appropriation. India also claims that Pakistan need not worry because the water diverted by the Kishanganga Project would reach Pakistan through River Jhelum, no matter Neelum-Jhelum project suffers.

Baghlihar Dam

In 1999, India began construction work of 470-feet high, 317 meter wide Baghlihar Dam, also known as Baghlihar Hydroelectric Power Project, on River Chenab in Doda District of Indian occupied Kashmir. Although India called it a run-of-the-river project, the dam was to have a ‘pond age’ of 15 million cubic meters with submerged gate spillways.

Pakistan raised objection to the project design on the ground that the submerged gate spillways would enable India to increase the storage capacity of the reservoir and, if India desired, to halt the supply of water to Pakistan for more than three weeks during winter season.

Pakistan fears that it would lose between 7000 to 8000 cusecs of water per day for Rabi crops. Pakistan also sensed the danger of inundation of the area above Marala Head Works, if India released water simultaneously from Dulhasti, Baghlihar and Salal Dams into River Chenab.

Pakistan viewed the Baghlihar Project as another security risk, in times of tension or war, as India would be able to control the flow of water facilitating or hampering the movement of Indian/Pakistani troops according to its requirement.

After the Indus Water Commission failed to resolve the Baghlihar Dam issue, the matter was referred to the World Bank which acknowledged that the issue amounted to a ‘difference’ and appointed Professor Raymond Lafitte, a engineer from Switzerland, as the neutral expert to decide the matter.

On 12 February 2007, Lafitte gave his verdict directing India to reduce the capacity of ‘pond age’ by 13.5% and the height of the Dams’ structure by 1.5 meter. He also called for raising of power intake tunnels by 3 meters to reduce flow-control capability. Pakistan had reservations about the verdict but both India and Pakistan agreed to abide by it. The matter, it appears, stands closed.

It is heartening to see that during its recent visit to Pakistan to discuss Indus Water issues, the Indian delegation conceded that all “water disputes must be resolved within an agreed timeframe.”

Pakistan’s Indus Commissioner Syed Jamaat Ali Shah told the Indian delegation that reduction in supplies was jeopardizing the water transfer operation to eastern part of Pakistan. He also conveyed the message that Pakistan wanted India to take necessary steps if deforestation and environmental impact affected the river flow on its side.

G. Ranganathan, India’s Indus Commissioner, assured the Pakistani side that India was committed to the Indus Water Treaty and prepared to resolve all disputes in accordance with it.

However, he significantly stated that the current water reduction was the result of weather variations rather than any activity on the part of India. He added that India was, affected as much as Pakistan, due to water shortage in the Indus River system.

The above review of the projects that India has undertaken shows that apart from water-sharing, nevertheless, Pakistan’s primary concern is with the security risk they pose by granting India the capability of manipulating and withholding water supply to Pakistan in time of crisis, tension or war. Perhaps, Pakistan failed to foresee security dimensions of the Indus Water Treaty when it conceded certain rights and entitlements to India on the western rivers.

As far as the scarcity of water in Pakistan is concerned, apparently it has also to do with

1. Climatic changes
2. Negligence and mismanagement of water resources by successive governments in Pakistan

The global warming has led to melting of the Himalayan glaciers and consequent depletion in the flow of water into the Indus River system. The trend is likely to continue with rising temperature. It is not that only agricultural sector, the backbone of Pakistan’s economy, is suffering; due to depleting water supply, there is reduced power-generation from the hydroelectric plants, having a devastating impact on the country’s industries too.

Pakistan has no control over the nature; however, it can improve the management of water resources. Pakistan needs to address the following problems on urgent basis:

1. The silting of dams and barrages is a continuous process. Due to heavy sediments carried by the rivers, Tarbela, Mangla and Chasma Dams have lost nearly 25%of their capacity.
2. An estimated 40% of water that run through canals is lost because of seepage. The reason: the canal beds and banks are unlined, poorly lined or porous.
3. Traditional and antiquated agricultural techniques lead to excessive loss of water.
4. While water intensive varieties of crops, like sugarcane and rice, are cultivated. Optimum crop rotation is imperative but is not done effectively.

On 2 June 2008, Pakistan’s National Economic Council met under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani and approved the development strategy based on the Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10.

The water sector part of the overall strategy concentrates on water augmentation, water conservation and effective use of water. It calls for the development of additional medium and large-size reservoirs with priority.

The water storages to be completed, by 2016 include Akhori Dam, Basha-Diamer Dam, Kalabagh Dam and Munda Dam. Simultaneously the ongoing projects such as raising the structures of Mangla Dam, Gomal Dam, Satpra Dam, Kurram Tangi Dam and Sabakzai Dam are also to be the top priority.

The Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10 also envisages a number of other measures, including reclamation of land from water logging and salinity, improvement of watercourses and ground-water management etc.

Last year, 20 different UN bodies had warned; “Water is linked to the crisis of climate change, energy and food supplies and prices, and troubled financial markets. . . . Unless their links with water are addressed and water crises around the world are resolved, these other crises may intensify and local water crises may worsen, converging into a global water crisis and leading to political insecurity and conflict at various levels.”

In a recent report, the United Nations has estimated that Pakistan’s water supply has dropped from about 5,000 cubic meters per person in the 1950s to about 1,420 cubic meters. Any further drop would seriously jeopardize economic growth and would be a health hazard.

Not withstanding Indus Basin Treaty, The need for effective international co-operation among riparian countries is greater now than ever before. The demand for water in all countries is escalating and increasingly the harmful effects of activities in upstream countries are being observed.

Over a third of the 200 international river basins, are not covered, by an international agreement; only some 30, including Pakistan and India, have co-operative institutional arrangements.

Clearly, efforts are needed to formulate and reach agreement on an international “code of conduct” or convention in the utilization of shared water basins so that the water needs of some countries are not undermined by irresponsible utilization of water resources by others. Improved international co-operation is also necessary regarding the transfer of knowledge and technology in the water resources field.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1998, sets the standard for all agreements involving the shared use of trans boundary water resources.

It specifically establishes the dual criteria of “equitable and reasonable utilization” of the water resources and the need to “exchange data and consult on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition” of the water resource. The U.N. Convention provides the overall framework for Trans boundary water sharing.

Indus Basin-A Failed Treaty

Neither country is satisfied with the Indus Water Treaty, and both are desperate for more water. Pakistani officials criticize it privately for being biased toward India and experts seek its renegotiation.

Indian scholar and writer PR Chari believes that “[n]egotiating an Indus Water Treaty 2 would be a huge Confidence Building Measure (CBM) as it would engage both countries in a regional economic integration process.”

Dr Robert G Wirsing, a member of the faculty of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii and an expert on South Asian affairs, said in a lecture in Islamabad that the Treaty had inherent weaknesses. “The solution to water disputes is heavily tied with the fate of Jammu and Kashmir,” he said.

“India’s intransigence on Chenab is being seen as a threat to Pakistan’s lifeline, and if India does not relent, the letter and spirit of the peace process plus the bonhomie with the new government in Islamabad would be undermined,” he told ISN Security Watch.

Pakistan is likely to be one of the hardest hit countries. It is yet to be seen, whether the government has the political will and financial resources to overcome the water crisis. Sooner we evolve our Water Goals the better. March 22, 2010 is World Water Day; we need to have an awareness campaign for Future Water vision for Pakistan.

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Thank you Hafiz Sahab. I would be obliged if you could mention the source of this article.


Regards,