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Old Tuesday, August 07, 2012
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TRAGEDY OF EAST PAKISTAN

The separation of East Pakistan was a great setback to Pakistan. By 1970, sentiments for national unity had weakened in East Pakistan to the extent that constant conflict between the two Wings dramatically erupted into mass civil disorder. This tragically resulted in the brutal and violent amputation of Pakistan's Eastern Wing.

The physical separation of a thousand miles between the two wings without a common border, and being surrounded by Indian territory and influences, led to constant political, economic and social conflicts between the two wings; embittering relations bringing the country on the verge of collapse.
As a result of the separation of its Eastern Wing, Pakistan's international credit was depleted and the military, being its most powerful institution, suffered a lot. To some, the very concept of Pakistan as the homeland for the Muslims in Southeast Asia no longer appeared valid.

Trouble started right at the inception of Pakistan in 1947. Almost immediately, East Pakistan claimed that as their population (55 percent as compared to 45 percent in the West) was greater, they were in a majority. Democratically, the Federal Capital, therefore, should have been in Dhaka and not in Karachi.
Since Karachi was the seat of the National Government; ministers, government officials and industrialists exerted immense influence on national and regional affairs, which brought them many benefits. But the East Pakistanis were unable to extract the same kind of advantages, as they were a thousand miles away from the Capital. Moreover, the Capital initially attracted wealthy industrialists, businessmen, administrators, doctors and other professionals who had fled from India.

The location of the Capital, it was said, created great economic imbalance, uneven distribution of national wealth and privileges, and better jobs for the people of West Pakistan, because they were able to sway decisions in their own favor.

Secondly, Bengalis resented the vast sums of foreign exchange earned from the sale of jute from East, which were being spent on defense. They questioned how the expenditure for the Kashmir cause would be justified, when it could otherwise have been productively used to build dams and barriers to control floods, eradicate poverty and illiteracy, and supply food and shelter for the ever-growing population in East Pakistan.

Thirdly, the people of the East believed that it was sheer regional prejudice that all white-collar jobs were taken by West Pakistanis.

Many mistakes were made early in the short history of Pakistan. There lived in East Pakistan about 15 million Hindus who, with the help of their fellow West Bengali Indians from across the border, were able to exploit East-West differences that emerged as a result of these mistakes. Grievances were exaggerated to foster anti-West Pakistani feelings that eventually created Bengali Nationalism and separatist tendencies. Bengali political leaders went around depicting the Central Government and West Pakistan as hostile exploiters. However, no effective efforts were made by the Government to check these anti-national trends.

Awami League, formed in 1951, was headed by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. He had always been an ardent Bengali nationalist. He began to attract popular support from Bengalis in East Pakistan. He put forward his Six Points that demanded more autonomy for the Provinces in general, and East Pakistan in particular. He was arrested in April 1966, and soon released, only to be rearrested and imprisoned in June the same year. He languished in prison until February 1969.

Being deeply aware of the explosive political situation in the country, the then Chief Martial Law Administrator, Yahya Khan, set in motion moves to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people, and announced that the general elections would be held on October 5, 1970.

In all his election speeches, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman reiterated his demand for implementation of his Six Points and provincial autonomy plans.

The 1970 elections were postponed from October to December due to heavy floods that caused immense destruction and havoc in East Pakistan. The sheer enormity of the disaster attracted worldwide attention. This gave Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman a golden opportunity to have an international audience for his anti-West Pakistan feelings, which he accused of brutal callousness. The Awami League gained much sympathy and benefit out of this suffering, and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and his people were portrayed on the international scene as victims of West Pakistan's indifference.

In the general elections held in December 1970, the Awami League achieved an overwhelming victory. They captured 167 seats, the highest number in East Pakistan and overall. In the West, the Pakistan Peoples Party had won 85 seats. The way was now open to draw up a new Constitution.

The Awami League, now overwhelmingly victors, stood firm on its Six Points plan and refused to compromise on that issue. The Peoples Party in the West maintained that the Six Points Program did not really permit a genuine federation. It was in fact a unique constitutional proposal that proposed a federation that had power only over defense and foreign policy.

Efforts were made to start a constitutional dialogue and narrow the differences between the two Wings, but all in vain. Mujib-ur-Rahman's adamant stand in support of his Six Points, and his proposal that East Pakistan should have a sovereign status independent of Pakistan, further aggravated the situation.

Mujib-ur-Rahman launched a non-cooperation movement. The civil administration was totally paralyzed. All government and educational institutions were closed. People were asked not to pay any taxes. The transport system came to a standstill. Factories and shops were shut. All government activities between both the Wings ceased. The Awami League setup a parallel government. Gangs of local Awami League freedom fighters, known as Mukti Bahini, led violent demonstrations and howled racial and anti-West Pakistan slogans, inciting the people to more violence.

Amidst these disturbances, Genaral Yahya decided to convene the National Assembly in March 1971. But Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman unexpectedly put forward other demands such as the immediate lifting of Martial Law and power transfer to the elected representatives of the people, prior to the National Assembly session.

Unfortunately, on March 23, the Republic Day of Pakistan, the Awami League declared "Resistance Day" and Bangladesh flags flew all over the Province. There was a great massacre. East Pakistan had reached a point of no return. To quash the armed rebellion of Awami League militants, the Pakistan Army struck its first blow on March 27, 1971. Yahya Khan chose to use force to bring law and order in the country.

In the meantime, India exploited Pakistan's dilemma to the full. It sought to wring full propaganda and strategic value for itself out of the Bengali suffering and misery. India launched an attack on East Pakistan on November 22, 1971. The use of modern Soviet missiles, geographical separation by a thousand miles lying across the hostile Indian territory, and the collusion of Mukti Bahini and the Indian Army, made Pakistan's military defeat in the East almost certain.

On December 10, 1971, the first feeler for surrender in East Pakistan was conveyed to the United Nations. On December 17, 1971, a formal surrender was submitted and accepted. Forty five thousand troops and an almost equal number of civilians of West Pakistan were taken as prisoners of war.

Courtesy: storyofpakistan.com
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Six points of Mujeeb-ur-Rehman


First enunciated on February 12, 1966, the six points are as below:

1. The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in the true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and for a parliamentary form of government based on the supremacy of a directly elected legislature on the basis of universal adult franchise.

2. The Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects; Defense and Foreign Affairs. All residuary subjects will be vested in the federating states.

3. There should be either two separate, freely convertible currencies for the two Wings, or one currency with two separate reserve banks to prevent inter-Wing flight of capital.

4. The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units. The Federal Government will receive a share to meet its financial obligations.

5. End Economic disparities between the two Wings through a series of economic, fiscal, and legal reforms.

6. A militia or paramilitary force must be created in East Pakistan, which at present has no defense of its own.
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The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report [1971]

In December 1971, within a week of replacing General Yahya as the President, Bhutto formed a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Hamood-ur-Rahman. The Commission's responsibility was to ascertain the facts of the 1971 debacle. The commission interviewed 213 persons including General Yahya, Z. A. Bhutto, Chief of Air Force, Chief of Navy, senior commanders, and various political leaders. It submitted its first report in July 1972.

Originally there were 12 copies of the Report. These were all destroyed; expect the one that was handed over to Z. A. Bhutto. Neither Bhutto, nor the Army which took over in 1977, made the Report public. Though the Report remained classified, its contents were presumably learned from various writings and memoirs of the military officers narrating their side of the story of what the Hamood-ur-Rahman Inquiry Commission had to say. The report recommended public trials of the concerned officers responsible for the 1971 debacle.

The inquiry was reopened in 1974. The Commission again interviewed 73 bureaucrats and top military officers and submitted its supplementary report in November 1974. It was this supplementary report that was presumably published by an Indian magazine in August 2000, and afterwards allowed to be published in the Pakistani press. Publicizing of the Report by the Indian media was not a surprise since it had come out at a time when there was international pressure mounting on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Immense human rights violations were being reported by international organizations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch with reference to the role of Indian Security Forces in the Indian-held Kashmir. The publication of the Report was seen in Pakistan as an attempt by India to divert the world attention from its inhumane and unjustified actions in Kashmir.

Volume I of the main report dealt with political background, international relations, and military aspects of the events of 1971. Volume I of the supplementary report discussed political events of 1971, military aspect, surrender in East Pakistan and the moral aspect.

A large number of West Pakistanis and Biharis who were able to escape from East Pakistan told the Commission awful tales of the atrocities at the hands of the Awami League militants. It was revealed that many families of West Pakistani Officers and other ranks serving with East Bengal Units were subjected to inhuman treatment. Their erstwhile Bengali colleagues had butchered a large number of West Pakistani Officers.

As the tales of slaughter reached West Pakistani soldiers of other Units, they reacted violently, and in the process of restoring the authority of the Central Government, committed severe excesses on the local Bengali population. The Report's findings accuse the Army of carrying out senseless and wanton arson, killings in the countryside, killing of intellectuals and professionals and burying them in mass graves, killing of Bengali Officers and soldiers on the pretence of quelling their rebellion, killing East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, raping a large number of East Pakistani women as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture, and deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority.

Having dealt with the claim of General Niazi that he had no legal option but to surrender, the Commission proceeded to consider whether it was necessary for General Niazi to surrender, and whether he was justified in surrendering at that particular juncture, for most of the messages that emanated from the General Head Quarters were studiously ambiguous and designed. Secondly, General Farman Ali had suggested to him that instead of ordering surrender en masse, he should leave it to each Divisional Commander to surrender or not, according to his own circumstances. It was pointed out in the Report, that despite the assurances given by the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and the terms of surrender, the killing of loyal East Pakistani population, West Pakistani civilians, and civil armed forces by the Mukti Bahini started in full swing soon after Army's surrender.

It was maintained in the Report that the defeat suffered by the armed forces was not a result of military factors alone, but had been brought about as the cumulative result of political, international, moral and military factors. The political developments that took place between 1947 and 1971, including the effects of the two Martial Law periods, hastened the process of political and emotional isolation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan.
The dismemberment of Pakistan was also accelerated by the role played by the two major political parties, Awami League and the Pakistan Peoples Party, in bringing about a situation that resulted in postponement of the National Assembly session, scheduled to be held at Dhaka on the March 3, 1971. The events occurring between March 1 and 25, 1971, when the Awami League had seized power from the Government, resulting in the military action of March 25, 1971, were deplorable. The Commission also touched upon the negotiations, which General Yahya Khan was pretending to hold during this period with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman on the one hand, and political leaders from West Pakistan on the other. Although he never formally declared these negotiations to have failed, yet he secretly left Dhaka on the evening of March 25, 1971, leaving instructions behind for military action to be initiated as soon his plane landed at Karachi.

The Commission declared that military action could not have been substitute for a political settlement, which was feasible once law and order had been restored within a matter of few weeks after the military action. No serious effort was made to start a political dialogue with the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. Instead fraudulent and useless measures were adopted. The use of excessive force during the military action had only served to alienate the sympathies of the people of East Pakistan. The arbitrary methods adopted by the Martial Law Administration in dealing with respectable citizens of East Pakistan and their sudden disappearances made the situation worse. The attitude of the Army authorities towards the Hindu minority also resulted in a large-scale exodus to India.

Although General Yahya Khan was not totally unaware of the avowed intention of India to dismember Pakistan, he didn't realize the need for early political settlement with the political leaders of East Pakistan. There was wastage of considerable time during which the Indians mounted their training program for the Mukti Bahini and freely started guerillas raids into the Pakistan territory. Pakistan Army was almost unable to prevent infiltration of Mukti Bahini and Indian agents all along the borders of East Pakistan. In the presence of these two factors, the Pakistan Army was obviously fighting a losing battle from the very start.

There had been a large exodus of people from East Pakistan to India, as a result of the military action. The results of Indian efforts to propagate this refugee problem on an international level cannot be undermined. The Indian propaganda was so forceful that all endeavors made by the military regime in Pakistan to defuse the situation proved to be futile and left the world unimpressed. The mutual assistance treaty signed between India and the U. S. S. R. in August 1971 further aggravated the situation.

No rational explanation was available as to why General Yahya did not take the dispute to the Security Council immediately after the Indian invasion of East Pakistan on November 21, 1971. Nor was it possible to explain his refusal to accept the first Russian resolution, if indeed the situation in East Pakistan had become so critical that surrender was inevitable. The Army High Command did not carry out any in-depth study of the effect of these new factors, nor did it pay any attention to the growing disparity in war preparedness and capability between the armed forces of Pakistan and India as a result of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971.

The traditional concept of defense adopted by the Pakistan Army that the defense of East Pakistan lays in West Pakistan was never implemented in a determined and effective manner. The concept remained valid, and if ever there was need to invoke this concept, it was on November 21, 1971, when Indian troops crossed the East Pakistan borders in naked aggression. Unfortunately, the delay in opening the Western front and the half-hearted and hesitant manner in which it was ultimately opened only helped in precipitating the catastrophe in East Pakistan. Besides, the detailed narrative of events, as given in the supplementary report, clearly shows that the planning was hopelessly defective. There was neither any plan at all for the defense of Dhaka, nor any concerted effort to stem the enemy onslaught with a Division or a Brigade battle at any stage. It was only when the General found himself gradually being surrounded by the enemy which had successfully reached Faridpur, Khulna, Daudkandi and Chandpur (the shortest route to Dhaka), that he began to make frantic efforts to get the troops back for the defense of Dhaka.

The Report maintained that there was no actual order to surrender. In view of the desperate picture painted by the Commander Eastern Command, higher authorities gave him permission to surrender if he, in his judgment, thought it necessary. General Niazi could have opted not to surrender if he thought that he had the capability of defending Dhaka. On his own estimate, he had 26,400 men to hold out for another two weeks. The enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces and another week to reduce the fortress of Dhaka. But evidence showed that he had already lost the will to fight after December 7, 1971, when his major fortresses at Jessore and Brahmanbari had fallen. Detailed accounts of witnesses given to the Commission indicate that Lt-General Niazi had suffered a complete moral collapse during the closing phases of the war.

It had been concluded that apart from the political, international and military factors, an important cause for defeat of the Pakistan Army was the lack of moral character and courage in the senior Army Commanders. The process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the armed forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958. These tendencies were intensified when General Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law in the country once again in March 1969. A large number of senior army officers had not only indulged in large-scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and lewd ways of life, which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership. It appears that they had lost the will to fight and the ability to take vital and critical decisions required for the successful prosecution of the war. These remarks particularly applied to General Yahya Khan, his close associates, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Major General Khuda Dad Khan and Lt-General A. A. K. Niazi, apart from certain other officers. The Commission recommended that these grave allegations be dealt with seriously.

The surrender in East Pakistan had been a tragic blow to the nation and had caused, not only dismemberment of Pakistan, but also shattered the image of Pakistan Army as an efficient and excellent fighting force. In the end it was hoped in the Report that the Nation would learn the necessary lessons from these tragic events, and that effective and early action will be taken in the light of the conclusions reached.

The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report is a valuable document. It was prepared with the explicit purpose of not repeating the various mistakes committed by the Army, General Yahya Khan and Z. A. Bhutto, which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan. Writings and memoirs disclose that apart from its inquiry into the 1971 crisis, it also makes thoughtful recommendations about the defense of the country as a whole.

Courtesy: storyofpakistan.com
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GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN.

Geo strategic means the importance of a country or a region as by virtue of its geographical location. Geo political is defined as, stressing the influence of geographic factors on the state power, international conduct and advantages it derives from its location.

Stephen Cohn describes this importance

“While history has been unkind to Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit. It has resource rich area in the north-west, people rich in the north-east.”

Pakistan is a junction of South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia, a way from resource efficient countries to resource deficient countries. The world is facing energy crisis and terrorism. Pakistan is a route for transportation, and a front line state against terrorism.

Geographical Importance:

Bridge between South Asia and South West Asia; Iran and Afghanistan are energy abundant while India and China are lacking of.
China finds way to Indian ocean and Arabian Sea through Korakaram. China with its fastest economic growth rate of 10%; is developing its southern provinces because its own port is 4500 km away from Sinkiang but Gawader is 2500 km away.

Pakistan offers to CARs the shortest route of 2600 km as compared to Iran (4500 km) or Turkey (5000 km).

land locked Afganistan now at the phase of Reconstruction, finds its ways through Pakistan..

Economic Blocs: SAARC, ASEAN, ECO. A link between them. Gawader port with its deep waters attracts the trade ships of China, CARs and South East Asian Countries

Gas pipelines:
1. IPI: Iran is struggling to export its surplus gas and oil to eastern countries. Pakistan would get 400 million dollar annually if IPI gets success.
2. Qatar Pakistan and Turkmenistan Pipeline project: highlights the position.
3. TAPI:
Mountain Ranges: Himalayas, Hindu Kush in the North are plentiful in providing water and natural resources.

Political importance:

US interests in the regions to contain the Growing China, nuclear Iran, terrorist Afghanistan, and to benefit from the market of India. Security and Business are two main US interests in the region while Pakistan is playing a front line role against terrorism.

Today the political scenario of the region is tinged with pre emption policy and US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear program, India’s geopolitical muscles(new strategic deal with US) to gain the hegemony and to counter the ‘The Rise of China’ which has earned all the qualities to change unipolar world into Bipolar world. In all these issues, Pakistan is directly or indirectly involved, especially after Al Qaeda operations.

The American think tanks have repeatedly accepted that war against terror could never be won without the help of Pakistan. Pakistan has rigorously fought, and ongoing military operation in Wazirstan is also targeting the suspected Taliban in the bordering area.

Main threats to Pakistan:

1. Balochistan and Wazirstan conflicts are posing threats to any economic project like IPI gas pipeline.
2. Negative role of India, US, Iran in this conflict ridden area.
3. Kashmir is flash point, accelerating nuclear race in the South Asia.
4. Instable governments in Pakistan have contributed in weakening the strong position.

(Geo-Strategic and Economic Importance of Gwader Port)

Gwadar is located on the southwestern coast of Pakistan, close to the important Straits of Hormuz, through which more than 13 million bpd of oil passes. It is strategically located between three increasingly important regions of the world: the oil-rich Middle East, heavily populated South Asia and the economically emerging and resource-rich Central Asia.

To the Chinese, Gwadar spells bad economics (constructed with $200 mn, now GOP is trasnfering cargo from Karachi to Gwadar at $40 per ton extra charges - Forex Pak. $ 2bn needed to connect it with Pak industrial cities and $30 million per kilometer to China – Gilgit Baltistan Bulliten), premature geostrategic confrontation with the United States and the prospect of becoming the target of a burgeoning local insurgency that just might be receiving covert support from Washington and New Delhi.


Background (Sino-Pak):

Pakistan recognized China in 1951 and 1961 voted for restoration of Communist China’s rights in the UN. Sino Indian war 1962 culminated in close friendship; in 1963 an agreement on border was signed. Pakistan, during peak days of cold war (1970), facilitated visit of Henry Kissinger (US Foreign Secretary) to China. This led to Nixon’s visit to China which eased the rising tension between them.

Initially Pak-China’s strategic partnership was driven by the mutual need to counter the Soviet Union and India. China supported Pakistan in its wars against India with military and economic assistance. China assisted in developing Pakistan’s Nuclear Program, enhanced trade and investment.
Recent Developments:

• Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 2005  “Neither party will join any alliance which infringes upon the sovereignty, security ant territorial integrity.”
• China role in SCO and pak membership
• Trade: $ 6 bn in 2010 whereas likely to rise $ 10 bn by 2015
• China invested $13 bn in Gwadar

Geo-Political Importance Of Gawadar

1. Dubai is the hub of business not only for Gulf but also for rest of the world including Europe, United States, Africa, China and Central Asian States, simultaneously. The gulf region is facing many political conflicts at the moment and huge disturbances in the current administrative structure are expected in the coming years. In such a scenario, a substitute of Dubai is essential to be located before the crisis hits the finances of millions. The substitute shall be a nearest point probably, to ensure continuous supply line of oil from Gulf to the outer world. Fortunately, Gawadar proves to be the nearest and infact more cost-effective substitute of Dubai, from many aspects.

2. China is emerging as a super economic power of the world in the recent years. Despite occupying a huge area of world's land, it doesn't have any port of hot waters, which can be used the whole year. Gawadar port is only on a distance of 2500 km from China and the port is working for the whole year because of the hot waters here.

3. The central Asian states, after the independence from USSR, are trying to develop their economies. These states are land locked and Karachi was expected to provide them the services through Afghanistan. For the purpose, a highway from Peshawar to Karachi was constructed but due to Afghan crisis, this line couldn't be established. The Afghan situation is till not clear, so, Gawadar being near to Iranian border will provide port facilities to Central Asia as well.

Gwader- Strategic and Economic Interests of China:

Arrival of US troops in Afghanistan- doorstep of China that it agreed to construct Gwader port in 2002 and funded $ 198 million, with 450 workers and technical assistance, while Pakistan shared $ 50 million for phase 1.

Benefit to China: So Beijing will get considerable influence in the Persian Gulf, entrance to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, while closely monitor US naval activity and US Indian maritime cooperation. The port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments (60% of its oil need) from the Persian Gulf, and energy imports from Central Asia. Having no blue water navy, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf. President Mushraf’s statement, “when needed the Chinese Navy could be in Gwader to give befitting replies to every one.”

US, Iran, India: A report by Pentagon entitled ‘Energy Features in Asia’ states that Beijing has set up electronic spy posts at Gwader to monitor ship traffic. The Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea heightens India’s feeling of encirclement by China. Iran fears that the development of the port will undermine the value of its own ports as outlets to Central Asia’s exports.

Benefits for Pakistan:
1. The port will help integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by import and export through overland links that stretch across the Korakorum Highway.
2. Gwader would inhibit India’s ability to blockade Pakistan and permit China to supply Pakistan by land and sea during war time.
3. The Gwader area is rich in fisheries and the 600 km coastal line will boost fish export.

Importance of Gawadar

1. Gwader lying to close to the oil rich Gulf States- could be a potential source of off-shore gas and oil reserves.
2. Gwader as a trade Hub will enable the transfer of Central Asia’s vast energy to world markets, earning Pakistan transit charges and to investment.
3. Afghanistan will become beneficiaries for international trade to get trasit fee to Central Asia.
4. The oil supply during Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Kowait war was stopped; Gawadar is a best solution
5. Cargo handling capacity of 100,000 tons


Conclusion

Finally, Pakistan would have to work the completion of necessary infrastructure to support these plans; it needs effective diplomacy, economic stability with improved Center-Province relationship. Balochistan continues to be crippled by violence with Baloch nationals protesting against the construction of the port supported by Indian elements.
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Default Virtual University Lectures by Dr. Hassan Askari

Virtual University Lectures by Dr. Hassan Askari

LECTURE 1- IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN.

http://www.youtube.com/v/dCruT4g-1xw


LECTURE 2- IDEOLOGY OF PAKISTAN IN THE LIGHT OF STATEMENTS OF QUAID-I-AZAM AND ALLAMA IQBAL

http://www.youtube.com/v/SjhTyPCc5WU


LECTURE 3- THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT
http://www.youtube.com/v/Ir008bHNcU4


LECTURE 4- SIR SYED AHMAD KHAN AND HIS CONTRIBUTIONS

http://www.youtube.com/v/IVeWMriBaCE


LECTURE 5- MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1857-1918
http://www.youtube.com/v/i1iYSJH6Pg0



LECTURE 6- THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

http://www.youtube.com/v/BUch0HvU878


LECTURE 7- MUSLIM POLITICS IN BRITISH INDIA: 1924-1935

http://www.youtube.com/v/UNaTegpOf-o


LECTURE 8- ALLAMA IQBAL’S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS DECEMBER 1930

http://www.youtube.com/v/hR6yllbvNC8


LECTURE 9- MUSLIM POLITICS AND CHAUDHRY RAHMAT ALI

http://www.youtube.com/v/B2FkS0KyCwo


LECTURE 10- THE CONGRESS MINISTRIES-- POLICIES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

http://www.youtube.com/v/veDpWmtDze0


Courtesy: Virtual University
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LECTURE 11- THE LAHORE RESOLUTION, 1940.

http://www.youtube.com/v/KMxOyZuiAqY


LECTURE 12- MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1945-46
http://www.youtube.com/v/o75TCN4fF3Q


LECTURE 13- TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE, 1947
http://www.youtube.com/v/ObV5umDll0k


LECTURE 14- CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRITISH INDIA
http://www.youtube.com/v/tJQhi0laXiE


LECTURE 15- THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE
http://www.youtube.com/v/Kwi4cPUHBPc


LECTURE 16- THE OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION (1949)
http://www.youtube.com/v/VyxBzCHuaoY


LECTURE 17- CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
http://www.youtube.com/v/xU4AV3H0lxo


LECTURE 18- CONSTITUTION MAKING (1947-56)

http://www.youtube.com/v/1QbTNn8lqdc


LECTURE 19- THE 1956 CONSTITUTION
http://www.youtube.com/v/Ps3s_YaJV-4


LECTURE 20- THE 1962 CONSTITUTION

http://www.youtube.com/v/LmqJ0HFCve4



Courtesy: Virtual University of Pakistan
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LECTURE 21- THE 1973 CONSTITUTION

http://www.youtube.com/v/YJKALNp0_ek


LECTURE 22- POLITICAL HISTORY
http://www.youtube.com/v/HTLyWLiNcIk


LECTURE 23- POLITICAL HISTORY (1972-2003)
http://www.youtube.com/v/XzkcFQFJbdo


LECTURE 24- GEOGRAPHY, LAND, BOUNDARIES AND NEIGHBORHOODS
http://www.youtube.com/v/jh65D2ghMlc


LECTURE 25- NATURAL RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE
http://www.youtube.com/v/AGIhZDMCODg


LECTURE 26- INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
http://www.youtube.com/v/HgACstlQVu8


LECTURE 27- EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

http://www.youtube.com/v/-3sJTHzwXQs


LECTURE 28- FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN .
http://www.youtube.com/v/Px2zOke485c



LECTURE 29- PAKISTAN AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

http://www.youtube.com/v/l-vJ9_2CNDA


LECTURE 30- COURSE REVIEW

http://www.youtube.com/v/42oEM7YG_k4



Courtesy: Virtual University of Pakistan
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Dismemberment of Pakistan


“Learning from experience is a faculty almost never practiced.”

Introduction: Remembrance of national tragedies is as important as celebrating victories. In short but tremulous history of our beloved homeland, we have often found ourselves pitched against mighty challenges – in both scope and scale, sometimes by chance and sometimes by design. We managed to negotiate many of them fairly, if not with perfection like achievement of Nuclear capability as a minimum deterrent despite inordinate global pressure and offsetting Brass tacks crisis (1986-87). Butone such instance has become a perpetual source of torment and shame for us – Dismemberment of Pakistan. The purpose of writing this article is to review the catechism of this tragedy and to evaluate our post debacle national performance to understand whether or not we have learnt any lessons from it and to trace its relevance with our contemporary socio-politics.Separation of East Pakistan was a tremendous loss and unbearable tragedy. Cocktail of various factors generated, directed and expedited the flow of unfortunate events towards this debacle. It was the outcome of perpetual deficit of good governance which created an unbridgeable hiatus between the two wings of Pakistan. The bruised sentiments of National unity and the constant conflict between them dramatically erupted into mass civil disorder that was blatantly and shamefully fuelled by India, which tragically resulted in the brutal and violent amputation of Pakistan’s Eastern Wing.

It is a rebuke to our political sagacity that we failed to mature the dream of our founding fathers right from the first step i.e. we miserably failed in framing a unanimously agreed upon constitution. Whereas in India, passed by the Constituent Assembly on November 26, 1949, the constitution came into effect on January 26, 1950.

Political factors

i. Delay in Framing Constitution: It is a rebuke to our political sagacity that we failed to mature the dream of our founding fathers right from the first step i.e. we miserably failed in framing a unanimously agreed upon constitution. Whereas in India, passed by the Constituent Assembly on November 26, 1949, the constitution came into effect on January 26, 1950.

“The delay in producing a constitutional framework made the reconciliation of these two dialectically different inheritances a far more difficult and almost hopeless task.”
-Lawrence Ziring


ii. Flawed ‘One Unit’ system: Though in theory one Unit system was in vogue but practically West Pakistan enjoyed the superiority because had it not been the case, Awami league would have been allowed by the west Pakistan’s administrative elite to form the government after its blazing victory in 1970’s elections.

iii. Dysfunctional Democracy:

“Our history of dysfunctional democracy has caused us great grief, most hauntingly in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971…”
-President Musharraf
In the Line of Fire


iv. The war of 1965 and flawed military strategy: Ayub Khan had developed the fatal theory that the defence of East Pakistan lay in the West. Therefore the East Pakistanis were left undefended and completely abandoned to their fate. This policy only added to the feeling of isolation and alienation in East Pakistan.

v. Role of Mujeeb Ur Rehman: Mujeeb, in the words of Yahya khan, was “an unreliable and immature person” who thrived on publicity and mass hysteria, could only gesticulate and shout and was incapable of analyzing and thinking. His uncompromising insistence on his infamous 6-points agenda and equally rigid response of Mr. Bhutto made reconciliation, virtually, an impossible task.
“Awami league demanded nothing less than the break-up of Pakistan.”
-Lawrence Ziring


vi. Role of Ayub Khan: Three of the Prime Ministers hailing from East Pakistan – Khawaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra and Suhrawardy – were manoeuvred out of office by the west Pakistani elite. Ayub Khan’s martial law proved to be the proverbial last straw.

vii. Hostility of India and Mukti Bahni: It was a regional sectarian force, created and trained by BSF, to challenge the authority of Pakistan Army. It escalated the violence into a full-fledged civil war.

viii. Imposition of Marital law: Ayub khan’s decision to hand over the power to the then army chief Gen. Yahya instead of politicians, as a quid to escape a public trial further worsened the already tensed environment.

ix. Negative attitude of leaders of East Pakistan: Taj-ud-din Ahmad, General Secretary Awami League said in 1970 that

“A class of exploiters belonging to western region had sucked east Pakistan for the last 23 years. History of Pakistan is the history of conspiracy and a history of continued oppression.”

2. Economic Factor


i. Economic inequality of both the wings: It was widely and pervasively shared thought – though not without some substance – that more funds were allocated to West Pakistan and the development of the other half was altogether neglected.

ii. Larger share of West Pakistanis in administration and Army: The medium built Bengalis found it quite difficult to finesse their way to Army as compared to the strong built Punjabis and Pathans. Though there was no discrimination in recruitment process but unfortunately it was interpreted with the mindset of narrow nationalism.

3. Geographical factors

i. Geographical discontinuity:.

“The integration of the nation, split at its birth into two segments separated from one another by a thousand miles of India territory, was a daunting exercise.”
-Lawrence Ziring


ii. Flood of 1970: Government acted quite late to carry out the relief operation during the heavy flood of 1970 that caused havoc in East Pakistan and the sheer enormity of the disaster attracted worldwide attention. Sheikh Mujeeb cashed the opportunity and ignited the sentiments of sedition of general populace by labelling it as a deliberate delay on the part of West Pakistan because it was least concerned by the sufferings and plight of the East.

“When the Pakistan government finally acted, its assistance was only a fraction of that provided by international agencies…”
-Lawrence Ziring


4. Social Factors

i. Language and emotive issues: This was the first schism in the Centre-East Pakistan relationship and developed immediately after the Quaid declared in a speech in Dhaka on March 24, 1948, that Urdu alone would be the official language of Pakistan. This took an ugly turn when 3 students of Dhaka University were killed by the riot police when they were protesting against the announcement.

ii. No attempt for cultural unity of both the wings: No attempts were made to develop common cultural ties and solidarity between both the blocs. Bengalis resented that even though they were learning the Urdu language yet there was no desire amongst the Western half to learn Bangla language.

5. Administrative Factors

i. Issue of the Capital: East Pakistan, that was culturally homogenised, politically sensitive and socially united, wanted to have Dhaka as the capital of Pakistan but instead of negotiating a mutually agreed upon solution to this problem, unilaterally, Karachi was declared capital of Pakistan, a decision that was greatly resented by East Pakistan.

ii. Military Operation: Instead of following a proper course to develop political reconciliation through negotiations with the spirit of mutual accommodation, the Government resorted to the easy-looking but fateful option of launching military operation “Search Light”. Atrocities were committed in the name of national interest further polarising the eastern wing.

“Pakistan’s failure to strengthen her political institutions and her political frailty were an invitation to disaster. If the politicians blundered…..the military harmed the country no less with its repeated intervention in civil affairs. Both are at fault, and both accuse each other for causing greater disservice to the state.”
- Gen. K. M. Arif (Khakhi Shadows)


iii. Role of State Controlled Media: The state controlled media was feeding the Pakistanis with the news of imaginary victories and resultantly when the reality surfaced, the people of Pakistan were not mentally prepared to accept the magnitude of defeat.

6. Military Surrender:

After a lacklustre military performance, on 16 December 1971, Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi, supreme commander of Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, surrendered to the Allied Forces (Mitro Bahini) represented by Lieutenant General Arora of Indian Army at the surrender.

7. Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report:

A half-hearted attempt was made to surface the facts that caused the debacle but unfortunately that report was not published by Mr. Bhutto ostensibly to save the army from further demoralisation. The crux of this report is:
i. It accused the army of carrying out wanton arson killings in the countryside in the name of quelling rebellion.
ii. Moreover, the orders emanated from the GHQ were studiously ambiguous.
iii. It asserts that the political turmoil and the power struggle between Bhutto and Mujeeb along with the flawed military strategy and poor leadership hastened the dismemberment of Pakistan.

“While many others share the blame for this monumental tragedy, neither President Yahya Khan nor the military can escape responsibility.”
- Khaki Shadows (Gen. K. M. Arif)


8. Critical Analysis:

What would have happened had there been good governance and political stability; had there been a logical and a mature approach of our brain dead politicians and ear jammed bureaucracy towards simmering domestic issues; had Mr. Bhutto, instead of insisting on power sharing, decided to sit in the parliament as the opposition leader? - is a realm of speculation. But there is an intellectual consensus that had it been so, the situation would not have come to such a shameful denouement. Today East Pakistan debacle still offer us many lessons to learn such as:

i. Federalism can only work if each of the units is a willing and an equal partner.
ii. Resource distribution formula must be transparent and mutually agreed upon. It cannot be and must not be tilted by force in favour of any single unit.
iii. Political stability and good governance is the only way to survive as a nation state and to rise among the comity of nations with dignity and respect.
iv. Finally yet importantly, Military option must be carefully planned and executed and must be backed by a profound political vision.

Courtesy: currentaffairspk.com AND World Times Magazine (I think originally the article was published by World Times)
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Last edited by Shooting Star; Tuesday, August 07, 2012 at 03:20 PM. Reason: Do not use red colour.
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As I have already mentioned earlier, notes are just to review what one has already studied. They are in no way substitute of books or any other standard material.

Aspirants waste much of their time for making notes whereas at the end of the day they come up with the conclusion that much of the collected material was just useless. To save the time of aspirants I have posted my Pak Affairs notes here.

To use these notes, please study standard books first. Then go through the notes and may be lectures as you study the relevant material.

As requested by many members, I have compiled all the notes posted here in one file and uploaded on the web. You may download them from the following link.

PAKISTAN AFFAIRS NOTES


Please pray for me that Allah Almighty give me skill, ability, stamina and courage to work with full dedication for my beloved country and its people as effectively and efficiently as possible and give me success in my future endeavors.
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Last edited by rose_pak; Tuesday, August 07, 2012 at 03:42 PM.
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Please guide me that if a question comes on "the role of missionaries" in educational development or contribution in educational fields in the sub-continent.... Will this include only Islamia College Peshawar...??



Because under ISLAMIA COLLEGE PESHAWAR, the role of missionaries is discussed.. Plz guide
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