The Globalization of World Politics: Revision guide 3eBaylis & Smith:
Chapter 01: The globalization of world politics
Over the last three decades the sheer scale and scope of global interconnectedness has become increasingly evident in every sphere from the economic to the cultural. Sceptics do not regard this as evidence of globalization if that term means something more than simply international independence, i.e. linkages between countries. The key issue becomes what we understand by the term 'globalization'.
Globalization is evident in the growing extensity, intensity, velocity and deepening impact of worldwide interconnectedness.
Globalization denotes a shift in the scale of social organization, the emergence of the world as a shared social space, the relative de-territorialization of social, economic and political activity, and the relative de-nationalization of power.
Globalization can be conceptualized as fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents.
Globalization is to be distinguished from internationalization and regionalization.
The contemporary phase of globalization has proved more robust in the aftermath of September 11th than the sceptics recognize.
Contemporary globalization is a multi-dimensional, uneven, and asymmetrical process.
Contemporary globalization is best described as thick form of globalization or globalism.
Globalization is transforming but not burying the Westphalian ideal of sovereign statehood.
Globalization requires a conceptual shift in our thinking about world politics from a primarily geopolitical perspective to the perspective of globalized or global politics the politics of worldwide social relations.
Global politics is more accurately described as distorted global politics because it is afflicted by significant power asymmetries.
Globalization creates a double democratic deficit in that it places limits on democracy within states and new mechanisms of global governance which lack democratic credentials.
Global politics has engendered its own global political theory which draws upon cosmopolitan thinking.
Cosmopolitanism offers an account of the desirability and feasibility of the democratization of global politics.
Distorted global politics can be interpreted as expressing a contest between the forces of statism and cosmopolitanism in the conduct and management of world affairs.
Chapter 02: The evolution of international society
International society is an association of member states who not only interact across international borders but also share common purposes, organizations, and standards of conduct.
There are different historical versions of international society the most important of which is the contemporary global international society.
Political independence is the core value of international society.
In understanding international society it is important to keep in mind contrasting group relations, such as empires, which are far more common historically. Some argue that the concept of international society is not incompatible with forms of imperial power, understood as hierarchal relations between states in the global North and South.
Two forerunner international societies were ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy.
Two empires that contrasted with these international societies and also served as a historical bridge between them were the Roman Empire and its direct Christian successor in the West, the medieval Respublica Christiana.
Greek international society was based on the polis and Hellenic culture.
Italian international society was based on the stato and the strong urban identities and rivalries of Renaissance Italians.
These small international societies were eventually overwhelmed by neighbouring hegemonic powers.
The Peace of Westphalia was the first explicit expression of a European society of states, which served as a precedent for all subsequent developments of international society.
That international society displaced and succeeded the medieval Respublica Christiana.
It was the external aspect of the development of modern secular states that had to find an orderly and legitimate way to conduct mutual relations without submitting to either superior authority or hegemonic domination from abroad.
It was the first completely explicit international society, even though it was centered in Europe, with its own diplomatic institutions, formal body of law, and enunciated practices of prudential statecraft, including the balance of power.
Through their rivalries and wars European states developed the military organization and technology to project their power on a global scale and few non European political systems could block their expansion.
European international law, diplomacy, and the balance of power came to be applied around the world.
Indigenous non Western nationalists eventually went into revolt and claimed a right of self determination which led to decolonization and the expansion of international society.
That was followed by a further expansion after the Cold War, brought about by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and several other communist states.
During the 1990s, for the first time in history, there was one inclusive international society of global extent.
Whether this model of international society can endure under US hegemony is the subject of some dispute.
Today international society is usually conceived as a global social framework of shared norms and values based on state sovereignty.
An important manifestation of that social framework is the UN Charter.
But those shared norms and values have provoked unprecedented problems and predicaments of contemporary world politics.
There is a current debate about the future of state sovereignty and thus also about the future of the contemporary global international society.
OXFORD H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n © Oxford University Press, 2005. All rights reserved. Chapter 03: International history, 1900-1945 Europe's instability can be traced back to the creation of a unified Germany in the 1870s, which disrupted the balance of power. The European powers clashed over imperial issues in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Germany sought colonies and markets. A number of European dynasties were in a state of collapse, leaving open the question of what territorial and constitutional arrangements would replace these empires when they finally disintegrated. At the same time, nationalism was growing, particularly in the Balkans and Central Europe, with nationalist movements asserting their claims to statehood in the decaying Ottoman and Austro Hungarian empires. A combination of imperial, nationalist, and economic tensions ultimately resulted in the First World War. Many of the terms of the peace treaties concluded following World War I (referred to as the Versailles settlement) were shaped by the 'Fourteen Points' supplied by American President, Woodrow Wilson, but the points themselves were both problematic and inconsistently applied. Future wars were to be deterred by the League of Nations, which would take collective action against aggressor states. A series of new states was created in the Balkans and Eastern and Central Europe, where the Ottoman and Austro Hungarian empires had collapsed. Colonial territories of Germany and portions of the collapsed Ottoman Empire were turned into League Mandates, administered by Britain and France. Germany was found 'guilty' of having begun the war: Germany lost land to Poland; Alsace Lorraine was returned to France; Germany was to be disarmed, with France occupying the Rhineland as a security zone; and reparations were to be repaid to the victorious powers. Many critics found fault with the settlement, either because it was too hard, or not hard enough, on Germany. Since the Industrial Revolution, a global capitalist economy had been developing, drawing all parts of the world into transnational flows of finance and trade. The First World War disrupted this development, with a profound negative impact on the international economic system, which was initially masked by the vibrancy of the US economy in the 1920s. Baylis & Smith: The Globalization of World Politics: 3e Revision guide OXFORD H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n © Oxford University Press, 2005. All rights reserved. In 1929, the Wall Street stock market crash induced a world depression, illustrating the degree to which national economics were enmeshed in a global system. Depressions in many countries around the world resulted in extremist political movements gaining strength, and, more generally, in an upsurge of introverted nationalism and the pursuit of economic autarky. From 1868 onwards, Japan underwent a rapid period of industrialization and modernization, with profound social, economic, and political consequences. To find new markets, raw materials, and land for Japan's growing population, Japan began to expand into northern China, whilst China was in a protracted state of civil war. Japan, although it fought against Germany during World War I, emerged from that war similarly dissatisfied with the post war settlement. Between 1931 and 1933, Japan consolidated its hold over Manchuria, establishing a puppet state, 'Manchuguo': the League of Nations' response to the most blatant act of aggression it had thus far faced was minimal. By 1937, Japan was at war with China, which caused worsening relations with the US, also with a strong imperial interest in China. When the US limited Japans ability to import oil and other vital strategic commodities in 1939, relations between those two powers drastically deterioratedculminating in the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The origins of the Second World War have been the subject of particular historiographical controversy. Historians still dispute how far Hitler actually planned the war; whether he foresaw the extent of the war that began in 1939; and how ambitious Nazi territorial expansionism actually was (European hegemony or world domination?). Fascism and Nazism, as practised in Italy and Germany, led to a complete reordering of those societies, eliminating any notion of a private sphere. In foreign policy terms, ambitious territorial plans were mapped which went far beyond the revision of aspects of the Treaty of Versailles. Confronted with numerous international crisesin China, Abyssinia, and Europe policy makers in Britain and France adopted a policy of appeasing Hitler. Once Germany occupied Prague in March 1939, appeasement was abandoned, and Britain and France declared war on Germany once it invaded Poland in September 1939. The three predominant traditions in International Relations offer quite distinct interpretations of large-scale historical events over the period 19001945. Baylis & Smith: The Globalization of World Politics: 3e Revision guide. Realists emphasize states' ruthlessly self-interested search for territorial, military, and economic resources whereas Liberal/Idealisms point to effortshowever fruitless they may ultimately appearto foster internationalism during the inter-war period. World-systems theorists, for their part, accentuate the role of the global capitalist economy in bringing states and people into often dislocating proximity. Baylis & Smith: The Globalization of World Politics: 3e Revision guide
Chapter 04: International history, 1945-1990
Different European powers had different attitudes to decolonization after 1945: some, such as the British, decided to leave while others wished to preserve their Empires, in part (the French) or whole (the Portuguese).
European powers adopted different attitudes to different regions and countries; e.g. British withdrawal from Asia came much more quickly after 1945 than from Africa.
The process of decolonization was relatively peaceful in many cases; it led to revolutionary wars in others (Algeria, Malaya and Angola), whose scale and ferocity depended on the attitudes of the colonial power and the nationalist movements.
The struggle for independence or national liberation became embroiled in Cold War conflicts when the superpowers and/or their allies became involved, e.g. Vietnam.
Whether decolonization was judged successful depends, in part, on whose perspective you adoptthat of the European power, or the independence movement, or the people themselves.
There are disagreements about when the Cold War started, why, and who was responsible.
The Cold War began (or accelerated) in Europe with the failure to implement the agreements reached at Potsdam and Yalta.
Distinct phases can be seen in EastWest relations during which tension and the risk of direct confrontation grew and receded.
Some civil and regional wars were intensified and prolonged by superpower involvement; others may have been prevented or shortened.
The end of the Cold War has not resulted in the abolition of nuclear weapons.
There remains debate about the use of the bomb in 1945, and the effect that this had on the Cold War.
Nuclear weapons were an important factor in the Cold War. How far the arms race has had a momentum of its own is a matter of debate.
Agreements on limiting and controlling the growth of nuclear arsenals played an important role in SovietAmerican (and EastWest) relations.
States with nuclear weapons agreed on the desirability of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other states.
Various international crises occurred in which there was the risk of nuclear war. Judging how close we came to nuclear war at these times remains a matter for debate.
Chapter 05: The end of the cold war
The end of the Cold War was a major historical turning point as measured by changes in the international system, the nation state, and international organizations.
The term 'Cold War' can refer both to the behavioural characteristics of USSoviet relations, which fluctuated over the period 194589, or to the basic structure of their relations, which remained constant.
The key structural elements of the Cold War are political and military (above all nuclear) rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, ideological conflict between capitalism and communism, the division of Europe, and the extension of superpower conflict to the Third World.
The explanation for the end of the Cold War is to be found in the interaction between Soviet bloc failure and the external environment.
The suddenness of the collapse of communism defied the predictions of experts.
Gorbachev's accession to power represented the advent of a new generation in the Soviet leadership, though Gorbachev gave little indication early on that he would break the mould of Soviet politics.
The Soviet Union suffered from systemic economic problems which were compounded in the 1980s by poor harvests and a failure to meet the challenge of the computer revolution.
Glasnost began with relaxation of censorship which Gorbachev hoped to be able to control, but the process soon eluded his grasp as something approaching a genuine public opinion emerged.
A combination of glasnost and political restructuring undermined the role of the Communist Party and ultimately the Soviet Union itself which by the end of 1991 had dissolved into separate republics.
Economic restructuring had the effect of destroying the rationale of the old system without putting viable new mechanisms in its place.
The end of communism in Eastern Europe was sudden but protest against communist rule was nothing new.
The Soviet Union had always been forced to acknowledge the existence of national differences and desires for autonomy among Eastern European nations and had tried to maintain a balance between maintaining the integrity of the Soviet bloc and allowing some diversity.
The Polish union Solidarity illustrated the deep currents of dissent, whose momentum was maintained even after the banning of the organization in 1981.
A catalyst for the revolutionary process was Gorbachev's abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for Eastern Europe.
Failure of the attempts by Eastern European leaders to stem the tide of revolution in 1989 by installing new personnel illustrated the degree to which the crisis of communism was systemic.
Opinion about the American role in ending the Cold War has tended to polarize: either the Reagan hard line forced the Soviet Union to its knees or Reagan's policies were immaterial or actually served to prolong the Cold War.
SovietAmerican relations did not change overnight with the advent of Gorbachev. The United States responded cautiously to his initiatives.
Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy overthrew the conventional wisdom of Soviet foreign policy.
Gorbachev's concessions, which helped to produce the INF Treaty and generally improve the climate of SovietAmerican relations, were promoted initially in a controlled fashion but tended to become more unilateral and sweeping as the pace of domestic reform quickened.
The story is not simply one of Soviet concessions. The United States made some significant movement too, indicating that a polarized interpretation of the end of the Cold War is too simple and schematic.
The causes of the end of the Cold War are to be found not only in internal and external conditions considered separately but in the interaction between the two.
The separation of the communist bloc from capitalism, though not apparently disadvantageous to communism until the 1970s, left it at an increasing relative disadvantage to the capitalist West.
Growing consciousness of relative disadvantage was a factor in the collapse of communism.
The end of the Cold War offered grounds for both pessimistic and optimistic speculation.
Both the above approaches could find evidence for their contentions in the varied and conflicting tendencies in post Cold War international developments.
The novelty of the post Cold War international system lay not in the existence of instability and conflict but in the environment in which conflict took place.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, globalization and the future of the United States were considered by many scholars to be closely linked, though countervailing processes to both could be expected to develop.
Chapter 06: From the cold war to the war on terror
The Cold War was a complex relationship combining elements of both conflict and stability.
Most experts assumed that the Cold War would go on.
The end of the Cold War has been interpreted in at least five different ways.
While some historians argue that 1989 did not turn the world upside down, most accept that it was a crucial turning point.
The 1990s are now viewed as the high moment of liberalism and Francis Fukuyama's concept of the 'end of history' as the most influential liberal theory of the post-Cold War era.
Liberal optimism about the post Cold War rested on three assumptions: that democracies do not go to war with one another; that institutions can overcome the logic of anarchy; and that modern globalized capitalism binds states more closely together.
Realists are not realists because they are 'realistic', but rather because they have what they believe is a more historically rooted analysis about the way the international system has always operated and operates now.
Mearsheimer's argument about going 'back to the future' is built upon the basic realist argument that the Cold War system of bipolarity led to a 'long peace' that might now be undermined by its dissolution.
Kaplan's 'coming anarchy' builds on the experience of what he terms the 'dying regions' of the worldlike parts of Africaand asserts that the West ignores what is happening in these areas at its risk.
Huntington's thesis about the 'clash of civilizations' takes as its starting point the inevitability of conflict as a historically proven fact, and goes on to argue that the next key conflicts in the world will not be economic or ideological but cultural.
Some of the more significant radical writers on world politics developed their ideas outside ofand in opposition tomainstream international relations.
Noam Chomsky is a famous best-selling author in the United States whose critique of what he terms the 'American empire' takes as its point of intellectual departure the notion that in the new world order very little has fundamentally changed other than Americas increased capacity to get it own way.
Robert Cox has a more established reputation in the field of international political economy, but like Chomsky believes that the structures of hegemony established in one era still remain intact.
Naomi Klein was less a systematic thinker than the self-defined activist voice of an anti-globalization movement opposed to consumerism and faceless corporations.
The existence of communism limited the geographic range of capitalism; the end of the Cold War therefore led to globalization and the more rapid spread of market principles around the whole world.
The short hand term used to define global economic policy in the post-communist era was the 'Washington consensus', describing a strict set of economic criteria that all countries had to adhere to, whatever the welfare consequences.
After the Cold War, there was a detectable trend in the advanced capitalist countries towards a more economically driven foreign policy.
Critics of globalization made a powerful case, but were unable to provide a serious economic alternative to the market.
In the late 1980s there were many writers like Paul Kennedy who argued that the United States was in decline.
This once fashionable view virtually disappeared during the 1990s. A combination of factors including the early defeat of Iraq in 1991, the collapse of the USSR, the long economic boom in America, and high levels of military expenditure, continued to guarantee US hegemony.
The major problem facing US foreign policy after the Cold War was not isolationism but an inability in the absence of a defining enemy to formulate a clear grand strategy.
The attempt to build a popular functioning market economy in Russia thus far has been unsuccessful.
However, there is too much at stake for the West to now abandon Russiain spite of human rights abuses in Chechnya and the election of Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, to the office of President.
Even if economic reform has been unable to restore Russia, because Russia is now so weak it does not represent a serious problem internationally.
China's rise in the 1990s has been on the basis of an economic system that is an almost unique blend of capitalism and communism.
Policy makers in the United States in particular are more concerned about the great business opportunities in China than they are about political freedom.
However, over time, many predict that market reform and China's integration in the global economy will lead to irreversible political change.
Meanwhile, many in the Asia Pacific region regard China as the number one threat.
Until the second half of the 1990s the accepted wisdom was that Asia Pacific had achieved economic take off: many even predicted a new 'Pacific Century'.
The Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 has led to a massive shake out and profound social and political consequences.
The crisis also had a major impact on the stability of the world financial system.
Since 2000 there has been economic recovery in the region; however, this is now being driven by China as much as Japan.
Europe has been a major testing ground for liberal and realist international relations theories.
The key political question facing Europe after 1989 was how to manage the process of German unification.
The expansion and integration of the European economic space has not been accompanied by a parallel development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The collapse of Yugoslavia was a major test which the European Union failed to pass.
The United States remains the key provider of security in Europe.
Many experts now question the use of the term 'Third World'.
In the 1990s, poverty remains a reality for the majority of people.
The end of the Cold War has produced contradictory results in the less developed countries.
The political tensions caused by underdevelopment cannot be isolated from the advanced countries.
11 September 2001 marked the end of the post-Cold War era.
The two key factors shaping world politics since 9/11 have been Islamic terrorism and the US-led war on terror.
US foreign policy has come under sustained attack after it decided to go to war against Iraq.
The world is now a less stable place than it was before 9/11
Chapter 07: Realism
Realism has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of academic International Relations.
Outside of the academy, Realism has a much longer history. Scepticism about the capacity of human reason to deliver moral progress resonates through the work of classical political theorists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.
The unifying theme around which all realist thinking converges is that states find themselves in the shadow of anarchy with the result that their security cannot be taken for granted. In such circumstances, it is rational for states to compete for power and security.
At the end of the millennium, Realism continues to attract academicians and inform policy makers, although in the period since the end of the cold we have seen heightened criticism of realist assumptions on the grounds that they are of declining relevance in a globalized world.
There is a lack of consensus in the literature as to whether we can meaningfully speak about Realism as a single coherent theory.
There are good reasons for delineating different types of Realism. The most important cleavage is between those who grant theoretical primacy to human nature and those accentuate the importance of international anarchy and the distribution of power in the international system.
Structural realism divides into two camps: those who argue that states are security maximizers (defensive realism) and those who argue that states are power maximizers (offensive realism).
There are contemporary realists who dissent from both defensive and offensive variants of structural realism. Neoclassical realists bring individual and until variation back into the theory while rational choice realists recognize the importance of international institutions.
Statism is the centrepiece of Realism. This involves two claims. First, for the theorist, the state is the pre eminent actor and all other actors in world politics are of lesser significance. Second, state 'sovereignty' signifies the existence of an independent political community, one which has juridical authority over its territory.
Key criticism: statism is flawed both on empirical (challenges to state power from 'above' and 'below') and normative grounds (the inability of sovereign states to respond to collective global problems such as famine, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses).
Survival: the primary objective of all states is survival; this is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere. All other goals such as economic prosperity are secondary (or 'low politics'). In order to preserve the security of their state, leaders must adopt an ethical code which judges actions according to the outcome rather than in terms of a judgement about whether the individual act is right or wrong. If there are any moral universals for political realists, these can only be concretized in particular communities.
Key criticism: are there no limits to what actions a state can take in the name of necessity?
Self help: no other state or institution can be relied upon to guarantee your survival. In international politics, the structure of the system does not permit friendship, trust, and honour; only a perennial condition of uncertainty generated by the absence of a global government. Coexistence is achieved through the maintenance of the balance of power, and limited co operation is possible in interactions where the realist state stands to gain more than other states.
Key criticism: self-help is not an inevitable consequence of the absence of a world government; self-help is a logic that states have selected. Moreover, there are historical and contemporary examples where states have preferred collective security systems, or forms of regional security communities, in preference to self help.
Chapter 08: Liberalism
The liberal tradition in political thought goes back at least as far as the thinking of John Locke in the late seventeenth century. From then on, liberal ideas have profoundly shaped how we think about the relationship between government and citizens.
Liberalism is a theory of both government within states and good governance between states and peoples worldwide. Unlike realism, which regards the international as an anarchic realm, Liberals seek to project values of order, liberty, justice and toleration into international relations.
The high water mark of liberal thinking in international relations was reached in the inter-war period in the work of Idealists who believed that warfare was an unnecessary and outmoded way of settling disputes between states.
Domestic and international institutions are required to protect and nurture these values. But note that these values and institutions allow for significant variations which accounts for the fact that there are heated debates within Liberalism.
Liberals disagree on fundamental issues such as the causes of war and what kind of institutions are required to deliver liberal values in a decentralized multicultural international system.
An important cleavage within Liberalism, which has become more pronounced in our globalized world, is between those operating with a positive conception of Liberalism who advocate interventionist foreign policies and stronger international institutions, as against those who incline towards a negative conception which places a priority on toleration and non-intervention.
Early liberal thought on international relations took the view that the natural order had been corrupted by undemocratic state leaders and out dated policies such as the balance of power. Prescriptively, Enlightenment liberals believed that a latent cosmopolitan morality could be achieved through the exercise of reason and through the creation of constitutional states. In addition, unfettered movement of people and goods could further facilitate more peaceful international relations.
Although there are important continuities between Enlightenment liberal thought and twentieth-century ideas, such as the belief in the power of world public opinion to tame the interests of states, liberal idealism was more programmatic. For Idealists, the freedom of states is part of the problem of international relations and not part of the solution. Two requirements follow from their diagnosis. The first is the need for explicitly normative thinking: how to promote peace and build a better world. Second, states must be part of an international organization, and be bound by its rules and norms.
Central to idealism was the formation of an international organization to facilitate peaceful change, disarmament, arbitration, and (where necessary) enforcement.
The League of Nations was founded in 1920 but its collective security system failed to prevent the descent into world war in the 1930s. The victor states in the wartime alliance against Nazi Germany pushed for a new international institution to be created: the United Nations Charter was signed in June 1945 by fifty states in San Francisco. It represented a departure from the League in two important respects. Membership was near universal, and the great powers were able to prevent any enforcement action from taking place which might be contrary to their interests.
In the post-1945 period, liberals turned to international institutions to carry out a number of functions the state could not perform. This was the catalyst for integration theory in Europe and pluralism in the United States. By the early 1970s pluralism had mounted a significant challenge to realism. It focused on new actors (transnational corporations, non governmental organizations) and new patterns of interaction (interdependence, integration).
Neo-liberalism represents a more sophisticated theoretical challenge to contemporary realism. Neo-liberals explain the durability of institutions despite significant changes in context. According to neo-liberals, institutions exert a causal force on international relations, shaping state preferences and locking them in to cooperative arrangements.
Democratic peace Liberalism and neo-liberalism are the dominant strands in liberal thinking today.
Chapter 09: Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism
The neo-neo debate has been the dominant focus in international relations theory scholarship in the USA for the last 1015 years.
More than just theories, neo-realism and neo-liberalism represent paradigms or conceptual frameworks that shape individuals' images of the world and influence research priorities and policy debates and choices.
There are several versions of neo-realism or neo-liberalism.
Neo-liberalism in the academic world refers most often to neo-liberal Institutionalism. In the policy world, neo-liberalism is identified with the promotion of capitalism and Western democratic values and institutions.
Rational choice approaches and game theory have been integrated into neo-realist and neo-liberal theory to explain policy choices and the behaviour of states in conflict and cooperative situations. These present more rigorous and scientific versions of the theories.
Neo-realist and neo-liberal theories are status-quo oriented problem solving theories. They share many assumptions about actors, values, issues and power arrangements in the international system. Neo-realists and neo-liberals study different worlds. Neo-realists study security issues and are concerned with issues of power and survival. Neo-liberals study political economy and focus on cooperation and institutions.
Kenneth Waltz's structural realism has had a major impact on scholars in International Relations. Waltz claims that the structure of the international system is the key factor in shaping the behaviour of states. Waltz's neo-realism also expands our view of power and capabilities; however, he agrees with traditional Realists when he states that major powers still determine the nature of the international system.
Structural Realists minimize the importance of national attributes as determinants of a state's foreign policy behaviour. To these neo-realists, all states are functionally similar units, experiencing the same constraints presented by anarchy.
Structural Realists accept many assumptions of traditional realism. They believe that force remains an important and effective tool of statecraft and balance of power is still the central mechanism for order in the system.
Joseph Grieco represents a group of neo-realists or modern realists who are critical of neo-liberal Institutionalists who claim states are mainly interested in absolute gains. Grieco claims that all states are interested in both absolute and relative gains. How gains are distributed is an important issue. Thus, there are two barriers to international cooperation, fear of those who might not follow the rules and the relative gains of others.
Scholars in security studies present two versions of neo-realism or modern Realism. Offensive neo-realists emphasize the importance of relative power. Like traditional Realists, they believe that conflict is inevitable in the international system and leaders must always be wary of expansionary powers. Defensive Realists are often confused with neo-liberal Institutionalists. They recognize the costs of war and assume that it usually results from irrational forces in a society. However, they admit that expansionary states willing to use military force make it impossible to live in a world without weapons. Cooperation is possible, but, it is more likely to succeed in relations with friendly states.
Contemporary neo-liberalism has been shaped by the assumptions of commercial, republican, sociological, and institutional Liberalism.
Commercial and republican Liberalism provide the foundation for current neo-liberal thinking in Western governments. These countries promote free trade and democracy in their foreign policy programmes.
Neo-liberal Institutionalism, the other side of the neo-neo debate, is rooted in the functional integration theoretical work of the 1950s and 1960s and the complex interdependence and transnational studies literature of the 1970s and 1980s.
Neo-liberal Institutionalists see institutions as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation in the international system. Regimes and institutions help govern a competitive and anarchic international system and they encourage, and at times require, multilateralism and co operation as a means of securing national interests.
Neo-liberal Institutionalists recognize that cooperation may be harder to achieve in areas where leaders perceive they have no mutual interests.
Neo-liberals believe that states co operate to achieve absolute gains and the greatest obstacle to cooperation is 'cheating' or non compliance by other states.
The neo-neo debate is not a debate between two polar opposite worldviews. They share an epistemology, focus on similar questions and they agree on a number of assumptions about international politics. This is an intra-paradigm debate.
Neo-liberal Institutionalists and neo-realists study different worlds of international politics. Neo-realists focus on security and military issuesthe high politics issue-area. Neo-liberal Institutionalists focus on political economy, environmental issues, and lately, human rights issues. These issues have been called the low politics issue agenda.
Neo-realists explain that all states must be concerned with the absolute and relative gains that result from international agreements and cooperative efforts. Neo-liberal institutionalists are less concerned about relative gains and consider that all will benefit from absolute gains.
Neo-realists are more cautious about cooperation and remind us the world is still a competitive place where self interest rules.
Neo-liberal Institutionalists believe that states and other actors can be persuaded to cooperate if they are convinced that all states will comply with rules and cooperation will result in absolute gains.
This debate does not discuss many important issues that challenge some of the core assumptions of each theory. For example, neo-realism cannot explain foreign policy behaviour that challenges the norm of national interest over human interests. Neither theory addresses the impact of learning on the foreign policy behaviour of states.
Globalization has contributed to a shift in political activity away from the state. Transnational social movements have forced states to address critical international issues and in several situations that have supported the establishment of institutions that promote further cooperation and, fundamentally challenge the power of states.
Neo-realists think that states are still the principle actors in international politics. Globalization challenges some areas of state authority and control; but, politics is still inter-national.
Neo-realists are concerned about new security challenges resulting from uneven globalization, namely, inequality and conflict.
Globalization provides opportunities and resources for transnational social movements that challenge the authority of states in various policy areas. Neo-realists are not supportive of any movement that seeks to open critical security issues to public debate.
Free market neo-liberals believe globalization is a positive force. Eventually, all states will benefit from the economic growth promoted by the forces of globalization. They believe that states should not fight globalization or attempt to control it with unwanted political interventions.
Some neo-liberals believe that states should intervene to promote capitalism with a human face or a market that is more sensitive to the needs and interests of all the people. New institutions can be created and older ones reformed to prevent the uneven flow of capital, promote environmental sustainability, and protect the rights of citizens.
Chapter 10: Marxist theories of international relations
Marx's work retains its relevance despite the collapse of Communist party rule in the former Soviet Union.
Of particular importance is Marx's analysis of capitalism, which has yet to be bettered.
Marxist analyses of international relations aim to reveal the hidden workings of global capitalism. These hidden workings provide the context in which international events occur.
Marx himself provided little in terms of a theoretical analysis of International Relations.
His ideas have been interpreted and appropriated in a number of different and contradictory ways resulting in a number of competing schools of Marxism.
Underlying these different schools are several common elements that can be traced back to Marx's writings.
World system theory can be seen as a direct development of Lenin's work on imperialism and the Latin American Dependency School.
Immanuel Wallerstein and his work on the modern world system makes a key contribution to this school.
Wallerstein's work has been developed by a number of other writers who have built on his initial foundational work.
Drawing upon the work of Antonio Gramsci for inspiration, writers within an 'Italian' school of international relations have made a considerable contribution to thinking about world politics.
Gramsci shifted the focus of Marxist analysis more towards superstructural phenomena. In particular he explored the processes by which consent for a particular social and political system was produced and reproduced through the operation of hegemony. Hegemony allows the ideas and ideologies of the ruling stratum to become widely dispersed, and widely accepted, throughout society.
Thinkers such as Robert W. Cox have attempted to 'internationalize' Gramsci's thought by transposing several of his key concepts, most notably hegemony, to the global context.
Critical theory has its roots in the work of the Frankfurt School, a group of thinkers including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jόrgen Habermas.
Among the key concerns of critical theorists is emancipation, and, in particular, the human capacities and capabilities appealed to in calls for emancipatory action.
Several different understandings of emancipation have emerged from the critical theory tradition. The first generation of the Frankfurt School equated emancipation with a reconciliation with nature. Habermas has argued that emancipatory potential lies in the realm of communication and that radical democracy is the way in which that potential can be unlocked.
Andrew Linklater has developed on critical theory themes to argue in favour of the expansion of the moral boundaries of the political community and has pointed to the European Union as an example of a post Westphalian institution of governance.
New Marxism is characterized by a direct (re)appropriation of the concepts and categories developed by Marx.
Warren deploys Marx's analysis of capitalism and colonialism to criticize some of the central ideas of dependency and world system theorists.
Rosenberg uses Marx's ideas to criticize realist theories of international relations, and globalization theory. He seeks to develop an alternative approach which understands historical change in world politics as a reflection of transformations in the prevailing relations of production.
Marxists are rather sceptical about the emphasis currently being placed on the notion of globalization.
They see the recent manifestations of globalization as not a recent phenomenon but part of long-term trends in the development of capitalism.
Furthermore the notion of globalization is increasingly being used as an ideological tool to justify reductions in workers rights and welfare provision.
Chapter 11: Social constructivism
International relations theory in the 1980s was dominated by neo-realism and neo-liberal Institutionalism; both theories ascribed to materialism and individualism.
Various scholars critical of neo-realism and neo-liberalism drew from critical and sociological theory to demonstrate the effect of normative structures on world politics.
The mainstream responded coolly to these challenges, demanding that critics demonstrate the superiority of these alternative claims through empirical research.
The end of the cold war meant that there was a new intellectual space for scholars to challenge existing theories of international politics.
Constructivists drew from established sociological theory to demonstrate how social science could help international relations scholars understand the importance of identity and norms in world politics.
Constructivists demonstrated how attention to norms and states identities could help uncover important issues neglected by neo-realism and neo-liberalism.
Constructivists are concerned with human consciousness, treat ideas as structural factors, consider the dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as a consequence of how actors interpret their material reality, and are interested in how agents produce structures and how structures produce agents.
Knowledge shapes how actors interpret and construct their social reality.
The normative structure shapes the identity and interests of actors such as states.
Social facts such as sovereignty and human rights exist because of human agreement while brute facts such as mountains are independent of such agreements.
Social rules are regulative, regulating already existing activities, and constitutive, make possible and define those very activities.
Social construction denaturalizes what is taken for granted, asks questions about the origins of what is now accepted as a fact of life and considers the alternative pathways that might have and can produce alternative worlds.
Power can be understood not only as the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what they would not do otherwise but also as the production of identities and interests that limit the ability to control their fate.
Although the meanings that actors bring to their activities are shaped by the underlying culture, meanings are not always fixed but are a central feature of politics.
Although Constructivism and rational choice are generally viewed as competing approaches, at times they can be combined to deepen our understanding of global politics.
The recognition that the world is socially constructed means that constructivists can investigate global change and transformation.
A key issue in any study of global change is diffusion, captured by the concern with institutional isomorphism and the life cycle of norms.
Although diffusion sometimes occur because of the view that the model is superior, frequently actors adopt a model because of external pressures or its symbolic legitimacy.
Institutional isomorphism and the internationalization of norms raise issues of growing homogeneity in world politics, a deepening international community, and socialization processes.
Chapter 12: Alternative approaches of international theory
Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism together comprised the inter-paradigm debate of the 1980s, with realism dominant amongst the three theories.
Despite promising intellectual openness, however, the inter-paradigm debate ended up naturalizing the dominance of Realism by pretending that there was real contestation.
In recent years, the dominance of Realism has been undermined by three developments: first, neo-liberal Institutionalism has become increasingly important; second, globalization has brought a host of other features of world politics to centre stage; third, positivism, the underlying methodological assumption of Realism, has been significantly undermined by developments in the social sciences and in philosophy.
Theories can be distinguished according to whether they are explanatory or constitutive and whether they are foundational or anti-foundational. As a rough guide, explanatory theories tend to be foundational and constitutive theories tend to be anti-foundational.
The three main theories comprising the inter-paradigm debate were based on a set of positivist assumptions, namely that a denial of the idea that social science theories can use the same methodologies as theories of the natural sciences, that facts and values can be distinguished, that neutral facts can act as arbiters between rival truth claims, and that the social world has regularities which theories can discover.
Since the late 1980s there has been a rejection of positivism, with the main new approaches tending more towards constitutive and anti-foundational assumptions.
The current theoretical situation is one in which there are three main positions: first, Rationalist theories that are essentially the latest versions of the Realist and Liberal theories; second, alternative theories that are post-positivist; and third Social Constructivist theories that try to bridge the gap.
Alternative approaches at once differ considerably from one another, and at the same time overlap in some important ways. One thing that they do share is a rejection of the core assumptions of Rationalist theories.
Historical sociology has a long history, having been a subject of study for several centuries. Its central focus is with how societies develop the forms that they do.
Contemporary historical sociology is concerned above all with how the state has developed since the Middle Ages. It is basically a study of the interactions between states, classes, capitalism, and war.
Charles Tilly looks at how the three main kinds of state forms that existed at the end of the Middle Ages eventually converged on one form, namely the national state. He argues that the decisive reason was the ability of the national state to fight wars.
Michael Mann has developed a powerful model of the sources of state power, known as the IEMP Model.
Like realism, historical sociology is interested in war. But it undercuts neo-realism because it shows that the state is not one functionally similar organization, but instead has altered over time.
The concerns of historical sociology are compatible with a number of the other approaches surveyed in this chapter including feminism and postmodernism.
Normative theory was out of fashion for decades because of the dominance of positivism, which portrayed it as 'value-laden' and 'unscientific'.
In the last fifteen years or so there has been a resurgence of interest in normative theory. It is now more widely accepted that all theories have normative assumptions either explicitly or implicitly.
The key distinction in normative theory is between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. The former sees the bearers of rights and obligations as individuals; the latter sees them as being the community (usually the state).
Main areas of debate in contemporary normative theory include the autonomy of the state, the ethics of the use of force, and international justice.
In the last two decades, normative issues have become more relevant to debates about foreign policy, for example in discussions of how to respond to calls for humanitarian intervention and whether war should be framed in terms of a battle between good and evil.
Liberal feminism looks at the roles women play in world politics and asks why they are marginalized. It wants the same opportunities afforded to women as are afforded to men.
Marxist/socialist feminists focus on the international capitalist system. Marxist feminists see the oppression of women as a by product of capitalism, whereas socialist feminists see both capitalism and patriarchy as the structures to be overcome if women are to have any hope of equality.
Standpoint feminists, such as J. Ann Tickner want to correct the male dominance of our knowledge of the world. Tickner does this be re-describing the six objective principles of international politics developed by Hans Morgenthau according to a female version of the world.
Post-modernist feminists are concerned with gender as opposed to the position of women as such. They look into the ways in which masculinity and femininity get constructed, and are especially interested in how world politics constructs certain types of men and women.
Post-colonial feminists, such as Gayatri Spivak, work at the intersection of gender, race and class on a global scale. They suggest that liberal feminists and others have ignored the interests and opinions of women in the global South often preferring to speak on their behalf. This is a form of cultural imperialism with important material effects.
Lyotard defines post-modernism as incredulity towards metanarratives, meaning that it denies the possibility of foundations for establishing the truth of statements existing outside of discourse.
Foucault focuses on the powerknowledge relationship and sees the two as mutually constituted. It implies that there can be no truth outside of regimes of truth. How can history have a truth if truth has a history?
Foucault proposes a genealogical approach to look at history, and this approach uncovers how certain regimes of truth have dominated others.
Derrida argues that the world is like a text in that it cannot simply be grasped, but has to be interpreted. He looks at how texts are constructed, and proposes two main tools to enable us to see how arbitrary are the seemingly natural oppositions of language. These are deconstruction and double reading.
Post-modern approaches have been accused of being too theoretical and not concerned with the real world. They reply, however, that in the social world there is no such thing as the 'real' world in the sense of a reality that is not interpreted by us and have done a great deal of work on important empirical questions such as war and famine.
Given the state-centrism and positivism of IR, postcolonial approaches have been largely ignored until recently as old disciplinary boundaries are breaking down.
Post-colonialism essentially focuses on the persistence of colonial forms of power in contemporary world politics, especially how the social construction of racial, gendered, and class differences uphold relations of power and subordination.
Most post-colonial research rejects positivism given its claims to produce knowledge devoid of race, gender, and class power hierarchies.
Racism, in particular, continues to operate in both obvious and sometimes subtle ways in contemporary world politics but this not captured in traditional approaches to international theory.
Post-colonial research seeks to offer positive resources for resistance to imperial and other forms of power and not just critique.
Chapter 13: International and global security in the post-cold war era
Security is a 'contested concept'.
The meaning of security has been broadened to include political, economic, societal, and environmental, as well as military, aspects.
Differing arguments exist about the tension between national and international security.
Different views have emerged about the significance of 9/11 for the future of international security.
Debates about security have traditionally focused on the role of the state in international relations.
Realists and neo-realists emphasize the perennial problem of insecurity.
The 'security dilemma' is seen by some writers as the essential source of conflict between states.
Trust is often difficult between states, according to Realists, because of the problem of cheating.
Realists also point out the problem of 'relative gains' whereby states compare their gains with those of other states when making their decisions about security.
'Contingent realists' regard themselves as 'structural realists' or 'neo-realists'.
They believe standard 'neo realism' is flawed for three main reasons: they reject the competition bias in the theory; they do not accept that states are only motivated by 'relative gains'; they believe the emphasis on cheating is exaggerated.
'Contingent realists' tend to be more optimistic about cooperation between states than traditional 'neo-realists'.
Supporters of the concept of 'mature anarchy' also accept that structure is a key element in determining state behaviour.
There is, however, a trend towards 'mature anarchy', especially in Europe, which focuses on the growing importance of international security considerations.
This is occurring because more states in the contemporary world are recognizing that their own security is interdependent with the security of other states.
The more this happens the greater the chances of dampening down the security dilemma.
Neo-realists reject the significance of international institutions in helping many to achieve peace and security.
Contemporary politicians and academics, who write under the label of Liberal Institutionalism, however, see institutions as an important mechanism for achieving international security.
Liberal Institutionalists accept many of the assumptions of Realism about the continuing importance of military power in international relations but argue that institutions can provide a framework for cooperation which can help to overcome the dangers of security competition between states.
Democratic peace theory emerged in the 1980s. The main argument was that the spread of democracy would lead to greater international security.
Democratic peace theory is based on a Kantian logicemphasizing three elementsrepublican democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights, and transnational interdependence.
Wars between democracies are seen as being rare and they are believed to settle mutual conflicts of interest without the threat or use of force more often than non-democratic states.
Supporters of democratic peace ideas do not reject the insights of Realism, but they reject 'vulgar realism's' preoccupation with the idea of war of all against all. They argue that internal norms and institutions matter.
Collective security theorists take power seriously but argue that it is possible to move beyond the self help world of Realism.
Collective security is based on three main conditionsthat states must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo; that they must broaden their view of national interest to take in the interests of the international community; and that states must overcome their fear and learn to trust each other.
Collective security aims to create a more effective system of 'regulated institutionalized balancing' rather than relying on the unregulated balancing which takes place under anarchy.
Collective security is believed to contribute to the creation of a more benign international system.
Despite past failures, supporters argue that there is an opportunity to try collective security again with more success in the post Cold War world.
Social Constructivist thinkers base their ideas on two main assumptions; (1) that the fundamental structures of international politics are socially constructed; and (2) that changing the way we think about international relations can help to bring about greater international security.
Social Constructivist thinkers accept many of the assumptions of neo-realism, but they reject the view that 'structure' consists only of material capabilities. They stress the importance of social structure defined in terms of shared knowledge and practices as well as material capabilities.
Social Constructivists argue that material things acquire meaning only through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.
Power politics and realpolitik, emphasized by realists, are seen as being derived from shared knowledge which is self-fulfilling.
Social Constructivists can be pessimistic or optimistic about changing international relations and achieving international security.
Critical security theorists argue that too much emphasis is given by most approaches to the state.
Some critical security theorists wish to shift the main referent to the individual and suggest that 'emancipation' is the key to greater domestic and international security.
Feminist writers argue that gender tends to be left out of the literature on international security, despite the impact of war on women.
Feminist writers also argue that bringing gender issues back in will result in a reconceptualization of the study of international security.
Post-modernists emphasize the importance of ideas and discourse in thinking about international security.
Post modernists aim to replace the 'discourse of realism' with a 'communitarian discourse'.
Realist and post-modernist approaches have very different epistemologies.
Post-modernists try to reconceptualize the debate about global security by looking at new questions which have been ignored by traditional approaches.
There is a belief amongst post-modernist writers that the nature of international politics can be changed by altering the way we think and talk about security.
Supporters of the 'global society school' argue that the end of the twentieth century witnessed an accelerating process of globalization.
Globalization can be seen in the fields of economic development, communications, and culture. Global social movements are also a response to new risks associated with the environment, poverty, and weapons of mass destruction.
Globalization is occurring at a time when the fragmentation of the nation-state is taking place, encouraged in particular by the end of the cold war.
The 'fracture of statehood' is giving rise to new kinds of conflict within states rather than between states which the state system cannot deal with. This has helped encourage an emerging politics of global responsibility.
Globalism is also encouraged by the spread of regional security communities and the development of a growing consensus on norms and beliefs.
There are disputes about whether globalization will contribute to the weakening of the state or simply to its transformation, and over whether a global society can be created which will usher in a new period of peace and security.
One of the critical contemporary arguments about global security centres on the issue of continuity and change.
Different theorists have contrasting views about whether global security has changed fundamentally since 9/11.
Globalization appears to have an ambivalent impact on international security.
Chapter 14: International political economy in an age of globalization
Immediately after the Second World War international institutions were created to facilitate co operation in the world-economy and to ensure countries did not pursue the kinds of beggar-thy-neighbour policies which had contributed to the Great Depression.
The onset of the cold war postponed the operation of these institutions, as the United States stepped in directly to manage the reconstruction of Europe and the international monetary system based on the dollar.
The Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates and capital flows operated until its breakdown in 1971 when the US announced it would no longer convert the dollar to gold.
The 1970s were marked by a lack of international economic cooperation among the industrialized countries, which floated their exchange rates and indulged in new forms of trade protectionism.
Developing countries' dissatisfaction with the international system came to a head in the 1970s when they pushed unsuccessfully for a new international economic order.
The debt crisis in the 1980s thrust the IMF into a new role, causing its work to overlap with that of the World Bank.
Trade negotiations in the 1980s produced a new world trade organization.
The rise of IPE as a prominent subject in international relations was due in part to the decline in US economic preponderance and the challenge to traditional notions of power and security posed by the US failure in Vietnam.
The rise in importance of IPE was also associated with new economic challenges in the 1970s, including the OPEC oil price rise and the developing countries' push for a NIEO which highlighted theories focusing on the nature and structure of the world-economy.
The economic challenges of both the end of the cold war and globalization have further underlined the centrality of IPE in the study of international relations.
The labels Liberal, Mercantilist, and Marxist usefully describe three different analytical and moral starting points for the study of global economic relations.
The Liberal (or neo-liberal) perspective presents global economic order as the result of the relatively unfettered operation of markets, guided by rational individual policy makers.
Mercantilists describe the world-economy as an arena for inter state competition for power.
Marxist analyses focus on the structure of the world capitalist economy, proposing that state and government choices simply reflect the preferences of those who own the means of production.
The three traditional perspectives usefully highlight different actors, different processes, and different 'levels of analysis' in the study of IPE.
Rational choice explains outcomes in IPE as the result of actors' choices which are assumed always to be rationally power or utility maximizing within given particular incentives and institutional constraints.
Political economy applies rational choice to sub-state actors such as coalitions, interest groups, and bureaucrats in order to explain outcomes in a state's foreign economic policy.
Institutionalists apply rational choice to states in their interactions with other states in order to explain international cooperation in economic affairs.
Constructivist approaches pay more attention to how governments, states, and other actors construct their preferences, highlighting the role of identities, beliefs, traditions, and values in this process.
Neo-Gramscians highlight that actors define and pursue their interests within a structure of ideas, culture, and knowledge which itself is shaped by hegemonic powers.
Globalization poses some new constraints for all states, including the most powerful. In particular, the emergence of global capital markets means that all governments have to be cautious in their choice of exchange rate and interest rate policies.
On other issues of economic policy, wealthier and more powerful countries are less constrained by globalization than is portrayed by the globalists. This is because the firms and investors whom governments are keen to attract are not solely concerned with levels of taxation and wages. They are equally concerned with factors such as the skills of the workforce, the provision of infrastructure, and proximity to markets.
At the international level the more powerful states in the system get to set (and enforce) many of the rules of the new global economy.
Weaker states in the system not only must accept and abide by rules set by others, but also have little capacity to manage their integration into the world economy. These states do not enjoy much sovereignty or independence of policy choice in the global economy.
Institutionalists argue that international institutions will play an important and positive role in ensuring that globalization results in widely spread benefits in the world-economy.
Realists and neo-realists reject the institutionalist argument on the grounds that it does not account for the unwillingness of states ever to sacrifice power relative to other states.
Constructivists pay more attention to how governments, states and other actors construct their preferences, highlighting the role that state identities, dominant beliefs, and ongoing debates and contestation play in this process.
Chapter 15: International law
States have strong incentives to free themselves from the insecurities of international anarchy.
States face common coordination and collaboration problems, yet cooperation remains difficult under anarchy.
To facilitate cooperation, states create international institutions, of which three levels exist in modern international society: constitutional institutions; fundamental institutions; and issue-specific institutions, or regimes.
We are concerned with fundamental institutions, of which international law is one of the most important.
Modern international law is a historical artefact, a product of the revolutions in thought and practice that transformed the governance of European states after the French Revolution (1789).
Prior to the French Revolution, in the Age of Absolutism, law was understood principally as the command of a legitimate superior, and international law was seen a command of God, derived from natural law. In the modern period law as been seen come to be seen as something contracted between legal subjects, or their representatives, and international law has been seen as the expression of the mutual will of nations.
Because of its historical roots, the modern institution of international law has a number of distinctive characteristics, informed largely by the values of political liberalism.
The most distinctive characteristics of the modern institution of international law are its multilateral form of legislation, its consent based form of legal obligation, its language and practice of justification, and its discourse of institutional autonomy.
So long as international law was designed to facilitate international order it was circumscribed in key ways: states were the principle subjects and agents of international law; international law was concerned with the regulation of inter-state relations; and the scope of international law was confined to questions of order.
The quest for global governance is pushing international law into new areas, raising questions about whether international law is transforming into a form of supranational law.
Individuals, and to some extent collectivities, are gradually acquiring rights and responsibilities under international law, establishing their status as both subjects and agents under international law.
Non-governmental actors are becoming increasingly important in the development and codification of international legal norms.
International law is increasingly affecting domestic legal regimes and practices, and the rules of the international legal system are no longer confined to issues of order. As international humanitarian law evolves, issues of global justice are permeating the international legal order.
A plethora of theories have emerged to explain the nature, function, and importance of modern international law.
Realists argue that international law is only important when it serves the interests of powerful states. Yet they struggle to explain how strong states come to be constrained by law, how weak actors can use law to achieve valuable political outcomes, and why we have an ever expanding and complex international legal order, particularly in areas that cannot easily be reduced to the narrow self-interests of powerful states.
Neo-liberals explain how self-interested states come to construct dense networks of international legal regimes. The approach is limited, however, by their inability to explain the development of law in areas where the self-interests of states are weak or unclear; by their failure to explain the origins of the modern system of international law; and by their blindness to the way in which international law constitutes the identities and interests of states.
Constructivists treat international law as part of the normative structures that condition state and non-state agency in international relations. Like other social norms, they emphasize the way in which law constitutes actors' identities, interests, and strategies. The principal weakness of constructivism, however, is that its account of international law is under specified, particularly in the area of distinguishing social from legal norms.
New liberals emphasize the domestic origins of state preferences and, in turn, international law. Within International Law, they stress the need to disaggregate the state to understand transnational legal integration and interaction, and they prioritize international humanitarian law. The principal limitation of this perspective is that it neglects the role that international law can play in constituting the domestic realm.
The New Haven School points to the emergence of a global public order, characterized by processes of global authoritative decision, from which international law emanates. These processes, and the values they embody, provide the principal source of international laws authority. Unfortunately, this approach fails in its own attempt to transcend positivism and naturalism.
Critical legal studies concentrates on the way in which the inherent Liberalism of international law seriously curtails its radical potential. The problem is, however, that critical legal scholars often fail to recognize the emancipatory effects of
international law, particularly the way in which weak actors have been able to use international law lever genuine reform in their states.
Chapter 16: International regimes
Regimes represent an important feature of globalization.
There is a growing number of global regimes being formed.
The term regimes, and social science approaches to them, are recent but fit into a long-standing tradition of thought about international law.
The onset of dιtente, loss of hegemonic status by the USA, and the growing awareness of environmental problems sensitized social scientists to the need for a theory of regimes.
Liberal Institutionalists and Realists have developed competing approaches to the analysis of regimes.
Regime theory is an attempt initiated in the 1970s by social scientists to account for the existence of rule-governed behaviour in the anarchic international system.
Regimes have been defined by principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures.
Regimes can be classified in terms of the formality of the underlying agreements and the degree of expectation that the agreements will be observed. Full-blown, tacit, and dead-letter regimes can be identified.
Regimes now help to regulate international relations in many spheres of activity.
The market is used by Liberal Institutionalists as an analogy for the anarchic international system.
In a market/international setting, public goods get underproduced and public bads get overproduced.
Liberal Institutionalists draw on the Prisoners' Dilemma game to account for the structural impediments to regime formation.
A hegemon, 'the shadow of the future', and an information-rich environment promote collaboration and an escape route from Prisoners' Dilemmas.
Realists argue that liberal institutionalists ignore the importance of power when examining regimes.
Realists draw on the 'Battle of the Sexes' to illuminate the nature of coordination and its link to power in an anarchic setting.
Chapter 17: Diplomacy
Diplomacy is a key concept in world politics. It refers to a process of communication and negotiation between states and other international actors.
Diplomacy began in the ancient world but took on a recognizably modern form from the fifteenth century onwards with the establishment of the permanent embassy.
By the end of the nineteenth century all states had a network of embassies abroad linked to foreign departments at home. Diplomacy had also become an established profession.
The First World War was a 'watershed' in the history of diplomacy. The perceived failure of diplomacy to prevent this war led to a demand for a 'new' diplomacy that would be less secretive and more subject to democratic control. The outbreak of the Second World War revealed the limits of the 'new' diplomacy.
Cold war diplomacy relates to the period after the Second World War when international relations were dominated by a global confrontation between the superpowers and their allies. The imperative need to avoid a nuclear war but also to 'win' the Cold War produced a very delicate, dangerous form of diplomacy.
The end of the cold war produced a new mood of optimism that diplomacy could resolve all major international problems. Such optimism quickly dissipated when a host of new problems and old problems in a new guise emerged.
The war against terrorism after 11 September 2001 has posed a major challenge to the role of diplomacy in global politics. This challenge has been framed within a debate about the appropriate relationship between hard and soft instruments of power.
Diplomacy plays a key role in the foreign policies of states and other international actors.
A diplomatic 'machinery' (minimally a foreign department and overseas representation) performs important functions in the making and the implementation of foreign policy.
Diplomacy involves persuading other actors to do (or not to do) what you want (do not want) them to do. To be effective, ('pure') diplomacy may need to be supplemented by other instruments, but negotiating skills are central to the art of diplomacy.
Diplomacy combined with other instruments (military, economic, subversion) is called mixed diplomacy. Here, diplomacy becomes a communications channel through which the use or threatened use of other instruments is transmitted to other parties.
Diplomacy usually has comparative advantages over other instruments in terms of availability and cost.
Developing states are handicapped as effective international actors by having a relatively under-developed diplomatic machinery and by a restricted range of policy instruments.
Even the most powerful sates are no longer the only significant international actors. Bilateral state-to-state diplomacy has been increasingly supplemented by multilateral forms of diplomacy.
International organizations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental, have become significant diplomatic actors. With at least a rudimentary diplomatic machinery, they can communicate their interests and deploy their resources to influence the outcome of negotiations.
Complex multilateral types of diplomacy have evolved at the regional level and have reached their most developed form in Europe.
In complex, multilateral negotiations, diplomacy has become less an art form and more a management process reflecting high levels of interdependence between societies.
There is now a lively debate about the extent to which states and the state system remain, or should remain, the major vehicles for global diplomacy. Globalization challenges a traditional state-based diplomacy but there are indications that states are adapting to these changes. It is certainly too soon to conclude that state-based diplomacy does not remain highly significant in global diplomacy.
Chapter 18: The United Nations
The United Nations was established to preserve peace between states after the Second World War.
In a number of ways, the institutions of the United Nations reflected lessons learned from its predecessor, the League of Nations.
The institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations reflect both the demands of Great Power politics (ie. Security Council veto) and universalism. They also reflect demands to address the needs and interests of people, as well as the needs and interest of states. The tensions and balance between these various demands have been a key feature of UN development.
The cold war and the decolonization process had discouraged more active involvement by the United Nations within states.
After the cold war, it became more difficult for states and diplomats to accept that what happened within states was of no concern to outsiders.
It became more common for governments to see active membership in the United Nations as serving their national interest as well as being morally right.
By the mid-1990s the UN had become involved in maintaining international peace and security in three main ways: by resisting aggression between states, by attempting to resolve disputes within states (civil wars), and by focusing on conditions within states, including economic, social and political conditions.
New justifications for intervention in states were being considered by the 1990s, but no consensus has been reached.
Nonetheless, most operations of the United Nations were justified in the traditional way: as a response to a threat to international peace and security.
Any relaxation of the traditional principle of non-intervention had to be treated very cautiously, and new methods of approval in the UN could be advisable.
The number of institutions within the UN system that address economic and social issues has significantly increased. Several Programmes and Funds were created in response to Global Conferences.
Coordination between the various economic and social organisations has been problematic.
Despite a shortage of funds and coordination problems, the UN has done important work in key economic and social areas.
In the mid to late 1990s under the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN embarked on an overarching reform effort.
Reform of the economic and social arrangements of the UN aimed at improving coordination, eliminating duplication, and clarifying spheres of responsibility.
These efforts strengthened the norms of the multilateral system.
Chapter 19: Transnational actors and international organizations in global politics
The concept of the 'state' has three very different meanings: a legal person, a political community, and a government.
The countries and governments around the world may be equal in law, but have few political similarities. Many governments control less resources than many transnational actors.
It cannot be assumed that all country-based political systems are more coherent than global systems, particularly as national loyalties do not match country boundaries.
By abandoning the language of 'states' and 'non state' actors, we can admit the possibility of theorizing about many types of actors in global politics. By distinguishing government from society and nation from country, we can ask whether private groups, companies, and national minorities in each country engage in transnational relations.
The ability of TNCs to change transfer prices means that they can evade taxation or government controls on their international financial transactions.
The ability of TNCs to use triangulation means individual governments cannot control their country's international trade.
The ability of TNCs to move production from one country to another means individual governments are constrained in regulating and taxing companies.
The structure of authority over TNCs generates the potential for intense conflict between governments, when the legal authority of one government has extraterritorial impact on the sovereignty of another government.
In some areas of economic policy, governments have lost sovereignty and regulation now has to be exercised at the global level rather than by governments acting independently.
Effective action against transnational criminals by individual governments is difficult for the same reasons as control of TNCs is difficult.
Groups using violence to achieve political goals generally do not achieve legitimacy, but in exceptional circumstances they may be recognized as national liberation movements and take part in diplomacy.
The transnational activities of criminals and guerrillas shift problems of the domestic policy of countries into the realm of global politics.
Terrorism may be particular to individual countries, have transnational aspects or be carried out by groups in a transnational network, but it is not a single political force.
Most transnational actors can expect to gain recognition as NGOs by the UN, provided they are not individual companies, criminals, or violent groups, and they do not exist solely to oppose an individual government.
The ECOSOC statute provides an authoritative statement that NGOs have a legitimate place in intergovernmental diplomacy.
The creation of a global economy leads to the globalization of unions, commercial bodies, the professions, and scientists in international NGOs, which participate in the relevant international regimes.
Governments can no longer control the flow of information across the borders of their country.
Improved communications make it more likely that NGOs will operate transnationally and make it very simple and cheap for them to do so.
NGOs from each country may combine in four ways, as international NGOs, as advocacy networks, as caucuses, and as governance networks.
International organizations are structures for political communication. They are systems that constrain the behaviour of their members.
Governments form intergovernmental organizations and transnational actors form international non-governmental organizations. In addition governments and transnational actors accord each other equal status by jointly creating hybrid international NGOs.
International organizations are more than the collective will of their members. They have a distinct impact upon other global actors.
The high politics/low politics, distinction is used to marginalize transnational actors. It is invalid because politics does not reduce to these two categories.
A simple concept of power will not explain outcomes. Military and economic resources are not the only capabilities: communication facilities, information, authority, and status are also important political assets. In addition, an ability to use the interaction processes to mobilize support will contribute to influence over policy.
Different policy domains contain different actors, depending upon the salience of the issues being debated.
TNCs gain influence through the control of economic resources. NGOs gain influence through possessing information, gaining high status and communicating
effectively. TNCs and NGOs have been the main source of economic and political change in global politics.
Chapter 20: Environmental issues
International environmental issues emerged as a major focus for international politics and concern in the last three decades of the twentieth century.
Although environmental problems are not new in themselves, industrialization and rapid population growth have greatly increased the scale and intensity of the over-exploitation of natural resources and environmental degradation, generating a wide range of urgent international and global problems.
Environmental issues have become international and global in several senses, many environmental problems are intrinsically transnational or global, or relate to global commons. Other local or national problems are experienced widely across the Earth. Finally, the processes generating most environmental problems are closely related to broader political or socio-economic processes, which are themselves part of an increasingly global system.
Global environmental issues exist in many different forms, and though they share some common characteristics, each needs specific examination in its own right.
Environmental issues first emerged on the international agenda in the late nineteenth century.
Environmental awareness and concern developed strongly after the 1960s, particularly in relation to pollution problems.
The 1972 Stockholm Conference established a number of principles, institutions and programmes which helped to provide a framework promoting the further development of international responses to transnational environmental problems.
In the 1970s and 1980s, international environmental politics developed and matured. Green movements, environmental and industrial NGOs, and international organizations established themselves as key actors in international environmental politics alongside states.
The Brundtland Commission promoted the concept of 'sustainable development', and preparations began for a 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.
Each of the main approaches within International Relations theory provides important insights into international environmental politics. At the same time, environmental issues pose major challenges, particularly relating to: the role and significance of states and the notion of sovereignty; the relationship between international and domestic spheres of political activity; and the relationship between knowledge, values, power, and interests in determining outcomes in international processes.
The notion of the 'tragedy of the commons' provides an instructive model of how common resources can become over-exploited.
The collective management of global commons on principle is more widely applicable than approaches focusing on 'privatization', though the development of international collective management regimes poses particular challenges.
Much international environmental politics can be said to focus around the development and implementation of international environmental regimes.
The development of international environmental regimes can roughly be divided into four phases: agenda formation; negotiation and decision-making; implementation; and further development.
The regime developed to limit and reverse ozone layer depletion illustrates each of these phases, and is justifiably regarded as an important and effective environmental regime.
Three new conventions were agreed as the Rio Conference, aimed at limiting climate change, preserving biodiversity, and combating desertification. Each of these came rapidly into force, but the process of making these conventions affective has proved a long-term task.
The negotiations to develop further the Climate Change Convention demonstrated the immense challenges involved in achieving a sufficient response to prevent substantial anthropogenic climate change, and also the complexity of equity issues in negotiations. The Kyoto Protocol agreed in 1997 established substantial legally binding commitments, but many challenges remain.
There are still major disputes about the main aims and objectives of the Biodiversity Convention and means to achieve them.
The institutions established to promote the implementation of Agenda 21 have simulated the production of national plans for sustainable development and provided a forum where plans can be reviewed and where networks of NGOs, government representatives, and international secretariats can develop and influence agendas. However, their influence on overall patterns of development has been small.
The relationship between environment and trade regimes has emerged as a key issue.
Chapter 21: Terrorism
Agreement on what constitutes terrorism continues to be difficult given the range of potential acts involving violence.
Terrorism, or acts of violence by sub-state groups, has been separated from criminal acts on the basis of the purpose for which violence is applied, namely political change.
Terrorist groups succeed when their motivations or grievances are perceived to be legitimate by a wider audience. Disproportionate or heavy-handed responses by states to acts of terrorism serve to legitimize terrorist groups.
The definition of globalization, as with terrorism, is open to subjective interpretation but the technologies associated with globalization have improved terrorist capabilities.
Many of the technologies and processes associated with globalization have enabled terrorism to have an impact internationally since 1968.
The majority of transnational terrorist attacks from 1979 onwards targeted American citizens and symbols.
The collapse of the Soviet Union denied leftist groups their major source of direct or indirect sponsorship, allowing the rise of religious terrorist groups.
Explanations for terrorist violence based exclusively on the cultural, economic, and religious aspects of globalization provide insights into the underlying motivations and causes for terrorism but lack a holistic understanding of the problem.
The current wave of terrorist violence uses religious justifications to legitimize the killing of non-combatants.
Religion may be a powerful motivating element for terrorists, but the ultimate purpose for which violence is applied is the seizing and remolding of the controls of a state.
Explanations for terrorist violence based exclusively on the cultural, economic, and religious aspects of globalization provide insights into the underlying motivations and causes for terrorism but lack a holistic understanding of the problem.
The current wave of terrorist violence uses religious justifications to legitimize the killing of non-combatants.
Religion may be a powerful motivating element for terrorists, but the ultimate purpose for which violence is applied is the seizing and remolding of the controls of a state.
Elements of globalization that permit the rapid exchange of ideas and goods can also be levered and exploited by terrorist groups.
The technologies associated with globalization allow terrorists to operate in a highly distributed global 'network' that shares information and allows small cells to conduct highly coordinated, lethal attacks.
Globalization may allow some terrorist groups to acquire, manufacture, and use weapons of mass destructions in order to conduct catastrophic attacks.
States, individually and collectively, have political, military, legal, economic, and technologies advantages in the struggle against terrorist groups.
Differences between states over the nature and scope of the current terrorist threat, and the most appropriate responses to combat it, reflect subjective characterizations based on national biases and experiences.
Chapter 22: Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear weapon production requires a broad-based technological infrastructure and individuals with key scientific and technical skills.
Nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons differ in their management of the chain reaction, and in the nature of the energy produced.
In 1948, the United Nations introduced the category known as Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD), which incluided atomic explosive weapons and radioactive material weapons.
More recently, a new category has appeared know as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities).
Nuclear weapons produce energy in three formsblast, heat and nuclear radiationand the phenomenon know as electro-magneitc pulse (EMP).
Nuclear weapons were used at the end of the Second World War and have not been used in conflict since that time.
The testing of thermonuclear weapons indicated the greater explosive capacity ofthis type of weapon, although the trend in recent years have been towards weapon designs with much lower yields.
The nature of nuclear weapons and the dissemination of the capabilities to manufacture them around the world since 1945 makes the issue of nuclear proliferation a good illustration of the globalization of world politics.
The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union has generated new problems concerning nuclear proliferation.
Greater attention has recently been paid to the theoretical aspects of nuclear proliferation and anti-proliferation.
A debate has emerged over the merits of the further proliferation/spread of nuclear weapons.
Because of new proliferation challenges generated by what some analysts call the 'second nuclear age, a debate has begun over whether the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be supplemented or supplanted by a new more flexible approach to the problems of global nuclear governance.
A major element of the nuclear proliferation process is the acquisition of the key technologies to produce fissile materials to construct either a fission (nuclear) or fusion (thermonuclear) weapon.
The effects of nuclear weapons are considerable and are manifest in the form of blast, heat, and nuclear radiation.
Since 1945, the spread of nuclear technology for civil and military purposes has meant that states beyond the five which possess nuclear weapons now have the capacity to produce nuclear devices at relatively short notice, if they have not already done so.
Over the same period the structure of the civil nuclear trading market has also changed, leading to proliferation concerns because there are more nuclear suppliers around, including transnational supply networks operating outside the established export control guidelines.
There has also been a diffusion of ballistic missile and space launch technology since 1945.
A debate over the merits of deploying defensive systems to counter ballistic missiles has emerged and the ABM Treaty agreed in 1972 between the United States and the former Soviet Union is no longer in force.
Over time, the characterization of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons has become more complex.
There are also difficulties associated with determining whether nuclear proliferation has actually occurred due to technical ambiguities and the observation that a nuclear capability can be constructed without the need for a nuclear test.
A number of states have the potential to manufacture nuclear weapons if they wanted, and a few actually embarked on military nuclear programmes before abandoning them.
The role of non-state actors and transnational nuclear supply networks have added a further dimension to the nuclear proliferation issue.
There is an ongoing task of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials around the world and efforts have been made to improve the prospects of personnel who formerly worked in the Soviet Union's nuclear weapon complex.
The complexity surrounding compliance and non-compliance with international obligations has been a key feature of debate since the early 1990s.
Nuclear control and anti-proliferation measures have been evolving since the end of the Second World War.
The IAEA has established a global safeguards system.
Attempts to implement a CTBT and negotiate a fissile material cut-off have stalled following a period of renewed impetus after 1995.
A number of NWFZs have been negotiated.
The NPT now has 189 parties, although three key states remain non-signatories.
Since 1987, the MTCR has been operating as an export control agreement among suppliers to constrain the proliferation of missile technology and a new measures, The Hague Code of Conduct, was introduced in 2002.
In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and review conferences have been held every five years since 1970.
Since 1995, the NPT has encountered several challenges related to new incidences of nuclear testing, attempts to achieve universality of the Treaty, disposal of fissile material, compliance, and verification.
It has been suggested that a 'second nuclear age' has emerged and this raises new risks for nuclear proliferation in the future.
New measures have been implemented in response to the continuing globalization of the nuclear proliferation issue.
Chapter 23: Nationalism
Nationalism was only fully recognized as relevant by International Relations in the past two decades.
Nationalism is both opposed to globalization and a product of it.
The spread of nationalism is a result of the transformation of the international system over the past two centuries.
Nationalism is now the moral basis of states and of the international system.
Nationalism as ideology is a normative idea; nations exist objectively and should have the right to self determination.
The modern idea of nationalism is a combination of (1) Enlightenment and liberal concepts of self ruling community; (2) the French revolutionary idea of the community of equal citizens; (3) German conceptions of a people formed by history, tradition, and culture.
Nationalism propounds both an idea of a history and tradition, and a claim of obligation.
Nationalism was evident first in Western Europe and in the Americas.
After the First World War, the collapse of the multi ethnic empires in Eastern Europe, after the Second World War the end of the European empires in Asia and Africa.
Decades of conflict followed the proclamation of self determination by President Wilson in 1918.
Nationalism for the past two centuries has been the moral, normative, basis for the system of states.
Nationalism both legitimates states and has been promoted by states as part of nation building.
Nationalism has been the justification for secession and territorial claims.
Nationalism closely relates to the incidence of war.
Nationalism both underpins and challenges the security of states.
Nationalism can be thought of as the fulfilment of a long historical development of peoples, or as a recent, modern, response to social change.
There are strong arguments as to the benefits of nationalism to the international system, and also as to the harm it causes relations between states.
Nationalism is one among several answers to the question of loyalty and identity.
Nationalism remains an important part of relations between states and also of the domestic politics of many countries.
Expectations of a disappearance of nationalism, made over the past century and a half, were mistaken.
Nationalism is a response to the new international context: in part benefiting from resentment at globalization, in part adjusting those parts of its programme that are no longer so relevant.
Chapter 24: Culture in world affairs
Culture defines the identity of individuals in a society. A culture is composed of the customs, norms and genres that inform social life. Religion remains a key influence.
Civilization is the broadest form of cultural identity, and represents a level of identity that may spread across nations and states.
Cultural groups often define themselves by representing different cultures as alien, or as the 'Other'.
The West has been the dominant civilization in the modern age, and all other civilizations have had to absorb its influence, whether this was welcome or not.
The end of the cold war heightened the significance of cultural identity. The hegemony of the West and of its liberal capitalism challenged the culture and social order of most societies. Globalization also fostered multicultural landscapes across the world.
The new wave of globalization has met local resistance in some places from those seeking to preserve their cultures from unbridled change. Religious revivalism has been a global phenomenon since the 1970s.
Religious fundamentalism has become the most important cause of domestic and international terrorism in many parts of the world.
As the cold war came to an end, a discourse was led by Samuel Huntington that suggested that a 'clash of civilizations' was about to become the principal cause of international conflict.
The impact of the West has been the principal issue facing Islamic civilization since the eighteenth century. Muslim modernizers sought to imitate the West, but the secular state went on to fail in much of the Middle East.
A crisis of modernization exists in many Muslim societies. Poor economic performance has left large umbers of the urban population poor and frustrated.
Islam remains a powerful influence in the Muslim world. When secular states faltered, Islam was there to fill the vacuum of leadership.
Islam revivalists have embraced a cultural conflict with the West. In the 1980s, the Iranian revolution led militant Islamists against the West. In the 1990s, the Sunni Islamists of the Al Qaeda network took up the torch of conservative rejectionism.
Islamic movements are suspicious of the global, but the pressures to be pragmatic are strong. The Iranian Revolution is a good example of how political and economic realities can force compromise on Islamists.
Islam does not have a single voice. Muslims will meet the forces of globalization in different ways. Muslim societies will continue to change in the twenty-first century.
Chapter 25: Humanitarian intervention in world politics
Traditionally, intervention has been defined as a forcible breach of sovereignty that interferes in a state's internal affairs.
The legality of forcible humanitarian intervention is a matter of dispute between restrictionists and counter restrictionists.
States will not intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons.
States should not place their armed forces in harms way for primarily humanitarian reasons as this violates the compact between state and citizen.
A new legal right of humanitarian intervention would be vulnerable to abuse as states employed humanitarian claims to cloak the pursuit of traditional national interests.
States will apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively.
In the absence of a consensus on what principles should govern a right of individual or collective humanitarian intervention, such a right would undermine international order.
Humanitarian intervention will always be based on the cultural preferences of the powerful.
Solidarism is committed to developing consensual moral principles that would legitimate a practice of humanitarian intervention in international society.
Counter-restrictionists argue for a legal right of forcible humanitarian intervention based on an interpretation of the human rights provisions in the UN Charter and the existence of customary international law.
A legal right of humanitarian intervention enables intervention but it does not determine it. To ensure intervention in cases where it is desperately needed states would have to recognize a duty or obligation to act.
Humanitarian considerations do not seem to have been decisive in the decisions of Vietnam and Tanzania to intervene.
Vietnam and Tanzania justified their interventions in terms of the traditional norms of the society of states.
The reluctance of the society of states to legitimize humanitarian intervention reflected fears about setting precedents which could erode the non-intervention principle.
In the polarized world of the late 1970s, reactions to the Tanzanian and Vietnamese interventions were conditioned by cold war geopolitics.
Media images of human suffering have led Western publics to pressurize their leaders into post-cold war humanitarian interventions.
Humanitarian intervention secures its greatest legitimation when it is done through the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the Security Council.
Forcible humanitarian intervention can alleviate immediate human suffering but does not always tackle the underlying causes of human suffering.
Humanitarian outcomes should be conceptualized in terms of a continuum ranging from short term (immediate relief of suffering) to long term (addressing the underlying political causes of the suffering).
Non forcible humanitarian intervention is characterized by the pacific activities of states, international organizations, NGOs and INGOs in the global humanitarian community.
INGOs and NGOs have succeeded in broadening the humanitarian agenda to include issues of development, the environment, and women's rights.
Dominant Western political and economic elites encourage a crisis management approach to complex humanitarian emergencies that does nothing to tackle the underlying causes of these emergencies.
Humanitarian crises like Somalia and Rwanda are the tip of the iceberg of human suffering. The slow death of millions through poverty and malnutrition are just as pressing cases for humanitarian intervention.
Chapter 26: European integration and regional co-operation
The Second World War and its aftermath provided much impetus for a change in the nature of relations between the European states.
Sectoral integration, driven by a smaller core of six countries, led to the creation of the European Communities.
Powers and competences of the European institutions were gradually expanded in a move from economic to political integration.
In line with enlargement to a membership of 25 of more countries in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the EU has embarked on an ambitious process of constitutionalization.
The development of integration theory originated as a branch of International Relations.
Key debates in integration theory are between supranationalists, emphasizing the role of central institutions, and intergovernmentalists, arguing for the continued relevance of states, their resources and processes of domestic preference formation.
Contending approaches emphasize different aspects of the integration process. Important distinctions in their focus are: institutional dynamics/state preferences; policy making/treaty reform; long term/short term developments; ideas/interests; and process/events and outcomes.
Greater theoretical Pluralism, moving beyond the established debate, has developed from the late 1990s onwards.
The process of integration has interacted with, and received much impetus from, developments at the global level.
The relationship between processes of globalization and integration is contested: some see integration as a regional expression of globalization, accelerating the transnational nature of markets and thus further disenfranchising states and societies.
However, the EU can also be regarded as a mechanism through which states and societies regain a degree of control over markets and are able to address transborder issues such as environmental protection, health, migration, or international crime more effectively.
Multilateral negotiations and global economic competition have provided powerful incentives for cooperation among states on a regional basis.
Efforts to establish free trade areas and customs unions in Asia and in North and South America received a boost during the 1990s.
On the whole, these forms of regionalism differ from European integration in only focusing on economic matters and relying on a very limited degree of institutionalization.
Chapter 27: Global trade and finance
The 'globalization' of economic activity can be understood in several different ways.
Sceptical interpretations emphasize that current levels of cross-border trade, money movements, and investment flows are neither new nor as great as some claim.
Globalist interpretations argue that large-scale relaxations of border controls have taken international economic activity to unprecedented levels.
Geographical conceptions of globalization highlight the proliferation of economic transactions in which territorial distance and borders present limited if any constraint.
Transborder production and associated intra-firm trade have developed in a number of industries since the middle of the twentieth century.
Many states have created special economic zones in order to attract so-called 'global factories'.
Much contemporary commerce involves transborder marketing of global brand-name products.
The growth of a substantial global dimension to world trade may have discouraged protectionism.
Globalization has changed forms of money with the spread of transborder currencies, distinctly supraterritorial denominations, digital cash, and global credit cards.
Globalization has reshaped banking with the growth of supraterritorial deposits, loans, branch networks, and fund transfers.
Securities markets have gained a global dimension through the development of transborder bonds and stocks, transworld portfolios, and electronic round-the-world trading.
Globalization has likewise affected the instruments and modes of trading on derivatives markets.
Global trade and finance have spread unevenly between different regions and different circles of people.
Transborder commerce has to date often widened material inequalities within and between countries.
Territorial geography continues to be important in the contemporary globalizing economy.
Although lacking Westphalian sovereign powers, states exercise significant influence in global trade and finance.
While economic globalization has weakened cultural diversity and national attachments in some respects, it has promoted them in others.
Chapter 28: Causes and consequences of the communications and Internet revolution
Communications and IT firms are at the core of a new world information economy.
The rise of cheap global communications added new players to the decision-making mix and often forced decisions to be taken more rapidly.
National monopolies provided telephone services in almost all countries for decades. They used the International Telecommunication Union to prevent competition in the provision of international communications services.
The introduction of domestic and international communications competition in national and international communications, and unleashed significant technological innovation.
The United States is the lynchpin of interregional telecommunications and data traffic, but European countries generate a third more international traffic flows than North America.
Growth rates are higher in Europe, Latin America, the Pacific, and Africa than in North America or Asia.
International data traffic has grown faster than international voice traffic and is now the larger of the two. The distinction between voice data is losing its meaning. The rise of the Internet, the Web, and e-commerce complements this trend.
Wireless Internet voice traffic and international video-phones will increase in popularity.
Different professional expertise is used by firms to create advantage. Computer programmers and engineers can design software and standards to create competitive advantages for firms within networks.
Lobbyists work to shape laws and public policy to advantage their clients.
Economists try to devise systems to increase the revenue and profits of their clients, firms or governments.
Lawyers use intellectual property laws to maximize the power of firms over content.
Business executives are paid to find ways to create advantages and profits for their firms relative to their competitors.
The information revolution increased the influence of the market and of giant firms relative to governments.
Global networks allowed NGOs to increase in number and influence. NGOs sometimes promote positive changes, but may hamper initiatives that governments and firms launch through international institutions.
Global networks and new communication technologies empowered non-state actors and democratized access to information. The information gap between states and others narrowed.
Decision-makers must act more quickly because every crisis is aired on CNN and BBC as it happens. A flood of information, often with vivid images is narrowing the global news gaps. Democracy slows down decisions, so governments are having are more difficult time keeping up with changing situations.
The information revolution altered intelligence gathering and its impact on foreign policy; allowed activists and cyber terrorists to more influence, and networked information has transformed military conflict.
New communications and information technologies are beginning to enable advances in e-government, e-democracy, and e-participation. But, they also empower NGOs, firms, revolutionaries, terrorists, fundamentalist religious leaders, extremists of all stripes, criminal syndicates, and political subversives as well as well-meaning social movements, reformers, and activists. These forces threaten stability, raising concerns that decentralized, fragmented, anarchy could occur.
Global networks promote economic growth but may lead to uneven development. Faced with a growing digital divide, legal and illegal activities could undermine the trust in and functioning of the world-economy.
Virtual communities build on new network connections and change the identity of those participating.
The nature of cyberspace impacts individuals, the content that flows over global networks, the communication infrastructure, and the global regulatory environment.
A balance is needed between protecting the rights of individuals and the data security needs of governments and firms.
A balance is needed between the rights of users of information and the creators of information. Therefore, valuing intellectual property on global networks is important.
Whoever controls the winning standards wins. Therefore, 'standards wars' are fierce.
Competition (anti-trust) policy is becoming trade policy for the world information economy.
The advent of global networks will transform international relations as much as the end of the cold war. Whether the results will be positive or negative is unclear.
Chapter 29: Poverty, development and hunger
The monetary-based conception of poverty has been almost universalized among governments and international organizations since 1945.
Poverty is interpreted as a condition suffered by peoplethe majority of whom are femalewho do not earn enough money to satisfy their basic material requirements in the market-place.
Developed countries have regarded poverty as being something external to them and a defining feature of the Third World. This view has provided justification for the former to help 'develop' the latter by promoting their further integration into the global market.
However, such poverty is increasingly endured by significant sectors of the population in the North, as well as the Third World, hence rendering traditional categories less useful.
A critical alternative view of poverty places more emphasis on lack of access to community-regulated common resources, community ties and spiritual values.
Poverty moved up the global political agenda at the start of the twenty-first century.
In 1945 the USA had carte blanche to set up a liberal international economic order, the institutional pillars of which were the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT. Yet governments were responsive to the demands of national security, and embedded liberalism was the order of the day.
The cold war stimulated competition between the West and the East to win allies in the developing world. Most of the latter were born into the Western international economy and saw their development within the context of that system, i.e. based on growth within a free market, but also they stressed the role of the state in promoting development.
Progress was achieved up to the 1980s according to the orthodox development criteria of GDP per capita, economic growth, and industrialization. Yet despite apparent success in conventional terms, there has been an explosive widening of the gap between the richest and poorest 20 per cent of the world's population, and the developing countries as a group entered the 1990s more indebted than the 1980s. Most of the countries of the former Eastern bloc or Second World, now known as the economies in transition from central planning to free market, have suffered a rapid economic decline in the 1990s and effectively joined the Third World.
Trickle-down has been discredited, and it has been recognized that economic growth only reduces poverty if accompanied by specific economic and social policies.
In recognition of the failure of economic growth-based indices of development, the UNDP Human Development Index was designed in 1990 to measure development in terms of longevity, education, and average purchasing power.
National poverty reduction strategies, a response to perceived shortcomings in the development orthodoxy, are criticized on issues of national ownership and policy content.
Dependency theorists see the current predicament of the Third World as predictable, arguing that export oriented, free-market development promoted in the Third World has increased the wealth of the West and of Southern elites.
The last two decades of the twentieth century saw increasing debate about what constitutes development, with NGOs and grassroots activists playing a significant role.
An alternative view of development emerged, based on the transformation of existing power structures which uphold the status quo. Such structures vary in scope from the global to the local, and these are often interlinked; for example, the global economy severely disadvantages the poorest 20 per cent of the global population, whilst at a local level access to common resources affects the ability of people to provide for themselves.
Grassroots organizations challenge entrenched power structures as people defend their rights, as they define them, seeking local control and empowerment. Development in this alternative view can be seen as facilitating a community's progress on its own terms. The Alternative Declarations of NGOs at global conferences have stressed community participation, empowerment, equity, self-reliance, and sustainability.
The development orthodoxy remains essentially unchanged. However, the mainstream debate has shifted from growth to sustainable developmentthe view that current development should not be at the expense of future generations or the natural environment.
The orthodox view asserts that sustainable development is to be achieved by further growth within a global free-market economy. This is the most effective way to maximize global wealth creation. Supporters believe that this will free up resources to care for the environment and to ensure social progress.
This approach has been approved by the UNCED and the Copenhagen Summit, both of which legitimated further global integration via the free market. However, in the run-up to Copenhagen, many developing countries advocated embedded Liberalism rather than pure free-market economics, as necessary to help meet the basic needs of their people and ensure political stability.
Critical alternative views of development have been effectively neutralized by the formal incorporation of their language and concerns into the orthodox view. Nevertheless, the process of incorporation has resulted in some small positive
changes in the implementation of the orthodox view, for example by the World Bank.
Nevertheless, despite semantic changes, fundamental questions remain about the sustainability of the dominant model of development.
In recent decades global food production has burgeoned, but paradoxically hunger and malnourishment remain widespread.
The orthodox explanation for the continued existence of hunger is that population growth outstrips food production.
An alternative explanation for the continuation of hunger focuses on lack of access or entitlement to available food. Access and entitlement are affected by factors such as the North-South global divide; particular national policies; rural-urban divides; class; gender; and race.
Globalization can simultaneously contribute to increased food production and increased hunger.
Chapter 30: Gender issues
Gender analysis and feminism came late to International Relations.
Women's experiences of and ideas about world politics were rarely admitted to the discipline.
Asking the question 'Where are the women?' makes women visible in world politics.
Making women visible also reveals gender relations as power relations.
Feminism claims that women's experiences are systematically different from men's and that all social relations are gendered.
Feminism is not restricted to Western states.
Contemporary feminisms are diverse in their understandings of the difference gender makes, and how to stop this difference from counting against women.
Since the early 1980s, the issue of differences between women has become visible in feminist politics.
Women's rights are not being progressively achieved. Today there is a global-wide backlash against women's rights.
Feminist critiques, women's NGOs and the Decade for Women helped generate 'Women in Development' (WID).
WID includes very different approaches to gender and development.
Recent crises associated with intensifying globalization and restructuring impact on women in particular, generating a crisis in reproduction.
The 'export of women' is big business, and also contributes significantly through remittances to poorer states' economies.
Migrants and foreign workers are often scapegoated for rising unemployment and social distress.
Nationalism is usually called up in gendered language.
Women get caught up in nationalist politics in their construction as mothers of the nation and as markers of difference.
Women also participate in or oppose nationalist politics.
Women's symbolic significance in nationalism makes them vulnerable to violence, including war rape.
9/11 and the war on terror had the effect of further militarizing, and masculinizing, international politics.
There are now different transnational women's movements, for example, for women's health and reproductive rights.
International conferences, especially women's conferences, have been very important in building transnational women's networks, and in putting women's issues on the global agenda.
The Beijing conference is seen by some as an example of global feminism in action, while for others it illustrated the difficulties facing women's rights struggles globally.
Contemporary global politics are strongly anti-feminist, and threaten the gains of the last two decades.
Chapter 31: Human rights
The international human rights regime is an established feature of contemporary world society, and a good example of the processes of globalization.
Modern thinking distinguishes between three generations of rights: first, broadly political; second, economic and social; third, the rights of peoples.
One major set of contemporary problems concerns compliance, enforcement and the politics of human rights.
More recently, the universal status of human rights has come to be challenged by critics who stress the Western, masculine, intolerant nature of this universalism.
We need to establish the status of rightswhat a right is, what kind of rights people have, whether rights imply duties, and why.
The distinction between rights as claims, liberties, powers, and immunities helps to clarify these questions.
The origin of thinking about rights can be traced to two features of medieval political and intellectual life, the doctrine of natural law and the political practice of extracting charters of liberties.
Natural law generates universal rights and duties, while a Charter confers local and particular liberties. The actual rights and liberties conveyed by Charters may be compatible with natural law, but this compatibility cannot be relied upon and a potential conflict exists between these two sources of the idea of rights.
From out of medieval theory and practice a synthesis emerged, the liberal position on human rights, which combines universal and particularist thinkinguniversal rights established by a contract between rulers and ruled.
This position is conceptually suspect, but politically and rhetorically powerful.
Nineteenth-century Liberalism supported international humanitarian reform but within the limits of the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.
For some Liberals these latter norms did not apply when the standards of civilization were in question. Twentieth-century thinking on human rights has been less restrictive, largely because of the horrors of the World Wars and the Holocaust.
The politics of the Universal Declaration of 1948 allow us to identify the three major human rights issues of the post-1945 era.
First, there is the contest between the old norm of sovereignty and the new norm of universal domestic standards.
Second, there is the contest between political and liberal and social and economic formulations of human rights.
Finally, there is the assertion of the rights of peoples to be different.
The politics of rights varies according to whether constitutional or non-constitutional regimes are involved.
In any event, the international community rarely acts on human rights cases unless public opinion is engaged.
Economic and social rights are conceptually different from political rights, and present a more basic challenge to existing norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.
The human rights template severely limits the degree of acceptable variation in social practices.
This universalism can be challenged on feminist grounds as privileging patriarchy.
More generally, the liberal position on rights privileges a particular account of human dignity.
Cultural critics of universal rights such as proponents of 'Asian Values' can be seen as self-serving, but no neutral criteria for assessing this criticism can exist.
But a set of basic rights may be defensible, likewise the idea of a human rights culture.
Chapter 32: Globalization and the transformation of political community
The members of a political community are committed to governing themselves.
Totalitarian states attempted to make the political community absolute but liberal-democratic states recognize that their citizens value their membership of many communities including the nation-state.
Because they expected to be involved in major wars, states have tried to persuade their citizens to place obligations to the state ahead of duties to other communities, whether local or global.
Globalization and the declining significance of military competition between the great powers have raised the question of whether political communities will become more cosmopolitan in future.
Most forms of political community in human history have not represented the nation or the people.
The idea that the state should represent the nation is a European development which has dominated politics for just over two hundred years.
War and capitalism are two reasons why the nation-state became the dominant form of political community.
The extraordinary power of modern statesthe growth of their 'intensive' and 'extensive' powermade global empires possible.
States have been principal architects of globalization over the last four centuries.
The global spread of the sovereign state and nationalism are key examples of globalization.
Demands for citizenship rights emerged in response to the growing power of the modern state.
The demand to be treated as a citizen was initially concerned with securing legal and political rights but citizenship was redefined early in the twentieth century to include social or welfare rights.
The stability of modern forms of political community has owed a great deal to the fact that citizens won these rights.
Modernization theory argued that Western liberal democracy had solved the social conflicts which earlier dominated industrial societies.
Modernization theory also assumed that non-Western societies would follow the Western path of economic and political development. This controversial thesis resurfaced in the West at the end of the bipolar era.
Globalization and fragmentation are two phenomena challenging traditional conceptions of political community and national citizenship.
Ethnic fragmentation is one reason for the failed state in Europe as well as in the Third World, but demands for the recognition of cultural differences exist in all political communities.
Globalization theorists have argued for cosmopolitan democracy on the grounds that national democracies are less able to influence global forces which affect them.
The war against terror has sharpened the division between a Hobbesian conception of national security politics and the Kantian belief in the possibility of perpetual peace.
The apex of nationalism in relations between the Great Powers occurred in the first half of the twentieth century.
Nationalism remains a powerful force in the modern world but globalization and fragmentation have led to discussions about the possibility of new forms of political community.
Cosmopolitan approaches which envisage an international system in which all individuals are respected as equal have flourished in the contemporary phase of globalization.
Communitarians argue that most people value their membership of a particular political community; they are unlikely to shift their loyalty from the nation-state to the human race.
Post-modern writers argue that all forms of political community contain the danger of generating the domination or exclusion of significant sections of society.
Chapter 33: Globalization and the post-cold war order
It is difficult to make out the characteristics of the contemporary order.
Because we live in the midst of it, it is hard to get any sense of historical perspective.
Our understanding of, say, the inter-war period (1919-39) is coloured by how it ended, but we do not yet know how our present period will 'end'.
We can see that international and transnational connections are a very important element of contemporary order because of currently high levels of interdependence.
When we speak of order, we need to specify order for whomstates, peoples, groups, or individuals.
International order focuses on stable and peaceful relations between states, often related to the balance of power. It is primarily about military security.
World order is concerned with other values, such as justice, development, rights, and emancipation.
A pattern of order may advance some values at the expense of others. There is often a tension, for example, between state centred concepts of order, and those that promote individual values. For instance, policies based on the balance of power might lead to assistance being given to regimes with bad human rights records.
A key question about globalization is whether it supercedes all ideas of international order, or whether it can be incorporated into more traditional ideas.
Order is shaped by the changed nature of states and of the tasks they perform.
There are complex questions about whether the end of the cold war has released a new agenda of nationalism and national identity or whether these issues have been present all along.
Security is increasingly being dealt with on a multilateral basis even when this does not conform to classical 'collective security' models.
The global economy is primarily shaped by relations between the three key America, Western Europe and East Asia), and is managed by a panoply of Western-dominated institutions.
There are dense patterns of international institutions in all functional areas.
There are strong trends towards regionalism, but they take different forms in various regions.
Matters to do with human rights have a much higher profile than in earlier historical periods.
Globalization is often portrayed as an effect of the end of the cold war because this led to its further geographical spread.
At the same time, globalization has to be understood as one of the factors that caused the end of the cold war. It was the Soviet Union's marginalization from processes of globalization that revealed, and intensified, its weaknesses.
Accordingly, globalization is an element of continuity between the cold war and post-cold war orders, and the latter should not be regarded as wholly new.
A variety of authors are sceptical about the claim that globalization is the hallmark of contemporary order.
One of the reasons is that, as a long term historical trend, globalization is not specific to the late twentieth, nor the early twenty-first, century.
Globalization embodies a range of often competing values.
Globalization is too much outside our control to form an order. We are its objects rather than its subjects.
There is evidence of resistance to globalization.
Some of this is generated by the feeling that traditional democracy does not offer effective representation in the global order.
National elections may not make politicians accountable if they cannot control wider global forces.
There is a heated debate about whether global civil society can help democratize international institutions, or whether they themselves are largely undemocratic.
Some governments in the South remain suspicious of social movements that may be better organized in developed countries.
Globalization is often thought of as an extreme form of interdependence. This sees it largely as a change in the external environment in which states find themselves.
The implication of such analyses is that states are now much weaker as actors. Consequently, they are in retreat or becoming obsolete.
If this were the case, ideas of international order would be much less relevant to our concept of order.
But if globalization is considered as a transformation in the nature of states themselves, it suggests states are still central to the discussion of order: they are different but not obsolete. This leads to the idea of a globalized state as a state form.
In this case, there is no contradiction between the norms and rules of a state system, operating alongside globalized states.
This international order will nonetheless have different norms and rules in recognition of the new nature of states and their transformed functions. Rules of sovereignty and non-intervention are undergoing change as symptoms of this adaptation.
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