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US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests The last calendar year was by far the most tumultuous in a decade of tense and mistrustful relations between Pakistan and the United States. It began with CIA contractor Raymond Davis shooting and killing two Pakistanis in broad daylight in Lahore, then only worsened in May when Osama bin Laden was found and killed in a US raid at a compound near the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad (an episode that severely angered Pakistanis and embarrassed the Army, which was domestically seen as unable to secure the homeland against foreign intrusion and internationally suspected of providing refuge to America’s worst enemy). Tensions escalated further as the US began pressuring Pakistan to attack the Haqqani Network (HN), a Taliban group with safe havens in North Waziristan. Pakistan refused, and crisis hit when the HN launched a twenty-two hour assault on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul. An infuriated Admiral Mike Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lashed out against Pakistan, saying the HN was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Weeks of diplomatic efforts finally thawed relations, but just as the situation stabilized, a NATO attack on a Pakistani checkpoint in Salala in late November threw the relationship into a tailspin. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers died in the two-hour assault. Pakistan was furious, immediately suspending NATO supply lines and boycotting the Bonn conference on Afghanistan held in early December.Share
The crises of 2011 prompted debates in both countries over how to move forward. In Washington, several administration officials and members of Congress have argued for sidelining Pakistan and giving India a larger stake in Afghanistan. Others insist that it is important to tread carefully and that Pakistan cannot just be dumped. In Pakistan, many are arguing for complete disengagement while others are pushing for new rules of engagement.
There are two fundamental problems undergirding US-Pakistan troubles. First, instead of a broad partnership that includes trade and cultural linkages, the two countries have a one-dimensional transactional relationship centered along security concerns, i.e., the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In a way, General Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s retired Army chief and ambassador to the US, underscored this point, saying that, in his assessment, “US-Pakistan relations were at their worst because relations between the Pentagon and the Pakistan Army were unstable.” US-Pakistan relations are further complicated because of clashing security interests, especially vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban.
These two problems will not yield to quick diplomatic fixes. Barring a fundamental re-thinking, Washington and Islamabad should get used to making the best of an ambiguous alliance, and one that, going forward, will be limited, transactional, and security-centered, featuring competition over the endgame in Afghanistan, cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda, and a trimmed-down and conditional aid structure.
The main source of US-Pakistan tensions has been the war in Afghanistan, and recent scuffles are linked to the shifting American strategy there. In 2009, the Obama administration set a goal of reversing the momentum of the Taliban by carrying out counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan. The main objective was not to defeat the Taliban, but to create a situation that could allow for a face-saving withdrawal. The 2009 troop surge was aimed at gaining control in major cities and roadways and imposing costs on the Taliban that would force them to the negotiating table. These objectives would be bolstered by the parallel Afghan-led national reconciliation program announced in January 2010, two months after the November surge. The US publicly supported the process and even established a special fund of $1.5 billion to provide monetary incentives to Taliban fighters.
However, Pakistan’s role was crucial in the success of this program. While NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) targeted the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan was supposed to launch an operation against the group’s bases in North Waziristan. It was to then follow this with political pressure that would force the Taliban to negotiate with the US and the Karzai government. Pakistan, whose security establishment has continued to provide refuge to the Afghan Taliban over the past decade, refused to comply. Leaders of all three major Taliban factions live in Pakistan, with a large part of the leadership of Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura having relocated to Karachi. According to a study published by the London School of Economics, ISI representatives sit in on the meetings and decision making of the Taliban’s major councils. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid has written that members of the Taliban even travel abroad on Pakistani passports.
That Pakistan would support a Taliban insurgency should be hardly surprising. First, Pakistan sees the Taliban as the group in Afghanistan that is the least averse to its interests and most capable of blocking increased influence by India, which Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment fears might pick up the pieces in Kabul following a US withdrawal. It is this strategic calculation, more than anything else, that has prevented Pakistan from cutting the Taliban loose, and it was disastrously naive for US policymakers to think that they could buy off such a deeply held security obsession for temporary offerings of $1.3 billion a year in aid.
It is also true that deviousness in this situation has not been a Pakistani monopoly. While it has been insisting that Islamabad press on with attacks against the Taliban over the past year, the US has held secret meetings with Taliban representatives in Germany and Doha, Qatar—and kept Pakistan out of those talks. This only increased Pakistani insecurity and reinforced the idea that Washington will ignore its interests in the Afghan endgame.
The US goal in Afghanistan now is to reach a negotiated settlement that allows it to withdraw most forces, leaving a few thousand behind on bases in the north and west to protect the government in Kabul and carry out limited counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and other groups that threaten the government or US interests. A Time magazine blogger captured the new strategy poignantly, saying, “Counter-insurgency is so 2007. . . . All the cool kids are into counter-terrorism now.” Moreover, the US and Taliban are also moving toward more serious negotiations. Some initial confidence-building measures such as the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha and the release of Taliban prisoners from Guantánamo are being undertaken. Prospects of peace, however, cause disunity as much as prospects of war. Pakistan is already suspicious of the Qatar initiative because the US has kept it (and Afghanistan) out of the dialogue. It also won’t hesitate to exercise its influence over members of the Taliban leadership in exile. It has jailed several members of the group and is keeping others under house arrest and will undoubtedly seek several preconditions and concessions before it releases them to participate in the reconciliation. It is also true that while negotiations shimmer, mirage-like, on the horizon, the Taliban has continued to systematically assassinate people in Karzai’s government to weaken the regime, and there is no guarantee that they will cease such attacks between now and 2014. Any future Taliban attack threatens to again raise the heat between America and Pakistan.
Finally, the negotiations themselves will prove a tough endeavor. During the bargaining process, the United States’ rational goal will be to concede as little as possible in terms of power and control to the Taliban and other Pashtun groups being supported by Pakistan, while Pakistan’s goal will be to draw away as much power as possible from the US and its Afghan allies, who are mainly composed of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras and belong to the group formerly called the Northern Alliance. Moreover, Pakistan, like other countries in the region, would not want a long-term American military presence in Afghanistan and will also make that an issue that will continue to complicate the tug-of-war with the US over ultimate outcomes in Afghanistan.
While the US seeks a political settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, its policy against al-Qaeda is to “disrupt, defeat, and dismantle” the organization and prevent its return to Afghanistan or Pakistan. The war against al-Qaeda is an area in which the US and Pakistan have cooperated in the past and will continue to cooperate in the future. Since 2002, Pakistan has been steadily attacking al-Qaeda in the tribal areas and arresting its operatives in Pakistani cities. Several members of al-Qaeda, including senior member Younis al-Mauritani, were arrested in Pakistan in 2011.
The war against al-Qaeda, however, raises the key issue of drone strikes. Since 2004, the CIA has been conducting a drone campaign inside Pakistan that has eliminated hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters and their local allies. Last year alone, at least three top al-Qaeda operatives, including military chief Ilyas Kashmiri, were killed through drone strikes.
The drone program has, however, been an issue of contention for two reasons. First, these strikes are unpopular with the Pakistani public because of the civilians who perish in the collateral damage. A 2011 Pew survey found that sixty-one percent of Pakistanis disagreed that missile strikes were necessary and eighty-nine percent said strikes kill too many civilians. A survey carried out within the tribal areas by the New America Foundation found that seventy-six percent opposed US missile strikes and forty-eight percent said they kill civilians rather than militants.
While Pakistan’s official policy has been to condemn drone strikes, the military and the civilian government have supported them behind the scenes. In one cable released by WikiLeaks, Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani was quoted as saying, “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, the powerful head of the Pakistani military, was reported to have even requested more drone support in South Waziristan. Moreover, these strikes have occurred with intelligence sharing between the ISI and CIA, with the human intelligence that is required to conduct the strikes coming from Pakistan. Finally, until recently, the drones often flew from Pakistan’s Shamsi Airfield.
But a shift in policy has now taken place with the forced vacation of the Shamsi air base and the Pakistani Parliament’s recommendation that “no unauthorized incursions into Pakistan’s airspace” occur. Based on Pakistan’s new policy, drones can no longer fly out of Pakistani bases and Pakistan itself should have an increased role in the decisionmaking over the strikes. According to Zafar Hilaly, a retired Pakistani diplomat, “due to the indiscriminate and hugely counterproductive attacks of recent years, Pakistan wants to limit their number and also be informed of the strikes and the targets prior to their occurrence.”
Despite these shifts, however, the drone program will continue to be an area of cooperation between the two countries. This point was clearly illustrated through the two strikes that took place on January 10th and 12th of this year. The strikes killed Aslam Awan, a senior al-Qaeda aide, and also allegedly targeted Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of the Movement of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), an al-Qaeda allied group. Several more strikes have taken place since, and despite tensions over the Salala incident no sustained opposition has been voiced from Pakistani officials, evidencing continued cooperation in the drone program and the fight against al-Qaeda.
US aid to Pakistan, a third major issue between the two counties, has become contentious as relations have deteriorated and American policymakers and elected officials have often charged that Pakistan has been given more than $20 billion in recent years in effect to bite the hand that was feeding it. But this is an issue, from Islamabad’s point of view anyhow, that is not as simple as it appears. First, in terms of the breakdown of US financial transfers to Pakistan, based on figures compiled by the Congressional Research Service, from 2002 to 2011 Pakistan is supposed to have received approximately $5.7 billion in security aid, $7.47 billion in economic aid, and $8.9 billion in Coalition Support Fund transfers. Thus, out of $22 billion, US aid to Pakistan has totaled approximately $13.2 billion in ten years. The remaining $8.9 billion, or forty percent of the total, has actually been reimbursements to Pakistan for the costs it has incurred in fighting al-Qaeda and its allies, and not aid.
Second, aid disbursement has been chaotic. Many times payments have been delayed, millions have often remained stuck in the pipeline, such as money from the Kerry-Lugar bill, and Pakistan has been owed money from previous fiscal years.
Finally, US aid has not made enough of an impact on Pakistani civilians to provoke any significant gratitude. Most do not see the benefit of civilian aid, much of which goes to foreign contractors, or is distributed by the government to its cronies and supporters. Moreover, some Pakistanis see US aid as a way to force Pakistan to fight America’s wars. In the absence of tangible benefits and in the face of war wariness, many average Pakistanis are now said to favor the end of American aid so Washington loses the power to compel Pakistan to agree with its objectives.
In the aftermath of the bin Laden raid, and because of congressional desire to cut expenditures, the US-Pakistan aid relationship has changed in the last year. For example, $700 million of military aid was frozen in July 2011, when Pakistan expelled American military trainers. Congress has also made economic and security aid conditional upon Pakistan fighting militants. Although the Obama administration was influential in tripling non-military aid to Pakistan through the Kerry-Lugar bill, experts are predicting a future shrinking of economic assistance as well. Currently there is a bill in the House of Representatives titled the Pakistan Accountability Act, which seeks to cut all aid to Pakistan, except for money for the protection of nuclear weapons. The bill has yet to be voted on, but it foreshadows where the aid relationship is headed. It is quite possible that, over the next few years, US aid to Pakistan will become minimal, except for funds for protection of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan is often described in Washington as “double-dealing” and “duplicitous.” Pakistani analysts describe their country’s relationship with the US to me as “unequal” and “humiliating.” Najam Rafique, a US expert at the Institute of Strategic Studies, in Islamabad, said, “Pakistan has been treated with contempt by the US; it’s been mistreated and ordered around.” Sadly enough, both characterizations are accurate. After 9/11, the US essentially coerced Pakistan to join the Global War on Terror and, since then, often forced it to act against its own perceived interests. Pakistan, on the other hand, accepted Washington’s monetary incentives but undermined the US effort by providing safe havens to its enemies.
The lack of a broad partnership between America and Pakistan prevented the building of mutual trust or the alignment of interests. Instead, the two countries settled for a one-dimensional, transactional relationship centered along security concerns. What was missing was a synchronicity between the two countries’ security calculus for the “AfPak” region. Nor is there much evidence that this state of affairs will change, a point painfully obvious to foreign affairs experts in the US and Pakistan alike. Bruce O. Riedel, a former CIA officer who authored the Obama administration’s 2009 policy review for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was recently quoted in the New York Times Magazine as saying, “I can see how this gets worse . . . And I can see how this gets catastrophically worse. . . . I don’t see how it gets a whole lot better.” Similarly, Zafar Hilaly, a retired Pakistani diplomat, recently said to me, “This relationship is not headed anywhere—our ways part, our paths are divergent.”
While disengagement is not an option—the continuation of relations today despite the horrors of 2011 illustrates this point—limited collaboration is the best that can be expected. Even as both countries cooperate to eliminate al-Qaeda, their positions in the Afghan endgame will be competitive. Pakistan will seek concessions before it allows the Afghan Taliban to fully participate in negotiations. Moreover, it will seek greater influence for its allies in a future Afghan government, while the US will push to secure the power of its Afghan allies. Finally, military and economic aid to Pakistan will be conditional and results-oriented.
It is important to point out that although such a relationship can accomplish short-term objectives, it cannot tackle mid-to-long-term challenges. That is why there is a crucial need for Washington to vigorously rethink relations with Pakistan. US regional interests and Pakistan’s geopolitical importance warrant a pragmatic, complex, and dynamic Pakistan policy. The US plans to maintain sizable bases and a military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014. It also has interests in Central Asia because of the region’s vast reserves of oil and natural gas. On the other hand, Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state led by corrupt and unaccountable leaders and institutions, with a weak economy, growing population, and a youth bulge. Moreover, it suffers from resource scarcity and mismanagement (especially in water, gas, and electricity) and will need resources to provide post conflict stability in many parts of the country. In the long run, the US can scarcely afford a minimalist relationship with Pakistan. It must engage Pakistan on multiple dimensions and create partnerships to encompass the government, business, and financial sector and civil society. The alternative to such a creative rethinking is not pleasant to contemplate.
PAKISTAN AMERICAN RELATIONS BOOK REVIEW Abdul Sattar, in his book Pakistan’s Foreign Policy-2009: a Concise History has skillfully explained the relationship between Pakistan and the United States from 1947 to the post 9/11 period. Abdul Sattar has served his 39 years in Pakistan’s Foreign Office and held the positions of Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Ambassador. Having such an experience, he has given insight to the Pak-US Relations. Sattar has given the detailed explaination, based on the logic and rationale, of the international compulsions and pressures that necessitated Pakistan to enter into an engagement with the US in the war against terrorism. Also, he has brilliantly explained the factors that led Pakistan to come closer to the US since 1947 and paid special attention to the changing of Pak-US relations based on the convergence and divergence of interests between the two countries.
A.Z. Hillali, in his book US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, describes the Pak-US relations as “both cooperative and conflictual”. Although the book only details with Pak-US relations till the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; it gives better idea of how Pakistan had engaged with the US after its creation in 1947. It gives a detailed analysis of the factors that necessitated Pakistan to look towards the US for ensuring economic and defence security. It has also explained the Indian factor that has a strong bearing on Pak-US relations. The US tilt towards India always disturbed its relations with Pakistan. Hillali also held the view that the relationship between Pakistan and the US only focused on Pakistan’s need for ensuring the security vis-à-vis India, and the US need for Pakistan in its strategic objectives in the South Asia. The interaction between them is solely based upon the changing national interests.
Aparna Pande, in his book Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy has linked Pakistan’s foreign policy making with its skepticism of India. He viewed the relationship between Pakistan and the United States in the context of insecurity to Pakistan by India. He has explained that Pakistan believes to have existential threat from India. In order to secure itself from Indian threat, Pakistan has allied with the United States in the Cold War or in the Post 9/11 period. After 9/11, Pakistan engaged with the United States only to secure itself from the threat coming from the Eastern Border. Pakistan see its relations with the United States with only one eye, and that is to build up its defence and economy to secure itself from India. The only variable in the changing foreign policy of Pakistan is India.
Christine Fair’s Rand funded study, The Counter Terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India presented the US view of Pak-US Relations. The study revealed that Pakistan was significant for the US to counter terrorism in Afghanistan. The US had strategic objectives in Afghanistan in which Pakistan had to play an important role. Due to significance of Pakistan in the US strategic objectives, the US cooperated with Pakistan after 9/11. Also, the cooperation was aimed at making Pakistan a modern state free from religious fundamentalists and Islamic extremists. The study also discussed the costs and benefits of the US cooperation with Pakistan and India in the post 9/11 period. It held that both Pakistan and India are important for the US strategic calculations in the South Asia.
Tahir Kheli in his book, The United States and Pakistan: The evolution of an Influence Relationship, explained the reasons behind the engagement between Pakistan and the United States before 9/11. The understanding of the events in 1950’s, 1960s and 1980’s are important to know the nature of Pak-US Relations. Kheli believes that before 9/11, the US came closer to Pakistan to check the expansion of communism in Asia. The only objective of the US was to keep a check on the spread of communism, to which end, Pakistan could play an important role in Asia. For these reasons, Pakistan and the US entered into the defence agreements of SEATO and CENTO. Also, the US helped Pakistan against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan only to contain the further expansion of Communism led by Soviet Union. Thus, the relationship of Pakistan and the US always concentrated upon the global interests of the US. In 1970’s and 1990’s, the US interests changed from the Containment of Communism to the nuclear non-proliferation. For this reason, the US disengaged from Pakistan owing to Pakistan’s efforts to gain nuclear technology.
Bruce Ridel, in his book Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad, has explained the relationship of Pakistan and the United States in different aspect. Ridel is an expert on U.S. Security, South Asia and Terrorism, and has served in the White House during 9/11 events. In this book, he held the view that the US always cooperated with Pakistan to achieve its short-term interests whether it was of containing the communism or of adopting hard line against the militant organizations in Afghanistan. Ridel believed that it is the pursuance of the short-term interests by the US that has contributed in destabilizing and radicalizing Pakistan. Because of the US flawed policy with Pakistan based on achieving its narrowed interests; Pakistan is going towards instability and radicalization that is contributing in the development of the global jihad.

Topic 1
Simple Definition of INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
: An area of study or knowledge concerned with relations between different countries

Full Definition of INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
: A branch of political science concerned with relations between nations and primarily with foreign policies


Meaning

No nation is an island. Because domestic policies are constantly affected
By developments outside, nations are compelled to (rather than sit on the
Fence or out-rightly isolate themselves) enter into dialogue with target or
Initiating entities or form alliance(s) for the purpose of enhancing their
Status quo, or increasing their power or prestige and survival in' the
International system.

Because international relations is in transition following emerging
realities in the international system, it has become complex and even
more difficult arriving at a more universally acceptable definition of the
subject. But this is not peculiar to international relations as there are
more intense disagreements over the definition of political sciences
itself. Nevertheless scholars have persisted in their attempt to define
international relations.


Definition
International Relations Defined
International relations is an academic discipline that focuses on the study of the interaction of the actors in international politics, including states and non-state actors, such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and Amnesty International. One of the key features of the international system is that it's a state of anarchy - each state in the system is sovereign and does not have to answer to a higher authority.

Imagine living in a confined space with a group of other people with limited resources. Further imagine that there is no law enforcement and that the only 'law' is agreements between individuals and self-help is the only means of enforcement. In short, every person can do whatever he or she wants only subject to what the others in the space will do as a result. This situation gives you an idea of the world in which states live.

International relations involves the study of such things as foreign policy, international conflict and negotiation, war, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, international trade and economics, and international development, among other subjects. As you may expect, international relations' broad scope requires an interdisciplinary approach, drawing upon the fields of economics, law, political science, sociology, game theory, and even psychology.



Nature of International Relations
International Relations, like the world community itself are in transition.
In a rapidly changing and increasingly complex world, it encompasses
much more than relations among nation states and international
organization and groups. It includes a variety of transitional
relationships at various levels, above and below the level of the nation
states. International relations are a multidisciplinary field gathering
together the international aspects of politics, economics, geography,
history, law, sociology, psychology , philosophy and cultural studies.
It is a meta-discipline.


Scope of International Relations
It is known by now that international relations encompass a myriad of discipline. Attempts to structure and intellectualize it have often been
Thematically and analytically confined to boundaries determined by data.
The core concepts of international relations are International Organization,
International Law, Foreign Policy, International Conflict, International
Economic Relations and Military Thought and Strategy.
International/Regional Security, Strategic Studies, International Political
Economy, Conflict/War and Peace Studies, Globalization, International
Regimes.

Moreover it covers, state sovereignty, ecological sustainability,
nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, terrorism,
organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism and human rights.
These have been grounded in various schools of thought (or traditions)
notably Realism and Idealism.


Example:
International relations are thus concerned with every form of interaction
between and amongst nations. Such interactions can also occur between
corporation and social groups. Examples are interactions between member
states of the OPEC or the International Human Rights Commissions.
The moment such interactions cross a state boundary it is of interest to
the study of International Relations. International relations recognize and
respond to the fact that the foreign policy goals that nations pursue can
be a matter of permanent consequences to some or all of the others.



2…Evaluation and development of International Relation

IR encompasses much more than the relations among nation-states and international organization and groups. It includes a great variety of transitional relationships, at various levels, above and below the level of the nation-state, still the main actor in international community. ~ Palmer and Perkins
Relations between many entities of uncertain sovereignties.
# groups like: nations, states, governments, peoples, regions, alliances, confederations, international organizations, industrial organizations, religious organizations, etc.
International relations embraces all kind of relations traversing state boundaries, no matter whether they are an economic, legal, political, or any other character, whether they be private or official and all human behavior originating on one side of the state boundary and affecting human behavior on the other side of the boundary.

In simple and narrowest sense, IR is taken to donate the study of relations between states. IR denotes interactions between state-based actors across state boundaries.
~ Lawson

Entire population of the world is divided into separate territorial political communities, or independent state, which profoundly affect the way people live.
Sovereignty i.e. a state’s characteristic of being politically independent of all states, doesn’t mean isolated or insulated state.
Motive: wealth and welfare of state of their citizens.

Five basic social values of state:

Security
Freedom
Order
Justice
Welfare

Security People generally assume that the state should and will underwrite the value of national security, which involves the protection of citizens from internal and external threat.
Being armed at least some degree state can both defend and threaten peoples’ security

Freedom Personal and National Freedom i.e. Independence.
Govt. place on citizens, as tax burdens or obligations of military services is the condition of national freedom.
Peace and progressive change are most fundamental values of international relations.

Order & Justice States have a common interest in establishing and maintaining international order so that they can coexist and interact on a basis of stability, certainty, and predictability.
International law, diplomatic relations and international organizations.
Human right framework: civil, political, social, and economical.

Welfare
Population’s socioeconomic wealth and welfare.
People expect their govt. to adopt appropriate politics to encourage high employment, low inflation steady investment, the uninterrupted floe of trade and commerce, etc. International economic environment.
Realism: Security (Power Politics, conflict and war)
Liberalism: Freedom (Cooperation, peace and progress)
International Society: Order and justice (Shared interests, rules and institutions)
IPE theories: Welfare (Wealth, poverty and equality)


What is the is significance of international relations?
International relations are key for ensuring a safe world. Without effective communication, small misunderstandings can have dire consequences. As the nations grow and change over time, foreign relations are key for forging beneficial relationships
Countries need to communicate to survive. All nations depend on trade, and all nations have to interact with others on occasion. Even isolated nations, such as North Korea, are forced to communicate with their neighbors. Foreign relations are based on this international communication.
Poor foreign relations can lead to horrific consequences. World War I, for example, is largely due to Germany's rapid ascent the role of the most powerful nation in Europe. Many experts believe that better relations between Germany, France and England could have prevented one of the most destructive wars the world has ever seen.
Modern foreign relations also depend on cultural understanding. Individuals from different cultures have different values and beliefs, and politicians and other foreign representatives are not immune to these feelings. By learning about other cultures and how to interact with them, politicians and diplomats can make exchanges more productive and beneficial. As the developing world continues to grow, new countries are becoming bigger players on the international stage. These nations are expected to have a profound impact on foreign relations in the 21st century.

What Is the Nation State? Concept?
When we talk about the nation state, we are really talking about three separate things: the nation, the state, and the nation state. Confused? Don't worry - you're not alone! Take a deep breath, and relax.
The nation state is a system of organization in which people with a common identity live inside a country with firm borders and a single government. That wasn't so bad, right? But what does it all mean? The nation state has a dramatic influence on the way we live our lives. It's how we identify ourselves. I'm American. I'm Russian. I'm Antarctican. (Okay, that last one isn't a thing.) It also determines what language we speak, what laws we follow, and what holidays we celebrate. Cinco de Mayo? Boxing Day? Fourth of July? The nation state is a system of political, geographic, and cultural organization, and it is one of the most important parts of your life that you don't think about. The nation state is held together by its physical boundaries, its government, and the fact that the people believe they are connected to each other.

Before the Nation State
There have been different kinds of states in history, other than the nation state. For example, in 15th-century Italy, the independent body of government was centered on a city. These were called city-states. City-states were based on the city, but their power extended beyond the city limits and could change depending on other powers, resources, etc. The nation state, by contrast, has a definite border where its power ends. The United States cannot enforce its laws in Canada.

At one time, kingdoms and empires ruled over lots of very different people who did not see themselves as united or sharing any sort of identity. The transition from kingdoms, empires, and city-states into nation states did not happen everywhere in the world at the same time, or in the same way

In general discussion, a nation-state is variously called a "country," a "nation," or a "state." But technically, it is a specific form of sovereign state (a political entity on a territory) that is guided by a nation (a cultural entity), and which derives its legitimacy from successfully serving all its citizens. The Compact OED defines "nation-state": a sovereign state of which most of the citizens or subjects are united also by factors which define a nation, such as language or common descent. The nation-state implies that a state and a nation coincide.
The modern state is relatively new to human history, emerging after the Renaissance and Reformation. It was given impetus by the throwing off of kings (for example, in the Netherlands and the United States) and the rise of efficient state bureaucracies that could govern large groups of people impersonally. Frederick the Great (Frederick II of Prussia 1740 - 1786) is frequently cited as one of the originators of modern state bureaucracy. It is based on the idea that the state can treat large numbers of people equally by efficient application of the law through the bureaucratic machinery of the state
Some modern nation-states, for example in Europe or North America, prospered in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were promoted as a model form of governance. The League of Nations (1919) and the United Nations are predicated on the concept of a community of nation-states. However, the concept of a modern nation-state is more an ideal than a reality. The majority of the world's people do not feel that the ruling elite in their state promotes their own national interest, but only that of the ruling party. As a result, most of the world's population does not feel their nation (cultural identity) is represented at the United Nations.
There are very few geographic territories in which a single ethnic, religious, or other culturally homogeneous group resides. This has been increasingly true as a result of globalization and the dispersion of people of countless national cultures all over the world displaced as refugees from national conflicts within states. The attempt to impose cultural homogeneity on all minority groups within a country has been one of the greatest scourges on human society, but it has taken on a particularly onerous quality in an increasingly pluralistic world.Genocides, civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and religious persecutions are rooted in the concept of creating a unified nation-state by force—a state in which a specific set of cultural norms are imposed either by the ruling elite, or by the majority.
Oppressed peoples have consistently risen up in self-defense to advocate freedom of religion, speech and cultural expression. Bloody revolutions, the arduous hardship of civil disobedience, the pressure for political reform from the mass media, outside campaigns by human rights organizations, and diplomatic efforts at high levels have been responses to the mistreatment of minorities in the modern state. Checks and balances on power, representation of all, equal opportunity, and equal protection all are ideals of the modern democratic and pluralistic state, which has these general values as its "national" culture while many sub-national minority groups remain free to exist. For example, a Mexican-American citizen of the United States gives his loyalty to the Constitution of the United States, obeys the laws of the state where he resides, while still being free to practice his inherited Mexican traditions, so long as they do not infringe upon the basic rights of others. While this balance of general national culture, or civil religion, and plural inherited national cultures is a requirement for social peace, it is an uneasy balance to maintain. This is a fundamental issue for world peace today.

National interests are the vital interests of a state of which survival is the first and foremost interest. A state's independence and territorial integrity come above all other interests. If the state disappears, then no other interest remains. The supreme duty of the state is, therefore, to maintain itself.
Economic welfare is a key preoccupation of the foreign and domestic policies of a state. The preservation of ideological values is another important national interest, though a rather passive one. Only if these values face the threat of destruction from an external power does their defense become a vital national interest.
The primary justification of state action is national interests. Foreign policies of states are made mainly to protect and advance these interests. According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer, “Self-interest is not only a legitimate, but a fundamental, cause for national policy; one which needs no cloak of hypocrisy.” As a principle, it does not require justification. Hans Morgenthau, a top scholar, said that the minimum requirement of nation states is to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation states.
The pursuit of a state's national interests in the international arena constitutes its foreign policy. The success or failure of foreign policy is directly related to a state's capability. Capability comes from physical, economic and other elements, including geography, natural resources, population, economic and military strength, technology, organizational efficiency and political stability. The capability of a state is often called its power.
National power is the most important of all interstate controls, and the role of power is central to foreign policy. To be successful, foreign policy must be commensurate with the power available to carry it out. Policymakers must be guided by realism, rather than by emotionalism and illusions. Prudence must be exercised in the exercise of power. Decisions concerning national interest should always be made on the basis of concrete national advantage rather than on moralistic, legalistic or ideological criteria.
Diplomacy is the art of conducting and implementing foreign policy. It is the process by which diplomats seek to achieve foreign-policy objectives, mainly through negotiations held with their counterparts. The essence of diplomacy is bargaining, which involves the use of both the carrot and the stick. A diplomat has four basic functions representation, negotiation, reporting and protection of the interests of his country and the latter's citizens in foreign lands.
Pakistan's foreign policy, like that of other states, has sought to secure its national interests. Diplomacy has indeed acted as the first line of defense for Pakistan. The goal has always been clear, though mistakes were made in the way national objectives could be achieved, most notably in handling the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 when emotionalism and lack of realism clouded the judgment of policymakers and the nation.
Security has been an obsessive dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy. From the very outset, Pakistan's great problem was an unfriendly relationship with its neighbor India, which did everything in its power to harm Pakistan from its inception. Not surprisingly, Pakistan quickly developed a siege mentality. A sense of insecurity has profoundly influenced the formulation of Pakistan's defense and foreign policies.
Given the disparity in its size vis-Ã -Vis India, the principal task of Pakistani diplomacy has always been to find an equalizer against India. This led Pakistan in the 1950s to join US-led military pacts that had been formed to counter communist aggression. India, on the other hand, sought to establish close ties with the Soviet bloc. However, the 1960s produced a new equation following the Sino-Indian border war, which induced India and the West to come closer. That influenced Pakistan to turn to China as the new equalizer, proving that in international relations there are no permanent friends or enemies; only permanent interests.
The 1980s would bring Pakistan close to the US again in the context of the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, which was seen by Pakistan as a threat to its own security and by the US and others as the latest evidence of Soviet expansionism.
When the Soviet withdrawal was achieved in 1989, Pakistan and the US moved away from each other. However, 9/11 again induced them to work in tandem in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan's support was secured by Washington on the plank of 'either you are with us or against us'.
Opposing the US in such a scenario would have brought unacceptable consequences for Pakistan's national interests. However, unlike the Pakistani government, the Pakistani 'street' has been more influenced by emotionalism and has not supported this alliance. This dichotomy continues to create misgivings and mutual doubts even though both countries have a common objective — countering religious extremism which is destabilizing Pakistan.
Pakistani foreign policy has also focused on promoting the country's economic welfare. Over the years, significant economic aid has been obtained by Pakistan from its foreign friends. The US and the West have been the principal aid givers. Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia have also been forthcoming. Significant economic and material help has been received from China, which is seen by Pakistanis as an all-weather friend. Japan too has emerged as a key aid giver to Pakistan.
International financial institutions, where US influence is notable, have also given considerable economic assistance to Pakistan. In fact, few countries in the world have received as much aid as Pakistan on a per capita basis.
Pakistan occupies a key geo-strategic location, which has enhanced its importance in the international arena. Its nuclear capability, which has kept an uneasy peace in the subcontinent since the 1980s, gives it added importance. At the same time, it would be uncharitable to deny that diplomacy has played a key role in the advancement of Pakistan's security and economic interests.

he balance of power theory in international relations suggests that national security is enhanced when military capability is distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others.[1] If one state becomes much stronger than others, the theory predicts that it will take advantage of its strength and attack weaker neighbors, thereby providing an incentive for those threatened to unite in a defensive coalition. Some realists maintain that this would be more stable as aggression would appear unattractive and would be averted if there was equilibrium of power between the rival coalitions.[1]
When confronted by a significant external threat, states that look to form alliances may "balance" or "bandwagon". Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, while states that have bandwagon have aligned with the threat.[2] States may also employ other alliance tactics, such as buck-passing and chain-ganging. There is a longstanding debate among realists with regard to how the polarity of a system impacts on which tactic states use,[3] however, it is generally agreed that balancing is more efficient in bipolar systems as each great power has no choice but to directly confront the other.[4] Along with debates between realists about the prevalence of balancing in alliance patterns, other schools of international relations, such as constructivists, are also critical of the balance of power theory, disputing core realist assumptions regarding the international system and the behavior of states.[5]

e balance of power is one of the oldest and most enduring concepts of international relations. In a world of powerful and threatening states, it is often the only dependable strategy. It is surprising, therefore, that since the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of power balancing have been all but absent: the great powers have not formed counterbalancing coalitions to guard against U.S. predominance and are unlikely to anytime soon. This book, which brings together leading international security experts to assess the current status of balance-of-power theory, confirms the peculiarity of today's international system. The authors do not settle the debate about why this is so-whether the cause is nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, democratic peace, or the relatively benign character of U.S. hegemony. Jack Levy argues that balance-of-power theory emerged to explain European dynamics but never claimed universal validity. Robert Ross argues that China is pursuing an indirect form of balancing through internal mobilization but may never be in a position to build a true anti-U.S. coalition. The editors conclude that states are pursuing an array of security strategies, including "soft balancing," in today's unipolar world. But the logic and stability of this new situation remain unclear.

In a rare departure from standard practice, the Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif set aside the military uniform and donned a black suit when he met with US Secretary of State, John Kerry. More than the change in attire, the extended trip of two weeks, which contained a flurry of hushed meetings, and loud, friendly gestures, have led to a few raised eyebrows. In a telling comment, the Sectary of state termed the Pakistan Army – not the Pakistani government – a ‘truly binding force’. Contrast this with the Prime Minister’s track record with the US; a largely anonymous visit, a few diplomatic meetings in the sideshow of the UN conference, and a miserly phone call from President Obama, informing the Prime minster of his impending India visit and exchanging of empty platitudes about taking bilateral ties ‘one step beyond’. It becomes increasingly clear the not only does the US recognize where the balance of power lies in the Pakistani politic, but that the civilian government has surrendered its defence and foreign policymaking to the men in khaki.Are we being too prejudicial? Letting history colour our interpretations of chance remarks, and what might be a civilian endorsed delegation of duties? Yet, events other than the US relations endorse this unfortunate imbalance. President Ashraf Ghani’s milestone visit to Pakistan was topped off with a stop at GHQ Rawalpindi. Operation Zarb-e-Azb seems to be running without much civilian input or oversight, and the military, not the state, is perceived as the face of the operation; a fact, lack of independent journalism testifies. Most significantly, the PTI-PAT march on the parliament that shook the sitting government, made the military a major player. The question of it being the actual ‘third umpire’ is irrelevant, since it is undeniable that the military made gains in the whole fiasco, be it by design or by chance. Now this development, one that was on the cards, is a blow to the nascent democratic procedure. Despite a strong government President Nawaz Sharif has squandered the opportunity to establish parliamentary supremacy. Once again, an important chunk of Pakistani governance has been handed over to people with no democratic legitimacy and little diplomatic or political training. Although a stronger Pakistan-US relationship is extremely necessary in nexus with Afghanistan, and the efforts of Raheel Sharif for both, the strategic dialogue and the military operation are highly appreciated. The sidelining of democracy is the graver causality.One jarring note in this otherwise bleak picture is Pakistan’s blooming relationship with China, which seem not only to be the forte of the premier, but his brainchild. Does this represent some sort of exclusive civilian domain, or does the purely economic nature of these agreements hint at what the military controls and what it allows the democratic leader to control?

Globalization and regionalization are two key defining features of the contemporary world politics. Regionalization and globalization are not completely new processes. Nonetheless it can be said there was a (re)emergence of both processes in relevance, influence and intensity since the 1980s and especially during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. There has been an explosion of new and reinvigorated existing regional organizations, the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, the Arab League, or ASEAN and so on. By 2006 all but one
Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) were part of regional trade agreements. Between 1995 and 2007 were signed 227 agreements [1]. What are the motivations and forces behind this interest of states towards regional cooperation? And what is the relationship of the regionalization process with the wider process of globalization? Are they conflicting process or is regionalization part of or built on globalization? In attempting to answer these questions we will first revise the historic context in which regionalization and globalizations ‘took off’ and the events that shape these developments. In order to clarify key concepts we will define terms such as globalisation, region, regionalisation and regionalism as well as their most visible impacts in the world system. After having clarified these key concepts the discussion will be then moved on to the analysis of the motivations driving states to pursue regional cooperation policies and leading them to form regional organizations as well as the links of such motivations with the process of globalisation. After reaching a conclusion the final section of this work will deal with what Hurrell[2] called the “one (global) world/many (regional) worlds” relationship; the controversy about whether globalisation and regionalisation are conflicting processes or, on the contrary, the latter is part of the former.
Globalization and regionalization are not completely new processes. Sweeney[3] argues that the origins of globalisation “go back to when humans first put a boat into the sea”. This work focuses on the more recent and reinvigorated globalization and regionalization starting back in the 1980s and consolidating during the 1990s. The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the context in which states conducted their security and political relations. Indeed Ravenhill[4] points at two main factors that made possible the exponential growth of regional organizations in the 1990s; first the end of Cold War which freed states from geopolitical and ideological constrains; second, the growing global interdependence and the consolidation of neo-liberal international financial institutions. The fact that USA, the sole superpower since the early 1990s, was actively participating in regional cooperation policies and agreements fostered even further this trend[5].
Defining globalisation is a controversial task. Here globalisation is understood as “the increased flows of goods, services, capital, people, and information across borders”[6]. Defining region is no less controversial. How establishing where a region ends or what criteria use to say what forms a region; whether cultural, commercial or historical. In its most basic sense a region is “a group of countries in the same geographically specified area”[7]. Regionalization on the other hand is the “societal integration and the often undirected process of social and economic interaction”[8]. It is important to distinguish regionalization from regionalism which is “the formal process of intergovernmental collaboration between two or more states”[9]. As Beeson[10] stresses regionalism is the set of conscious activities carried out by states within a region to cooperate while regionalization is a less conscious process which is the outcome of these states policies. The most recent wave of regionalism is commonly known as ‘new regionalism’. Söderbaum and Sbragia[11] highlight that “whereas the old regionalism in the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by the bipolar Cold War structure with nation-states as the uncontested primary actors, current regionalism since the end of the 1980s needs to be related to the current transformation of the world, especially globalisation”. New regional organizations are mainly economic-focused and, as a major difference to the “old” regionalism and non-state actors, such as trans-national corporations, play a remarkable role[12]. It must be mentioned that not all regional organizations are equal. The scope, goals and degree of integration varies considerably among them.
We must now turn our attention to the actual motivations and factors pushing forward the recent global trend to regionalization of the world system that increasingly lead states towards seeking regional cooperation policies. It is difficult to isolate a single reason. It normally encompasses a complex mixture of many factors and motivations.
The effects of globalisation can be seen, at least, in the economic, cultural, social and/or political spheres of the contemporary world. One remarkable impact of globalisation is its challenge to the nation-state and its central role within the inter-national system. Globalisation dramatically undermines nation-states’ capacity, autonomy and sovereignty. Today’s global economy “gives mobile international investors the upper hand over domestic political authorities”[13]. Likewise DeMartino and Grabel [14] argue that the global neoliberal economic regime undermines the states’ ability to pursue their goals. Within the neoliberal global economy national governments have lost capacity to “impose restrictions on investor freedoms”. Huntington[15] adds to these the loss of states’ control over the flows of ideas, technology, goods and people. States borders are increasingly permeable. The Westphalian order is being gradually and increasingly undermined and a new system more similar to the medieval times is emerging.
Security concerns, promoting peace and stability are powerful reasons behind regionalism. Confidence building can be effectively enhanced through economic cooperation within a region; the EU is a perfect example of it since one of its main goals was to pacify the conflicting relationship between France and Germany by promoting regional integration. ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are regional organisations with a strong security-seeking focus through cooperation.
Huntington[16], on the contrary, believes that in the post- Cold War era culture and identity rather than economic and/or security concerns are the guiding factors behind the current increasing regionalisation. He argues that international organizations whose member states share a common culture and/or identity (EU or Mercosur) are far more successful than those than encompass states belonging to different civilizations (NAFTA). In their broadest level, culture and identity are civilizations. “In the post-Cold War world, states increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms”. Huntington identifies nine major civilizations; Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese.
Nevertheless economic motivations are arguably the main motivation behind contemporary new regionalism. As underlined above, today’s globalized economy challenges states’ capacity and their manoeuvre room. It is therefore by entering in regional organizations that states may regain some control over flows of capital[17]. By entering into regional groupings states enhance their bargaining power against transnational economic actors such as invest groups, TNCs and so on. In this sense increasing interest by states to belong to regional organizations can be considered an attempt to reduce some negative impacts of the globalization. Another important economic motivation behind regionalism is the so-called strategic trade theory which argues that domestic companies benefit from belonging to a regional market big enough to allow them scale economies while still being protected from global competition. Regional organisations allow national companies the opportunity to succeed in a protected but big enough market in a way that they would otherwise fail if exposed to global competition. Non-state actors very often act as a driving-force towards (new) regionalism. TNCs (intimately linked to economic globalization) whose host countries are not part of a given regional trade agreement find themselves in a disadvantaged commercial situation respect competing companies belonging to the regional organisation in question. Given this situation, disadvantaged TNCs will lobby their national governments in order to sign similar trade agreements in order to end their disadvantaged commercial situation[18].
States see more feasible and easier to reach agreements and/or deeper integration through regional organizations -either in the political (as in the EU), and/or security (as in the ARF) and/or the economic spheres (as elsewhere) – Negotiations are usually much more difficult at global level[19]. An article in The Economist recently commented; “Regional trade deals are not always a good idea… But with the Doha round of global trade talks showing no flicker of life, there is little danger that the Trans-Pacific Partnership will derail a broader agreement… it should boost world trade”[20].
So are globalisation and regionalisation opposing processes or does the latter fit into the former? Hurrell[21] capture this debate in his ‘one world many worlds relationship’; the one – global – world and the many – regional – worlds. At first sight it may seem apparent that they are conflicting processes. The very nature of globalization is by definition global while regionalization is naturally regional. Many commentators believe that regionalisation of the world system and economic activity undermines the potential benefits coming out from a liberalized global economy since regional organizations privileges regional partners over the rest. Regional organizations, as already noted, respond to states’ attempt to reduce the perceived negative effects of globalisation. Therefore it could be said that regionalism is a sort of counter-globalisation. In a 2007 survey the Financial Times[22] revealed that majority of Europeans consider that globalization brings negative effects to their societies. Many policy makers and scholars think that globalisation must be regulated and managed. Monti[23] warned of the threats of “ungoverned globalisation”. This is what Jacoby and Meunier[24] called “managed globalisation”; it refers to “all attempts to make globalization more palatable to citizens”. Nevertheless it is important bear in mind the gradual development of inter-regional relations (the EU and ASEAN or EU and Mercosur agreements). In fact a sort of “contagion effect” has spread during the past years; regionalisation in one part of the world encourages regionalization elsewhere. Whether by imitation (the success of the European Single Market) or by “defensive” reaction[25] (Mercosur was in part a response to the creation of NAFTA for instance[26]). According to this regionalisation and the development of inter-regionalism would indeed be global in nature. As McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton claim; “the new regionalism is not a barrier to political globalisation but, on the contrary, entirely compatible with it – if not an indirect encouragement”[27].
We have seen how the end of the Cold War along with those constrains attached to it, created a favourable international context in which the processes of globalisation and regionalisation could take off. Motivations and factors behind the states’ renewed interest in pursuing regional cooperation policies are various and it would be impossible to isolate just one. It would be more adequate to point at a complex mixture of motivations and factors. It is nonetheless argued here that states’ attempt to mitigate or better manage the perceived negative effects that globalisation exercises on them and more specifically the economic side of globalisation is the main and more common driving force behind the gradual regionalisation of the world system. The depth in regionalisation as well as the scope and objectives of the different regional organizations varies considerably throughout the world. It is paradoxical though that regional cooperation policies, which are states’ rationally chosen policies for a variety of concrete objectives already explained, lead to a gradual regionalisation of world politics. Increasing regionalisation, just like globalisation, diminishes the sovereignty and autonomy of nation-states. States have to abide to the regional organizations norms that limit their behaviour. We also have revised the debated over the one world (global) many world (regional) relationship. Regional developments in one part of the world have affected and fuelled regionalisation everywhere else in a sort of contagion or domino effect. This fact along with increasing developments in inter-regional cooperation shows that the regionalisation process is global in nature. Therefore, it could be said that regionalisation is intimately linked to globalisation since it is part of it, it builds on it. Hurrell[28]perfectly summarizes this argument when he claims; “The age of economic globalisation has also been the age of regionalisation, and much of the analysis of the new regionalism has been devoted to the links between the two tendencies. Thus regionalism is seen as critical part of the political economy of globalisation and the strategies that states (and other actors) have adopted in the face of globalisation …The emergence of regionalism need to be understood within the global restructuring of power and production. The many worlds are very closely intertwined with the character and fate of the one. The core driving force is global even if the manifestation is regional”.

WE will not allow our soil to be used against any other country for terrorism.’ This oft-repeated cliché in our official statements has almost become a national embarrassment. A solemn pledge loses all credibility when major militant attacks in other countries are allegedly traced back to our territory.
It is not just cross-border involvement but also the activities of banned outfits at home that raises questions about how much control the state really has within its own domain. Then there is also the question of whether or not we are really serious about getting rid of all violent non-state actors that have become a pervasive challenge to state authority. The Pathankot air force base terrorist attack has yet again brought the issue of non-state actors to the fore.
Surely, it is too early to confirm or deny the Indian allegation of a Pakistani militant group being involved in the incident, but such possibility cannot be completely ruled out given past experience. Pakistan has once again been put in the dock by this latest terrorist incident across the border.
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It is not just cross-border involvement but also the activities of banned outfits at home that raises questions.
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Unfortunately though, the fact is that the ball is in our court to take the investigation to its conclusion. There is no conceivable gain that Pakistan can make by protecting the same militant groups that have also been responsible for killing thousands of Pakistanis.
Unlike the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks carried out by Pakistani-based militants, this time the civil and military leadership have not gone into a state of denial. Some senior officials actually concede that militants could have sneaked across the border.
One hopes that the 2008 mistake is not repeated. For sure, Pakistan had conducted a comprehensive investigation that provided extensive details of the group involved in planning the Mumbai terror attack. Several of the accused were arrested too, but were freed because of what was described as legal complications. Despite all that evidence, the accused were never punished for using our soil for planning cross-border terrorist attacks. The inaction has provided India a strong whip to beat us with. The stigma of that attack can never be washed away.
This time, however, there was no outright knee-jerk reaction rejecting the Indian allegation. By assuring India of full cooperation in the investigation and promising to take action against those found involved, the prime minister has shown a degree of maturity not seen before. But it needs more than mere assurances. A lot will depend on how the investigation is conducted and whether the culprits are brought to justice.
What has lent credence to the scepticism of our commitment to act against all militant groups are the continued activities of many of our erstwhile jihadi assets despite the National Action Plan being operative for more than one year. It has been a long time since we outlawed those groups and claimed they have been rendered dysfunctional. But this has never happened. We were perhaps never really serious in enforcing the ban despite the havoc these groups have inflicted on our own country.
Surely there may not yet be conclusive evidence substantiating the allegation of the involvement of Jaish-e-Mohammed in the Pathankot air force base assault, but elements of one of the fiercest banned militant networks have long been involved in terrorist activities both inside and outside the country.
After it was banned in 2002, JeM broke up into small cells many of them directly linked to Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Those splinters were responsible for a series of audacious terrorist attacks including two assassination attempts on former president Gen Pervez Musharraf. The footprints of JeM were also found in the Lal Masjid episode.
Interestingly, despite many of his followers being involved in a war against the state and terror activities, Masood Azhar has never been detained in Pakistan. He has reportedly continued with his ‘non-militant activities’, as described by Pakistani authorities, from his hometown Bahawalpur.
Breaking his long hibernation, the JeM leader resurfaced in 2013 when he addressed thousands of his supporters in Muzaffarabad by phone. This first public appearance of sorts in years reinforced the suspicion about the network being revived. He reportedly called upon Pakistani authorities to lift restrictions on ‘jihad’.
It is often said that Masood Azhar had lost control over his banned outfit and was not responsible for any terrorist actions attributed to those who belonged to JeM. But his address to the Muzaffarabad rally confirms that he has continued his jihadi activities, while maintaining a low profile.
First Hafiz Saeed was made ‘kosher’ by being brought into the mainstream and then Masood Azhar has been drawn back into the arena. It has surely been a disturbing development for the international community as well as for our national security. One can hardly understand the logic behind this.
It is not just about cross-border terrorist attacks; more importantly, it is our own security and stability that is at stake. How can a state allow itself to become hostage to the whims of non-state actors? Once patronised by the state, these jihadi networks seem to now have gone completely out of control. These non-state actors are now drawn by their own ideological goals threatening our sovereignty. The country has paid dearly for using militancy as a tool of regional policy in the past, and it is high time that they are stopped.
Indeed, the Pathankot attack has come as a huge blow to the normalisation process between the two countries. Yet there is also a possibility that an impartial investigation into the matter could open a new window of opportunity. It is imperative that India provide all relevant information about the attackers to the Pakistani authorities. A sensible, cooperative approach by both governments is crucial to thwarting the subversive designs of the terrorists. The actions of non-state actors must not be allowed to derail the peace process.