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Originally Posted by CaprioMarucci View Post
1. Weapons of Mass Destruction?
2. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones?
3. Export Controls?
4. General Assembly Resolutions on the subject?
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones


The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories“.

General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975) defines a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as

…any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

(b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The UN Disarmament Commission in its report of April 30, 1999, recommended a set of principles and guidelines for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which included, inter alia:

Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.
The initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively from States within the region concerned and be pursued by all States of that region.
The nuclear-weapon States should be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the treaty, through which they undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty.
A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the treaties establishing such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic, scientific and technological development of the States parties.
Treaties Involved in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The following treaties form the basis for the existing NWFZs:

Treaty of Tlatelolco — Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
Treaty of Rarotonga — South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
Treaty of Bangkok — Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty of Pelindaba — African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
Resolution on the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East (67th Session)

A/RES/67/28
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East
(68th Session – includes addenda and reports by Member States submitted after the deadline)

A/68/124 (Part I)
A/68/124 (Part I)/Add.1
A/68/124 (Part II) The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East
Submissions to Part I still to be issued as addenda

Submitting Member States

Israel (3 October 2013)

Letters addressed to the Secretary-General confirming support for declaring the Middle East a region free from weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

Mongolia’s self-declared nuclear-weapon-free status has been recognized internationally through the adoption of UN General Assembly resolution 55/33S on “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear weapon free status.”

Other treaties that also deal with the denuclearization of certain areas are:

Antarctic Treaty
Outer Space Treaty — Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Moon Agreement — Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Seabed Treaty — Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

2. Export controls


A number of export control regimes and related arrangements that contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery have been established. These include the following

(a) The Australia Group (AG)

The (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible.

website address: http://www.australiagroup.net/en/

(b)What is the MTCR?

The MTCR was initiated by like-minded countries to address the increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons by addressing the most destabilizing delivery system for such weapons. In 1992, the MTCR’s original focus on missiles for nuclear weapons delivery was extended to a focus on the proliferation of missiles for the delivery of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Such proliferation has been identified as a threat to international peace and security. One way to counter this threat is to maintain vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMD.

website address: http://mtcr.info/


(c) The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.

The NSG Guidelines also contain the so-called “Non-Proliferation Principle,” adopted in 1994, whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other provisions in the NSG Guidelines, authorises a transfer only when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Principle seeks to cover the rare but important cases where adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty may not by itself be a guarantee that a State will consistently share the objectives of the Treaty or that it will remain in compliance with its Treaty obligations.

The NSG Guidelines are consistent with, and complement, the various international, legally binding instruments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government (PG) in accordance with its national laws and practices.
Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.

website address: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/

(d) The Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The aim is also to prevent the acquisition of these items by terrorists.

website address:http://www.wassenaar.org/

(e) Zangger Committee


The Zangger Committee, also known as the Nuclear Exporters Committee, sprang from Article III.2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which entered into force on March 5, 1970. Under the terms of Article III.2 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards must be applied to nuclear exports.

Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
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Default Nuclear Crises and Crisis Management

Thank you so much Sir. Your contribution here on this very topic is highly appreciated. If you could research and find more material on the following ;

(1) Nuclear Crises and Crisis Management
(2) Confidence-Building and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures
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Default The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is a proposed international treaty to prohibit the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The treaty has not been negotiated and its terms remain to be defined. According to a proposal by the United States, fissile material includes high-enriched uranium and plutonium (except plutonium that is over 80% Pu-238). According to a proposal by Russia, fissile material would be limited to weapons-grade uranium (with more than 90% U-235) and plutonium (with more than 90% Pu-239). Neither proposal would prohibit the production of fissile material for non-weapons purposes, including use in civil or naval nuclear reactors.

In a 27 September 1993 speech before the UN, President Clinton called for a multilateral convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives or outside international safeguards. In December 1993 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 48/75L calling for the negotiation of a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and international effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 23 March 1995 agreed to establish a committee to negotiate "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.". However, substantive negotiations have not taken place.

In 2004, the United States announced that it opposed the inclusion of a verification mechanism in the treaty on the grounds that the treaty could not be effectively verified. On November 4, 2004, the United States cast the sole vote in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly against a resolution (A/C.1/59/L.34) calling for negotiation of an effectively verifiable treaty. The Bush Administration supported a treaty but advocated an ad hoc system of verification wherein states would monitor the compliance of other states through their own national intelligence mechanisms.

On April 5, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama reversed the U.S. position on verification and proposed to negotiate "a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons." On May 29, 2009, the CD agreed to establish an FMCT negotiating committee

However, Pakistan has repeatedly blocked the CD from implementing its agreed program of work, despite sevee re pressure from the major nuclear powers to end its defiance of 64 other countries in blocking international ban on the production of new nuclear bomb-making material, as well as discussions on full nuclear disarmament, the arms race in outer space, and security assurances for non-nuclear states. Pakistan justified its actions when Chairman joint chiefs General Tariq Majid argued that "a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty would target Pakistan specifically.
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Default Crisis Management

Renewed interest in crisis management is caused by a growing recognition that a failure of communication between the superpowers in the face of a crisis provoked by some third party could issue in a nuclear war, other causes of this renewed interest are the fear of miscalculation and runaway escalation if the US and Soviet Union are drawn into a regional war in which each had vital interests and a concern that a missile might be fired on either side by accident or without proper authorization despite precautions. The authors, stating that crisis prevention should be viewed as an objective, not as a strategy, support the establishment of a joint US-Soviet nuclear risk control center designed to carry out four functions: (1) to facilitate communications between the two countries, (2) to avert nuclear confrontations during periods of accelerating tension, (3) to serve as an exchange of confidence building information during normal periods, and (4) to serve as a joint management center to plan for responses to terrorist or other third party group
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Default Strategic crisis management: Oecd

Read the detailed analysis: STRATEGIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT

https://www.mmc.com/content/dam/mmc-...-July-2013.pdf
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Default The 1986-87 Brasstacks Crisis

The Crisis

Exercise Brasstacks was a multi-phase exercise conducted by the Indian military in 1986 and 1987. Brasstacks’ purpose remains a matter of debate. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi appears to have favored a major exercise out of a desire to showcase India’s increasing military prowess. The Indian Army viewed Brasstacks as an opportunity to assess military readiness as well as the effectiveness of the army’s new, mobile Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPID) formations (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 44). Some contend Prime Minister Gandhi and Indian Army Chief of Staff General K. Sundarji wanted to signal to Pakistan the costs the latter might incur if it continued to support Sikh separatists in Indian Punjab (Narang, 63). Others have surmised that Gen. Sundarji wished to prompt a war with Pakistan prior to its acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The exercise’s final phase, which began in November 1986, took place along 100-mile front in Rajasthan, which bordered Pakistan’s Sindh Province. This phase may have involved as many as 250,000 Indian soldiers, including armored, infantry, and mechanized divisions—some of which had been converted to RAPID formations. (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 44 and 46). Some Indian officials failed to anticipate that Pakistan would respond in dramatic fashion to a large-scale exercise because Rawalpindi’s response to Exercise Digvijay, a similar exercise that took place in Rajasthan three years prior to Brasstacks, was muted (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 30). This time, however, Pakistan chose to respond with troop movements of its own.


Pakistan’s Army Reserve North (ARN) and Army Reserve South (ARS) were engaged in military exercises at the time of the crisis. Since Indian intentions were uncertain, Pakistani commanders decided to keep these corps deployed in their exercise areas until the crisis subsided (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 52). New Delhi perceived these initial actions as defensive maneuvers that neither threatened India nor foreshadowed war. This sense of relaxation shifted to concern when the ARS crossed the Sutlej River and assumed positions near two Indian cities. New Delhi worried that Pakistani forces were positioned to either intervene on behalf of Sikh separatists in Punjab or cut off Indian access to Jammu and Kashmir (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 54). These fears prompted India to reinforce its positions in Punjab on January 23, 1987 (Narang, 63). For a brief period, war seemed likely.

The spiral to war was stopped when Prime Minister Gandhi apparently became cognizant of rising dangers and intervened decisively to re-impose civilian control over defense matters. India and Pakistan agreed in late January 1987 to enter secretary-level negotiations to de-escalate tensions at the border. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar and Indian Secretary (East) Alfred Gonsalves concluded an agreement on February 4, 1987. The Sattar-Gonsalves Accord stipulated a step-by-step withdrawal to peacetime positions and included a pledge not to attack one another (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 58).
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Default Crisis Management

Crisis Management

India and Pakistan jointly undertook crisis management during the final phase of the Brasstacks Exercise. Washington made modest crisis-management contributions by warning both sides of misperception dangers and offering “good offices” at the height of the crisis. For instance, American officials assured Pakistan in late January 1987 that the United States regarded as “sincere” Indian claims that Brasstacks was an exercise, not a prelude to invasion (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 74).

At the time of the Brasstacks Crisis, the United States and Pakistan were seeking to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Washington’s primary concerns, therefore, were to maintain Pakistan’s focus on the war effort to the west as well as to prevent it from crossing “redlines” in nuclear-weapons development that would trigger the suspension of U.S. military aid (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 67-9). These broader foreign-policy objectives—not concerns about a nuclearized crisis—underpinned U.S. perceptions and actions throughout.

In the early stages of the Brasstacks Exercise, bilateral crisis-management was limited because neither India nor Pakistan were willing to rely upon a hotline between the directors-general of military operations (DGMO) that had been established following the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. The hotline’s purpose was to facilitate information sharing during periods of tension. In the case of Brasstacks, however, the DGMO hotline failed to assuage Pakistan’s misgivings as the crisis unfolded. This failure was due to general suspicions on both sides that the hotline could be used for deception and the Indian military’s refusal to respond to Pakistani inquiries about the exercise’s scope or the use of live ammunition (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 48-9).

Nuclear Developments


Both countries began their nuclear journeys long before the Brasstacks crisis. Contemporaneous press reports suggested that Pakistan could acquire the Bomb with “two [additional] screwdriver turns” (Kux, 284). The Brasstacks Crisis likely confirmed the view within Pakistan that nuclear weapons were essential to deter Indian adventurism and to deal with a prospective widening of the conventional imbalance vis-à-vis India.

General Sundarji subsequently remarked that the border confrontation had been India’s last, best chance to halt Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 67). After the crisis was over, on March 1, 1987, Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar published in the London Observer an interview with AQ Khan, the father of Pakistan’s uranium-enrichment program. In this account, Khan claimed that Pakistan had the wherewithal to produce a nuclear bomb (Kux, 284). Pakistan’s President, General Zia ul-Haq, was annoyed with Khan for this indiscretion, but later endorsed Khan’s claims in an April 1987 interview with Time magazine: “You can write tody that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes” (Kux, 285). After Brasstacks, every subsequent crisis on the Subcontinent has had a distinct nuclear dimension.
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Default The 1990 Compound Crisis

The Compound Crisis began in February 1990 and lasted until June 1990. A series of events precipitated the crisis, including civil unrest in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and serious unrest by the disaffected Sikhs in Indian Punjab—both fostered by Pakistan’s military and intelligence services—as wel as a major military exercise in Pakistan. Weak political leadership in India and Pakistan further exacerbated crisis dynamics. Stephen Cohen and other scholars have thus termed events in 1990 a “compound” crisis in recognition of the complex interplay of factors that contributed to its onset (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen., 80).

Discontent with Indian rule in the Kashmir Valley emerged in the 1980s as New Delhi refused to lend credence to Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which accorded a special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The state assembly elections of 1983 witnessed episodes of intercommunal violence between Muslims and Hindus. Relations deteriorated further when Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ousted the region’s governor in 1983 for neglecting to take a tougher line against Farooq Abdullah, the head of the state government, who was supported by the Valley’s Muslim-majority population (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 85).

The next elections for the state assembly were held in 1987. This time, Farooq’s National Conference (NC) and the Congress Party were aligned. The NC-Congress coalition defeated the Muslim United Front, but evidence of widespread fraud, blatant vote rigging, and intimidation marred the results (Perkovich, 306). Strikes and clashes with security personnel became commonplace after the vote. Pakistan provided intelligence and military aid to some anti-Indian elements as security conditions deteriorated (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 36). A separatist movement emerged in May 1989. New Delhi orchestrated a crackdown in early 1990 that led to hundreds of deaths and economic hardship, which deepened the sense of grievance against Indian rule (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 87).

In Indian Punjab, meanwhile, Sikh separatists, backed by Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus, continued to agitate for independence (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 35). The Indian Army had carried out an assault against a major separatist complex in Amritsar in June 1984. This heavy-handed action, known as Operation Blue Star, caused hundreds of Sikh deaths and motivated Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards to assassinate the prime minister months later (Ibid). Thousands more were killed in the anti-Sikh riots that ensued. The Sikh community grew increasingly disillusioned in the intervening years as the Indian government failed to stop the bloodshed or carry out meaningful reforms that would benefit marginalized Sikhs (Kux, 401 and 414).

Zarb-e-Momin and Indian Countermeasures

It was against this unsettled backdrop that a confident Pakistani army chief, Gen. Aslam Beg, initiated in December 1989 a large military exercise, Zarb-e-Momin, involving 200,000 soldiers (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 86). Zarb-e-Momin was combined with an air exercise called Highmark, which included combat aircraft firing live munitions close to the international border (Ibid). At the exercise’s conclusion, Pakistani forces remained deployed near Indian Punjab (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 37).

In February 1990, the Indian Army initiated its annual exercise in the Mahajan training range in Rajasthan. Rawalpindi’s sources indicated that many as 100,000 Indian forces were involved in the exercise and decided to put its forces on alert (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 92). The Indian Army sought to reassure Pakistan by noting that only two tank units were at Mahajan (Ibid). These assurances aside, the army conspicuously kept its tanks and heavy artillery near the international border rather than sending them to reinforce operations in Kashmir (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 92-3). These indicators suggest India may have been hedging against a possible confrontation with Pakistan.

Domestic Politics

Political instability in India and Pakistan also contributed to the onset and severity of the crisis. Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh headed a beleaguered coalition government, which was opposed by the two most dominant parties in Indian politics, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress Party (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 35). Without a robust political base, Singh could ill afford to be viewed as appeasing Pakistan (Ibid). The BJP exploited this reality for political gain and urged Singh, a political opponent, to authorize “hot pursuit” of Pakistan-sponsored militants across the Line of Control (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 91).

Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had won a no-confidence vote in November 1989, but the episode had damaged her political standing. This prompted her to adopt more hawkish, positions of the kind favored by Gen. Beg (Perkovich, 307). In a speech delivered during the crisis, Bhutto combatively pledged a “thousand-year war” in support of the Kashmiris’ fight against India (Ibid). Sing responded with bellicose language of his own in a speech before the Indian Parliament: “I warn them [that] those who talk about a thousand years of war should examine whether they will last a thousand hours of war” (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 91).

Crisis Management

India and Pakistan attempted bilateral crisis diplomacy at two points. The first effort occurred during a high-profile trip to New Delhi by Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan in January 1990. Accounts of his meetings differ, but some have claimed the Pakistani diplomat threatened to “set on fire” the Subcontinent if India’s approach to Kashmir did not change (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 90). Singh then warned that New Delhi would “retaliate even if it meant war” (Ibid). The second diplomatic initiative took place in April 1990 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. At Bhutto and Singh’s behest, India and Pakistan’s foreign ministers pledged in New York to recommit themselves to bilateral confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and forestall the momentum toward war (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 39-40).



The United States became engaged by sending senior officials, led by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, to the region in May 1990. In Islamabad, Gates chided Gen. Beg and Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Pakistan’s president, for supporting the Kashmiri insurgency and provoking a crisis with India (Kux, 306). He bluntly warned them that the United States had “war-gamed every conceivable scenario… [and] there isn’t a single way you win” (Perkovich, 309). Gates informed them that the Bush Administration might no longer be able to certify as required by the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device (Kux, 306-7), which meant the suspension of U.S. economic and military aid was imminent. Gates cautioned restraint in his meetings with Indian leaders. He noted that American war games suggested India would incur long-term costs from a conflict with Pakistan even if it realized short-term gains (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 40).

Nuclear Developments

Most experts believed at the time that India and Pakistan possessed nuclear-weapon capabilities, including a small number of warheads ready for assembly and rudimentary means of delivery (Narang, 65). Whether nuclear weapons factored into India or Pakistan’s crisis calculus in any meaningful manner is a matter of dispute. Both Indian and Pakistani officials engaged in saber-rattling during the crisis and made statements that ominously alluded to nuclear use. The presence of new capabilities, combined with uncertain adversary intentions, meant consideration of a nuclear angle was unavoidable, though both countries discounted the likelihood of a nuclear exchange (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 102-3).

There is some evidence, however, that Pakistan used nuclear weapons to catalyze American intervention in the crisis on its behalf. U.S. communication intercepts reportedly revealed that Pakistan had assembled nuclear devices (Narang, 67). Satellite imagery also spotted unusual movements associated with nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles (Ibid). Gen. Beg later acknowledged that these movements were intended to be seen (Khan, 230-1). This suggests that Washington was the primary audience, and that Pakistan’s strategy in preparing these assets was to draw the United States into a crisis-management role (Narang, 69).
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Default Short Question-Answers

1. What is vertical proliferation?

Vertical proliferation is when nuclear-weapons states either increase the size of their nuclear arsenals or enhance their nuclear capabilities (NTI). Vertical proliferation could include the expansion of warhead stockpiles, the diversification of delivery systems, and related phenomena. The U.S.-Soviet arms race during is an example of vertical proliferation.

2. What is horizontal proliferation?

Horizontal proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons to new states (NTI). North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is an example of horizontal proliferation.

3. According to Jeffrey Lewis, what is the “grand bargain” of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)?

Jeffrey Lewis describes the grand bargain as an agreement that the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China—will pursue disarmament in exchange for the non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons. An additional aspect of the grand bargain is the right of all parties, including NNWS, to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

4. According to Michael Krepon and Jayita Sarkar, why did India back out of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations at the last minute?

India contested several aspects of the CTBT’s final text. The entry-into-force provision required that 44 states ratify the treaty, making its entry into force contingent upon Indian accession (Tellis, 202). India viewed this as an attempt to undermine its sovereignty. It further contended that the treaty fell short in terms of global nuclear disarmament, as the CTBT allowed for the maintenance and enhancement of existing arsenals (Ibid, 280). New Delhi also condemned the treaty as discriminatory because the Indian program needed to conduct further tests while countries such as the United States and Soviet Union no longer needed to test to ensure the reliability of their arsenals (Ibid, 201).

5. According to Zamir Akram and Pervez Hoodbhoy, which of the following is NOT an explanation as to why Pakistan is blocking Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations?

Pakistan is blocking FMCT negotiations at the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva (Dalton and Krepon, 9). Zamir Akram argues that this is because the FMCT only restricts future production and fails to address existing stockpiles, namely India’s. Pervez Hoodbhoy argues that Pakistan is blocking negotiations due to its pursuit of more tactical nuclear weapons, which calls for an expanded fissile material stockpile. India has, in fact, agreed to commence FMCT negotiations (Ibid, 14).


6. According to Dan Markey (Lesson 4.8), what was the United States’ main strategic rationale for negotiating the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal?

Dan Markey argues that Washington’s key strategic rationale for negotiating the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal was to pursue broad geopolitical objectives. Washington viewed New Delhi as a crucial partner in “balancing” Beijing’s rising influence in the region (Bajoria and Pan), which the accord’s supporters distinguished from the unrealistic goal of “containing” China (Tellis). The Bush Administration concluded that India’s nuclearization was an irreversible fact. Therefore, nonproliferation concerns should no longer prevent the relationship from advancing. Normalizing civilian nuclear trade was considered the best way to recognize India’s potential as a strategic partner without offsetting the military balance between India and Pakistan.

On the Indian side, skeptics were concerned that the deal drew India into a subordinate relationship with the United States (Chari, 60). Proponents of the deal countered that negotiating a nuclear deal with the United States would remove the accumulated distrust from the relationship, facilitate international recognition of India as a responsible nuclear power, and provide the means for normalized civilian nuclear trade (Mohan, 219-22).

7. According to Zamir Akram, membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should follow a ______ approach.

Zamir Akram argues that a criteria-based approach should be used to determine which states are granted membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Akram maintains that when certain criteria are not met – including those already identified by the NSG (NSG) – a country should not be granted membership. Many, particularly in Pakistan, have argued that a criteria-based approach is superior because it is nondiscriminatory (Mustafa, 51). This would arguably eliminate the possibility of states receiving special treatment based on global power politics (Khan, 17). Advocates of this approach argue that it would advance global nonproliferation objectives by encouraging states to conform to nonproliferation norms rather than isolating them (Ibid). Some contend that this model would enhance nuclear security by integrating Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) outliers that possess nuclear weapons into the nonproliferation regime (Ibid). Akram maintains that if an exception is made for one country, namely India, the same exception should be made for all other countries in that same category, including Pakistan.
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Default Short Question/Answers No. 2

8. According to Jayita Sarkar, what was the main justification behind India’s nuclear energy program in the 1950s?

Jayita Sarkar argues that Indian leaders were motivated to pursue nuclear energy in order to facilitate large-scale industrialization, which would in turn speed up economic development (Sarkar, 23). While leaders in India were aware of the dual-use nature of nuclear energy, it was the development-based justification that made the nuclear energy program widely acceptable in the domestic political sphere.

9. According to Zia Mian, how did ideas about nuclear war-fighting reach Pakistan?

In the early 1950s, the United States and Pakistan signed a number of agreements making Pakistan a U.S. ally against the Soviet Union (Mian, 5). During this period, the United States gave economic aid and military advice to Pakistan, including nuclear-energy technology and, Mian argues, ideas about the future nuclear warfighting, i.e., the use of nuclear weapons to achieve one’s war aims during a conflict. This Cold War-era alliance, in conjunction with the “Atoms for Peace” Program, opened the door to nuclear research and development in Pakistan (Lavoy). However, it was not until after Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war with India that then-Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto pushed for a nuclear-weapons program (FAS).

10. According to Feroz Khan, which of the following interest groups had concerns about Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear-weapons program in the mid-1960s?

The mid-1960s were a turning point in Pakistan’s nuclear program. India was starting to pursue nuclear weapons and an internal debate emerged in Pakistan as to whether it should follow suit (Khan, 60). Feroz Khan explains that two lobbies emerged: the nuclear enthusiasts and the nuclear cautionists (Ibid). The nuclear enthusiasts, led by then-Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his associates in the Foreign Ministry, argued that Pakistan needed to offset the growing asymmetry between itself and India, which would increase exponentially with the advent of an Indian nuclear weapon capability (Ibid). The response needed to be hasty, they argued, because the global nonproliferation debate was heating up (Ibid). This group further argued that Pakistan’s waning relationship with the United States meant that it needed to develop a durable internal source of security (Ibid).

The nuclear cautionist lobby was led by Pakistani President Ayub Khan and included three main interest groups: the military leadership, the financial bureaucracy, and the scientific community (Ibid, 62). The military leadership was concerned that a nuclear-weapons program would undermine Pakistan’s conventional weapons capabilities by disrupting international transfers of military aid and supplies (Ibid). The financial bureaucracy was concerned that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) would cease cooperation with Pakistan, causing it to lose out on vital economic benefits (Ibid). The scientific community was worried that a nuclear-weapons program would jeopardize their ability to acquire important, peaceful-purpose technology from abroad through the “Atoms for Peace” program (Ibid).

11. According to Scott Sagan, why did India conduct a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974?

Scott Sagan argues that the main reason India conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” or PNE, in 1974 was to satisfy domestic and bureaucratic interests. During the 1970s, a cycle of domestic political turmoil and government crackdowns was causing Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s approval ratings to suffer, threatening the longevity of her rule (Perkovich, 175). Many argue that the PM authorized the nuclear explosion primarily to enhance domestic approval by stirring up nationalist sentiment (Ibid, 176). The test was also an appeal to the scientific community. The scientists were key advocates of the PNE, anxious to demonstrate their technological capabilities (Ibid, 177). Other analysts speculate that a key rationale for India’s 1974 PNE was to send a message of strategic autonomy to the Soviet Union (Ibid). A nuclear test could signal to the international community, particularly the Soviet Union, that India was an independent, major player that should be taken seriously. Nonetheless, Perkovich argues that the ultimate decision to conduct a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 was not preceded by a great deal of informed debate. The decision was made on relatively short notice, lacked a robust cost-benefit analysis, and excluded key actors, including the military (Ibid).

12. According to Robert Einhorn, which of the following was a consequence of India’s 1974 nuclear test?

On May 18, 1974, India conducted its first explosion of a nuclear device, code named “Smiling Buddha.” The Indian government claimed that the test was for peaceful purposes (Tellis, 170). However, the test demonstrated to the international community that non-nuclear-weapon states (as designated by the NPT) were using imported nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes to advance their weapons programs (CTBTO). This triggered the creation of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), which set strict guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports to curb the weaponization of peaceful nuclear technology (NSG).

13. According to Rabia Akhtar, what did the Pressler Amendment of 1985 stipulate?

The Pressler Amendment stated that both economic and military aid to Pakistan would be cut off if Pakistan were found to possess a nuclear device (Foreign Assistance Act, 315). The amendment required the U.S. President to certify annually that Pakistan had not crossed this threshold. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush had no choice but to withhold this certification, as U.S. intelligence analysts had reached the definitive conclusion that Pakistan had obtained a nuclear weapon (Kux, 308). Thus, in 1990 the Pressler Amendment was invoked, suspending $300 million in annual military aid to Pakistan as well as the transfer of American-made F-16s (Ibid, 309).

14. According to George Perkovich, why was the scientific establishment in India eager to test a nuclear weapon in the mid-1990s?

George Perkovich outlines three reasons for the Indian “near-test” in the mid-1990s. First, the Indian scientific establishment was frustrated because they had wanted to test a nuclear weapon since the “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 (Perkovich, 365). Second, the scientists who had designed and tested the nuclear device in 1974 were aging. These scientists believed another test would help them recruit and train a new cadre of scientific talent (Ibid, 365). Finally, the strategic enclave worried that the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) combined with the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would put India under enormous pressure not to test (Ibid, 371). Therefore, they reached the conclusion that India should test before a test-ban agreement negotiated. Nevertheless, the political leadership decided a nuclear test was not worth the risk of international sanctions and isolation (Ibid, 375). India refrained from testing another nuclear device until 1998.
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