15. According to Shyam Saran, what are two of the main tenets of India’s nuclear doctrine?

Indian diplomats often cite a no-first-use (NFU) policy and credible minimum deterrence (CMD) as the main tenets of India’s nuclear doctrine (Government of India). The NFU policy suggests that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict because it views them as political weapons suitable for deterrence and retaliation rather than warfighting. CMD refers to the minimum number of nuclear forces (e.g. warheads, delivery vehicles, etc.) required to ensure a credible second-strike capability (Rajagopalan). The concepts of NFU and CMD are interrelated. A NFU posture implies limited retaliatory capabilities whereas a first-use policy would require expansive counterforce capabilities that go beyond minimum deterrence (Koithara, 85).

16. According to Zamir Akram, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and posture has evolved from __________ to __________?

Zamir Akram contends that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and posture has evolved from credible minimum deterrence (CMD) to full-spectrum deterrence (FSD). CMD refers to Pakistan’s ability to both deter a nuclear first strike and retaliate in the event of a deterrence breakdown. FSD extends nuclear deterrence to conventional attacks. Pakistani strategists cite the growing conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan, India’s “Cold Start” doctrine, and the Indo-U.S.-civil nuclear deal as some of the reasons justifying Pakistan’s shift to FSD (Salik). FSD could require the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the refinement of its warheads and delivery systems, and the development of counterforce targeting capabilities (Ibid). The induction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) into Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is consistent with its FSD posture.

17. According to Ahsan Butt, what is the main reason why nuclear substitution has not occurred in Pakistan?

Nuclear substitution refers to the idea that a state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons reduces the deterrent role of conventional forces, which allows scarce resources to be allocated elsewhere. Scholars have not found evidence of the “substitution effect” in South Asia. Ahsan Butt argues that conventional forces remain attractive to states with nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, conventional forces give states the ability to acquire territory, an important capability for countries seeking to overturn the territorial status quo (Butt, 234). Second, not all security threats can be addressed through nuclear deterrence. Addressing domestic security concerns, such as insurgency and terrorism, requires the use of conventional forces (Ibid, 250). Butt contends that Pakistan’s revisionism over Kashmir is the main reason behind the absence of nuclear substitution in Pakistan because it fuels the domestic political influence of the Pakistani military.

18. According to Toby Dalton, more South Asian strategic thinkers and policymakers lean towards _____?

Deterrence optimism is the confident belief in the power of nuclear weapons to deter. Thus, deterrence optimists tend to be more ambivalent about the Bomb based on the assumption that deterrence will prevail. Deterrence pessimism, on the other hand, refers to skepticism about the ability of nuclear weapons to deter. Deterrence pessimists tend to be wearier of accidents or misadventures, and more cognizant of the dangers of misperception. Some scholars contend that policymakers and strategists in South Asia err on the side of deterrence optimism while those in Washington are more likely to adhere to deterrence pessimism (Dalton, 3). Deterrence pessimism contributes to ongoing U.S. concerns about nuclear use in South Asia. It has also been argued that deterrence optimism is prevalent in India whereas deterrence pessimism reigns in Pakistan (Krepon).

19. According to Vipin Narang, why don’t India’s deterrent capabilities look minimal towards Pakistan?

Vipin Narang argues that India needs to deter Pakistan and China simultaneously. The capabilities necessary for India to achieve credible minimum deterrence (CMD) vis-à-vis China are different than those it needs to deter Pakistan. Thus, what is minimal towards Pakistan will not appear credible towards China, and what is credible towards China will not appear minimal towards Pakistan (Narang, 144). As India develops its capabilities, doctrine, and strategy to achieve CMD against China, Pakistan is likely to enhance its own capabilities to maintain deterrence vis-à-vis India. This dynamic, Narang argues, could drive an arms race between India and Pakistan (Ibid, 147).

20. According to Walter Ladwig, __________ is India’s attempt to create space under the nuclear umbrella to use conventional forces to punish the Pakistani Army for cross-border terrorism?

India’s “Cold Start” doctrine was conceived in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament. At the time, New Delhi recognized three problems with its warfighting capabilities and strategy: 1) large strike corps are difficult to deploy and maneuver; 2) strategic surprise is hard to achieve – once mobilized, strike corps’ movements could be tracked; and 3) a dearth of offensive power hindered a rapid response (Ladwig, 163). To mitigate these issues, the “Cold Start” doctrine envisions breaking down large strike corps into quick-moving, division-sized integrated battle groups that would be used for shallow, punitive incursions into Pakistani territory (Ibid, 164). The Indian military’s operational capacity to execute “Cold Start” is debated (Joshi, 521). Experts contend that the doctrine poses risks to deterrence stability because it could result in the crossing of Pakistan’s declared nuclear thresholds, especially those regarding the integrity of Pakistan’s territory and warfighting capabilities (Ladwig, 168). It also might undermine arms-race stability to the extent it ignites reactive nuclear developments in Pakistan (Ibid, 169).

21. According to Dave Smith, why does Pakistan perceive it has to possess tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)?

Dave Smith argues that Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to offset what it sees as a conventional military imbalance vis-à-vis India. TNWs, such as Pakistan’s short-range ballistic missile Nasr (Hatf-IX), are weapons that can be used for tactical purposes on the battlefield (Kristensen & Norris, 373). Pakistan’s TNWs are meant to deter Indian conventional forces from achieving deep thrusts into Pakistani territory (space threshold) or significantly weakening Pakistan’s warfighting capacity (military threshold) (Smith, 288). Many in Pakistan cite the “Cold Start” doctrine as the driver behind the development of TNWs (Ahmed). The practical and operational risks of TNWs include stockpile insecurity and command-and-control (C&C) issues (McCausland, 163). Some argue that short-range missiles disrupt deterrence stability and increases the risk of crisis escalation by introducing the possibility of nuclear warfighting (Ibid, 170).

The Crisis


The 1999 Kargil Conflict was instigated by the infiltration in the winter of 1998 of an estimated 1,500-2000 troops of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) across the Line of Control (LoC). They found no resistance and advanced all the way to the heights above Kargil. Once New Delhi understood the nature and extent of this advance, it mounted an effective counteroffensive. Rawalpindi chose not to reinforce NLI troops, falsely claiming that they were mujahideen acting independently of the government’s wishes (Lavoy, ed., 6-7). Intense fighting occurred along the LoC in May, June, and July, causing significant casualties on both sides and fanning fears that the conflict could escalate and end in a nuclear conflagration.


There were, however, key elements of restraint during this limited war. New Delhi used airpower, but not across the Kashmir divide, and Pakistan chose not to respond in kind. The international community held Pakistan fully accountable for the conflict. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif found no support in Beijing, and was in a vise during a hurried visit to Washington over the July 4th holiday, when U.S. President Bill Clinton demanded that Pakistan accept the status quo ante. Sharif accepted this outcome, along with a promise by Clinton to help revive the Lahore Process between India and Pakistan (Talbott, 166-8). This outcome led to an untenable situation between the prime minister and chief of army staff, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who had approved the Kargil adventure. New Delhi announced in late July that all the infiltrators had either been killed or expelled, signaling the end of the conflict.

Causes of the Conflict

The Kargil Conflict had proximate and longstanding causes. The Pakistan Army’s primary motivation in initiating the operation was to create a new military reality along the LoC that could be leveraged into a political solution to the Kashmir dispute (Lavoy, ed., 172-3). Authoritative sources have corroborated this picture, noting that the intent was to “provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement” (Qadir, 25). Indeed, Rawalpindi maintained throughout the conflict that the failure to resolve the Kashmir issue meant that the LoC remained a temporary border along which “nibbling” of the other side’s outposts was appropriate and routine (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, 124).

A deep sense of grievance over the Indian Army’s occupation of the Siachen Glacier contributed to the Pakistani Army’s desire to capture territory from India along the LoC. The Siachen episode was viewed as a humiliation to the Pakistan Army, especially the 10 Corps and the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) that were responsible for the LoC and the Northern Areas. (Lavoy, ed., 74-5). From Pakistan’s perspective, India’s seizure of Siachen and other “nibbling” had violated the 1972 Simla Agreement in which both countries had pledged to “put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations” (USIP).

Pakistan worried throughout the 1990s that its positions along the LoC were becoming harder to defend as the Indian Army deployed additional troops to quell in the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley (Lavoy, ed., 81). The opportunity to gain the upper hand presented itself when Indian forces abandoned their outposts in the higher elevations on their side of the LoC, as was customary during the harsh winter months. The Pakistani Army was also motivated to initiate the Kargil operation at this juncture because it suspected the Indian Army was planning an offensive operation to reinforce its positions overlooking National Highway-1A (NH-1A), a strategic artery that connects Srinagar and Leh and facilitates the resupply of Indian forces on Siachen (Lavoy, ed., 58). This action would have hindered Pakistan’s ability to interdict NH-1A.

Domestic politics were another factor in the Pakistani Army’s decision to move forward with its risky Kargil plan. Nawaz Sharif had entertained Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee in Lahore in February 1999, where both leaders agreed to an ambitious program to normalize relations (Chari, Cheem, and Cohen, 120). The army was not on board with efforts to dramatically improve relations with India. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif had unceremoniously dismissed the chief of army staff in October 1998 (Lavoy, ed., 83). The army chief’s successor, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, was determined to clarify the Army’s primacy with respect to civil-military relations and policy toward India.

Military Operations

New Delhi reacted to the infiltration in a manner that Rawalpindi did not anticipate: it engaged in a high-profile diplomatic campaign while employing air power to gain the upper hand on the battlefield. Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis, the Indian air chief, and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh reportedly opposed the use of air power initially due to uncertainties about how Pakistan would respond to such escalation (Lavoy, ed., 106-7). The potential use of air power was first debated in mid-May. At the time, Indian leaders had yet to fully comprehend the extent of Pakistan’s advance and still believed the infiltrators were mujahideen. As Indian Chief of Army Staff Gen. V.P. Malik later put it, “the fog of war remained thick until the end of May” (Lavoy, ed., 104). Once this fog lifted, the service chiefs presented to Vajpayee a unified recommendation to escalate the conflict to the air domain, which was approved on May 24 (Lavoy, ed., 107). The Indian Air Force targeted command posts and resupply bases, severely disrupting Pakistan’s ability to exercise command-and control over its forces and sustain logistical operations (Lavoy, ed., 108). The initiation of the air campaign may also have boosted the morale of the Indian infantry while signaling to Rawalpindi the lengths to which New Delhi was willing to go to expel the intruders (Lavoy, ed., 107-8).

Gen. Malik chose to focus the army’s initial counteroffensive on the Tololing Ridge, which overlooked the strategic NH-1A (Lavoy, ed., 105). As with the air operations, the army was under strict guidance to avoid crossing the LoC. The first triumph came on June 13 with the recapture of Tololing. Indian infantry steadily gained ground thereafter, benefiting from Bofors artillery support as well as superior logistics and reconnaissance capabilities (Lavoy, ed., 114). The director generals of military operations (DGMOs) from India and Pakistan convened in Attari near the India-Pakistan border on July 11 and agreed to a de-facto ceasefire in which the Pakistani intruders were ultimately given six days to withdraw their forces (Lavoy, ed., 117).

Several military factors contributed to India’s victory and Pakistan’s defeat. First, junior NLI commanders may have pushed deeper into Pakistani territory than intended (Lavoy, ed., 98). Second, Pakistan’s contention that the infiltrators were mujahideen rather than its own troops meant that their resupply would belie this cover story (Ibid). Third, the Zojila Pass opened in early May due to unseasonably mild weather. This allowed the Indian Army to send Bofors artillery guns into the Kargil-Dras area, which gave the Indians a decisive advantage (Ibid). Finally, Pakistan failed to foresee an extremely negative international reaction and India’s resolve and willingness to escalate the conflict vertically (Lavoy, ed., 88).

__________________
“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

Crisis Management

India and Pakistan made diplomatic overtures in the early and middle phases of the crisis. Pakistan’s diplomatic moves may have been motivated by a desire to end the conflict before New Delhi could re-establish the status quo ante. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sartaj Aziz met with his counterpart, Jaswant Singh, in New Delhi on June 12. Aziz sought an agreement by New Delhi to cede captured Indian outposts to Pakistan (Lavoy, ed., 185). Indian intelligence intercepts had by this point substantiated the Pakistani Army’s authorship of this initiative. Singh rejected Aziz’s proposal and insisted that Pakistan withdraw its forces (Ibid). Vajpayee reiterated this demand in a subsequent phone call with Sharif, but the Pakistani prime minister refused to back down.

Sharif and Vajpayee had established a backchannel during the Lahore Summit in February. Though the backchannel’s purpose was to foster discreet negotiations on Kashmir, it was called into service when the Aziz-Singh talks failed to make progress (Lavoy, ed., 187). Indian journalist R.K. Mishra and Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani diplomat, met four times in May and June to convey messages from one leader to another (Ibid). The Mishra-Naik backchannel encouraged Vajpayee and Sharif to consider a face-to-face meeting in New Delhi to resolve the conflict, but the plan was nixed after it was leaked to the Indian press (Ibid).

Pakistan tried to enlist Beijing’s support, but Beijing rejected this overture. Aziz and Sharif both visited the Chinese capital in June. Rather than back its “all-weather” friend, Beijing consistently urged Rawalpindi to reverse course because it was apprehensive about the regional consequences of an all-out war between India and Pakistan (Lavoy, ed., 344). The Chinese Foreign Ministry ultimately issued a public statement calling on both India and Pakistan to “respect the Line of Control and resume negotiations at an early date in accordance with the spirit of the Lahore declaration” (Chang). Beijing’s steadfastness dashed any remaining hopes in Islamabad and Rawalpindi that diplomacy could end the conflict on Pakistan’s terms.

The United States was an active crisis manager during the Kargil Conflict. Washington assessed from the start of the crisis that Pakistan was the aggressor. The Clinton Administration thus focused its diplomacy on pressuring Islamabad and Rawalpindi to withdraw its forces to the Pakistani side of the LoC. Clinton was personally involved in these efforts. He spoke with the Pakistani prime minister on several occasions and reiterated the international community’s demand that Pakistan withdraw to its side of the LoC. Clinton and Sharif met in Washington on July 4, where he relayed U.S. intelligence reports suggesting that Rawalpindi was preparing to deploy nuclear assets (Riedel, 8). Against this tense backdrop, Sharif eventually acceded to a joint statement acknowledging that the limited conflict could spark a full-scale war. The statement also committed Pakistan to the “restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement” (Krepon and Cohn, eds., 44-5). On July 12, Sharif announced to the world that Pakistan would be withdrawing from Kargil.

Washington did not waiver in its assessment of Pakistan’s role in fomenting the crisis. Yet, it worried that Indian leaders might escalate the conflict with military operations across the LoC. The administration therefore worked hard to reassure New Delhi that it shared its concerns and would pressure Rawalpindi to accept the status quo ante.

__________________
“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

Nuclear Developments

The Kargil Conflict began less than a year after India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices. The Subcontinent’s nuclearization, followed by the Kargil adventure, heightened international perceptions of Pakistan’s contention of Kashmir as a potential nuclear flashpoint. The conflict also strengthened international resolve to prevent the impression that nuclear weapons would enable successful military aggression (Lavoy, ed., 12). Nuclear-related capabilities were used for signaling purposes during this crisis—both to signal resolve and to enlist Washington as a crisis manager. Peter Lavoy and other scholars have concluded that neither India nor Pakistan were inclined to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield, nor had made advanced preparations to do so (Lavoy, ed., 11).

Despite the successful resolution of the Kargil Conflict, it posed several disquieting elements. First, and most important, it clarified the limits of nuclear deterrence. This was the second instance (the first being the border war between the Soviet Union and China is 1969) in which nuclear-armed rivals fought a limited war. Rather than strengthen national security, nuclear weapons aggravated longstanding grievances. Moreover, nuclear weapons did not provide for greater strategic autonomy, and they were not useful against subconventional warfare. Instead, during the Kargil Conflict, Pakistan sought help from both China and the United Sates, while New Delhi relied on Washington to help with crisis management. (Lavoy, ed., 205).

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

Proving all claims and assessments wrong, a few hundred militants continue to control some of the most crucial mountainous positions in the Kargil-Dras region. As all attempts by the Indian ground and air forces to recapture the lost positions are frustrated by the well-equipped militants, the intensity in artillery duels between Indian and Pakistani troops along the Line of Control touches new heights.

Within weeks, the troop concentration along the LoC and the international border has increased manifold, and the naval fleets of the two countries have sailed out into the open seas to position themselves against each other. And as thousands of villagers living on the two sides of the border start to move out to safer areas, India and Pakistan once again appear to be at the brink of another more disastrous war.

This situation deteriorated further in recent weeks when the Indian administration, embarrassed at its army's failure to flush out the militants from Kargil and Dras, looked for a military solution to the conflict. The Indian government's snub to Pakistan's proposal for talks, and its refusal to hold any dialogue until the withdrawal of the "Islamabad-backed infiltrators" from Kargil, and Pakistan's categorical rejection of its direct involvement, has led to a new level of jingoism in India.

Although the Indian government did try to clarify that the American visit did not amount to third-party mediation, Delhi's frustration over the pro-longed conflict in Kargil had ultimately sucked it into accepting some kind of US role in this affair.
As more and more bodies of Indian soldiers from the conflict zone reach their respective towns, the most popular war cry in Delhi now is to "teach Pakistan another lesson." On the other hand, Pakistan's army chief, General Pervez Musharraf has made it absolutely clear that the Pakistani armed forces are fully prepared to counter any aggression.

Already, the so-called 'bus diplomacy', which only a couple of months ago had created a fresh atmosphere of optimism in the region, looks like a thing of the past. Now there is renewed talk on both sides of settling the outstanding dispute through military means. Yes, despite all the official denials from Delhi and Islamabad about the possibility of a direct engagement on the battlefield, a war between the two proud nuclear powers does look imminent.

Also read: The pursuit of Kashmir—The untold story

As war clouds started to hover over the subcontinent, matters were made worse by the role of the media, particularly in India. Almost the entire battery of newspaper and satellite television networks in India appears to have fallen in line with the policy of the Indian ministry of external affairs and their military establishment, thus creating a tangible war-like atmosphere. There were statements, not only from politicians, but also journalists, wherein Pakistan was called a "rogue state", and demands were made to inflict "lasting punishment" on Pakistan.

Of course, the Pakistani media has also not lagged far behind. State-run television (PTV) and the right-wing conservative press continue to project these few hundred militants as the true liberators of Kashmir. The press has also kept up constant pressure on the government against any "peace deal". Some newspapers and analysts are now ridiculing the Indian army for its failure in Kargil, and are describing the present situation as "the most opportune time" to declare full-fledged war for the liberation of Kashmir.

Caught in the crossfire: villagers in Azad Kashmir | Archives
Caught in the crossfire: villagers in Azad Kashmir | Archives
Also read: In Kashmir, the young are paying for India’s lack of vision

These moves have been given further substance by statements and speeches made by members of the hard line Islamic parties. For instance, speakers at a rally in Rawalpindi, attended by several thousand supporters of the Pakistan-based militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, did not mince words in giving a warning to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against pulling out of the conflict. And then there are the likes of the former ISI chief, Lt. General (retd.) Hamid Gul, who went to the extent of saying that any deal with Delhi at the cost of the militants offensive would amount to putting the last nail in the coffin of the present government. So, if anything was lacking in creating an atmosphere to start a greater conflict, the hawks amongst the politicians and the media on the two sides have done their bit to justify an all-out war.

As war clouds started to hover over the subcontinent, matters were made worse by the role of the media, particularly in India
With both sides locked in one of the worst conflicts since the 1971 war, it soon started to dawn on the international community that developments in South Asia were getting out of hand. When Pakistan downed two Indian combat aircraft which had crossed into its territory, and Delhi started to show signs of crossing the LoC in a counter-offensive, the international community responded with alarm and panic. The United States and other G-8 countries, despite their heavy involvement in the Kosovo crisis, were compelled to take time out and turn their attention towards the conflict in South Asia.

It did not take them long to realise that the possible escalation in the region could have catastrophic consequences. A resolution passed by G-8 leaders not only took notice of the long-standing dispute over Kashmir, it also expressed serious concern over the escalation in the Kargil region.

US President Bill Clinton went a step further and telephoned both the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers, asking them to show restraint. But both these developments signalled diplomatic setbacks for Pakistan. The G-8 and President Clinton clearly sided with the Indian version of cause and blame. In fact, President Clinton even asked the Pakistani prime minister to use his influence to withdraw the militants from Kargil — thus directly implying that Pakistan not only had the means to pull out these fighters but that it had in fact put them there in the first place.

The United States did not stop just there. Realising the seriousness of the Kargil conflict, which by all means had the potential of snow-balling into all-out war, Washington immediately rushed its senior most military commander in the region and a senior State Department official to Islamabad. General Anthony Zinni and the State Department official held extensive discussions with top Pakistani officials, including the prime minister and the army chief.

Although there were no positive statements from either side, the meetings did produce enough ground for the State Department official to undertake a trip to Delhi to hold talks with the Indian authorities. And although the Indian government did try to clarify that the visit did not amount to third-party mediation on Kashmir, Delhi's frustration over the prolonged conflict in Kargil had ultimately sucked it into a situation where it had been forced to accept some kind of US role in this affair.

Along the LoC: Reluctant warriors? | Archives
Along the LoC: Reluctant warriors? | Archives
However, even as a small conflict in a remote mountainous region has resulted in a situation where a bloody war between the two known South Asian adversaries looks like a reality, very little is known about the circumstances which led to this development. Amidst allegations and counter-allegations, and claims and counter-claims by Islamabad and Delhi, the truth about the events of Kargil remains shrouded in secrecy.

The Indian establishment has directly blamed Pakistan's armed forces for carrying out the present offensive, accusing the Light Infantry Battalion of being actively involved with the Pakistani and Afghan militants in Kargil. Pakistan's foreign office and military establishment still maintain they have no active role in the Kargil conflict. But, does this also mean that they were unaware of the militants' plans? There have also been strong suggestions in Delhi that perhaps Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not even aware of the army's decision to launch this operation, and many Western diplomats in Islamabad tend to agree with this theory.

Also read: Military has some serious misgivings about India—Mahmud Durrani

Despite the repeated claims by India about the active presence of Pakistani troops in the Kargil mountains, so far very little concrete evidence has been produced to substantiate such allegations. However, the Pakistan-based leadership of the various militant groups have not missed any opportunity to embarrass Islamabad. Their attempts to boost the activities of their comrades in Kargil and reports of sending in reinforcements belie the government's claim about the indigenous nature of the present conflict.

If a former head of the ISI, Lt. General (retd) Javed Nasir is to be believed, the preparations for the Kargil operation started several months ago. The Kargil region has been traditionally used by the Kashmiri militants to enter the valley. However, this time the militants had more ambitious plans. They decided to move into the area and try to capture the strategically located mountains and ridges that overlook the Kargil-Srinagar road. The idea was to try and block the supply route for the Indian troops based at the Siachen glacier. Towards the end of last year, several hundred volunteers from four well-known militant groups began vigorous training sessions in mountainous areas to prepare themselves to brave rough, wintry conditions.

Army *jawans*: ready for battle | Archives
Army jawans: ready for battle | Archives
They were mainly from Tehrik-e-Jihad, an organisation that draws its cadres from Kashmir, Al-Badr, whose members include both Kashmiris and Pakistanis, Harkatul Mujahideen, which has in its fold a few Kashmiris but many Pakistanis and Afghans, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose members largely hail from Pakistan. Later on, when the conflict intensified in Kargil, two more groups, Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkat-e-Jihad, also joined to provide reinforcements. But according to a number of western diplomats, it is hard to believe that these militant groups could have launched such a major offensive without the active help and support of the Pakistan army.

Also read: Enforced disappearances: The plight of Kashmir's 'half widows'

By now, it has been established beyond doubt that this time the militants have completely shaken the entire Indian establishment. Many senior Indian journalists admit that the belligerency presently being witnessed in India is not only because the militants have badly bruised the Indian claim of being a mighty regional power; the sheer number of casualties from the present conflict have shaken the entire country. Television images beamed by Indian satellite net¬works, showing the arrival of the dead and wounded from the battle front, and the reactions from the family members and the local population capture the real mood of depression and anger in India.

A recent report by the French news agency AFP from Indian-held Kashmir gave a graphic account of the way the dead and wounded are being brought to Srinagar from the battle front, before being sent to Delhi. According to the report, the Indian Airline's flight from Srinagar to Delhi these days has turned into an air ambulance service. Almost every day, it carries to the Indian capital dead bodies and injured soldiers from the battle front in Kargil in greater numbers than normal passengers. The passenger seats in the air¬craft are often removed to accommodate stretchers carrying the wounded, and a special section of the Delhi airport has been designated to accommodate the coffins arriving from the battle zone.

A few journalists covering the Kargil conflict who managed to get on the flight describe the atmosphere on the flight as a true reflection of the events in Kargil. According to Abu Maaz, who is a sector commander of the Tehrik-e-Jihad in Kargil, even now several bodies of Indian soldiers are lying decomposing on the mountains, and Indian troops dare not lift them for fear of coming in the line of fire. Abu Maaz, who recently came to Skardu for reinforcements, told journalists the number of casualties on the Indian side have been much higher that what is being claimed by New Delhi.

Rough estimates indicate that the Indian army has lost more officers and men in these few weeks of fighting in Kargil than it lost in the last full-fledged war with Pakistan in 1971. And according to a senior Indian journalist, this time the bodies are going to some of the remotest towns and villages in India, thus creating a nation-wide mood of anger, and encouraging hawks to go for an all-out war against Pakistan.

The Indian Army: facing heavy losses | Archives
The Indian Army: facing heavy losses | Archives
However, the question being asked by many senior observers is that can either India or Pakistan afford to engage in a full-scale war, even if it is limited to the use of conventional forces? Some Western diplomats in Islamabad are of the view that, even if there is a war, it will be fought along the LoC, and will remain confined to Kashmir. But are there any guarantees that the losing side is not going to launch an offensive on the international border? In either case, the level of destruction on the two sides will be immense, and despite Indian claims of military superiority, there is little chance that India can win a war against Pakistan in a decisive manner.

A report titled "South Asian Military Balance", submitted by the US Deputy Secretary of Defence Bruce Riedel before the American Senate's foreign relations sub-committee last year, clearly stated that while India enjoys a numerical advantage over Pakistan in conventional military capability, it is most unlikely that it would score a decisive victory over Pakistan. Recently reproduced excerpts from the report suggest that the internal security problems faced by India in Kashmir and East Punjab may also hamper India's quantitative advantage over Pakistan.

While analysing comparative conventional forces in detail, the Riedel report argues that because of its more developed industrial capability and greater geographical expanse which provides strategic depth not available to the much smaller Pakistan, India could fight a longer war than Pakistan — thus a longer war would favour India. However, many analysts say that such a war would be a major blow to economic and social development in the two countries and may push them back to where they started more than 50 years ago.

Also read: Kashmir's Neelum Valley — The sapphire trail

But is there really a way to prevent the present conflict from snowballing into an all-out war? Many analysts and western diplomats believe the key to ending the present conflict lies with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

However, it mainly depends on what the government's real objectives, both strategic and diplomatic, are and the extent to which it wants to use the situation in Kargil to internationalise the Kashmir dispute. Some government leaders in favour of ending the present crisis believe the diplomatic advantage that Pakistan had in the initial stages of the conflict has gradually slipped away with the international community turning against Pakistan. This is precisely what the opposition leader, Aitzaz Ahsan, said in the Senate during the debate on the Kargil situation, and accused the government of isolating the country on the diplomatic front.

However, even if Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wants to end the present impasse in an attempt to prevent a major escalation, his choices are quite limited, argue analysts. As things stand at the moment, the government is just one of the three elements in the entire conflict — the other two being the army and the militants and their parent political parties.

It is not clear how the army leadership will react if there is a serious proposal from Premier Sharif to try and end the present conflict by asking the militants to withdraw. There is another, equally important question: even if the militants' initial offensive was launched with the active support from this side of the LoC, is it possible to force them into withdrawal? Militant leaders, both in Muzaffarabad and Pakistan, say they are fully committed to the present phase of the Kashmir struggle, and their sacrifices in the present fighting make it incumbent upon them not to agree to any diplomatic settlement.

Even if the militants' initial offensive was launched with active support from this side of the LoC, is it possible to force them into withdrawal?
Those close to the prime minister say he is certainly aware of these complications, but this has not deterred his desire to use the process of dialogue to settle outstanding issues with India. Following the failure of his peace initiative, whereby foreign minister Sartaj Aziz was sent to Delhi for talks, Sharif now appears to be employing back-channel diplomacy to try and defuse the situation. Recently, former foreign secretary Niaz Naik was quietly sent to Delhi to hold talks with Indian leaders. During his brief stay, he met both Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.

The visit was supposed to be kept secret as apparently it was a serious attempt to try and find a way out of the current impasse without drawing any media attention. However, some Indian officials deliberately leaked it to the local press, thus prompting Islamabad to also leak the move by Delhi to send senior Indian journalist, Mishra along with a ministry of external affairs official, to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Senior analysts in Islamabad say it is not only domestic problems that are creating difficulties for Sharif in his search for an agreeable solution to the current crisis. The level of belligerency being displayed by Delhi is also being described as a major factor in preventing a real diplomatic break¬through. However, some Pakistani analysts and Western diplomats in Islamabad are convinced that, since the visit by the US military and State Department officials to the region, things appear to be moving in the right direction. If this optimism is not misplaced, it is quite possible that the war, which at the moment appears to be imminent, may eventually be averted through diplomacy.

This was originally published in the Herald's June 1999 issue under the headline "War?". To read more subscribe to the Herald in print.

What were the lessons learnt by Pakistan, India and United State in regards to Kargil War?

For ten months between late December 2001 and October 2002, India and Pakistan kept approximately one million soldiers in a high state of readiness along their international border and the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir, raising the specter of conflict. The immediate trigger for the deployment was a brazen attack by militants on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. The attack set in motion an extended crisis with two distinct peaks when tensions were extremely high and when war appeared imminent to many observers. The first peak, immediately after the attack on Parliament, occurred in the December 2001-January 2002 timeframe. The second peak, in May-June 2002, followed another high-profile attack by militants, this time near the town of Kaluchak in Jammu. During both peaks of the crisis, high-level U.S. officials were deeply involved in crisis management, seeking to avoid war and to secure the return of Indian and Pakistani forces to their cantonments. This is the story of the Bush Administration’s crisis management effort, as told by over two dozen individuals who helped shape or who led the U.S. diplomatic response during the extended crisis.

The Twin Peaks Crisis grew in part out of tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Since their partition at the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan has contended that Muslim-majority Kashmir should have been joined to Pakistan, which its leaders created to be a homeland for Muslims on the Subcontinent. Pakistan maintains that the old princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is illegally occupied by Indian troops. The Government of India asserts that the entirety of the old princely state is rightfully part of its territory because the leader of that state signed an accession agreement with India following partition.

Prior to the Twin Peaks Crisis, India and Pakistan had fought in 1947, 1965, and 1999 over this territory. The first of these wars led to a division of the old princely state, which has remained to this day. Beginning in 1989, the Muslim majority areas of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir became inflamed, primarily as a result of longstanding local grievances. The resultant insurgency attracted support from Pakistan’s military and intelligence services, which contributed Pakistan-based militants and Afghan Arab veterans of the “jihad” against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. The Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir became the locus of friction between India and Pakistan—marked by routine exchanges of artillery, mortar and small arms fire and the infiltration of militants across the divide with Pakistani support. The testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 had the contradictory effects of exacerbating tensions over Kashmir and generating initiatives to normalize relations. As the Twin Peaks crisis unfolded, the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and the Pakistani government, led by President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf, were still pondering the lessons of a short, limited, and high-altitude war in 1999 near Kargil in Kashmir. Some observers saw the Kargil conflict as alarming evidence that India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status would complicate but not necessarily deter future conflicts, with the risk of escalation to nuclear use. In late 2000, under pressure from Washington and its allies, India and Pakistan entered into a shaky de facto cease fire in Kashmir that was to last about ten months.

Even after twelve years of anti-Indian violence linked to the Kashmir cause, the two attacks that precipitated the Twin Peaks Crisis—in December 2001 and in May 2002—evoked special outrage from the Indian public. On December 13, 2001, five terrorists—armed with assault rifles, plastic explosives, and grenades—used a fake pass to drive a nondescript, stolen white Ambassador sedan onto the grounds of India’s Parliament, where they attempted to enter the circular building. Their apparent plan was to attack the legislators during a morning session that was to be attended by senior government leaders, including the prime minister. The plan failed by sheer luck, according to one account. The attackers’ vehicle crashed into an official car, forcing them to proceed on foot. In addition, a power outage in the capital knocked out television broadcasts of the parliamentary session; the militant who was to alert the attackers by cell phone when key ministers arrived was therefore unaware that the 400-plus legislators had instead adjourned and that many senior ministers therefore would not be present. One of the militants blew himself up outside the Parliament door that was to be used by the ministers. The four others died during the ensuing gun battle with the small but determined Indian security detail, which took several casualties. Indian officials immediately linked the attackers to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad militant organizations and blamed Pakistani intelligence for sponsoring terrorism to pressure India to relinquish Kashmir.

Although the casualties from the October attack were higher, the events of December 13—a dramatic and direct assault on India’s leaders in their seat of democracy—galvanized New Delhi’s response to terrorism, much as the attacks on September 11, 2001 mobilized Washington. Home Minister L.K. Advani described the December 13 attack as “the most audacious and most alarming act of terrorism in the history of two decades of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India.” “Nothing will harm India more than inaction at this moment,” defense analyst Brahma Chellaney declared. Five days after the attack, India launched Operation Parakram with a general mobilization of troops.

As India mobilized forces, Pakistan responded in kind. Despite U.S. pleas and protests, Pakistan in late December began redeploying to its borders with India most of the 11th and 12th Army Corps sent to the border with Afghanistan only a month earlier, at Washington’s urging. Pakistan left in place two brigades, or about 6,000 of these regular troops, plus the 40,000 Frontier Corps troops who also had been sent to help seal the Afghan border. Most U.S. policymakers believe that the redeployment of the better equipped, more capable Pakistan Army regulars undercut whatever possibility existed of halting the passage of fleeing al Qaeda and Taliban operatives.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

22. According to Toby Dalton, what are the two main approaches to confidence-building measures (CBMs)?

Toby Dalton argues that there are two main approaches to CBMs: an incremental approach, which involves small steps that build on one other, versus a symbolic approach, which involves big steps that establish a new baseline for the relationship (Dalton, 5). Dalton argues that while incremental CBMs might be easier to agree upon, they are also easier to break and rarely address the most pertinent security concerns (Ibid, 10). The symbolic approach, on the other hand, has a higher likelihood of leading to real progress, but it is rare and difficult to achieve due to the high level of political and security risk-taking involved (Ibid, 12).

23. Which of the following was NOT a nuclear risk-reduction measure (NRRM) during the Cold War?

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union agreed on a variety of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk-reduction measures (NRRMs). In 1987, the United States and Soviet Union signed an Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which enhanced communication by providing means for direct, reliable, and high-speed transmissions between Moscow and Washington (U.S. Department of State). Another NRRM during the Cold War was lab-to-lab cooperation between Soviet and American scientists, which started in 1988 with the Joint Verification Experiment (Hecker, 77). The United States and Soviet Union also implemented a range of arms-control agreements, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) (ACA). A cap on fissile material production was not implemented during the Cold War.

24. According to Michael Krepon, what were the three products that came out of the Lahore Process?

In 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met in Lahore to discuss bilateral relations, regional cooperation, and security concerns (Stimson Center). The timing was particularly important, as both states had tested nuclear weapons for the first time the year prior. The move also required a huge amount of political risk-taking by the leaders on both sides. The prime ministers signed the Lahore Declaration and Joint Statement while the foreign secretaries signed a Memorandum of Understanding. All three agreements committed both sides to resolving all outstanding issues in the bilateral relationship, including the Kashmir dispute, and identified a range of potential confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk-reduction measures (NRRMs) (Krepon, ed., 66).

25. Which of the following is NOT contained in the Missile Flight-Test Pre-Notification Agreement?

The Ballistic Missile Flight-Test Pre-Notification Agreement, signed in 2005, requires prior notification of ballistic missile flight-tests. Each side is required to provide at least three-days’ notice of a five-day launch window. It also places restrictions on the missile trajectory, launch site, and landing site. The missile trajectory may not be in the direction of the international border or Line of Control (LoC) and the missile must be launched at least 40 km away from the border and land at least 75 km away from the border (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India). The agreement does not cover cruise missile flight-tests (ACA).

26. According to Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, what do the existing nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan lack?

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra argues that the downside of both the Agreement on Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities and the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Nuclear Accidents is that they both stop at verification. The agreements require the exchange of paperwork, but there is no inspection mechanism to verify that the information is accurate (Mishra and Ahmed, 33) (NTI). Iyer-Mitra argues that to take confidence-building measures (CBMs) to the next level, an element of verification, intrusive or non-intrusive, must exist. One example of non-intrusive verification is the Open Skies Treaty, which was signed in 1992 and allows states to conduct unarmed aerial observation flights over other state parties’ territories (ACA). In addition to providing an element of verification, the Open Skies Treaty fosters confidence-building through by building transparency and familiarity with other countries.

27. According to Michael Krepon, the biggest obstacle to confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan is which of the following?

While there a number of obstacles to confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argues that there are two main issues: 1) India’s conduct in Kashmir and 2) attacks against India by Pakistan-based groups. Krepon argues that unless a) India improves its administration of Kashmir to the benefit of the Kashmiri people, and b) the Pakistani military and intelligence services make an effort to prevent acts of terror against India emanating from Pakistani soil, the two sides will have trouble making progress towards the avoidance of dangerous military practices.

28. Which of the following is suggested as a future confidence-building measure (CBM) between India and Pakistan?

There are a variety of suggestions for ways in which India and Pakistan can work together to improve relations, build trust, and reduce the risk of misperceptions and misunderstandings. Gurmeet Kanwal and Robert Einhorn suggest the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in Islamabad and New Delhi, similar to those in Washington and Moscow. This would provide additional means for around-the-clock communication and reduce the possibility of a misperception during a crisis (Khan, 173). Toby Dalton argues for the extension of the missile test pre-notification agreement to cruise missiles (Dalton, 21). As cruise missiles have become integrated into each country’s arsenal, the risk of misinterpretation of a cruise missile test is just as salient as that of a ballistic missile test. Riaz Khan argues for bilateral summits once every two or three years, where the two sides could build trust and understanding through high-level interaction and each side would have an opportunity to air its grievances with the other. These are just a few of the many suggestions—arms control agreements, doctrinal discussions, intelligence-sharing, and nuclear energy and security cooperation are among the others.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

The Pursuit of BMDs, MIRVs, and Counter-force Targeting Strategies

India and Pakistan already possess the means to destroy “soft” targets such as population centers, which is known as “counter value” targeting. They are now acquiring the ability to destroy military targets, which is known as “counterforce” targeting (Krepon, Wheeler, and Mason, eds., 13). This shift could intensify the nuclear competition, making it more dangerous and destabilizing. When states move from counter value to counterforce targeting, they seemingly endorse nuclear war fighting concepts – i.e., the prosecution of a war by nuclear means. Precision-targeting capabilities by means of MIRVs – missiles carrying several warheads, each of which can destroy separate targets – are entirely consistent with counterforce targeting (Ibid). The development of ballistic missile defense (BMD), even if deployed on a limited scale, also has the potential to alter security dynamics in the region. One state’s BMD could raise the offensive force requirements of an adversary (Khan, 56). BMD could also increase the possibility that one side’s leadership might be emboldened to carry out a disarming first strike, using interceptors to destroy an adversary’s surviving missiles (Ganguly, 378).

China, India, and Pakistan are all moving toward MIRVs. China deployed limited numbers of MIRVed missiles beginning in 2015 (U.S. Department of Defense). Pakistan conducted its first flight-test of a missile it declared to be MIRV-capable in January 2017 (Dawn). India appears to be developing BMD and MIRVs, a combination that could be destabilizing to the extent that it signals further erosion of India’s no-first-use commitment and raises doubts about the survivability of Pakistan’s second-strike capabilities (Krepon, White, Thompson, and Mason, eds., 177-8 and 189). As MIRVing emerges as a new element of the triangular nuclear competition among China, India, and Pakistan, nuclear dangers will again grow alongside stockpiles (Krepon and Wheeler).


The No-First-Use (NFU) Debate

A debate has emerged among analysts, practitioners, and scholars as to whether India’s strategic doctrine, which declares a no-first-use (NFU) policy, might be evolving. New Delhi has previously declared exceptions to NFU in 2003, in the case of attacks by chemical or biological weapons (Government of India). Since then, various signs that NFU may be eroding – including statements and writings by Shivshankar Menon, a former Indian national security advisor, and other senior officials – have caused further speculation about the NFU policy’s longevity (Narang, 1-2). As Pakistan already has declared a first use nuclear posture, a companion first use posture by India could exacerbate crisis stability (Ibid).


Competition in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Nuclear Weapons at Sea

China, India, and Pakistan are expanding their maritime presence and activities in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which encompasses the all-important Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. Analysts have characterized China’s approach as that of securing a “string of pearls” because of its emphasis on securing access to ports and maintenance facilities across the IOR (CFR). Indian leaders increasingly recognize the need to invest in naval capabilities, and New Delhi has begun investing more diplomatic and financial capital to nurture its own security relationships in the region (Ibid). Pakistan, concerned by Indian naval superiority, has sought to expand its access to international trade and decrease its vulnerability to coercive measures with help from China. The development of a port in Gwadar has clear military as well as commercial ramifications (Garofano and Dew, eds., 150).

On the nuclear front, India appears ready to induct its first nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihant. The Arihant will enhance India’s second-strike capabilities vis-à-vis China. The K-4 missile is expected to provide India with long-range targeting options for hitting China’s eastern seaboard from a bastion in the Bay of Bengal (Rehman, 12-13). Pakistan is unlikely to develop a nuclear-powered submarine in the near term, but it might attempt to deploy cruise missiles with nuclear warheads aboard its small fleet of conventional diesel-electric submarines (Ibid, 17). Evidence that Pakistan is moving in this direction emerged in January 2017 when it tested the 450-km range Babur-3, a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), for the first time (Dawn). Moving nuclear weapons to sea is expected to introduce new command-and-control (C&C) challenges in South Asia (Rehman, 15-16). The risk of inadvertent escalation may increase, particularly as India develops more sophisticated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities (Ibid, 30, 46-7). Crisis simulations also suggest that India and Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds are most ambiguous at sea and that escalation dangers in a nuclearized maritime environment could be quite high (Khan, Wueger, Giesey, and Morgan, 32)

The China-Pakistan Relationship and China’s Future Role in “Nuclear South Asia”

The China-Pakistan partnership was forged after the 1962 Sino-Indo border war and the 1965 India-Pakistan war (Small, 19). Over the years, China has provided support to a range of Pakistani security endeavors, including its nuclear program (Ibid, 31). China-Pakistan security cooperation adds strategic advantage to both partners vis-à-vis India by increasing each side’s competitiveness as a regional player. The need to deter both Pakistan and China complicates India’s strategic calculus. As the China-Pakistan relationship deepens, scholars and strategic analysts are debating how China’s role in the region might evolve, especially considering the nascent China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and an enhanced strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

What are MIRVs

A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) is a ballistic missile payload containing several thermonuclear warheads, each capable of being aimed to hit one of a group of targets. By contrast a unitary warhead is a single warhead on a single missile.

What is Missile Defense System?

Missile defense systems are a type of missile defense intended to shield a country against incoming missiles, such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) or other ballistic missiles. The United States, Russia, France, India and Israel have all developed missile defense systems.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson