How do you see tensions growing between the two countries?

29: According to James Acton, what is the purpose of ballistic missile defense (BMD)?

The key purpose of ballistic missile defense (BMD) is to defeat incoming missiles by intercepting warheads before they explode (NTI). Missile defense interceptors – one’s own missiles – are fired at an adversary’s re-entry vehicles and either collide directly with the warhead or explode in its vicinity (Union of Concerned Scientists). The argument for BMD is that it is no different than any other form of defense, and a state should be able to protect itself from security threats through all possible means. There are several arguments against BMD. First, these systems are often rendered ineffective by decoys and other countermeasures (Union of Concerned Scientists); Second, it is easier and cheaper to build offensive missiles than defensive interceptors (Pifer). Third, BMD can undermine a state’s confidence in its second-strike capabilities (Khan, 56). Finally, missile defenses may lead a state to believe it can attempt a disarming first strike, using interceptors to destroy an adversary’s surviving missiles (Ganguly, 378).

30: According to Michael Krepon, what is a major nuclear danger that could result from the emergence of counterforce capabilities on the subcontinent?

When states move from countervalue to counterforce targeting, they enter the realm of nuclear warfighting concepts. This shift can be dangerous and destabilizing. For instance, if a state’s nuclear assets are vulnerable, they could become highly attractive targets, particularly in a crisis. An adversary with sophisticated counterforce capabilities might be incentivized to attempt a disarming first strike, and the other state might find itself in a “use it or lost it” dilemma (Macdonald). To guard against a first strike, India and Pakistan are likely to put more nuclear weapons on mobile platforms, keeping them out of garrison and in a high-state of readiness (Krepon). This increases the risk of accidents, command-and-control (C&C) difficulties, and misinterpretations that could lead to a nuclear exchange (Ibid).

31: According to Vipin Narang, India’s __________ stabilizes the nuclear dyad.

Vipin Narang contends that India’s no-first-use (NFU) doctrine stabilizes the nuclear dyad between India and Pakistan. Narang acknowledges that there are signs India’s NFU may be eroding. These indications include the 2003 doctrine’s stated exception in the case of a chemical or biological attack (Government of India) and statements by former senior government officials, including a scenario outlined in former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s book that seems to justify pre-emptive nuclear use in the case of an imminent threat (Narang 1-2). Narang notes that though India does not currently possess the capabilities to launch a pre-emptive counterforce strike, any move in this direction could increase crisis instability to the extent it creates a “use it or lose it” scenario for Pakistan (Ibid).

32:According to Nilanthi Samaranayake, Pakistan’s key interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is to __________ while India’s key interest in the IOR is to __________.

Nilanthi Samaranayake maintains that Pakistan’s key interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is to protect against attacks on shipping (i.e., international trade) by securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Arabian Sea. This is because Pakistan’s economy is heavily dependent on shipping, which accounts for 95 percent of the country’s international trade (Garofano and Dew, eds., 137). While New Delhi also has a significant stake in protecting SLOCs in the IOR, Samaranayake notes that India’s maritime interests are broader and include projecting power and expanding influence across the entire IOR (CFR).

33: According to Moeed Yusuf, why might Pakistan’s nuclear “redline” on the naval front be relatively low?

Moeed Yusuf argues that while all of Pakistan’s nuclear “redlines” are ambiguous, Pakistan may be more willing to use nuclear weapons at sea than on land. There are two reasons this may be the case. First, Pakistan’s naval capabilities are no match for India’s, which means it would be comparatively harder for it to deter conventional operations at sea than on land. Second, Pakistan’s economy is highly dependent on the Port of Karachi. An Indian blockade could reduce Pakistan’s access to international trade with devastating effects for the economy (Garofano and Dew, eds., 138). Since “economic strangulation” is one of Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds, such coercive measures could trigger nuclear use (Rehman, 17). Recent crisis simulations suggest an Indian naval blockade would cross this threshold, particularly when coupled with the destruction of air and naval assets (Khan, Wueger, Giesey, and Morgan, 2).

34: According to Thomas F. Lynch III, what is the main strategic driver behind the China-Pakistan relationship?

Thomas F. Lynch III states that the main strategic driver behind the China-Pakistan relationship is mutual suspicion and antipathy towards India. The partnership was forged after the 1962 Sino-Indo border conflict and the 1965 India-Pakistan War (Small, 19). Over the years, China has provided support to a range of Pakistani security endeavors, including its nuclear program (Ibid, 31). The need to deter both Pakistan and China rather than a single adversary complicates India’s strategic calculus (Narang, 144). Lynch and Small also reason that China-Pakistan security cooperation adds strategic advantage to both partners vis-à-vis India by increasing Beijing and Rawalpindi’s competitiveness as regional players (Hagerty, 284). China also has sided with Pakistan on numerous important diplomatic matters, such as blocking India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Dawn).

35: According to Yun Sun, Teresita Schaffer, and Andrew Small (Lesson 7.7), how might China play the role of a crisis manager between India and Pakistan in the future?

Yun Sun, Teresita Schaffer, and Andrew Small suggest several avenues through which China might play the role of a crisis manager between India and Pakistan in the future based on examples from the past. During the 1999 Kargil Conflict, China urged Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Kargil and respect the Line of Control (LoC) (Lavoy, ed., 344). In the 2001-2002 Twin Peaks Crisis, China worked closely with the United States to de-escalate the tensions (Small, 150). After militants affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba carried out the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, Beijing sent diplomats to Islamabad and New Delhi to convey information between the two capitals, a practice known as “shuttle diplomacy” (Ibid, 60). China’s special relationship with Pakistan, India’s objections, and a lack of Chinese political will are some of the many reasons Beijing is unlikely to become a major third-party crisis manager on the subcontinent. There are, however, precedents for China playing a more discreet, de-escalatory role. Thus, some experts are optimistic about China as a crisis manager in a future crisis.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

On this very day, exactly 18 years ago, riotous celebration erupted after Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons. Just 17 days earlier, India had experienced a similar moment. Then, one year later, Pakistan once again saw mass jubilation during the officially sponsored Youm-i-Takbir. But, in sharp contrast, today’s nuclear celebrations are barely audible. One hopes that this signals increased national maturity and sobriety.

From Pakistan’s perspective, its nuclear weapons have already delivered by reducing India’s willingness and ability to use its superior conventional military capability. Indian restraint during the 1999 Kargil war, the subsequent failure of Indian efforts at coercive diplomacy in 2001–02, and the caution exercised after the 2008 Mumbai attack attest to the central lesson of the nuclear age — it is not worth going to war against a nuclear-armed adversary on anything of less than national life-or-death importance.

That’s the success part. What of the rest? As readers will surely recall, there were many expectations that went well beyond matching India’s bombs. Lest they be forgotten, let’s recall what they were and review the report card.

First, the bomb was supposed to ensure Pakistan’s security. Post Chagai, it was common to claim that “none may now dare look at Pakistan with evil eye”. But this was shallow rhetoric. In 2016, Pakistan is threatened not so much by India as by a multitude of Islamist militant groups that are waging bloody war against our state and society. In the last decade, the Pakistan army has lost more soldiers to terrorism than in all four wars against India. Nuclear bombs are useless against terrorists.

The atomic bomb was supposed to create a state of bliss. Unsurprisingly that didn’t happen.
The bombs proved equally useless in stopping the drone that took out Mullah Mansour a few days ago, or the team of SEALs that hunted down Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Apart from issuing sullen remarks about the violation of its sovereignty, Pakistan could do nothing to challenge American power.

Second, ever since the first bomb was ready (1987), it was hoped that the bomb would resolve the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s favour. Protected by nuclear weapons, Pakistan could support militant groups to wage a low-cost war against Indian forces based in Kashmir, raising the cost of Indian occupation.

For fear of triggering nuclear confrontation, India would be deterred from launching cross-border retaliatory raids. The term ‘nuclear flashpoint’ for Kashmir reverberated in the international press. The hope here was that Western intermediaries would step in and force India to the bargaining table.

It didn’t work. After an initial period of worry, international interest in intervening in the Kashmir dispute waned. The UN no longer pays any attention to the matter. Today, the wisest option for Pakistan would be to stick to its officially declared policy of providing moral and diplomatic support — but no clandestine military support — to those Kashmiris who bravely resist Indian occupation. Else, how can it reasonably protest Indian support to Baloch separatists? Condemn Kulbhushan Jadhav and his associates?

Third, the euphoria created by the nuclear tests was expected to create a new national spirit. The euphoric press compared this historical moment with the birth of Pakistan in 1947. TV programmes of that time show Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif congratulating cheering citizens. To bear the pain of Western sanctions, he promised strict personal and public austerity. Henceforth grand public buildings — including the prime minister’s house — would be converted into schools and women’s universities.

Long before Panama, this became unbelievable. The fact is that such euphoric moments are strictly temporary. Once the excitement of the blast fades, harsh realities inevitably set in. May 28 did not end Pakistan’s struggle to discover an identity and national purpose or help it overcome deep provincial, religious, ethnic, and linguistic divisions. Beyond hoping for Chinese largesse, it does not have a programme for economic growth to meet the needs of an exploding population.

Fourth, now a country that was both nuclear and Muslim, Pakistan hoped to emerge as a leader among Islamic countries, standing tall alongside the much older, more established, and much richer Muslim nations. It also sought to become their defender.

The notion of creating a common defence for the ummah was vigorously promoted by numerous Islamist parties in Pakistan, most notably the Jamaat-i-Islami. Carrying cardboard replicas of the Shaheen and Ghauri missiles through the streets, they claimed the bomb was for Islam rather than just Pakistan. Much of the media was also enthusiastic about expanding the appeal of the bomb.

Indeed, Muslim nations as diverse as Iran and Saudi Arabia were delighted at Pakistan’s success. Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharazi flew over to congratulate Pakistan. Saudi Arabia went further; it provided Pakistan with 50,000 barrels per day of free oil to help it cope with the international sanctions triggered by nuclear tests.

But those moments have long passed. The notion of the ummah has evaporated as Muslims fight Muslims in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Turkey and Libya. Nothing suggests that this is temporary. Iran and Saudi Arabia are at daggers drawn, and the Pakistan-Iran relationship simmers with hostility. Today, Israel and Saudi Arabia are virtual allies with Pakistan drawing ever closer to the latter. The notion that Pakistan’s bomb could be directed against Israel has become unbelievable.

Fifth, and finally, the bomb was supposed to transform Pakistan into a technologically and scientifically advanced country. Amazingly, both India and Pakistan forgot something basic — making nuclear weapons many decades after they were first made is a highly unconvincing claim to technological prowess. Even poor North Korea, known for its cartoon-boy dictator — but not for new science — has conducted four nuclear tests and boasts of ICBM capability.

The atomic bomb was supposed to create a state of bliss. Unsurprisingly that didn’t happen. Indeed, Pakistan’s security problems cannot be solved by expanding its missile fleet, buying more F-16s, or developing tactical nuclear weapons. Instead, the way forward lies in building a sustainable and active democracy, an economy for peace rather than war, a federation in which provincial grievances can be effectively resolved, elimination of the feudal order, and creating a tolerant society that respects the rule of law.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

The Fallout From Pakistan's Nuclear Test

By Shah Meer Baloch
May 29, 2017

On May 28 each year, Pakistan proudly celebrates “Youm-e-Takbir,” which translates as the “Day of Greatness,” to commemorate the country’s first successful detonation of nuclear devices. But the locals in Balochistan’s Chagai district, and citizens all across Balochistan, see May 28 as a “black day.”

The locals still suffer as a result of the nuclear explosions the Pakistani government set off in the Ras Koh mountains 19 years ago. The new generation of Baloch inhabitants in the region is plagued with serious diseases stemming from those blasts. And all in Balochistan are constantly reminded of the promises made at the time by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (then serving his second of what would be three terms, spread out over 17 years) to invest in health, education, roads, and infrastructure in the province — promises that have yet to be fulfilled.

And yet it seems more important to Pakistan that on May 28 it became a member of the club of nuclear powers when it conducted five nuclear tests (followed by a sixth on May 30) in response to India’s five tests two weeks earlier. “We have settled the score,” Sharif said in 1998 in a nationally televised address defending the explosions. “I am thankful to God.”

But how many remember the plane hijacking just a few days before by three Balochs protesting those planned nuclear tests? On May 24, 1998, PIA Flight 554 took off from Turbat, destined for Karachi. Dawn explained their motives in a report on May 25, 1998: “They [the hijackers] were opposed to any nuclear test in their native Balochistan province following the recent Indian blasts, official sources said.”

The hijackers (Sabir, Shaswar, and Shabir) planned to take the plane to India, but did not succeed. Instead, the pilot landed at Hyderabad airport in Pakistan, as the hijackers were tricked into believing that they had actually landed at the Bhuj airfield in India. To deceive the hijackers, all mosques in the city were asked not to use loudspeakers. Some also say that an Indian flag was hoisted at Hyderabad airport. At night, Pakistani commandos overpowered the hijackers and the 30 passengers and five crew members on board were freed, unharmed.

Some are of the opinion that India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Intelligence Wing (RAW), was behind the plot because India knew that Pakistan – an undeclared nuclear power – would undoubtedly test its nuclear weapons after India’s own nuclear tests conducted earlier that month.

On May 28, 2015, hijackers Shaswar and Sabir were executed in the Central Jail in Hyderabad, and Shabir was hanged in the Karachi Central Jail. With their deaths, the hijacking case came to a close, but the grave consequences of nuclear tests on the residents of Chagai and nearby towns still remain.

Some Historical Background

Pakistan began building nuclear weapons in the early 1970s, when India became the sole nuclear power in South Asia. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in power in Pakistan at the time, famously said”Ham ghaas kahe ge, mager bomb banahe ge” — “We will eat grass later, but we will make a bomb.”

Shortly before the 1998 tests, the Pakistani government announced that it had chosen a deserted area in Chagai district to conduct them. But in his 2014 Master’s thesis, titled “Impacts of Nuclear Tests on Chagai,”Abdul Raziq reveals that the area was actually a village and was not deserted. He writes that the blasts took place on one mountain in the Ras Koh mountain range (Koh-E-Kamran), in the village of Chehtar in Chagai district. While the government claimed that there were “only ten households near to the site, who were shifted to a safer place,” Raziq reports that there were many households near the site, and that even if the tests were conducted one kilometer from the ten households the government says were moved, it would not have kept them safe. “Four thousand people were affected from the blasts,” he writes. “Even the government did not facilitate the people who were displaced and dislocated.”

In retrospect, Balochistan was divided at the time about the nuclear tests conducted in the province. For instance, Senator Sardar Sana Ullah Zehri of the then-ruling Balochistan National Party applauded them. On the other side, Senator Javed Mengal of the same party criticized the government for conducting the nuclear tests. The Baloch Student Organization (BSO) strongly condemned the explosions.

Soon after the tests, on May 21, 1998, The News reported that Sardar Akthar Mengal, chief minister of Balochistan at that time, had held talks with Sharif “for accelerating [the] process of development in the province. Mengal apprised the prime minister on financial problems and lack of funds for development in Balochistan.” Mengal requested that Balochistan be loaned 2.5 billion rupees for more development projects. According to reports, the chief Minister of Balochistan neither criticized nor applauded the nuclear tests. He later accompanied the prime minister on his visit to Chagai District on June 18-19.

Impact of the Nuclear Explosions on Locals

In his thesis, Raziq writes about the impacts of the residual radiation resulting from the blasts, which has lingered over Chagai – cases of lung, liver, and blood cancer, skin diseases, typhoid, and infectious hepatitis, as well as serious effects on the nervous system, blood pressure, eyes, and throats, and on newborn babies. The tests also impacted the environment.

There are significant numbers now suffering from thalassemia and hepatitis. Increased numbers of mental illness cases can be attributed to the hopelessness that the locals feel as they face seemingly unstoppable diseases that have sprung up in the area after that day in 1998. At almost every gathering Raziq attended during his research, young people asked questions about hepatitis and how it can be stopped, what kinds of herbs could be used, and whether there is any relief from the worry. He reports, “Even many people with hepatitis go undiagnosed, because the disease is mistaken for the flu or… [displays] no symptoms.” According to Tariq Rafiq, founder of the Iqra Blood Bank and the Welfare Society of Kharan, nearly half of the Chagai population has hepatitis.

In his paper, Raziq notes that after the blasts, every third death can be attributed to cancer. “Seven members of my family have died due to the cancer,” says Ehsan Mir of Nushki district (Nushki used to be part of Chagai district but it is now separate). A young boy named Shay Mureed Mengal of Nushki District died from blood cancer on May 5 of this year. Raziq’s research revealed that cancer is prevalent in Chagai, Nushki, and Kharan districts – all three are close to the Ras Koh mountains.

Thalassemia, a blood disorder, is one of the most dangerous diseases in the region, according to Tariq Rafiq. “More than half of the patients who had visited the blood blank have had major thalassemia. According to my information, the parents or grandparents of the patients do not have this problem. This is definitely very alarming.”

“Please allow me to share a story with you,” he went on. “Mohammed Ilyas, resident of the Ras Koh Union Council, brought two of his children to the blood bank in 2016. Two-year-old Haleema Bibi and four-year-old Ahmed Mehar had thalassemia. They needed O negative blood. I could not find the required blood to save both because it is a rare blood group. We lost Haleema.”

Rafiq paused, overcome with emotion. “It is not possible to provide blood to every patient and save him/her, but I am trying my best to play my role as a social worker. However, there are many thalassemia patients. They go to Quetta and Karachi for treatment. People who can’t afford to go far come to me.”

Balochistan is the richest of Pakistan’s provinces in terms of natural and mineral resources, and Chagai is one of the richest districts in all of Balochistan. The Reko Diq copper and gold mine there, an untapped resource, is valued at nearly $500 billion. The Sandak Copper-Gold project being run by the Metallurgical Company of China (MCC) is located in Sandak, also in Chagai. And yet, despite the abundance of natural wealth, Balochistan remains the poorest and most backward of the provinces.

According to a 2016 UNDP report, 71 percent of the
people of Balochistan live in multi-dimensional poverty.

“I promise I will make Chagai a model district in terms of roads, hospitals, and other infrastructure in the country,” Prime Minister Sharif said soon after the test, notes local journalist Muhammed Akbar Notezai. Sharif gave this statement publicly in Dalbandin, one of five tehsils (administrative centers) of Chagai district. But after a decade and a half, the town is still as poor and backward as it was before. To this day, the inhabitants of Chagai yearn for basic amenities: clean drinking water, electricity, hospitals, employment, and academic institutions. On a trip to Chagai, one of Dalbandin’s aging residents told Notazai: “After the nuclear tests in 1998, PM Nawaz Sharif promised that he would bring development to Chagai but, so far, nothing has changed over here.”

The nuclear weapons testing by neighboring arch-rival India, with which Pakistan has fought two wars, may have been justification for Pakistan making a show of testing of its own weapons. After all, India brought these weapons to the subcontinent, which prompted the need for nuclear deterrence in South Asia. But the people of Chagai must bear the consequences in the form of diseases which reportedly did not exist there before the nuclear tests.

It should be noted that more than 56 years after the nuclear bomb test on Kiritimati, then known as Christmas Island, the government of Fiji paid compensation to the victims of the blasts. The British government had refused to pay any compensation, but Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama took the lead by compensating the survivors of 1957-1958 tests. Thousands of British, Australians, and New Zealanders affected by the tests still await compensation and special recognition.

The people of Fiji suffer from the same kinds of diseases as the residents of Chagai, and yet scientific data is lacking on the impacts of the nuclear tests on Chagai and nearby places. It is the time for the state to allow national and international researchers on the ground to report the facts.

Nawaz Sharif is currently serving his third term as prime minister of Pakistan, and his broken promises still echo in the ears of people of Chagai and all of Balochistan. One wonders if he will ever follow the lead of Fiji’s prime minister and make good on his promises.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

Global Zero: Obama's Distant Goal of a Nuclear-Free World

In 2009, the president announced hopes to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Why there's been little progress since.

Just ten weeks after Inauguration Day in 2009, President Obama used his first overseas trip in office to announce his intention to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The U.S. "must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist: Yes we can," he told a cheering crowd of 20,000 in Prague's Hradcany Square, rhetorically linking the no-nukes push to the sky's-the-limit idealism that had electrified supporters during his recent presidential campaign.

Obama's high-profile endorsement of what arms-control advocates call "global zero" was a hugely significant step for a U.S. president to take. But since then, he's been hit with some jarring reminders of just what an uphill climb that journey to zero will be. And despite some successes -- most notably the New START treaty with Russia signed last year -- many of those following weapons policy say Obama's effort to begin reshaping the U.S.'s own massive nuclear arsenal in light of the zero goal has proceeded far more slowly than expected. In fact, despite Obama's pledge, he's spending more than President Bush did to upgrade and modernize our weapons. "He's clearly accomplished much less than had been hoped," says Barry Blechman, a veteran weapons-policy expert who has served on the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board and as a top arms-control official.

Advocates of major arms reductions say they always knew progress would be slow. But two and a half years after Prague, nuclear-weapons policy has become yet another area where the heady optimism of the administration's early days has largely evaporated. And Obama's bold push for a nuclear-free world -- and an American nuclear posture in support of that goal -- looks to be in danger of stalling.

In endorsing zero, Obama wasn't just paying lip service to some pie-in-the-sky dream of his liberal base. Since well before Prague, the U.S. nuclear weapons program has been facing something of an existential crisis. We haven't built a new bomb since 1992, and the nuclear track no longer tends to attract the military's best and brightest. "There isn't a whole lot of career advancement in nukes these days," Stephen Schwartz of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies told me last year.

That's led to a loss of focus, experts say, which in turn lies behind a recent spate of hair-raising, Homer-Simpson-style nuclear blunders: nuclear-tipped cruise missiles unknowingly flown from an air force base in North Dakota to another in Louisiana; ballistic missile components mistakenly shipped to Taiwan, where they sat for two years; Air Force officers falling asleep while guarding launch codes for nuclear weapons; scientists at Los Alamos flat-out forgetting how to make a crucial nuclear material.


There's also been a shift in thinking about the demonstrated value of nuclear weapons in history. Until recently, the firm consensus was that Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II, and that for the 45 years that followed, the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction" averted a U.S.-Russia nuclear conflict. Over the last decade, though, scholars have challenged both claims, arguing that fears of a Russian invasion played a greater role than the atom bomb in Japan's decision to surrender, and that the Cold War stayed cold more thanks to sheer luck than any fool-proof grand strategy -- as close calls like the Cuban Missile Crisis suggest.

The threat of terrorism has pushed in the same anti-nuclear direction. In late 2007, four national-security veterans with unimpeachable Cold Warrior bona fides -- Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and William Perry -- launched a campaign to convince the world that a planet free of nuclear weapons is the only guaranteed long-term way to guard against what many see as the gravest threat to American and global security: the prospect of a terror network or rogue regime acquiring nuclear material. And if global zero is ever to become a reality, they say, the U.S. will need to lead the way.

That campaign was crucial in giving Obama the cover he needed to endorse global zero and perhaps even paved the way for New START, the biggest arms control success of Obama's tenure to date. Few deny that the treaty -- which was signed in April 2010, and among other provisions, places limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on both sides -- was a major accomplishment that helped get U.S.-Russia relations back on a positive track, as well as a key starting point on the path to zero. (Between them, the two countries own the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons. The U.S. has around 5,000, while Russia may have as many as twice that.) That same April, Obama hosted a major nonproliferation summit in Washington, where 47 countries made voluntary commitments to work to safeguard loose nuclear material.

But that "nuclear spring," as the White House dubbed it, may come to signify the apex of arms-control advocates' hopes. Thanks to wariness on the part of the Russians, and ideological opposition to arms control from much of the Republican Party, further U.S.-Russia agreements look to be a long way off.

"There's a lot of skepticism [among U.S. lawmakers], even about further reductions, let alone zero," says James Acton, a senior associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. "So it'll be potentially very hard to make an agreement that satisfies Russian concerns and is ratify-able in the Senate."

And since the U.S. won't disarm unilaterally, that bodes poorly for the chances of additional cuts. Adds Acton: "I'm deeply pessimistic about the prospects for further reductions."

If Obama got out ahead of the Russians and the GOP, he appears to have done the same with a nuclear-weapons bureaucracy -- on both the civilian side of the Pentagon and the uniformed military -- that relies for its continued existence on a robust ongoing weapons program. Vested interests within the Department of Defense, many arms-control advocates say, have a strong personal incentive to oppose reductions.

In the wake of the Prague speech, Strategic Command, the Pentagon command in charge of nuclear weapons, held its first annual "Deterrence Symposium" -- a conference on nuclear strategy aimed in part at asserting the ongoing relevance of traditional nuclear-based deterrence theory in a post Cold-War world. At last year's conference, speakers ridiculed the commander-in-chief's stated goal of zero, to the chuckles of uniformed military officers. "Are we actually going to see a world without nuclear weapons?" James Schlesinger, the hawkish former Secretary of Defense from the Nixon and Ford administrations asked in the confab's keynote speech. "This is the vision of many people, and I remind you that the dividing line between vision and hallucination is never very clear."

This year, though, there wasn't much talk of global zero at all, almost as if the nuclear threats earlier worried over had passed. Instead, nuclear planners and theorists buzzed around a hangar-like auditorium at the Qwest Center in Omaha, Neb., in August, confidently anticipating a future in which nuclear weapons remain as central a part of U.S. security strategy as ever. ("The greatest tool of self-defense that the world has ever seen," as Keir Lieber, who teaches at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, put it at the Omaha conference.)

Even the administration seemed anxious to tamp down expectations. When I asked both the top military official in charge of nuclear weapons, Stratcom commander Bob Kehler, and the top civilian policy-maker on nuclear weapons, Defense Department deputy undersecretary James Miller, about the role the president's goal of zero played in driving policy and strategy, each began his response by noting that Obama had cautioned in the Prague speech that a nuclear-free world might not be achieved in his lifetime. Miller even felt compelled to add that "the goal [of zero] remains," though no one had suggested otherwise.

That Team Obama might have seen a need to reassure was understandable. After the inspiring rhetoric of Prague, many arms-control advocates expected that the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a broad statement of nuclear strategy that the last few administrations have produced, would be similarly bold. Instead, when it came out in April of last year, it re-stated the goal of zero but then went on endorse the status quo in several key areas.

Among other issues, the NPR declined to state, as arms-control advocates had urged that it should, that the sole purpose of the U.S. arsenal was to respond to a nuclear attack -- instead leaving open the possibility that the U.S. could be the first to use nukes in a conflict. And it recommended maintaining the U.S.'s traditional three-pronged combination of air-based, land-based, and sea-based missiles, disappointing those who think we could safely eliminate one of those with no cost to our global reach. Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association, says the decision was "yet another shortcoming" of the NPR.

Opponents of reductions, by contrast, could barely contain their enthusiasm. Gen. Kevin Chilton, then the commander of Stratcom, called the NPR "a tremendously good-news story" for advocates of traditional Cold-War-era deterrence, adding that his team was "intimately involved" with the document's production. Schlesinger declared: "It is something of a gift that the NPR turned out to be as strong as it is."

Obama's team argues that moving more quickly could have backfired. "A very bold, overly aggressive arms-control agenda is one the Russians are not prepared for, is one our allies are not prepared for, and therefore isn't practical," one administration official says. The official refers to Obama's "balanced approach," designed to "take practical steps toward the long-term goal, while ensuring that deterrence remains effective."

But as Obama has at times discovered on domestic policy lately, when you're facing adversaries intent on thwarting you, a balanced approach can mean you end up conceding a lot. Traditionally, Senate ratification of major arms control treaties has been little more than a formality. But in exchange for Republican support for New START, Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), who has been deeply skeptical of arms reductions, demanded that the White House put up $85 billion -- at a time of massive concern over the federal deficit -- to maintain and modernize some of the very weapons systems that many see as outdated and obsolete.

Not all arms-control advocates think that's a bad thing. "I think it actually helps you get to zero," Acton says. "It makes a world of low numbers a safer place, because it's harder for Russia to win an arms race."

But it certainly creates some strange optics, if nothing else. The new funding means that despite the president's call for a nuke-free world, we'll spend more under his administration to maintain our nuclear warheads than we did under President Bush -- a situation that Kimball, calls "incongruous."

And it continued a pattern of generous Obama administration funding for the U.S. weapons program. In February 2010, it asked for $80 billion over 10 years - a 15 percent increase over the Bush administration -- for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the U.S. weapons complex. "I'd have killed for that budget and that much high-level attention in the administration." Linton Brooks, who served as NNSA administrator during the Bush years, said at a briefing shortly afterwards.

Things don't figure to get any easier from here, either when it comes to reducing the U.S.'s own arsenal or on arms control efforts more broadly.

Though Kyl, the GOP's prime arms-control skeptic, is stepping down next year, a Republican-controlled Senate could doom the administration's chances of getting further deals through at an acceptable cost. That could spell trouble for one of the next big items on Obama's arms-control agenda: finally ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which was signed back in 1996 and bans all nuclear testing.

For now though, arms-control advocates are still looking on the bright side, even as they acknowledge that the momentum that Kissinger, Nunn, Schultz, Perry, and Obama helped generate a few years ago has petered out, at least for the moment. "The most recent wave in support of zero has crested, leaving behind an altered nuclear landscape," Michael Krepon, a nuclear policy expert at the Stimson Center, wrote recently. "Zero will always be in the picture now."

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

It didn’t capture the public’s imagination like “An Inconvenient Truth.” But the 2010 documentary “Countdown to Zero” was just as passionate in its cause as Al Gore’s global warming opus had been.

“Countdown’s” mission was clear: rally the people to banish nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. And it was all to start with a voluntary reduction in the arsenals of the major nuclear powers.


Doubtless, there were some personal goals as well. The producers of the film acknowledged they were inspired by the buzz for Gore’s project, which ultimately propelled him all the way to the Nobel Prize. Alas, it was not to be.

Peaceniks predictably applauded “Countdown to Zero,” but the mainstream audience stayed away in droves. Still, the campaign for Global Zero did have one very important fan: the president of the United States.

Well before the release of “Countdown,” Mr. Obama had declared his intent to help rid the world of nuclear weapons. In 2009, he announced Global Zero as the centerpiece of his atomic strategy.

“In endorsing zero, Obama wasn't just paying lip service to some pie-in-the-sky dream of his liberal base,” Zachary Roth wrote in The Atlantic. Mr. Obama had a plan. It started with negotiating reductions in the U.S. stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons. Hence, we got the New START deal with Moscow, which came into force in February 2011. That was to be followed by another treaty with Russia that would reduce tactical nukes—an area where Moscow enjoys a huge advantage.

Hopes were high, and Obama was serious. He picked former Senator Chuck Hagel, co-author of an influential report arguing that the road to zero made sense, as his new Secretary of Defense.

But even before Hagel headed to the Pentagon, Roth was pointing out that “nuclear-weapons policy has become yet another area where the heady optimism of the administration's early days has largely evaporated.”

Now it appears the road to zero may be at dead end.

The first bump in the road came when Moscow showed zero interest in nonstrategic nuclear arms reductions—no matter how much the administration agreed to pull back on the U.S. missile defense program in Europe.

Next, the president angered Republicans who had agreed to support his New START pact on the strength of his promise to modernize the American atomic arsenal. “[A]s long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies,” he had vowed.

But the president failed to fulfill his commitments. Critical modernization programs were delayed. Meanwhile, our nuclear weapons complex continues to atrophy.

Hope for the global zero campaign has been further diminished by the administration’s never-ending nuclear negotiations with Iran. Many on the Hill predict the “dialog” can end only in additional nuclear proliferation—the opposite direction from zero. When the negotiations started, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared: “If you see the reaction in Iran right now, they’re spiking the football in the end zone….”

Over the last month, we’ve seen a spate of reports concerning Russian violations of previous nuclear agreements, giving rise to charges that the Obama administration has failed to hold Moscow accountable. At a conference on the subject, Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees, concluded: “The Russians have basically violated every major treaty they’ve ever entered into, certainly every major weapons treaty….”

Then, as soon the last bobsled skidded down the course at Sochi, Putin ordered troops into the Ukraine, plunging U.S.-Russian relations to the lowest point since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.

Today,”zero” describes perfectly the likelihood of further bilateral reductions in nuclear arms.

Obama has burned all his goodwill with Congress. He won’t get any support for further unilateral cuts.

Worse, the danger of proliferation now seems greater than when Obama first looked down the No Nukes Highway. Reducing the U.S. and Russian arsenals has made the arsenals of other countries more valuable and the impact of going nuclear more desirable—a completely predictable turn of events.

Slow-rolling the deployment of global missile defenses hasn’t helped either. The need for these defensive weapons—which bolster stability and decrease the likelihood of nuclear confrontation—has never been greater.

Hoping that the world will learn to live without nuclear weapons is well and good. But the notion that the way to make that happen is for the U.S. to rush ahead while no one else follows was always fantastic. And now, it looks dead.

A more realistic road to zero starts with robust missile defenses, a modernized and adequate nuclear deterrent and appropriate conventional forces. Then we can look for cooperative partners committed to reducing the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Possible?

an mankind uninvent the nuclear bomb, and rid the world of the greatest military threat to the human species and the survival of the planet ever created?

Logic might seem to say of course not. But the president of the United States and a number of key foreign-policy dignitaries are now on record saying yes. They acknowledge that a nuclear-weapons-free world remains a vision, not immediately attainable and perhaps not achievable within the lifetimes of most contemporary policy makers. But they believe that the vision needs to be shared, in a vibrant, powerful way.

A movement known as Global Zero has gained in strength to attempt just that. It was established in the wake of a January 2007 newspaper column by George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn advocating a nuclear-free world. A group of 100 signatories (not including the above four) established Global Zero in Paris in December 2008. The organization’s goal is to rid the world of nuclear weapons by 2030 through a multilateral, universal, verifiable process, with negotiations on the Global Zero treaty beginning by 2019.

Ideas about eliminating the bomb are as old as the bomb itself. But Global Zero draws inspiration from the recent grass-roots effort to craft a land-mine treaty, and from the work of several influential philanthropists in global antipoverty campaigns. Of course, it also evolved from earlier nonproliferation efforts, including the 1996 report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. But the pace of the nonproliferation movement has accelerated in recent years. The current movement is notable too in that it has a serious strategy for moving forward—not at some distant time when miraculous new inventions might make nukes obsolete, but by later this decade, even if it would take at least another decade to put a treaty into effect.

Will President Obama really pursue such an idea? He gave an inspiring speech in Prague early in his first year in office, agreed to modest cuts in deployed forces with Russia in the New Start Treaty, and modestly lowered the profile of nuclear weapons in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. Those steps are not insignificant, but they have a good deal of continuity with past policy, and still leave us very far from nuclear zero.

The much-heralded nuclear-security summit in April, in Washington, was worthwhile. But it was notable primarily not for its progress toward nuclear zero, but for actions to reduce the risks of nuclear theft, accident, and terrorism. For example, Mexico agreed to convert a research reactor from highly enriched uranium (usable in bombs) to lower-enriched uranium (not usable); Ukraine agreed to eliminate its stocks of highly enriched uranium within two years; the United States and Russia recommitted to eliminate an excess stock of plutonium; and so on. Those steps, as well as the administration’s 25-percent increase in spending for global nonproliferation activities (to $2.7-billion in the 2011 budget request), are entirely sensible. But it seems unlikely that Obama will push nuclear issues in additional bold new ways anytime soon. On other national-security matters like Iraq and Afghanistan, he has been extremely pragmatic and deferential to military commanders, and other priorities, especially economic recovery, compete for his time and attention.

But even if Obama, in effect, drops nuclear zero, crises in Iran and North Korea may bring the issue to a head soon. As Obama is surely all too keenly aware, the motivation for nuclear-weapons abolition is not utopian or futuristic. It is the very pragmatic, immediate need to deny extremist countries the excuse of getting the bomb because others already have it. With leaders in Tehran, P’yongyang, and elsewhere bent on getting nuclear weapons, and charging Americans with double standards in our insistence that we can have the bomb but they cannot, Obama’s ability to galvanize a global coalition to pressure Iran, North Korea, and possibly others into scaling back their weapons programs may depend in part on regaining the moral high ground. And that, in turn, may require an American commitment to work toward giving up its own arsenal—that is, once doing so is verifiable, and once others agree to do the same.

But how to rid the world of nukes? And how to do so safely? A nuclear-abolition treaty could constructively contribute to global stability if done right, but it could be hazardous if done wrong. Among other things, it could make countries that depend on America’s military protection decide they should seek nuclear weapons of their own. Serious consequences could ensue if the Turkeys and Saudi Arabias and Japans and Taiwans of the world interpret the American debate over Global Zero to imply that they can no longer rely on the United States as a dependable strategic partner—a formal ally in the cases of Turkey and Japan, a more informal but still-trusted friend in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. The Global Zero movement could wind up sparking the very wave of nuclear proliferation and instability it was designed to prevent.

Sam Nunn compares nuclear disarmament to a mountain, with the summit beyond our current grasp and perhaps even out of sight. He advocates moving to a higher base camp, meaning much deeper disarmament and related measures, to determine if we can later reach the summit. That image makes sense, but I’d urge even more caution: We must also be safe on the way to the new base camp, and avoid committing ourselves to a certain route to the top too soon. A few scholars, including George Perkovich, Barry M. Blechman, and Frank N. von Hippel, acknowledge and discuss such complexities, but most Global Zero advocates don’t.

My forthcoming book on the subject does not argue against nuclear abolition; it is in fact a friendly skeptic’s case for nuclear disarmament. But I emphasize the conditions and caveats that would have to accompany any such treaty regime—including clear rules for how major powers might consider rearming themselves with nukes in the event of a future violation, even after weapons have supposedly been abolished. What if a dangerous country is highly suspected of having an active nuclear-weapons program but verification cannot resolve the question? What if a country develops an advanced biological pathogen with enormous potential lethality—and perhaps even an antidote that it could employ to protect its own people? Would nuclear deterrence truly be irrelevant or inappropriate as a response?

Many, if not most, advocates of Global Zero consider the abolition of nuclear weapons the moral equivalent of the abolition of slavery, and imply that, as with slavery, once eliminated, nukes should be gone for good. (The exception, these advocates say, would be a blatant violation of the treaty by a country that chooses to build a nuclear arsenal.) That, however, is a dangerous vision of a nuke-free world because it would deprive us of deterrent options we may someday need. Even once we eliminate nuclear weapons, in other words, we will have to accept the fact that we may not have done so forever. At a practical level, we will most likely still be living in a world full of nuclear power plants, as well as nuclear waste from nuclear bomb and energy programs to date. Neither the knowledge nor the nuclear materials will disappear.

What of the issue of timing—not only of when to try to negotiate and then eventually put in place a treaty, but of explaining the vision of nuclear disarmament for the short term? Many abolition advocates pull back the minute anyone asks if they want a treaty soon, recognizing the impracticality of trying to abolish nuclear weapons quickly. But it is they who put the idea into the contemporary nuclear debate with a renewed urgency, so putting off the details is neither consistent nor advisable.

That’s OK. There’s no time like the present, right? After all, eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth has technically been a goal of United States policy since the 1960s. Moreover, the world is likely to lose sight of the big picture during slow negotiations over the recent New Start Treaty with Moscow and ratification debates over that pact as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Bold ideas are inspiring and help the world remember how much is at stake.

I argue for a middle ground. Moving to nuclear zero at a set date in the near future is too fast. But dropping the subject for now and waiting for the 22nd century is too slow. Trying to abolish nuclear weapons too soon can, as I’ve said, spook American allies under our protection, but can also disrupt deterrent arrangements that are working today yet also somewhat fragile. That is, too much haste could encourage states entirely disinterested in nuclear disarmament to build up arsenals in the hope that the existing nuclear powers will reduce and thereby render their own nascent nuclear power greater. Too much haste also simply lacks credibility in a world in which some countries—Russia, Israel, Pakistan—clearly have no interest in denuclearizing anytime soon, even if the United States did. Declaration of ambitious but arbitrary and unattainable deadlines for action is more likely to discredit the Global Zero movement than to advance it.

The problem with putting off the nuclear-disarmament agenda, however, is that it leaves existing powers in a weak position to pressure would-be proliferators to abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and perpetuates a sense of complacency about the supposed safety of living with the bomb. We need a prudent form of urgency. Neither haste and impetuousness nor indefinite postponement on the matter will do.

The right time horizon for seriously pushing a new nuclear accord is when most of the world’s half-dozen or so major territorial and existential issues involving major powers are resolved—and this cannot be set to a calendar as precisely as the Global Zero movement would like. Those issues include the status of Taiwan, the territorial status of Kashmir, political relations between Russia and key “near abroad” states of Georgia and Ukraine in particular, and friction between Israel and its neighbors. Nuclear crises involving Iran and North Korea also need to be resolved, though the beginnings of a move toward nuclear disarmament might not have to await their complete resolution.

Once the former matters are largely resolved, the plausibility of great-power war over any imaginable issue that we can identify today will be very low. That would, in turn, make the basic structure and functioning of the international political system stable enough to take the risk of moving toward a nuclear-free world. That process will be so radical as to be inherently destabilizing in some sense, and thus prudent to pursue only when the great powers are in a cooperative mode and undivided by irredentist territorial matters.

Some argue that there is no foreseeable period of great-power peace and thus no prospect of the preconditions required for moving toward a denuclearized world. Such scholars often call themselves “realists” and imply that ideas such as Global Zero are just too utopian to be within mankind’s reach. But the so-called realists have a problem with their argument, too—the history of fallible mankind, and particularly of the nuclear age to date, makes it hard to believe that nuclear weapons will never be used if they continue to occupy a central role in international politics. If realism consigns us to the likelihood of nuclear war someday, it is hard to see why it is so prudent a worldview—indeed, it is hard even to call it realist, with all the connotations of prudence and pragmatism that the term implies.

That said, my vision for nuclear disarmament is of dismantling nuclear warheads, and should not be confused with their permanent abolition. The term “abolition” has several inappropriate connotations for our nuclear future. While most plausible uses of nuclear weapons would in fact be inhumane, it is war itself that is most inhumane, and war targeting civilians through whatever means that is the fundamental moral blight we should be trying to eliminate. Certain forms of biological-weapons attack, especially with plausible future pathogens; of large-scale conventional conflict resembling the world wars; and of wars that include genocide could be every bit as inhumane.

Outlawing nuclear weapons in a way that increased the prospects of other types of immoral warfare would be no accomplishment at all. Even as we strive for dismantling nuclear weapons, we need practical options for rebuilding them should even greater perils present themselves. Those might be pursuit of nuclear arms by a country bent on violating the accord, the development of advanced biological pathogens (the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report follows this line of thought), and even an especially threatening conventional military buildup by a future extremist state. That is the broad, strategic argument in favor of preserving options for nuclear reconstitution under a temporary withdrawal from the treaty, even after nuclear disarmament might someday be a reality.

The terms by which the right of temporary withdrawal could be exercised must be clearly stated, and a burden of proof placed on any state or group of states exercising the right. I argue for a “contact group” of democratic states, including not just traditional allies but newer powers like India and Brazil, that would be asked to support an American decision to rearm, should Washington ever consider that necessary. (The U.N. Security Council might not be reliable for that purpose, though it should be consulted too.)

Capricious or blatantly self-serving reconstitution must be avoided. But a treaty that precluded the international community from responding to the actions of an advanced future military power believed to be pursuing nuclear, biological, or enormous conventional military capabilities would be a chimera.

There is also a technical reason to view reconstitution as a real future policy option, even short of such extreme circumstances. Simply put, nuclear weapons will always be within reach of mankind, whatever we may do, whatever we may wish. Verification methods will almost surely be incapable of assuring us that all existing materials are dismantled or destroyed, even as verification improves in coming years. Moreover, demands for the nuclear-power industry make it likely that bomb-grade materials will be salvageable from nuclear fuel or nuclear waste.

With all the caveats and conditions, is a nuclear-disarmament treaty worth the trouble? Yes, because of the danger posed by nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the positive power of ideas and ideals in international politics on the other. These weapons are so heinously destructive as to be illegitimate; they are fundamentally indiscriminate killers, and on top of that, they have proved to be far harder to safely build and handle than many understand. They have no proper role even as visible deterrents in the normal interactions of states, and we should aspire to a world in which they would no longer have such an active, operational role.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects

With recent news surrounding the Novichok nerve agent, the Stimson Center is re-releasing this report. In 1995 Stimson released a report examining Russia, nerve agents, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. With essays by Amy Smithson, Vil Mirzayanov, and Maj. Gen. Roland Lajoie (ret.).

Drafted prior to the entry into force of the CWC and Russia's eventual ratification of the treaty, this report addresses some key questions: Will Russian authorities be able to comply with treaty provisions even if they want to because of insufficient resources? What if Russian authorities do not want to comply fully with the CWC?

Download the Report: https://www.stimson.org/sites/defaul...Report17_1.pdf

2. Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities

Pakistan has decided to rely on short-range, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles to deter India, which enjoys conventional military advantages, from launching military offensives. Much attention has been placed on the HAFT IX, also referred to as the Nasr, which is reported to have a range of 60 kilometers. The flight testing of the Nasr is only one manifestation of an ongoing arms competition in South Asia.

India and Pakistan have fought one limited war and have defused major crises since testing nuclear devices in 1998. Their nuclear arsenals continue to grow at a steady pace, and both have invested in infrastructure to increase this pace. McCausland argues that Pakistan's efforts to develop and produce short-range, nuclear-capable systems will seriously undermine deterrence stability and escalation control on the subcontinent. This places a heavier burden on India, Pakistan and the United States - the preeminent crisis-manager in South Asia - to address the underlying causes of deterrence instability on the subcontinent.

McCausland argues that the development of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan to confront growing conventional advantages by India is similar, but not identical, to the challenge that confronted the United States during the Cold War. The U.S. military sought to develop its own stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons as well as associated doctrines and operational plans to blunt a Soviet conventional offensive in Central Europe. Over time, many, if not most American military planners realized the enormous operational and practical challenges associated with the effort to integrate nuclear fire planning and operational maneuvers in an effort to enhance deterrence.

If U.S. and Soviet Cold War experience is any indication, Pakistani military planners and front-line soldiers will find battlefield nuclear weapons to be a logistical nightmare. Indeed, the unanticipated challenges that arise with the forward deployment and use of tactical nuclear weapons-incorporating nuclear fire planning with conventional maneuver operations, maintaining a clear chain of command in crisis scenarios where nuclear weapons are being used, and hardening communications against EMP blasts, among other dilemmas-offset the deterrent value these systems are purported to provide.

Pakistani leaders appear to believe that the "signals" conveyed by their actions during a confrontation with India with respect to their tactical nuclear forces would be interpreted clearly by Washington and New Delhi, and that risks for escalation would be manageable. McCausland doubts that these signals would be interpreted as intended by New Delhi.

McCausland concludes that the induction of short-range, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles on the subcontinent is both dangerous and problematic.

The South Asia program would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the National Nuclear Security Administration for their support of Stimson's programming on nuclear issues in South Asia.

3. The Security of Cities: Ecology and Conflict on an Urbanizing Planet

A report issued jointly by the Atlantic Council and the Stimson Center, "The Security of Cities: Ecology and Conflict on an Urbanizing Planet," argues that the environmental security field has yet to incorporate global urbanization, the 21st century's central demographic trend, fully into its purview.

Environmental security, which focuses mainly on conflict arising from resource scarcity, control over natural resources, and environmental degradation, historically has focused much attention on the rural poor in the developing world. Yet the rural poor are neither the primary cause of rising global demand for natural resources nor of environmental degradation, the report finds.

Instead, the report says the culprits are people who live in cities. The study concludes that the collective behavior of billions of urbanites is the main reason why fossil fuels are mined from the ground, coastal mangroves are turned into fish farms and the Earth's atmosphere is changing.

Report author Peter Engelke, senior fellow of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Foresight Initiative and former visiting fellow of the Stimson Center's Environmental Security Program, contends that because the environmental security field historically has treated cities as little more than an afterthought, their significance has been both poorly understood and badly transmitted to policymakers.

The report's central conclusion is that overcoming the 21st century's sustainability challenges will require placing cities at the center rather than the periphery of both our understanding and our policymaking. It says that only by doing so can we avoid the worst-case security implications of global ecosystem decline.

"Given the swift pace and enormous scale of urbanization, cities must become an increasingly important part of the foreign and security policy discussion," writes Engelke. "Urbanization intersects with multiple issues within the environmental security arena, including food security, energy security, climate change, fresh water use, public health and disease, and natural disaster planning and relief. It also intersects with more traditional foreign and security issues."

https://www.stimson.org/sites/defaul...OfCities_1.pdf

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

International arms sales represent an enduring and prominent feature of American foreign policy. The United States sells or licenses the sale of weapons to other governments to advance its foreign policy, security, and economic interests. And the US is the biggest player in the global arms marketplace.But when US weapons fall into the wrong hands — or become associated with corruption, human rights abuses, or violations of the laws of war — US foreign policy objectives, troops, and civilians around the globe can be put at increased risk.

What can the US do to modify arms sales to reduce civilian harm? The Center for Civilians in Conflict and the Stimson Center examine.

https://www.stimson.org/sites/defaul...ower_FINAL.pdf

Cyber security is the next frontier for nuclear risk managers. Within a short span of time cyber attacks have evolved in sophistication and stealth, making it difficult to develop an effective and adaptive risk management approach. While there is consensus within nuclear industry that it must bolster its capacity to “remain ahead of the dynamic cyber threat curve,” it is important to determine what this looks like in practice: what constitutes a reasonable application of cyber security measures such that it sufficiently attempts to reduce vulnerabilities and associated risks?

In November 2016, the Stimson Center, along with the Security Awareness Special Interest Group (SASIG) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), hosted The Nuclear Security Roundtable on Executive and Corporate Responsibility in London, bringing together fifty industry stakeholders and cyber security experts to discuss the inherent challenges in managing cyber security risks in the nuclear sector. Participants examined a hypothetical cyber attack scenario in a nuclear power plant that undermined the security posture of the facility, cascading into a major power outage and consequently resulting in first-party property damage, reputational fallout, and significant third-party business interruption losses. Under this scenario, participants considered potential negligence claims and cor porate liability, and how a “model of accountability” – demonstrating compliance to high industry standards – might be structured in order to mitigate such liability.

https://www.stimson.org/sites/defaul...cilities_0.pdf

https://www.stimson.org/sites/defaul...Facilities.pdf

3. A Transatlantic Drones Dialogue: Towards International Standards

On the same day that President Obama announced that a U.S. drone strike in January killed two humanitarian aid workers — American Warren Weinstein and Italian Giovanni Lo Porto — the Stimson Center and the Heinrich Boell Foundation hosted a seminar to discuss transatlantic views on drones and explore the potential for developing international standards and norms to guide the sale, transfer, and use of armed drones in the future. The seminar — influenced in part by the Recommendations and Report of the Stimson Task Force on U.S. Drone Policy — brought together U.S. and European experts to discuss the current state of drone policy within the United States and Europe, the legal frameworks that underpin current use, and the challenges presented by uncontrolled proliferation of drone technology worldwide. The report of the April 23 expert seminar lays out the complex issues related to lethal drone use that were addressed by seminar participants and the potential ways forward for developing international standards and norms with regard to drone use.

In addition to the deaths of Weinstein and Lo Porto, the White House revealed that two more Americans — Ahmed Farouq and Adam Gadahn — were killed via U.S. counterterrorism operations “in the same region.” Farouq was killed in the same strike that killed Weinstein, and Lo Porto and Gadahn were killed in a separate operation. Both Farouq and Gadhan were known as members of al-Qaida but had not been specifically targeted in either of the strikes. These revelations renewed calls for increased transparency and oversight over the U.S. drone program. The calls for more accountable and transparent policies or regulations reflect a desire for more clarity of the U.S. program from U.S. domestic audiences, as well as international partners and allies. To date, the United States has done little to explain its use of and rationale for lethal drone strikes to even its closest partners and allies. European Union (EU) countries, for example, have welcomed the U.S. promise of greater transparency and are keen to move to develop greater international norms and standards for drone use.

The Stimson task force report recommended the development of international norms regarding use of lethal force outside traditional battlefields. The development of such norms would allow states to respond to nontraditional threats from nontraditional actors while ensuring compliance with rule of law principles and respect for human rights. Such norms would also promote the development of a useful precedent for drone use. Current U.S. drone policy suffers from a lack of transparency and accountability, and the ad hoc way in which the United States has implemented its nascent policy has negatively impacted U.S. and international perceptions of drone technology. Indeed, the lack of a clear U.S. policy undermines U.S efforts to support the international rule of law.

https://www.stimson.org/sites/defaul...icy_070315.pdf

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

The United States faces unprecedented challenges in conducting diplomacy and development as it responds to the residuals of three wars and a constantly changing global environment. At the same time, the outlook for the entire federal budget has changed dramatically. A new era requiring increased fiscal austerity has emerged, and it threatens to not only end recent International Affairs personnel expansion but erode recent gains before the needed improvements have been realized or new missions have been absorbed. In the face of these challenges, the most valuable resource Americans have in their foreign affairs engagement is the men and women of the Department of State and USAID.

To understand what today's fiscal crisis means for the personnel of US foreign policy, The American Academy of Diplomacy and Stimson, funded by the Cox Foundation, present a new study, "Diplomacy in a Time of Scarcity," that examines the challenges of the world today and the progress in preparing our foreign policy personnel for those challenges. Our analysis found that our diplomatic capacity has seen significant gains in the last four years and over the last decade but that these gains should not be overstated. They represent efforts to address long-standing deficiencies and shortages, and have not readied our diplomatic capacity for the challenges we already faced, let alone set us to proactively engage the changing challenges of tomorrow's world.

Today, our diplomatic capacity, on which the security of the American people will depend in the tumultuous decades of the 21st century, is not yet completely staffed, trained, and deployed to meet the challenges. Our recommendations are designed to close the remaining gaps in personnel and training.

Recommendations

1. The Secretary of State should seek to complete the Diplomacy 3.0 staffing initiative in the FY 2014 budget. This would add 722 positions, achieving the targeted 25 percent increase in the Foreign Service compared to the 2008 baseline. These positions should be distributed across Core and Public Diplomacy in order to bring personnel in these areas closer to the 2008 FAB report's recommendations.

2. In order to alleviate shortages in mid-career officers, the Department should press Congress for legislation to temporarily lift limitations on pay and numbers of hours worked for While Actually Employed (WAE) retired officers and staff for a period of five years.

3. The Secretary of State should seek an additional (above attrition) 490 positions specifically for long-term training in the FY 2014 budget: 330 for language training to meet Congressional requirements and 160 for training to reach mid-level needs.

4. The Department should fund a study of what would be required for the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to take on a share of senior professional education comparable to the National Defense University and the Service War Colleges.

5. USAID should recruit as needed and on a targeted basis experienced personnel including retired USAID officers to address shortages of mid-career officers.

6. USAID should seek streamlined hiring authorities to rationalize the unnecessarily convoluted methods currently employed.

7. Congress should appropriate the Department's 2013 budget request for full Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization (CSO) staffing with a flexible hiring authority and dedicated funding proposed by the Department to increase the effectiveness and agility of the CSO's new model. If there is no regular budget for 2013, CSO should pursue this goal in FY 2014.

8. The Department should task CSO to make recommendations on how to respond to civilian surge scenarios that exceed planned CSO capabilities now that the creation of a large "surge capability" is no longer planned. This study should include, inter alia, the functioning of the current 3161 authority (for temporary hires), whether additional standby authority is needed, potential changes in contracting authority or spending flexibility for a large surge, and the potential for maintaining a larger roster of skills in the civilian sector.

Now, more than ever, the United States needs to be fully engaged in all areas of the world-and to achieve this will require a broad effort. The better the Shield, the less often the Sword is required.

https://www.stimson.org/sites/defaul...10_23_12_1.pdf

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson