Co-founder Michael Krepon announces the release of Nuclear South Asia: A Guide to India, Pakistan, and the Bomb. Nuclear South Asia is the first course to be published as part of Stimson's Nuclear Learning initiative. The course provides the emerging generation of strategic analysts in India, Pakistan, and elsewhere a platform to study nuclear competition and dangers on the Subcontinent. To enroll in the full, free course, please visit www.nuclearlearning.org.

"Our course [Nuclear South Asia] offers diverse viewpoints and doesn’t reach conclusions. It will take enrollees beyond talking points and national nuclear narratives" - Michael Krepon, Co-founder of the Stimson Center

Have you completed the course? How much time does it take to cover this course? Is this even reliable? I'm totally blank in the subject. Since I've opted International Relations, I need to have more guidance on this. Could you please share some fundamentals of Nuclear Learning?

Yes buddy. I've joined as I'm in the middle of the course. I'd suggest everyone reading this, irregardless of their optional combination, it'd be helpful in Pakistan Studies, Current Affairs as well as in Essay. It's coming from a reliable source whose core purpose is building the understanding of the people of Subcontinent pertaining to Nuclear arms both India and Pakistan possess and their repercussions in case there's any nuclear stand off between the countries.

Read the following to build your understanding off the topic. Do join the course, Its free and you will be able to cover in a week or so.


957 – Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

The IAEA was established in 1957 following U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech, in which he proposed the establishment of an international atomic regulatory body (IAEA). The overarching mission of the organization would be to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Both India and Pakistan joined the IAEA the year it was established (IAEA).


1968 – Establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):

The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The treaty was established with the goals of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, furthering nuclear disarmament, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy (UNODA). The treaty divided the world into two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) (U.S. Department of State). The NWS are those that had nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967, a group that includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. All other states, regardless of whether they possess nuclear weapons, are considered NNWS under the NPT.

Neither India nor Pakistan joined the NPT. The Indian establishment was divided on the matter. New Delhi was committed to disarmament objectives, but there was concern that the absence of security guarantees would make India vulnerable to attack (Perkovich, 134). Many also saw the treaty as discriminatory (Ibid). In the end, the Indian government chose not to accede to the NPT (Ibid, 145). Pakistan initially supported the treaty, but opted out when India did. In short, Pakistan wanted to retain the option to go nuclear if India attained nuclear weapons (Chakma, 270). As in India, many in Pakistan viewed the treaty as discriminatory. India and Pakistan therefore remain de facto, rather than de jure, nuclear-weapon states.


1974 – India’s “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion:”

On May 18, 1974, India detonated its first nuclear device in what it termed a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” or PNE. The test took place in Pokhran, Rajasthan, and reportedly had a yield of 12 kilotons (FAS). In the wake of the Indian PNE, the international community established the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which set strict guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports (NSG). Domestic regulatory instruments, such as the 1978 U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, were also promulgated (Squassoni). Pakistan had initiated its nuclear-weapons program in response to its 1971 war with India (Perkovich, 165). Yet, Pakistan used the occasion of the Indian PNE to reiterate its commitment to nuclear energy’s “peaceful purposes and to chastise New Delhi for attempting to distinguish between military and non-military applications of a nuclear test (Ibid, 185-6).


1974 – Establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG):

The NSG was established in November 1974 in response to India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” earlier that year (NSG). India’s nuclear test demonstrated to the international community that non-nuclear-weapon states, as designated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), were using imported nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes for their weapons programs. The NSG set strict guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports to curb proliferation (NSG). Because compliance with the NPT or an equivalent nuclear nonproliferation agreement is a key component of NSG membership, neither India nor Pakistan has become a member (NTI).


1996 – Adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):

The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as a Resolution on September 10, 1996, and opened for signature 14 days later (NTI). The treaty is a legally binding prohibition on nuclear explosions. However, it has not yet entered into force. The treaty required the 44 “Annex 2” states—including the United States, India, Pakistan, and China—to sign and ratify it as precursors to its entry into force (CTBTO).

While India was heavily involved in the treaty negotiations, it backed away from the CTBT once the text was finalized (Tellis, 202). India viewed the entry-into-force provision as an attempt to undermine its sovereignty. New Delhi further contended that the treaty fell short in terms of global nuclear disarmament by allowing for the maintenance and enhancement of existing arsenals (Ibid, 280). New Delhi also condemned the treaty as discriminatory because the Indian program needed to conduct further tests while countries such as the United States and Soviet Union no longer had to test to ensure the reliability of their arsenals (Ibid, 201).

Pakistan distanced itself from the final text of the CTBT as well. While it voted in favor of the treaty in 1996, Pakistan later revealed that it would not accede to the treaty unless India did, repeating a well-established pattern in international arms-control negotiations (CTBTO). Pakistan also said it was concerned that the treaty did not do enough in terms of global nuclear disarmament (Chakma, 276).


1998 – Nuclear Tests:

In May of 1998, India and Pakistan officially joined the nuclear club when they each tested nuclear weapons. On May 11 and 13, under the newly-elected BJP government led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests in Pokhran, Rajasthan (Perkovich, 404). Pakistan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, followed suit on May 28, just 17 days after the Indian tests (Khan, 1). The international community, including the United States, strongly condemned the tests and imposed sanctions on both nations (Krepon). Global events and strategic imperatives soon prompted Washington to relax American sanctions. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States needed Pakistan’s counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and gradually eased the sanctions to foster this relationship (Wagner). In the case of India, U.S. skepticism about the efficacy of the sanctions, combined with an overarching desire to overcome past nonproliferation disputes and cultivate a strategic partnership, led to the lifting of the sanctions in 2001 (Talbott, 180).


2004 – Discovery of the A.Q. Khan Network:

A.Q. Khan is a Pakistani nuclear physicist and metallurgist who is considered the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Throughout the 1970s, he worked for a European centrifuge manufacturer (Clary, 22). It was discovered in 2004 that Khan had exploited his European contacts to supply Iran, North Korea, and Libya with nuclear technology and know-how throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Lodhi, ed., 270). These revelations damaged Pakistan’s nonproliferation reputation. Rawalpindi failed to hold Khan accountable for his activities and did not let foreign intelligence services debrief the proliferation mastermind (Kimball), leading to informed speculation that the government may have been complicit in the Khan network (NTI). The Khan fiasco is considered the biggest proliferation disaster to date, and led to the tightening of export controls worldwide (Salik, 241). In the wake of the scandal, Pakistan sought to rectify its own export control deficiencies by enacting the Export Control Act, which strengthened regulations on the transfer of sensitive technologies (Fitzpatrick, 115).


2008 – Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal:

The Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal was finalized on October 1, 2008 (CFR). The deal meant India could engage in nuclear commerce with the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Ibid). New Delhi and Washington had to surmount several obstacles to secure an NSG waiver, which was required because India did not belong to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and there were ongoing concerns about India’s nuclear ambitions (Chari, 2). India agreed to allow more intrusive IAEA inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities, continue its moratorium on testing, and work towards negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). It also committed to let U.S. companies build nuclear reactors in India in exchange for access to U.S. dual-use nuclear technology (Ibid). Pakistan was critical of the deal, arguing that it gave special treatment to India and that Pakistan also deserved an NSG waiver (Squassoni). In response to the deal, Pakistan accelerated its production of fissile material (Ibid).

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

What is nuclear policy?

Nuclear policy, posture, or doctrine reflects how leaders in states that possess nuclear weapons view the utility of these weapons and the plausible conditions under which their use might be envisioned (Tellis, 260). Nuclear doctrine therefore combines theories of deterrence with declaratory statements and operational strategies that collectively suggest what leaders hope will deter other nuclear-armed states, how nuclear weapons might help leverage national goals, and, if necessary, how nuclear weapons might be used in warfare (Narang, 4).

Do nuclear weapons have political utility?

Some view nuclear weapons as having political utility. The Bomb could, for example, confer status and prestige—although states seeking the Bomb could also face diplomatic and economic penalties. The possession of nuclear weapons also lends itself to deterrence in extreme cases. That is, by having the Bomb, a state could deter the use of nuclear weapons against it, or deter a full-scale conventional war. However, having the Bomb does not necessarily deter limited conventional or sub-conventional war. It does not require many nuclear weapons to confer presumed political utility—just enough to prevent worst cases from occurring. A nuclear posture that suggests political utility has defensive connotations.

Do nuclear weapons have military utility?

Some view nuclear weapons as having both political and military utility. In this view, political utility is either insufficient or in need of reinforcement. Those who confer military utility to nuclear weapons believe that the nuclear threshold might be crossed, in which case capabilities for use and targeting strategies are required. If advantages can be gained, they are worth seeking or, at a minimum, a state can deny an adversary from gaining advantages. Belief in the military utility of nuclear weapons will be backed up by qualitative and quantitative means. How much is enough depends on what an adversary is presumed to have. A nuclear posture that suggests military utility has offensive suggestions.

What is countervalue targeting?

Under this posture, deterrence is sought by clarifying an ability to retaliate against cities. This is called “countervalue” targeting (Kristensen and Norris, 29). Leaders in states that rely on countervalue targeting believe that nuclear weapons have political, but not military, value. The essential value of nuclear weapons, in this view, is their ability to punish—and hence, to deter an adversary.

What is counterforce targeting?

An offense-oriented kind of deterrence is characterized by having many nuclear weapons of varied ranges, including weapons with high accuracy. The ability to strike military targets as well as cities is called a “counterforce” targeting posture (Krepon, Wheeler, and Mason, eds., 19). By adopting offense-oriented deterrence, national leaders seek to underscore the risks to an adversary of crossing the nuclear threshold, as well as a belief that, once this threshold is crossed, nuclear weapons can have military utility. The essential value of nuclear weapons, in this view, is their ability to deny an adversary’s ability to punish by targeting opposing nuclear forces. In this view, although grievous punishment cannot be avoided in nuclear exchanges, nuclear wars, like other kind of wars, might have winners and losers. In this view, comparative advantage can help deter and determine the outcome of warfare.

What are the primary components of nuclear policy?

Declaratory statements help leaders to characterize their nuclear doctrine to external audiences. These statements are important, but they may not be entirely accurate (Sagan, 227). For example, leaders may declare that they seek minimal deterrence, but they pursue capabilities that do not appear to be minimal (Ibid, 219-220). The use of adjectives, such as credible minimum deterrence, or minimum credible deterrence, suggests upwardly adjustable requirements. The term limited deterrence connotes a defensive posture. The term existential deterrence connotes that a small number of nuclear weapons capable of destroying a few cities will be sufficient to deter (Freedman, 184). Put another way, the mere existence of nuclear weapons—and not war-fighting capabilities—would have a desired deterrent effect (Ibid, 18). The term full-spectrum deterrence connotes war-fighting capabilities at different levels of conflict, including short-range weapons and long-range means of delivery (Salik).

A no-first-use (NFU) posture is self-explanatory. Leaders in states that view nuclear weapons as having political, but not military utility, might adopt this posture. Leaders in states that enjoy conventional military advantages might do so, as well—but not in all cases (Sagan, 222). NFU postures, as with nuclear postures that leave open the option of first use, may not be credible to adversaries. Leaders may not wish to resort to the first use of nuclear weapons, even though they advertise their willingness to do so (Ibid, 227). And leaders may not believe the NFU pledges of an adversary.

The possession of nuclear weapons requires employment concepts. Employment strategies reflect the objectives leaders have in crossing the nuclear threshold (Narang, 4). If the purpose of crossing the nuclear threshold first is to signal an adversary to halt a conventional advance, then a single demonstration shot might be employed (Waltz, 733). But there is no way to guarantee how an adversary might interpret this act. Was the detonation purposeful or accidental? Will command-and-control arrangements hold once a mushroom cloud appears? A single demonstration shot could open Pandora’s box.

If more than a single detonation is planned or anticipated, this requires a targeting strategy (countervalue or counterforce). Whatever strategy is adopted, escalation control is likely to be extremely difficult (Freedman, 34). There is no precedent in warfare for conflict between nuclear-armed foes. Command-and-control arrangements would be extremely stressed. Assessing the battlefield would be a severe challenge. Widespread chaos away from battlefields could be anticipated. Channels of communication between the adversaries might be irretrievably broken, as well as channels of communication in search of diplomatic intervention. Foreign leaders will avoid a radioactive war zone.

What postures might regional nuclear powers adopt?

Vipin Narang contends that regional nuclear powers have adopted three identifiable nuclear postures (Narang, 8):

A catalytic posture, in which a state threatens to use nuclear weapons to prompt a powerful third-party to intervene on its behalf;
An assured retaliation posture, in which a state seeks assured second-strike capabilities to deter an adversary’s first use of nuclear weapons; and
An asymmetric escalation posture, in which a state seeks to deter conventional military operations by threatening to cross the nuclear threshold first.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

What is nuclear command-and-control?

Nuclear command-and-control (C&C) refers to an interlocking series of institutional arrangements, operational procedures, and technical mechanisms that could provide leaders with the means to manage and employ nuclear forces as well as prevent their unauthorized or accidental use.

What are the primary components of C&C?

Leaders establish a national command authority (NCA), which is the highest decisionmaking body for nuclear posture and use. The composition of the body and the importance of its members vary from state to state.

In India, the NCA is comprised of a Political Council to make nuclear-employment decisions and an Executive Council to execute those orders. The Political Council includes the prime minister’s Cabinet Committee on Security and his or her national security adviser while the Executive Council includes the head of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), the chiefs of the air force, army, and navy as well as the directors of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), among others (see graphic below) (Koithara). The SFC retains custody of delivery systems whereas the DAE and DRDO maintain nuclear warheads and trigger assemblies in separate locations (Kampani). Military advice is part of the decision making process, but the power of decision lies firmly in civilian hands, and the apex decision maker is the Indian prime minister, who chairs the NCA.


Pakistan has established and published charts of its NCA, which place the civilian prime minister at the apex of decisionmaking. But in Pakistan, prime ministers take their cues on national security issues from the army leadership. Pakistan has released publicly the composition of its NCA and its supporting bodies, including the Employment Control Committee (ECC), the Development Control Committee (DCC), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Services Strategic Forces (SSF) (Khan, 334). The Pakistani prime minister chairs both the ECC and the DCC. Other key members of the ECC are the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, interior, and finance; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the three service chiefs, among others (see graphic below) (Khan, 336). The SPD staffs both the ECC and DCC as the NCA’s secretariat in addition to implementing nuclear force policies and directing fissile-material and delivery-system production (Khan, 332 and NTI). The prime minister sits at the head of the ECC, but the most powerful man in the country is the chief of army staff.

If leaders are incapacitated or otherwise unable to chair deliberations in India and Pakistan, there is an order of succession to assume leadership. Neither India nor Pakistan has issued public statements about these procedures.

What is the always/never dilemma?

The always/never dilemma refers to a stark challenge facing nuclear-armed states: how to design decisionmaking procedures and physical mechanisms for nuclear weapons so that they will always work when proper authorization for use occurs, but never work without proper authorization.

For nuclear weapons to pass the test of the always/never dilemma, they must be:

Reliable, i.e., they will function properly if the need to use them arises;
Safe, i.e., they will not detonate if they are acquired by outsiders or by unauthorized personnel, and they will not create a mushroom cloud in the event of an accident or if subject to attack (Krepon); and
Secure, i.e., they are protected against theft and other internal security threats.
The safest and most secure place for nuclear weapons is at extremely well-guarded facilities. This assumes, however, that the guardians of nuclear weapons are completely trustworthy. An adversary presumably knows the location of these facilities because they can be readily recognized by satellite imagery. Because these locations can be targeted, nuclear weapons and their means of delivery might be moved in a crisis. The more a nuclear weapon is readied for use, which includes removal from highly-guarded facilities, the harder it is to maintain nuclear weapon safety and security.

One mechanism to guard against unauthorized use and to gain time for sound decisionmaking is to maintain warheads separate from launchers. In a crisis, warheads can be mated with launchers, awaiting authorization for use by the NCA. Close observers suspect that both India and Pakistan maintain warheads separated from launchers (Koithara and Lavoy). This safety and security mechanism is very hard to maintain when warheads are placed at sea, which both India and Pakistan are in the process of doing (Rehman). This safety mechanism is also very hard to maintain with tactical delivery systems (Krepon). Pakistan has embraced short-range systems as part of full-spectrum deterrence to counter Indian conventional military advantages.

Some nuclear weapons have no range at all—such as the atomic demolition munitions that the United States and the Soviet Union embraced during the Cold War. These “backpack” bombs along with nuclear artillery shells are the most unsafe and least secure nuclear weapons.

What are negative and positive control?

Scholars sometimes discuss the always/never dilemma in terms of leaders’ preferences for negative or positive control. Negative control refers to systems that are “designed to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons” while positive control deals with “those elements that assure [a NCA’s] instructions to launch nuclear weapons reach the forces and will be carried out” (Congressional Research Service, 6).

How do states attempt to address the always/never dilemma?

National leaders cannot expect to resolve the always/never dilemma. A perfectly safe and secure nuclear weapon may not be available for use when deemed necessary, and an available nuclear weapon may not be perfectly safe and secure. National leaders are obliged to choose command-and-control arrangements that best suit their security needs.

A state like India, which prioritizes civilian control, enjoys conventional military advantages, and has adopted a no-first-use nuclear posture, may choose “assertive” command-and-control arrangements. An assertive C&C orientation is characterized by “the fact that central commanders have constrained the autonomy of lower-level operators and asserted control over operations” using “intrusive” and “physically restrictive measures” (Feaver, 169).

A state like Pakistan, in which the military maintains control over nuclear weapons and which adheres to the option of using nuclear weapons first because of conventional military disadvantages, may select “delegative” command-and-control procedures. A delegative C&C system means that leaders grant military operators a “degree of autonomy” in nuclear-weapons employment situations while imposing “fewer physical constraints” and relying on “the operators’ voluntary obedience” to their directives (Feaver, 168).

Peter Feaver contends that two factors determine leaders’ ultimate choice of command-and-control procedures: 1) civil-military relations and 2) “time urgency” (Feaver, 174). Whereas assertive arrangements predominate in countries where patterns of civil-military relations are stable and the military does not participate in politics, delegative procedures are more common in countries with volatile civil-military relations and a history of military intervention in the political arena.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

Appreciate your posting here. Do you expect any questions or even an essay on Nuclear Arms Race or on Indo-Pak nuclear regimes? Please share Pakistan's Nuclear Command & Control structure, etc. Is there any latest report on Pakistan's Nuclear Security Program by any international institution dealing Nuclear?

Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Regime: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan

http://www.mofa.gov.pk/documents/PNSR.pdf

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson

1. What types of nuclear weapons the P5+India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and Iran possess? Does size of the bomb matter?
2. Also share the status of NPT and CTBT in regards to India & Pakistan: How many countries have joined, ratified so far?
3. Share Basic Terms related to Bombs

1. Weapons of Mass Destruction?
2. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones?
3. Export Controls?
4. General Assembly Resolutions on the subject?

1. STATES HAVE GONE ON TO DEVELOP WEAPONS THAT DWARF THE POWER OF THE BOMBS DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI.

At the height of the Cold War, thousands of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles on high alert were capable of delivering up to 10 independently targeted warheads at a time, each one twenty times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. Though decades of arms control agreements have slowly reduced the size of their arsenals, nuclear weapon States still possess the capability to destroy each other many times over.

NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES STILL POSSESS THE CAPABILITY TO DESTROY EACH OTHER MANY TIMES OVER.


The largest nuclear explosion in history was the 1961 Soviet “Tsar Bomba” test, which measured more than 50 megatons (3,800 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb). To generate an explosion of this magnitude using dynamite, it would require 50 billion kilograms (over 110 billion pounds) of TNT, which is more than the weight of all the cargo that has passed through London’s Heathrow airport in the past 40 years. Expressed in volume, this would amount to 18 blocks of TNT each as large as the Empire State building.

“As the bomb fell over Hiroshima and exploded, we saw an entire city disappear. I wrote in my log the words: "My God, what have we done?"
Robert Lewis, pilot of the plane that dropped the 'Little Boy' bomb, April 1947

India misused plutonium extracted from its CIRUS heavy water reactor, supplied for energy purposes only, for conducting its first nuclear explosion 'Smiling Buddah' in 1974.


India’s 1974 nuclear explosion used plutonium extracted from its CIRUS heavy water reactor, supplied for energy purposes only (This misuse led to sanctions on India and the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group). Although it has now developed centrifuge enrichment capability, India claims that all HEU is intended for naval propulsion. To cope with its shortage of uranium reserves, India hopes to develop reactors that breed plutonium and to move eventually to a thorium fuel cycle.

Dust raised by the Pakistan I test on 28 May 1998.

Pakistan drew on the expertise of A. Q. Khan; and his procurement network to develop centrifuge enrichment capability. Since Pakistan did not initially have plutonium production capability, it is assumed that HEU was used for the tests it conducted in 1998. However, Pakistan’s plutonium production reactor at Khushab came online in 1998. These heavy water reactors will produce plutonium and tritium, key elements for thermonuclear weapons.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) separated plutonium for weapons from its Yongbyong reactor after announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in 2002.



2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.



Status of the Treaty

The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

General Assembly Resolutions

A/RES/66/33 (2011)
A/RES/61/70 (2006)
A/RES/56/24 (2001)


The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 27 April to 22 May and presided over by Ambassador Taous Feroukhi (Algeria), ended without the adoption of a consensus substantive outcome. After a successful 2010 Review Conference at which States parties agreed to a final document which included conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, including the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the 2015 outcome constitutes a setback for the strengthened review process instituted to ensure accountability with respect to activities under the three pillars of the Treaty as part of the package in support of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.



Neither India nor Pakistan joined the NPT. The Indian establishment was divided on the matter. New Delhi was committed to disarmament objectives, but there was concern that the absence of security guarantees would make India vulnerable to attack (Perkovich, 134). Many also saw the treaty as discriminatory (Ibid). In the end, the Indian government chose not to accede to the NPT (Ibid, 145). Pakistan initially supported the treaty, but opted out when India did. In short, Pakistan wanted to retain the option to go nuclear if India attained nuclear weapons (Chakma, 270). As in India, many in Pakistan viewed the treaty as discriminatory. India and Pakistan therefore remain de facto, rather than de jure, nuclear-weapon states.




3. Basic Terms:

Atom: The smallest particle of matter that can have the properties of a chemical element. Atoms

Radiation riskare composed of protons (positively charged particles), electrons (negatively charged particles), and neutrons (uncharged particles). Protons and neutrons are heavy particles that are found in an atom's nucleus (the core). Electrons, which are much smaller and lighter, orbit the nucleus

Fission: The splitting of the nucleus of an element into fragments. Heavy elements such as uranium or plutonium release energy when fissioned.

Fusion: The combining of two nuclei to form a heavier one. Fusion of the isotopes of light elements such as hydrogen or lithium gives a large release of energy.

Radiation: Radiation is any energy that is emitted from some source and travels through space. This includes things such as light, sound, and heat. The radiation typically referred to when discussing nuclear weapons or nuclear energy is ionizing radiation, which comes from unstable atoms. To become stable, unstable atoms emit radiation in the form of particles, such as alpha and beta radiation, or in the form of electromagnetic waves, such as gamma radiation and X-rays. Source: http://www.orau.gov/reacts/define.htm

Alpha Radiation: Radiation consisting of helium nuclei (atomic wt. 4, atomic number 2) that are discharged by radioactive disintegration of some heavy elements, including uranium-238, radium-226, and plutonium-239.

Beta Radiation: Radiation consisting of electrons or positrons emitted from atoms at speeds approaching the speed of light.

Gamma Radiation: Electromagnetic waves released during radioactive decay that can ionize atoms and split chemical bonds.

Rad: A unit of absorbed dose of radiation defined as deposition of 100 ergs of energy per gram of tissue. It amounts to approximately one ionization per cubic micron.

Chain Reaction: The process of nuclear fission in which the neutrons released trigger other nuclear fission reactions at the same or greater rate. In a nuclear weapon, an extremely rapid multiplying chain reaction causes an explosive release of energy. In a nuclear reactor the pace of the chain reaction is controlled to produce heat (in a power reactor) or large quantities of neutrons (in a research or production reactor)

Critical Mass: The amount of a fissile substance that will allow a self-sustaining chain reaction. The amount depends both on the properties of the fissile element and on the shape of the mass.

Atom Bomb: A nuclear bomb whose energy comes from the fission of uranium or plutonium

Hydrogen Bomb: A nuclear weapon that derives its energy from the fusion of hydrogen. Also known as a thermonuclear weapon.

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“What we need in this country today is more courage and more belief in the things that we have.”- Thomas J. Watson