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Old Thursday, June 09, 2011
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Default Pakistan’s Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the Fluctuating U.S. Strategy..

Pakistan’s Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the Fluctuating U.S. Strategy
By
Syed Farooq Hasnat


Dr. Hasnat highlights the historical tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussing how the two nations’ policy concerns have overlapped and diverged at various points in time. He argues that it is the historical differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan —not their sameness — that should guide U.S. policy toward the region. Hasnat believes that Obama’s strategy of “AfPak,” in which Afghanistan and Pakistan policy is unified due to their political, economic, and social intertwinement, is a mistake. He states that the strategic interests of the two countries differ, and thus a single strategy should not be devised for dealing with insurgents and terrorists.


Contrary to some optimistic estimates and expectations, Afghanistan and the adjoining tribal areas of Pakistan still present a serious strategic challenge for U.S. policymakers. Even after more than eight years, the United States—along with NATO forces—has not been able to eradicate terrorists in the region. The Taliban resilience in defying foreign forces is intact. The Al Qaeda leadership and its infrastructure are believed to be in place, albeit curtailed and damaged. The Taliban are still receiving arms from various sources and are not short on finances. At the same time, Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government is seen as inept, corrupt and dysfunctional. The second Afghan presidential election held in August of 2009 was counterproductive to establishing national unity, despite being urgently needed to repair a fragmented Afghanistan.

Although much was expected from the Afghan election, it did not live up to the hopes of the world community. The election failed to transform Afghanistan from a tribal society into a modern democratic state. In the previous election of 2004, it was predicted that elected officials would bring stability and cohesion to the fragmented country. An experiment in enforced democracy, it was accompanied by the increased detachment of the nation’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. The central authority in Kabul exercised little writ over the provinces, and most of the tribes in the southeastern region of the country remained independent of any administrative control. In the social sphere, the Afghan people saw little improvement in the education and health sectors. Vital elements of a modern state, such as political parties, struggled to establish themselves. To make matters worse, the influence of corrupt warlords remained dominant in every sphere of life. Hopes for building a new Afghanistan were effectively shattered.

Afghanistan received considerable foreign aid to build new institutions, solidify existing ones and improve the quality of life of its people. In the last eight years, Afghanistan received around $38 billion dollars from the United States alone. This massive amount of aid was provided to facilitate an exit strategy for U.S. forces by stabilizing the regime. Under this logic, aid was meant to reorient local support away from the Taliban and toward the Americans. This, however, has not had the desired effect, as the Taliban have only grown in number.

President Karzai applied all means at his disposal, including employing the services of various warlords, to win the 2009 elections. He appointed Muhammad Qasim Fahim, a warlord with a criminal record including human rights violations, as his running mate. This choice came in spite of the displeasure of U.S. President Obama’s administration as well as opposition from European states and the United Nations. As one Afghan-based observer wrote, “People will tend to vote for the local strongman who has daily power over their lives. This is hardly surprising in a country more familiar with the Kalashnikov than the ballot box.”

Karzai, desperate to gain support from various ethnic groups, allowed Uzbek warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum to return from seven months of exile in Turkey. Dostum enjoyed considerable support among another Turkic population, the Turkmens. To make matters worse, he was given back his previous status of chief of staff of the Afghan army. The Uzbek general has been accused by various independent sources in and outside Afghanistan of the torture and brutal murders of thousands of prisoners of war in 2001. The British Daily Telegraph has described him as “one of Afghanistan’s most brutal leaders from the 1990s civil war onwards,” noting that “he is notorious for disciplining a thieving soldier by running him over in a tank and faced allegations—which he denies—that his forces oversaw the suffocation of up to 2,000 Taliban prisoners packed into steel shipping containers in 2001.” It is generally believed that, in spite of pressure from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to keep Dostum away, he was allowed to return as “part of a backroom deal with President Karzai.”5 Karzai’s plans to win the election at any cost put at risk his credibility and legitimacy as president. Such tactics signify that the Afghan presidential election was won not on the basis of public support, but rather through the influence of warlords.

Inducting the over-represented ethnic minorities and their notorious leaders into the Karzai government could start a violent ethnic reaction, splitting the country along the fault lines of ethnic divide. If so, it will gravely endanger the already delicate security landscape of Afghanistan. The Taliban could further gain Pashtun support, having an adverse effect on the military goals of the NATO and American forces. This ethnic-related support could also have a negative spillover effect across the border areas of Pakistan.

Despite the Karzai administration’s weakness, the Obama administration still supports him as Afghan president. Although he has been unable to win the support of his entire ethnic community, he is still a Pashtun, and thereby likely to maintain support from Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group. Abdullah Abdullah, his main opponent in the August elections, is not expected to rally the much required Pashtun support, especially in the southeast region of the country. By publicly providing support for Abdullah, Americans and Europeans may risk ruining any future chance of opening a dialogue with the “moderate” Taliban. The Taliban come primarily from Pashtun tribes, whose cooperation is a pre-condition for achieving stability in the war-torn country. A Washington Post editorial states that, “Unless the fraud can be reversed or repaired through a UN-backed complaints commission or a runoff vote, Mr. Karzai may emerge as a crippled winner, his already weak and corruption-plagued administration facing further discredit or even violent protests.”

While all Taliban may be considered Pashtuns, not all Pashtuns are Taliban. On the Pakistani side of the border, the Pashtuns are in the mainstream of society in terms of politics, the economy and shared cultural sentiments. Pakistani Pashtuns are generally considered to be more educated, sophisticated and politicized than their counterparts in Afghanistan. That is also true when it comes to the art of entrepreneurship. Pakistani Pashtuns are part of a society whose development ranges from agrarian to high-technology sectors (a small portion is tribal but with increasing linkages to advanced sectors), while the Afghan Pashtun society is purely tribal, where warlords operate freely and administer vicious control with great force and brutality. During Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, the Pakistani tribesmen living in the border region had little or no political strategic contact with the regime in Kabul. During this time, the Taliban placed little focus on the Pakistani tribes. Instead, the supreme Taliban leader Mullah Omar and his commanders aligned themselves with the military establishment of Pakistan, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), whose agents came from various ethnic backgrounds. The Afghan Taliban were closer to their Saudi Arabian allies than their fellow ethnic tribes of Pakistani Pashtuns who lived just across the border. The emergence of a Pakistani Taliban came much later as a reaction to various military assaults in the tribal areas. The linkage between the Pakistani Taliban and the war-hardened Afghan Pashtuns has remained disjointed, irregular and delicate.

Given these differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the neologism of AfPak irritates every section and shade of the Pakistani society. These resentments are further reinforced by the rapid change in the U.S. perception of Afghanistan’s security situation. In an interview with the Financial Times, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari rejected President Obama’s strategy of binding Afghanistan and Pakistan together, saying, “Afghanistan and Pakistan are distinctly different countries and should not be lumped together in the generic label of AfPak.”

Background

Since 1947, serious differences and tensions have existed between the two respective governments at various phases of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Even during times of extreme hostility between the two countries, however, the Pakistani tribes remained loyal to Pakistan. Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Afghan leaders cultivated relations with India, Pakistan’s archrival. It was only during Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001 that Afghan rulers were seen as strategic partners, though not always trusted by Islamabad. Under the faulty concept of Strategic Depth, the army leadership gave martial and logistical support to Mullah Omar, who was the de facto ruler of Afghanistan under the title Amir al-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). Pakistan’s aspirations to establish trade links with the landlocked Central Asian nations in order to give them access to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar required a cooperative Afghanistan given its geographical position. Another Pakistani interest has been the potential 1,040 mile gas pipeline from Turkmenistan.

Ultimately, under U.S. pressure after 9/11, the military rulers of Pakistan were forced to change course, provoking General Pervez Musharraf to give unconditional support to U.S. forces in their fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The suspicion that Musharraf and his fellow army generals had two faces, one for the international community and another for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, became a sore point in relations between Islamabad and Washington. Pakistan was repeatedly blamed for harboring terrorist groups, while at the same time General Musharraf was criticized by a large segment of the Pakistani public for conceding too much to the Americans. It was alleged by various political and religious leaders that Musharraf was fighting an American war at the expense of Pakistan’s national interests. The Christian Science Monitor, acknowledging the general’s utility to America, wrote at the exit of Musharraf, “The United States lost a stalwart ally in its war on terror…when Pervez Musharraf resigned as president to avoid a looming impeachment.”

Afghanistan’s Disarray and the Fallout for Pakistan

Pakistani society paid a heavy price for taking an unwarranted interest in the affairs of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s recent history of conflict has changed the complexion and psyche of its people, introducing a culture of extremism, bigotry and intolerance. These adverse impacts can be categorized in two manners: Pakistan’s identification with terrorists and an ideological degeneration in society. The first is illustrated by the widespread suspicion of Pakistan’s involvement with terrorism, which has served to isolate Pakistan in both regional and international environments. This has served to increase scrutiny on Pakistan as a nuclear power and strain Pakistan’s relations with other countries, including Iran and Turkey, along with others in the larger Middle East and the Central Asian republics. China became irritable about Pakistan’s pro-Taliban posture and its fallout in the Xinjiang province bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan. The most damaging consequence on Talibanization in Pakistan, however, came when India linked the indigenous Kashmir freedom struggle to extremist elements in Pakistan.

Islamabad’s links with the Taliban, however, remained one-sided. The Afghan government has ignored requests by the Pakistani government on at least two vital occasions. The first regarded the safety of Iranian diplomats in Herat in September 1998, when nine Iranians were killed in spite of the fact that “on the day of the attack, Pakistani diplomats had relayed to Teheran an assurance from the Taliban that the safety of the Iranian consulates and diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif would be guaranteed.” The second dealt with the unwarranted demolition of centuries-old Buddha statues in March 2001 despite stern warnings from Pakistan. Pakistan’s close ties with the Taliban regime, though dubious, helped turn Afghanistan into a rogue state not only for the non-Pashtun Afghan population but also for the international community.

In some Pakistani circles, any government in Kabul, whether friendly or not, was regarded as a threat to Pakistan’s security; however, given Afghanistan’s geography, any government in Kabul has little choice but to rely on Pakistan for its land route to the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could provide a significant helping hand for this conflict-ridden land, in a number of ways:

-->It has the longest border with Afghanistan and thus the capacity to provide logistical support to the landlocked country.
-->Afghanistan owes its trade and social support to the liberal passage policies of its eastern neighbor.
-->Pakistan has close religious and ethnic links with Afghanistan.
-->Pakistan provided a safe haven to the three million Afghan refugees that fled after the Soviet invasion. The Afghan mujahideen were provided with Pakistani passports, and the borders were kept open for those who sought asylum in Pakistan.
-->All Afghan leaders were given extensive Pakistani support during the Soviet invasion, and they operated from Pakistani territory, thus subjecting Pakistan to frequent Soviet bombardment and sabotage activities in which thousands of Pakistani citizens lost their lives.

Since the days of Soviet occupation in the 1980s, Pakistan has been intertwined with Afghanistan’s security and stability in a variety of ways. Most recently, Afghan militancy has increased due to a resurgence of the Taliban, and Pakistan is blamed for harboring insurgents in the safe havens of the FATA. BBC commentary, however, explains the reasons for the resurgence of 2005-2006 Afghan terrorist acts as follows:

The powerful drugs trade is undoubtedly intertwined with the current violence. Local power holders who feel marginalized may find themselves allied to the Taleban, at least in the short term. In some areas it’s difficult to distinguish between attacks by the Taleban and those by other radical Islamic groups or individuals. These include Hezb-e Islami, headed by former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, or those loyal to Jalaluddin Haqqani, a former mujahideen leader who also served in the Taleban government. The situation is further complicated by a complex web of shifting allegiances, tribal, ethnic and local rivalries and feuds within Afghan society. Afghans have been known to denounce rivals or enemies as members of the Taleban for political or economic gain.

In 2005, Pakistan deployed more than 80,000 troops in tribal and adjoining areas in Afghanistan, and by 2008 the number had increased to 120,000 troops. Though borders were sealed with the latest reconnaissance devices, the movement of militants continued in porous and difficult terrain.

The hope that the September 2005 parliamentary elections could create stability in Afghanistan, thereby substantially improving the overall situation, did not come to fruition. According to a report by the London-based Senlis Council (renamed the International Council on Security and Development, or ICOS) in December 2008, the Taliban still had a permanent presence in 72 percent of the country, up from 54 percent in 2007. The report elaborated:

[The Taliban] is now seen as the de facto governing power in a number of southern towns and villages. The increase in their geographic spread illustrates that the Taliban’s political, military and economic strategies are now more successful than the West’s in Afghanistan. Confident in their expansion beyond the rural south, the Taliban is at the gates of the capital and infiltrating the city at will.

Pakistan’s Onslaught against the Militants

While addressing the Pakistani nation on 7 May 2009, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani vowed that the time had come to take stern military action against the growing capacity of the insurgents, saying, “We will not bow down before terrorists and extremists and force them to lay down arms.” He made it clear that the government’s policy of engagement with the militants was taken as a sign of weakness. Army spokesman Major General Abbas, supporting the military action against the militants in Swat and other parts of the Malakand Division, refuted the allegations that this action was at the behest of the Americans. He said, “We analyse the threats keeping in view our national interest, and not on the dictates of external powers.” He explained that in spite of U.S. and NATO pressure, efforts were made by the government to reconcile with the militants and establish peace. “The operation will continue till its logical conclusion and complete elimination of extremists from the area,” he asserted.

Between April and July 2009, 12,000 to 15,000 Army personnel were launched by Pakistan against some 4,000 insurgents, comprised largely of locals though including cross-border militants. Afghanistan, conversely, relies almost entirely on foreign troops for its security needs, with adverse repercussions.

Waziristan along with some other regions of FATA are areas in which determined and war-hardened tribes reside. Two military operations in Waziristan in 2003 and 2004 were not successful, resulting in conciliatory peace agreements with the tribal leaders in which Pakistani armed forces agreed to withdraw from the area. This has been routine practice going back to British times. The strategy typically adopted to settle disputes among Pakistan’s warring tribes is to go to a jirga (assembly of elders to settle disputes), where tribal members present their arguments before an assembly that then resolves the matter. With the emergence of a new socio-political configuration in the tribal belt of Pakistan, these principles of conflict resolution and peace no longer held. The militants have replaced the traditional malik (leader of a tribe), and the representative of the federal government is too weak to even visit the area of his appointment, let alone exert any power there.

Under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, the Waziri tribe formed the Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, in December 2007. Earlier in 2002, Pakistani troops took limited and perfunctory military action in the area against the fugitive fighters who had crossed borders from Afghanistan and were planning attacks against NATO troops. In February 2005, the Pakistani government signed a peace deal with the Mehsud tribe, after which the tribe controlled the landscape with negligible writ of the state in Waziristan. Mehsud was known to be a close ally of the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan. Another difficulty that the Pakistani government faces—and one often overlooked by Western nations—is that Pashtuns are well-entrenched in Pakistani society and cannot be separated from the mainstream of Pakistan. In spite of the fact that a consensus has developed against the militants, the Pakistani people will not support the troops if they fight against their fellow countrymen to further the security needs of Afghanistan.

With the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and widespread terrorist attacks on the civilian population, Pakistani public opinion began to rally against the Taliban and similar outfits. Even after the exit of Musharraf in August 2008, there was a large section of public opinion, including members of the legislature, who believed that they were being dragged into a war that was not Pakistan’s to fight. This cohort argued that the Afghan conflict was a messy American war into which Pakistan should not be drawn. They believed that the Pakistani government should instead negotiate with tribes angry because of U.S. and NATO military assaults on the Afghan people. The Swat military operations in the summer of 2009, however, ultimately helped build a consensus amongst all sections of the population, who vowed strict military action against the insurgents.

Fluctuating U.S. Regional Strategy

The future U.S. policy in the region was presented by President Obama’s announcement on 27 March of the AfPak strategy for fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. According to the Obama administration, both countries have similar interests and features, and therefore a single strategy should be adopted to fight the insurgents and terrorists.

This change of course began as soon as the president assumed office in January. During the presidential debates, Obama had made it clear that Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan would be a priority, as Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership were still active in those areas. He was critical of the Bush administration for diverting forces to Iraq at the expense of Afghanistan. Obama made this point in the first presidential debate held on 14 October 2008 when he said, “The question is, was this wise [to leave Afghanistan]? We have seen Afghanistan worsen, deteriorate. We need more troops there. We need more resources there.” He went on to emphasize,

…Keep in mind that we have four times the number of troops in Iraq…than we do in Afghanistan. And that is a strategic mistake, because every intelligence agency will acknowledge that Al Qaeda is the greatest threat against the United States and that Secretary of Defense Gates acknowledged the central front—that the place where we have to deal with these folks is going to be in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. So here’s what we have to do comprehensively, though. It’s not just more troops. We have to press the Afghan government to make certain that they are actually working for their people. And I’ve said this to President Karzai.

No. 2, we’ve got to deal with a growing poppy trade that has exploded over the last several years.

No. 3, we’ve got to deal with Pakistan, because Al Qaeda and the Taliban have safe havens in Pakistan, across the border in the northwest regions, and although, you know, under George Bush, with the support of Senator McCain, we’ve been giving them $10 billion over the last seven years, they have not done what needs to be done to get rid of those safe havens.

And until we do, Americans here at home are not going to be safe.

Departing from the previous policy of President Bush, the Obama administration pledged to concentrate on the Al Qaeda leadership and its Taliban allies, who were thought to be present in southwestern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan, especially Waziristan.

President Obama’s new policy announcement was accompanied by a White House white paper, which explained the objectives and recommendations for the new policy. Some of the main goals highlighted in the white paper include:

-->Disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, preventing their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.
-->Assistance for enhanced civilian control and a democratic government.
-->Help in building up Pakistan’s economic structures.
-->Conditional assistance for the Pakistani military, depending on their willingness to eliminate the sanctuaries Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups within the country.
-->Engage the Pakistani people in a long-term commitment for a revived economy, democracy and civil society.

As a follow-up to this strategy, the U.S. Congress passed the Kerry-Lugar legislation in September 2009, according to which Pakistan will receive $1.5 billion a year for five years for the development of social and economic institutions. This bill also authorizes military aid, drawing from the $400 million Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), on the condition that the U.S. administration certify Pakistan’s commitment to combat militants. The bill contains other strict conditions which have deepened tensions between the military establishment and the Zardari regime. Within days of Congress passing the final bill, Pakistani public opinion showed grave resentment and rejected many conditions mentioned in the bill. It was felt that Pakistan’s sovereignty was being compromised and that the United States desired to micromanage Pakistan’s strategic affairs. Ironically, although the bill was intended to create a long-term partnership between the United States and the people of Pakistan, it turned out to be a source of misunderstanding and suspicion between the two countries. The Kerry-Lugar Bill conditions also annoyed the Pakistani military at a critical juncture, when it was busy engaging the insurgents on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. A leading Pakistan daily highlighted the displeasure of the military:

The army has, unusually, made its feelings public. The terse press release issued after the corps commanders’ meeting evoked immediate panic at the presidency and in government corridors, with no room left for doubt over what the military made of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The statement expressed ‘serious concern’ over some of the provisions of the legislative bill and warned that these could affect ‘national security.’ Clauses referring to Pakistan’s nuclear programme, cross-border militancy and civilian government control over military appointments and promotions are reported to have caused most agitation, given their implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty.

In an interview with the Pakistani television channel Express News, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan said that some of the clauses in the financial bill might be poorly drafted. She also argued that some people in the U.S. Congress might not have understood the full content of the bill, but that the United States was acting on good intentions.

After the AfPak strategy was announced in March 2009, the U.S. administration and military leadership struggled to agree on a strategy for Afghanistan. Amid this confusion in Washington came an assessment report by General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The report painted a doomsday picture of Afghanistan and asked for more troops. It was further complicated by the rigged Afghan presidential election, during which the Karzai government lost legitimacy and credibility amongst the Afghan people.

General McChrystal has asked for as many as 40,000 more U.S. troops in Afghanistan in addition to the roughly 68,000 already authorized. If the request is approved, the combined force of nearly 110,000 will approach the size of the Soviet troop deployment in Afghanistan at its height in the 1980s. Conversely, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and other civilian members of the Obama administration oppose any increase in the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, preferring instead to focus on going after the leadership of Al Qaeda, especially in Pakistan. In a meeting on 30 September 2009 at the White House, Obama’s national security team was split over whether to send in additional troops. According to a report:

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and special Afghan and Pakistan envoy Richard Holbrooke appeared to be leaning toward supporting a troop increase. . . . White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel and Gen. James Jones, Obama’s national security adviser, appeared to be less supportive. . . . Vice President Joe Biden, who attended the meeting, has been reluctant to support a troop increase, favoring a strategy that directly targets al-Qaida fighters who are believed to be hiding in Pakistan. . . . Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both support McChrystal’s strategy. . . . Defense Secretary Robert Gates is on the fence.

As a result of changing circumstances in Afghanistan, President Obama faces a dilemma in defining a final strategy for Afghanistan, one which will most likely differ from the AfPak strategy launched in March. In a CNN interview he said, “I don’t want to put the resource question before the strategy question . . . there is a natural inclination to say, if I get more, then I can do more. But right now, the question is, the first question is, are we doing the right thing? Are we pursuing the right strategy?”

Conclusion

In the war against terror, Pakistan strongly prefers to be dealt with individually and separately from Afghanistan. Being two sovereign nations, both countries have specific security interests. Indian interests and interference in Afghanistan further complicate the strategic equation of the region. Moreover, Pakistan’s needs are different from that of its northwestern neighbor, with the development of socioeconomic and political institutions varying to a great extent. That is the reason for Pakistan’s discomfort with the neologism of AfPak.

A former chief of the Pakistani Army, General Mirza Aslam Beg, wrote that AfPak has presented many challenges for Pakistan, as “the war in Afghanistan has been reversed on Pakistan resulting into a running battle from Swat to Dir, to Waziristan and possibly Baluchistan in the very near future. The occupation forces surge in Helmand province of Afghanistan is causing spillover effects on the ongoing operations in Pakistan.” Beg and others have long held the view that the presence of the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan and the drone attacks on the Pakistani tribal areas have caused the Pashtun tribes to become aggressive, defiant and militant. They have argued that it was the presence and attacks of the U.S. forces on the tribal belt of Pakistan and General Musharraf’s policies of belligerence that had ignited suicide bombers and other terrorist activities. Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad said in a public speech, “I guarantee if the government withdraws the army from the Tribal Areas and leaves the restoration of peace to the local jirgas, normalcy will return to the region.” Hussain reportedly stressed that dialogue rather than force would solve the situation in the FATA. Former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mushahid Hussain Sayed has held the view that Pakistan was being used as a scapegoat by some in the United States to hide their ineffectiveness in Afghanistan. There is also a third view held by conspiracy theorists, who are many in Pakistan and should be taken seriously given their ability to influence public opinion. Ahmed Quraishi, a former journalist at Pakistan’s national television network, represents this view as follows:

In less than two years, the United States has successfully managed to drop from news headlines its failure to pacify Afghanistan. The focus of the Anglo-American media—American and British—has been locked on Pakistan. In order to justify this shift, multiple insurgencies and endless supply of money and weapons has trickled from U.S.-occupied Afghanistan into Pakistan to sustain a number of warlords inside Pakistan whom the American media calls ‘Taliban’ but they are actually nothing but hired mercenaries with sophisticated weapons who mostly did not even exist as recently as the year 2005.

The long-established Pakistani fear of Indian influence in Afghanistan is confirmed by General McChrystal’s September 2009 report, which notes that:

Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.

General McChrystal’s assessment will likely reinforce opposition to the notion of AfPak by supporting the idea that more than one country’s interests are involved in Afghanistan. Based on this belief, it would be illogical to lump Afghanistan and Pakistan together exclusively for the purposes of formulating strategic policy.

The strategic requirements of Pakistan are worlds apart from those of Afghanistan. It is true that events in Afghanistan had a bearing on Pakistan at least twice in recent history, most notably in 1978 and 2001. These events occurred, however, as a result of choice and improvised policies of Islamabad. Pakistan could otherwise have avoided involvement in Afghanistan’s affairs while still minimizing any strategic impact on its own society. The meddling in Afghanistan caused negative repercussions not only for the tribal areas of Pakistan, but for other parts of the country as well. These actions wreaked havoc upon the centuries old liberal and accommodating society of what is now Pakistan by introducing alien cultures of bigotry, extremism and fanaticism.

Based on the above discussion, we may reasonably determine that a near consensus has developed in Pakistan calling for meaningful government action to eradicate terrorism. After a vicious series of suicide bombing attacks by the Taliban outfits, this would warrant a forceful response. Nonetheless, the consensus also dictates that Pakistan’s security concerns are fundamentally different from those of Afghanistan and that Pakistan should avoid meddling in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

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Default Post-Cold War International Relations...

Post-Cold War International Relations: Trends And Portents
By
Sharif M. Shuja

Two world wars and the establishment of totalitarian tyrannies have shaken our faith in progress; technological civilization has shown that it possesses immense powers of destruction, for the natural world as well as for the cultural and spiritual environment. The civilization of abundance is also that of famines in Africa and other places. The collapse of totalitarian communism has left intact the evils of the democratic liberal societies, ruled by the demon of money. As the scramble for global wealth unfolds, international banks, transnational corporations are anxious to play a direct role in shaping financial structures and policing economic reforms.

One can find modem societies repellent on two accounts. On the one hand, they have taken the human race and turned it into a homogeneous mass: modern humans seem to have all come out of a factory, not a womb. On the other hand, they have made every one of those beings a hermit. Capitalist democracies have created uniformity, not equality, and they have replaced fraternity with a perpetual struggle among individuals. The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have brought neither economic stability nor social democracy to the world. Instead of 'a New World Order', based on democracy, open markets, law and a commitment to peace, we witness a geopolitical disorder.

On the positive side, it has paved the way for the universal aspiration for democracy as the only form of acceptable government because of its vital self-correcting capacity. It is said that we now live in one world, often called a global village. It can be argued that in many ways, particularly in terms of instant communications, of economic value, of a desire to avoid war, of a functional integration, of disease control, monetary and trade policies and so on, we are more of an integrated global community than ever before.

The dynamic transfer of people, information, capital and goods is progressing on a worldwide scale. Globalisation and an expansion of information technology have given rise to a new wave of changes in international relations. In this global era, people from numerous countries and civilizations will be blessed with the opportunity to work together.

While discovering in the next section the general trends in post-Cold War international relations, this article does not deal with how to learn the tricks of international relations. It is rather a reflection on some pretty powerful underlying forces which govern our lives unless we understand and take control of them.

Trends in Post-Cold War International Relations

These general trends can be identified in post-Cold War international relations.

First, on the security front, we have observed the decline in the salience of strategic nuclear weapons. The world is in transition from nuclear to conventional deterrence at the central (global) level. In the Cold War era, the strategic pillar of mutual assured destruction (MAD) made conquest difficult and expansion futile by either camp. The futility of expansion accounted for robust deterrence. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was robust for at least two other reasons: (1) due to the futility of 'overkill', it was possible for the superpowers to reach a weapons parity, and thus equilibrium, bringing stability to the system; and (2) ever fearful of the massive destructive might of nuclear weapons, each superpower had a powerful incentive to constrain its followers, lest a reserve proxy war break out unwittingly.

Thus, on the security front, we recognize that there is a growing trend toward depolarization, with the United States as the sole superpower. With the danger of thermonuclear warfare greatly diminished, the world has become more peaceful. But at the same time, the revival of nationalism, fundamentalism and ethnonationalist disputes in some part of the world has become a threat to international peace and the integrity of nations. New short and long-term security challenges also have come to the fore, such as the ongoing mid-intensity regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and uncertainties surrounding the reform process in the former Soviet Republics (Commonwealth of Independent States) and in other former socialist countries.

One important aspect is that the concept of security is now broadening to encompass issues, such as national development and economic interdependency, environmental protection and the promotion of democracy and human rights.

Second, on the economic front, there is a continuing trend toward tripolarity, with the European Union (EU), North America, and East Asia as the major poles. Each of them accounts for approximately one-fourth of the world's gross national product (GNP). The importance of economic factors in defining international relationships has grown relative to politico-security factors, and one of the major economic challenges facing us today is, of course, the possibility of increased friction among the three major economic poles.
This perception of tripolar economic alignments, in turn, makes us ask ourselves the following questions: Will the transatlantic security partnership run into trouble? Will transpacific trade friction intensify? Can regionalism and interdependence coexist in such a way as to maintain an open trading system, despite, or perhaps facilitated by, the tripolar economic arrangement?
Finally, on the ideological front, the ideas of market democracy, civil society, transparency and accountability of government, and market economy are becoming universalized.

The collapse of communism left the USA and its allies as the pre-eminent voices in intellectual, policy and scholarly discourse -- many of the values that the Soviets espoused have been discredited and generally rejected. Command economies and many of the elements of socialism are in disrepute; market principles, private property and competition are hailed as the essentials of economic health. Communist Party monopoly of power and extensive and intrusive state bureaucracies are rejected; elections, democratic governments and civil society are widely seen as the hallmarks of good governance.

The values and institutions associated with Western societies during the Cold War do not, of course, provide panaceas. They will undoubtedly undergo serious challenges, and modifications. International policies will continue to influence such choices, but will presumably not dominate them to the degree that bipolar politics did during the past half-century. Scholarship will continue to shape and clarify social, political, and economic options, but should operate in an atmosphere of greater openness and flexibility.

These fundamental transformations of international relations have undoubtedly produced profound changes in the Korean Peninsula. First of all, the major foreign policies and relationships of both the South and the North have undergone significant changes. Although Pyongyang seems reluctant to acknowledge these publicly, the tremendous changes that have taken place within its major allies and friends must have produced a profound impact on North Korea. The most obvious example is that North Korea together with South Korea as a Korean team participated in the XXVII Olympic Games in Sydney from 15 September to 1 October, 2000.

The Asia Pacific region is undergoing extensive and unprecedented change and the trend today is towards greater integration, democratization, and deregulation. Market forces have become the instruments of change and transformation in international relations and nowhere more so today than in the Asia Pacific region. The forces for global change are economic in origin, but they operate within particular political systems and deeply rooted cultures that will modify and condition their effect. The impact of global change upon the many disparate cultures and political systems of the Asia Pacific region is one of the most important issues of international relations today. Is globalisation a set of processes dominated by Western countries to their own advantage? It is not easy to answer, but the implication is that globalisation refers to a complex of changes rather than a single one. No single country, or group of countries, controls any one of them. Economic globalisation, of course, has been and is shaped by U.S . foreign and domestic policy.

Globalisation will not have the same effect in the Asia Pacific region as in North America or Europe, and it would be senseless to imagine that the impact would be similar, or that the results of globalisation would be uniform and comparable for all regions and cultures. At this stage we need to look at this globalisation issue more closely.

Globalisation and the Knowledge Divide

There is every indication that globalisation will increase. Western powers and the Western-based NGOs are likely to continue to promote the universalisation of values, rules and institutions. However, the pressure for homogenisation will intensify the struggle for diversity, autonomy and heterogeneity. Dr Samuel M. Makinda of Murdoch University's School of International Politics argued in 1998, in Current Affairs Bulletin (April/May), that:

The question of how to reconcile differences with uniformity, universalism with particularism, and globalisation with fragmentation, will remain central to policy makers at the national, regional and global levels. Political leaders will continue to determine policies that facilitate or frustrate globalisation, taking into account domestic and external pressures. But, at the same time, transnational forces will continue to lobby the states, regional organisations and the UN to try to influence those policies. It is this inter-subjective relationship between the policy-makers and the transnational forces that determines the character of globalisation.

However, the assumption that the real driving forces are the markets suits many political leaders. Government officials will, Dr Makinda further argues, 'often try to blame globalisation for their policy failures. They will claim that they were powerless to do much for their countries in the face of globalising forces. But, as always, they will claim credit for any positive results from globalisation'.

Conclusions

This article identifies four challenges that we should face in the 21st century. The first is that of peace. Since the end of the Cold War, a fourth
category of countries has appeared on the international stage, in addition to the industrialized and developing countries and those in transition. It comprises countries at war or emerging from conflict in which the state has been foundering in genocide and intercommunal massacres.

The second challenge: will this 21st century witness the onset of a new kind of poverty whose victims will live side by side with unprecedented wealth?
Sustainable development and the wise management of the global environment pose the third great challenge. Everywhere humanity is draining the resources which could have fed tomorrow's generation. We have to find our way towards another type of development. One that is more economic, more intelligent, more caring.

The fourth challenge is that of the 'erratic boat' syndrome. As a result of globalisation, many states appear to have mislaid their maps, compasses and direction-finding instruments, even the will to set a course. They are tossed about by the waves, who can no longer be controlled -- financial markets, raw materials markets, statistics of all kinds.

Yet awareness of these problems has sharpened and solutions exist: hope remains. We need the international community to return to the basic principles of international co-operation and introduce the idea that a minimum level of science and technological capability, including access to the Internet, is an absolute necessity for developing countries, and should be the subject of international solidarity. And greater co-operation between nation states, multinational corporations, the NGOs and the global business community are needed in meeting these challenges.

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Default Sovereignty in an age of globalisation...

Sovereignty in an age of globalisation
By
Dr Haider Shah

National sovereignty and honour have always been some of the most repeatedly used phrases in our national conversation. The Osama thriller has added fuel to the already raging fires. Many politicians and analysts appear fuming over the loss of national sovereignty in the outskirts of Abbottabad. The users of the cliché, however, do not realise that to a varying degree no country in the world enjoys sovereignty in a globalised world. In reality, ‘sovereignty’ is a glamourised ideal and the degree to which it can be achieved depends on the economic muscle of a country.

Economic and political freedoms are interdependent as our socio- political landscape is largely determined by economic realities, argues economist Milton Friedman, a Nobel Laureate. For instance, look at the example of the UK, which has always prided itself on its unique position in European affairs. In constitutional terms, the British parliament is said to enjoy complete sovereignty as it can change any law whenever it wishes to. The reality is now markedly different though, as economic gains have come at a price. After joining the European Union (EU) and adopting the European Convention on Human Rights via the Human Rights Act, 1998, the UK has traded off a big chunk of national sovereignty and has to conform to EU regulations and the European Court of Human Rights. Similarly, even a superpower like the US, when faced with economic ill health, is forced to do business with the healthier China — the human rights record of the latter notwithstanding.

Whether it is a case of rigorous research or analysing an organisational problem, the crucial test of success is always asking the right questions at the right time. The debate on the Osama incident appears to be purposefully hijacked by the right-leaning media analysts. Unfortunately, in the talk shows we have half a dozen analysts with half a dozen clichés which, like the ball bearings of a bomb, are relentlessly bombarded on us. Instead of asking what Osama was doing in Bilal Town, our writers and anchors have made loss of sovereignty the central theme of discussions. Like crackers, the discussions produce more noise than light. On the political side, the PPP leaders appear confused and voiceless. The MQM in recent times has emerged as a ‘friend in need’ for those who call the shots. It had offered its platform to the beleaguered General (retd) Musharraf on May 12, 2007 and once again it has made its services available in May 2011 to muddy the post-Osama conversation. Credit must, therefore, cautiously be given to Nawaz Sharif for setting the right tone for our national conversation by raising very pertinent questions. Better late than never.

In a globalised world, all countries are affected by any international terrorist movement. In the 20th century, the attention was on containing the Marxist movement due to its ‘workers of all lands unite’ appeal. In the 21st century, the world is concerned about the jihadi movement as, unlike the communist system in North Korea or the Tamil Tigers movement in Sri Lanka or Naxalism in India, the expanse of the jihadi movement is spread across all international borders and its appeal is not restricted to a single country. The Osama hunt was therefore not only a US mission but the whole international community was backing it up. The open declaration of Russia’s public support to the US action in Abbottabad should wake up all those who are shedding tears over our inability to stop the US action. Advocates of a megalomaniac stance should cast a glance over our national kitty first.

In the aftermath of Osama’s killing in a posh cantonment and at a stone’s throw from the country’s premier military academy, there are few chances that foreign investors would be willing to queue for Pakistan. Pakistan was ditched by its so-called eternal friends after signs of deteriorating economic health became evident in 2007 and was forced to approach the IMF for a bailout package of $ 11.3 billion to avert a balance of payments crisis. It appears that the donor agencies and other international actors have become wary of Pakistan’s use of the war on terror as an excuse for demanding external aid. David Bosco, an international affairs analyst, writes on his blog that an IMF official confirmed to him that a senior Fund mission would visit Pakistan in May to oversee the 2011-2012 budget as the upcoming budget was crucial for putting Pakistan’s economy back on track. Since the IMF has set its eyes on the budget, the economic realities pushed the PPP government to forge a new political alliance.

Jingoistic calls for sovereignty are a source of entertainment for many. An excited and agitated mind releases adrenalin into our bloodstream and is the source of our joyful exuberance. We are all entitled to keep ourselves happy. But there are far less risky ways of getting adrenalin pumped into our blood. A roller coaster ride or watching a horror movie would do the same. All hawks are advised to consider these simple alternatives to keep themselves entertained. Their jingoistic calls of severing ties with the international community by preserving mythical sovereignty are too dangerous and would prove a recipe for total self-destruction. Germany and Japan learnt their lessons in 1945. Hope we learn the lesson without undergoing same level of catastrophe. If we are genuinely concerned about sovereignty, we should start thinking about putting some flesh on our impoverished economy. Political and economic freedoms are interdependent. Friedman’s teaching should never be forgotten.

The writer teaches public policy in the UK and is the founding member of Rationalist Society of Pakistan. He can be reached at hashah9@yahoo.com

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Default Between Threats and War...

Between Threats and War (Part-I)
U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World
By
Micah Zenko,

Release Date: September 2010

INTRODUCTION

When confronted with a persistent foreign policy problem that threatens interests, one that cannot be adequately addressed through economic or political pressure, American policymakers routinely resort to using limited military force. Current and former government officials, foreign policy ana*lysts, and citizens call for the limited use of force with the belief that it poten*tially can resolve the problem expediently and without resulting in unwanted military or local civilian casualties. Proponents of such operations are found across the entire political spectrum, and their proposals range from the practical to the satirical: from centrist former senior Pentagon and State Department officials proposing to bomb North Korean ballistic missiles poised to launch; to a liberal Washington Post columnist calling for a Preda*tor missile strike to kill Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe—a scheme that was one-upped by a former diplomat and human rights advocate who suggested a “messy in the short run” invasion to oust Mugabe; to a White House spokesperson advocating the assassination of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein because “the cost of one bullet . . . is substantially less” than the cost of war—a scheme echoed by a conservative pastor who himself encouraged the assassination of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez because “it’s a whole lot cheaper than starting a war.” Out of anger, empathy, or impatience with an ongoing foreign policy dilemma, advocates in and out of the U.S. govern*ment continually propose the subject of this book—Discrete Military Opera*tions (DMOs).

America’s use of limited military force and DMOs since the end of the Cold War is important because the United States continues to be the domi*nant international actor and because U.S. decisionmakers have increasingly turned to the use of limited force against other states or non-state actors to achieve their policy goals. In addition, rapid technological advances in the
U.S. military’s capacity to conduct precise strikes from a safe distance, and an international setting in which the United States faces a potentially open-ended threat from non-state terrorist networks, make it likely that the reliance on limited force will remain a persistent feature of U.S. foreign policy. De*spite the rising significance of DMOs, however, it is unclear and understudied whether limited uses of force have succeeded at achieving their intended mili*tary and political objectives.

To clarify and illuminate recent U.S. limited uses of force, this book pres*ents a new concept: “Discrete Military Operations.” Here, DMOs are defined as a single or serial physical use of kinetic military force to achieve a defined mili*tary and political goal by inflicting casualties or causing destruction, without seeking to conquer an opposing army or to capture or control territory. DMOs usually consist of a single attack or series of sortie strikes, lasting just minutes, hours, or a few days. DMOs usually involve only one combat arm and one mode of attack directed against an adversary’s military capabilities or infrastructure, regime or organizational assets, or key leadership. DMOs are also proscribed by strict rules of engagement to ensure that the intensity and scope of the strike does not exceed levels necessary to attempt to achieve the political objectives.

In investigating U.S. DMOs from 1991 through June 1, 2009, thirty-six in all, this book answers three basic questions: “Why were they used?” “Did they achieve their intended military and political objectives?” and “What variables determined their success or failure?” By broadly addressing these questions, the book evaluates the policy choices of U.S. officials over the past two decades and offers recommendations for how limited military force can be better used in the future. In addition, because U.S. uses of DMOs have now been a reality for four successive administrations, the insights and recom*mendations from this book are increasingly relevant to making predictions about the development of American grand strategy and military policy.

The available evidence demonstrates that U.S. DMOs achieved all of their military objectives just over half of the time, and all political objectives less than 6 percent of the time. However, this large gap between political goals and military outcomes is predictable: identifying and destroying a target is a far easier task than affecting the behavior of an adversary, or potential future adversaries, through the use of force. The primary political objectives can be summarized as any one, or a combination, of the following goals: punishment, or revenge, for an adversary’s past behavior with no intention of altering fu*ture behavior; deterrence, to attempt to maintain the status quo by discourag*ing an adversary from initiating a specific action; and coercion, to attempt to compel a change in an adversary’s future behavior. For punishment to suc*ceed, the military objective of a DMO must be met: if you miss the target, your adversary experiences little or no cost and may even be emboldened. For deterrence or coercion to succeed, the adversary must either maintain the sta*tus quo or change its own desired course of action because it was targeted by a limited strike. Determining whether political objectives have been met as a consequence of a DMO is a difficult analytical undertaking, but possible after carefully reconstruction of the intended and actual outcomes of each case.

If DMOs have been so unsuccessful at achieving their political objectives, why do they continue to be so enthusiastically proposed and utilized by U.S. decisionmakers? The key explanation lies in divergent opinions between senior civilian and military officials over the utility of limited force. In the United States, the military is responsible for planning and executing DMOs, but only at the explicit authorization of the president of the United States and the secretary of defense (collectively, formally known as the National Com*mand Authority). As a general proposition—supported by recent history and interviews with dozens of national security officials—senior civilian officials support the use of DMOs, while senior military officials do not. An explana*tion for this split, detailed in Chapter 2, is that those authorizing the use of DMOs believe that they will achieve some set of primary political objectives. In practice, however, they overwhelmingly do not.

In addition, policymakers and the general public, conditioned by round*the-clock television news coverage repeatedly showing video clips of America’s armed forces surgically destroying cross-haired targets from afar, would be surprised to discover that only five in ten DMOs achieve all of their military objectives. Despite military and intelligence budgets of over $700 billion and unparalleled air, sea, and space capabilities, human error, weapon malfunc*tions, and poor intelligence hamper DMOs just like they do many other U.S. military operations. Even DMOs that attempt to destroy an easily observ*able, fixed target can encounter a range of problems: planes carrying out the operation can be damaged or shot down before they release their ordnance; guidance data can be incorrectly programmed; unsuitable weapons systems can be selected; precision-guided munitions can veer off course, or be pushed by high winds; and cloud cover, smog, or dust storms can obscure targets that require visual acquisition at the last minute. Attempting to successfully destroy a mobile target—especially an individual—is even more difficult. The primary reason is that despite all of the intelligence collection assets utilized by the United States and its allies, human beings who believe they are tar*geted are adaptive, resilient, and hard to kill from a distance. Throughout the years, efforts to eliminate from afar such adversaries of the United States as Muammar Qadhafi, Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Osama Bin Laden have generally failed. For these reasons, as well as countless other prob*lems that arise in the fog of limited operations, U.S. DMOs fail to achieve their military objective as often as they succeed.


UNDERSTANDING DISCRETE MILITARY OPERATIONS

The ultimate tool of diplomacy, force is utilized with varying degrees of de*structiveness, duration, and effectiveness according to the objective and mili*tary capabilities available.

The U.S. military conceives of conflict occurring along a spectrum of five general operational themes, of which the middle three could include DMOs: peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irreg*ular warfare, and major combat operations. Another way to consider DMOs is along a use-of-force continuum as described by the following list—with peace at one end and total war at the other. DMOs exist in an as yet poorly defined zone between threat of force and limited war.

Discrete Military Operations Typology of Force
  • Peace with potential adversaries
  • Show of force to influence an adversary with no certain intent of war
  • Threat of force to achieve a change in an adversary’s behavior
  • Demonstrative force to achieve a change in an adversary’s behavior
  • Limited force to punish an adversary or achieve a change in behavior
  • Limited war with no certain intent of escalation
  • Total war of unrestrained use of capabilities to eliminate an adversary

As an illustrative metaphor for understanding international uses of force,
consider an assailant pointing a gun at a person’s head. If the aggressor pulls the trigger and kills the target without making a political demand, this ac*tion would be an act of punishment, or brute force. If the aggressor threatens to pull the trigger but does not, and affects some change of behavior in the target as a result of the threat, it is a threat of force. If the aggressor makes a specific demand of a change in behavior, seeks to maintain the status quo, or simply seeks to punish the target, and puts a bullet into the target’s foot, those are all the equivalents of a discrete military operation. The foot-shot type of DMO may be undertaken for one or several primary or secondary reasons: to achieve a tactical military objective, to punish, to deter, to coerce, or to dem*onstrate resolve to a domestic or international audience.

From a strategic perspective, what ultimately distinguishes a DMO from more ambitious and destructive uses of force is that it is usually undertaken without a theory of victory—a hypothetical narrative detailing how the en*suing conflict could be permanently resolved on favorable terms. Although DMOs rarely have a theory of victory, they can be evaluated as being success*ful on the basis of the intended political and military objectives. DMOs can also be the iterative application of limited force against an adversary during an ongoing hostile relationship. After the DMO is completed, there is no clear military or political resolution between the two adversaries. For example, President George H.W. Bush in 1989 declared his “war” on drugs, which he claimed that “together we will win.” In 1993, U.S. Special Forces either as*sisted in, or were directly responsible for, the death of Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar. While Escobar’s death might have momentarily slowed the supply of cocaine from Columbia, and even deterred other drug lords, it hardly resulted in a U.S. victory in the war on drugs. Similarly, while three presidents used DMOs between 1993 and 2003 against Iraq, none were “fight and win” operations undertaken with the clear intent of resolving the state of hostilities with Saddam Hussein’s regime. By contrast, the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq—Operation Iraqi Freedom—intended to depose the rul*ing regime and install a new political authority into power, thereby resolving America’s long-standing contentious relationship with Hussein.

There are two terms used by political scientists and military historians that should not be confused with DMOs. The first is the historical limited war concept ascribed to North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers during the Cold War, which attempted to find a use for conventional tank-based armies without risking the escalation of a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. As defined by Robert Osgood, “limited war is one in which the bel*ligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the bellig*erents are capable. . . . It demands of the belligerents only a fractional commit*ment of their human and physical resources.” Second, DMOs should not be considered alongside the small wars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conducted by imperial powers to politically and militarily control overseas territories, extract natural resources, or brutally eliminate colonial resistance movements. These wars were rarely small in their intensity or in*tent, but are defined as such by the size of the adversarial target—that is, any state that is not also a great or middle power.

DMOs also do not include humanitarian or refugee relief operations, in which the military essentially provides protection or basic provisions for dis*placed persons; peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, or stability operations, in which the military attempts to shape or control the operational environment of a defined territory through shows of force, direct actions, or policing; or noncombatant evacuation operations in non-hostile environments, such as those the U.S. Marines have undertaken in Liberia (October 1992 and April 1996), Yemen (May 1994), and the Central African Republic (May 1996). Although force may have been used to protect U.S. troops or citizens during these operations, none of them were undertaken with the intent to create ca*sualties or damage.

There are yet two more types of military operations that are not counted as DMOs. First, DMOs in support of civilian authorities that occurred within the United States are not assessed, such as the April 19, 1993, armored invasion of the Branch Davidian complex in Waco, Texas, which resulted in seventy-five deaths. This omission is because the scope of this book only considers lim*ited military force as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. Second, DMOs that received covert or overt intelligence or logistical support from U.S. military or intel*ligence agencies, but that are conducted by other countries, are also excluded. Recent examples include Turkey’s 2007 and 2008 limited air and ground campaign against suspected members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Northern Iraq, which received real-time intelligence and overhead imag*ery from U.S. aircraft and unmanned drones; the intelligence and logistics assistance given by the George W. Bush administration to the Ugandan gov*ernment in its efforts to kill Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army; and the Obama administration’s provision of planning support, fire*power, and intelligence for more than two dozen ground raids and airstrikes in Yemen in late 2009 and early 2010. While such operations benefited from direct U.S. assistance, they ultimately were both authorized and conducted by foreign military or intelligence agencies.......

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Default Between Threats and War...

Between Threats and War (Part-II)


U.S. DISCRETE MILITARY OPERATIONS USE AND ISSUES

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, American foreign policy decision-makers have faced a radically changed international landscape. First, the United States is a unipolar power in the international system, so far lacking a competing superpower to substantially constrain its actions. Second, many new threats have arisen, including rogue states that are harder to deter than was the Soviet Union; the spread of weapons of mass destruction to such states; and transnational terror networks lacking an identifiable military force and operat*ing from stateless zones, where the government does not or cannot maintain oversight or political control. Despite the widely held belief among academics and policymakers that “everything changed after 9/11,” a close reading of the U.S. national security strategy documents published in the past decade demon*strates that there has been little variation in America’s declared national inter*ests and security threats. These threats are much less clearly identifiable and smaller in scope than was the Soviet threat, and far less state-centric. To coun*ter these current and other foreseeable security threats, a troubling dilemma emerges when leaders shape America’s policy responses: while each threat clearly contains the potential to endanger vital or secondary U.S. interests such that they necessitate the use of military force, they usually fail to justify the costs of a conventional war. Consequently, American political leaders keep re*turning to the use of DMOs.

As a unipolar power, America also remains the military hegemon in the post–Cold War world. No other state maintains a comparable cumula*tive military capability to project force against an adversary anywhere in the world. No other government has committed the sustained resources needed to research and develop more advanced capabilities to rapidly project offensive military power—be it through ground forces or missiles. In addition, only the United States has the range of international interests that could compel intervention anywhere, as well as forty-eight reported off-the-shelf warplans that contemplate attacking other countries through, among other military options, prompt global strikes.

Despite being a growth industry over the past two decades, limited force as a tool of statecraft remains undefined, and largely unexamined in an analyti*cal manner. Simply put, scholars and military historians of the United States have shown a substantial bias toward studying major incidents rather than smaller ones. In fact, the most-utilized dataset for security studies scholars of warfare—the Correlates of War Inter-State War Dataset—does not include any use of force that resulted in fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths. An ad*vantage to studying DMOs over conventional wars is that limited applications of force are increasingly perceived by both civilians and the armed forces as a more “usable” and internationally palatable military option. One reason for this, according to a survey of all public opinion polls on the U.S. uses of force abroad between 1981 and 2005, is that Americans show higher levels of support for airstrikes than for the deployment of U.S. ground troops. A second rea*son is that military planners—often employing worst-case planning assump*tions—offer civilian decisionmakers ground combat options that include a larger number of troops to deploy overseas than civilians find politically ac*ceptable. Thus, although the United States occasionally used DMOs prior to the Cold War’s end, a review of the political-military debates over using force in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and elsewhere demonstrates that they have been much more regularly “on the table” since 1991.

The lack of scholarly attention to DMOs is troubling because such limited attacks have become the norm among American uses of military force since the First Gulf War. The United States has used direct military force against another country at least forty-one times during the time period covered in this book. Of these, five are not DMOs, as they had the intended goal of con*trolling, or altering the control of, the territory of another sovereign state or overthrowing a governing regime: Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan since 1991, and the Iraq war that started in 2003. As listed in the appendix, thirty-six of the U.S. post–Cold War direct uses of force were Discrete Military Operations—88 percent of all uses of force.

Even as the employment of DMOs has increased, their use has been ques*tioned and even ridiculed at times by political and military leaders as being ineffective. For example, George W. Bush, while campaigning for the presi*dency in 2000, derided the use of “pinprick strikes” in retaliation for sus*pected Al Qaeda terror attacks. President Bush later spelled out his low regard for DMOs: “When I take action,” he said, “I’m not going to fire a $2 million missile at a $10 empty tent and hit a camel in the butt. It’s going to be deci*sive.” Yet President Bush found DMOs to be an attractive option when he ap*proved a Predator attack against suspected terrorists in Yemen in November 2002, in addition to dozens of other instances in Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria. But later, as detailed in Chapter 6, Bush did not, prior to March 2003, autho*rize a DMO against a terrorist training camp in Northern Iraq that might have eliminated terrorist operative Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, his followers, and a potential WMD production facility. The Clinton administration used lim*ited force on multiple occasions, and President Clinton himself had an affinity for creative DMOs, once telling Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton, “You know, it would scare the shit out of al-Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of helicopters in the middle of their camp. It would get us enormous deterrence and show those guys we’re not afraid.” Yet throughout 1998–1999, when there were reportedly at least ten opportunities to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden, the Clinton administration repeatedly decided not to act.

The American military, meanwhile, has generally held a strong institu*tional opposition to DMOs. Despite the battlefield necessity since 2006 to adapt and integrate counterinsurgency principles into the Army and Marine Corps, since World War II, the U.S. military has preferred large-scale con*ventional wars of annihilation to smaller-in-scope, low-intensity operations. Historically, America’s military doctrine, force structure, global military posture, education and training, and career promotional incentives have all overwhelmingly supported a preference for big wars. Military officials per*ceive that civilians prefer DMOs because they are an immediately responsive tool of statecraft that will result in fewer U.S. and target-state casualties, have fewer domestic political costs, and quickly demonstrate America’s resolve and willingness to use force. Many generals and admirals disagree with the lat*ter point, and furthermore argue that DMOs have little long-term impact on changing an adversary’s behavior, but have the inherently dangerous potential to uncontrollably escalate into a larger unwanted war. Military officials ideally prefer some version of the Powell Doctrine, in which force is used in an over*whelming manner, with clearly defined political goals, the sustained support of the American public, and an achievable exit strategy. As a consequence of that mind-set, senior military leaders have decried DMOs as “tank plinking,” “salami-tactics,” “a wrist-slap plan,” “token retaliation,” “pissing in the wind,” “pure fantasy,” “cowboy Hollywood stuff,” “quasi military,” “a waste of good ordnance,” or simply “political.”

In his excellent study of the military’s influence on decisionmaking for U.S. uses of force during the Cold War, Richard Betts provided an institutional logic behind the civilian-military split highly relevant to intra-administration debates over DMOs. Betts’s rationale is worth quoting at length:

The military’s natural professional impulse is toward worst-case contingency planning for any conceivable disaster. The standard rationale is that enemy intentions cannot usually be perceived with certainty, and even if they are, they can change abruptly (such as in a cabinet or presidium shuffle), while lead-time requirements mean that enemy capabilities cannot be matched in a comparably short time. Political leaders, on the other hand, have to be more sensitive to competing nonmilitary needs. Their natural tendency is to “satisfice” rather than optimize, to shave as much as possible from the military estimates of their requirements. Because scarcity prevents providing resources for all hypothetical contingencies but because paralysis of policy is also undesirable, political authorities may sometimes be more prone to take risks by selecting options that have only a probability of success rather than a guarantee.


Contrary to the opinion of some civilian and almost all military leaders, DMOs have several clear advantages over both conventional warfare or choos*ing not to use force at all. First, DMOs can support a wide range of military ob*jectives, including destroying suspected WMD production facilities, damaging anti-aircraft systems, demolishing an adversary’s runways or aircraft, killing political leaders or terrorist suspects, and rescuing hostages. Second, DMOs can achieve any combination of primary political goals against an adversary such as deterrence, compellence, or punishment, and secondary goals before a wider audience, such as signaling resolve, alliance-management, or domes*tic political gain. Third, because DMOs pursue more limited political objec*tives than full-scale warfare, presidents are rarely penalized for th ;text/javascript"> ose that are a mixed success, or even an outright failure. Success in a conventional war is easier to measure with yes-no questions: adversary’s military defeated?; regime changed?; territory conquered and controlled?; adversary’s behavior changed?; political leaders killed or captured? Presidents have authorized several DMOs that failed, or were at best mixed successes, in the past thirty-five years. For example: Ford—the May 15, 1975, bungled assault and bombing raids against Koh Tang, Cambodia, over the Mayaguez incident; Carter—Desert One, the April 24–25, 1980, unsuccessful hostage rescue operation in Iran; Reagan— the December 4, 1983, raid on Syrian anti-aircraft sites in Lebanon that result*ed in two downed planes, one killed U.S. pilot, and another taken hostage; and George W. Bush—the February 16, 2001, airstrikes against five Iraqi com*mand and control sites in which all but two of the twenty-eight Joint Stand-Off Weapons used missed their targets. In each instance, even though the key military and political objectives of the DMO went unfulfilled, the president did not suffer a noticeable decline in public support and did not encounter per*sistent criticism among elite observers for the decision. Furthermore, Ameri*can DMOs are conducted without a formal presidential declaration of war, and sometimes covertly, allowing the Executive Branch a relatively free hand, basically unchecked by congressional, media, or public oversight. Fourth, since most DMOs are conducted with stand-off precision strike weapons, they greatly reduce the risk of casualties to soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines. Finally, DMOs generally do not require extensive logistical support in the form of basing or staging rights from other countries. Because they lack the same heavy footprint as larger uses of force, DMOs do not have many of the political-military cooperation problems associated with full-scale warfare.


RESEARCH FINDINGS

Senior civilian officials are more likely to support the use of DMOs than are the uniformed military. Recent research, as reinforced by first-person interviews, shows that top-level civilian decisionmakers tend to have more interventionist foreign policy agendas, are more willing to use the military to achieve those foreign policy goals, and are more willing to place constraints on the manner in which force will be used. As mentioned earlier, senior military officials, in contrast, prefer overwhelming and decisive force in support of clear political objectives. Measuring the validity of this proposition throughout the case stud*ies in this book requires determining to what extent there was a split between the most influential military and civilian decision-makers.

Senior civilian officials favor the use of DMOs more than do the uniformed military for four reasons. First, civilians believe that DMOs are effective in achieving their limited military or political objectives, whereas, as noted earlier, military officials generally find DMOs ineffective. Second, civilians believe that DMOs are controllable uses of force that will not escalate to a wider conflict between the attacking state and the target. In contrast, military leaders believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, to manage “firebreaks” be*tween different intensities of force, and that even small uses of force can trig*ger an incremental chain of events that can unleash a full-scale war. Third, senior civilian leaders believe that the domestic political costs of a failed DMO will be low. Senior military officials, on the other hand, believe that unsuc*cessful DMOs have deleterious domestic political effects, because they can po*tentially harm the American public’s perception of the military. Fourth, civil*ians believe that the use of some DMOs demonstrates resolve both to targeted adversaries and to a wider international audience. In contrast, many military leaders believe that DMOs are actually a sign of weakness to the world re*garding America’s willingness to use overwhelming military force. This “all or nothing” school of thought, best articulated by General Colin Powell, finds DMOs to be nothing more than “gratification without commitment.”

In general, U.S. use of DMOs since 1991 has been tactically successful at meet*ing most military objectives, but strategically ineffective in achieving specific po*litical goals. Appendix I codes the level of success in meeting the stated mili*tary and political objectives of thirty-six instances of U.S. use of DMOs. It also contains a short description of each instance, aside from the four studied in depth in the case studies in this book. These assessments admittedly are sub*jective, though it is more straightforward to determine the objective military success of a DMO than the political success.

The findings are not promising for DMOs as a political solution. A detailed analysis of the evidence shows that five of the thirty-six cases had an undeter*mined military outcome. Of the remaining thirty-one, sixteen (52 percent) met all of the intended military objectives, while only two (6 percent) met all of the intended political objectives. When success and mixed success are combined, the results even out: twenty-two cases met roughly one-half of the intended military objectives (71 percent), twenty-seven cases met at least one-half of the intended political objectives (75 percent). Nine cases totally failed to meet their intended military goals—all of which were assassination attempts (Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Abu Hamza Rabia, an as-yet unidentified Al Qaeda member, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and four attempts on Al Qaeda officials in Somalia)—while nine completely failed to meet the in*tended political goal. Thus the data demonstrate that DMOs are a useful tool for destroying a target but that the attacks are generally unsuccessful in pun*ishing, deterring, or compelling an adversary.


CASE STUDIES TELL THE STORY

Collecting and analyzing data is a dry and insufficient means of evaluating complex decisionmaking processes, such as whether or not to attack another country or sub-state actor. Examination of case studies allows for a broader geostrategic, psychological, and historical understanding of the adversary against whom U.S. officials considered using limited military force. The four cases that are studied in-depth to better understand DMOs are as follows.

Iraqi No-Fly Zones (NFZ) (July 1991–April 2003). The no-fly zones operated under three names: Provide Comfort II, which included tens of thousands of sorties (July 24, 1991–December 31, 1996); Northern Watch, which included around 16,000 sorties (January 1, 1997–April 30, 2003); and Southern Watch, which included over 200,000 sorties (August 26, 1992–April 30, 2003). The no-fly zones were intended to deny Iraq the ability to fly fixed-wing flights against the perceived internal political enemies of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The typical enforcement flight included a package of four to five aircraft fly*ing inside the zones for thirty minutes to two hours, under strict rules of engagement created in collaboration with the host country from which the planes originated. Although British and French planes participated, only U.S. planes attacked Iraqi anti-aircraft and radar sites, and only after the planes were threatened.

Operation Infinite Reach (August 20, 1998). In retaliation for bombings against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States simultane*ously launched thirteen Tomahawk cruise missiles against a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, suspected of producing nerve gas and sixty-six Tomahawks against six sites within an Al Qaeda training complex in south*ern Afghanistan with the intention of killing Osama Bin Laden and other terrorist leaders. Between twenty and sixty people in the camps were killed and several dozen others injured—many of whom were reportedly Pakistani militants training for operations in Kashmir. Neither Bin Laden nor his chief lieutenants were killed.

Yemeni Assassination (November 3, 2002). A Central Intelligence Agency– operated Predator drone originating and controlled from Djibouti launched a Hellfire missile at a car carrying six suspected Al Qaeda members one hundred miles east of the capital, Sana’a. All six were killed, including Abu Ali al-Harithi, suspected mastermind of the U.S.S. Cole attack, and Ahmed Hijazi, a naturalized U.S. citizen and alleged ringleader of a purported terror*ist sleeper cell in Lackawanna, New York.

Khurmal, Iraq (Summer 2002). In early 2002, U.S. intelligence got word that in Iraqi Kurdistan, near the city of Khurmal, a Kurdish terrorist orga*nization—Ansar al-Islam—was running a training camp and reportedly producing cyanide gas, toxic poisons, and ricin for terrorist attacks by its af*filiated cells in Western Europe. The U.S. military developed a combined air-ground operation option that anticipated striking the camp on July 4, 2002. That option was unanimously supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and pro*posed to the White House. President Bush ultimately opted not to strike the camp because the DMO potentially could have derailed the goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power.

These cases were selected for five reasons. First, they involve all of the services of the U.S. military and CIA, thus negating any single-service bias in the sample. In addition, some of the DMOs are multi-service. Second—with the exception of the still-covert Yemen targeted killing—the cases have produced a wealth of available data that include participants who were willing to discuss them on the record, thus providing a deeper understanding of each case. Third, they differ in terms of length of duration, intensity of operations, and type of operation. Fourth, there are enough variations across the cases with regard to political and military intent—such as revenge, punishment, deterrence, national morale, and so on—that any initial findings developed in this book will be applicable to other countries that employ DMOs. Finally, the decisionmaking processes behind the three actual—and one proposed—DMOs reviewed have not been presented or analyzed in detail elsewhere. For scholars and historians, the care*ful presentation of the facts supported by first-person interviews reveals new details about each event. For the lay reader, the strategic setting and decision-making processes of the cases are meant to illustrate how intra-administration debates are occurring today over whether to strike Al Qaeda operatives in Paki*stan, attack pirate infrastructure onshore in East Africa, or bomb suspected Iranian nuclear facilities.

The Khurmal case is an example of the dog that did not bark. Social sci*entists refer to such non-events as negative cases, in which an expected and relevant outcome of interest did not occur, even though it was a strong pos*sibility. The case was included because, for the purposes of studying and evaluating U.S. limited uses of military force, it is important to understand the causes and conditions of negative cases, when limited force is proposed and debated among senior officials but never implemented. To be sufficiently comprehensive, one cannot only look at DMOs that were executed.

Recent examples of negative cases run the gamut from the oversized ex*treme with indeterminate political objectives to a very limited plan with well-defined political goals to initially limited operations that expanded beyond what was politically acceptable when logistics and support elements were in*cluded. An example of the first would be the decision by the NSC in June 1996 not to execute the “Eisenhower option,” a ground invasion in retaliation for the June 25, 1996, bombing of the Khobar Towers that ranged to as many as 500,000 troops, cruise missile strikes against strategic assets on Iran’s coast and WMD sites, and strikes against Iranian-sponsored terror camps in Leba*non. An example of the second would be President George H.W. Bush’s deci*sion in August 1990 to not attack an Iraqi oil tanker to disable it and prevent it from traveling to South Yemen, an operation initially planned to coerce Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait. And an example of the third would be the refusal, moments before it began, of Secretary of De*fense Donald Rumsfeld to authorize in late 2005 a complex U.S. Navy Seal operation to attempt to capture Ayman al-Zawahiri in northern Pakistan. Within this spectrum, between these extremes, lies a wide range of limited military operations—such as the potential Khurmal operation—that were developed, proposed, and debated, but ultimately rejected by senior officials as inappropriate instruments of national power to tackle a specific foreign policy dilemma.


CONCLUSION

Even in a globalized era characterized by increased trade and transactions, freely flowing capital, relatively open borders, and unprecedented intercon*nectedness, the world remains stubbornly anarchic, and military force contin*ues to be a fungible tool for achieving foreign policy goals. Whether it is the September 2007 Israeli airstrike on a suspected nuclear facility in Syria, Co*lombia’s March 2008 small-scale raid against suspected Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) officials located just inside Ecuador, or Israel’s attack against a suspected Hezbollah weapons convoy in northern Sudan in January 2009, limited military operations against other countries are an im*portant instrument of international statecraft. Such operations are conducted with political and military objectives that foreign decisionmakers believe can*not be met—in the timeframe required—through available non-kinetic solu*tions. The United States has both the widest and the deepest range of global interests, and the most available military capabilities to use limited force in support of those interests. It is no surprise, therefore, that the United States both considers at the most senior levels and conducts vastly more DMOs than any other country in the world. The goal of this book is to determine if those DMOs have been the correct course of action for the United States since 1991, and to prescribe the causes and conditions for their potential success in the future.

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Default Why nations fight ? ? ?

WHY NATIONS FIGHT
Past and Future Motives for War

By

RICHARD NED LEBOW


CONTENTS

PART 1 Introduction
1 Introduction
  • What is war
  • The causes of war
  • What is Novel about this Book?

2 Theoriesofwar
  • Realism
  • Power Transition
  • Marxism
  • Reason and Rationalist theories
  • Co-relational studies of War

PART II War in the past

3 Theory and propositions

4 Data set and findings


PART III War in the future

5 Interest and security

6 Standing and revenge


PART IV Conclusion

7 Conclusion

FIGURES

1 .1 Wars by year, 1946 – 2007
2.1 State power, 1740–1840
2.2 State power, 1845–1950
4.1 “Objective” and perceived leading powers
4.2 Great, rising and declining powers: 1648–2000
4.3 War initiation
4.4 Motives for war
4.5a Rising power targets
4.5b Dominant power targets
4.6 Systemic wars
4.7 War breakouts

TABLES

2.1 Post - 1945 wars pa ge
3.1 Motives, emotions, goals and means

click here to download the Book : Download 0521170451.pdf for free on Filesonic.com

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Old Monday, June 27, 2011
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Default Nuclear deterrence...

Nuclear deterrence: Universal security
by
Yevgeny Primakov


In 2010, important events in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have had a positive impact on the strengthening of international security. The presidents of Russia and the United States signed a new START treaty in Prague.
When the treaty is ratified, strategic relations between the two nuclear powers will become more sustainable, transparent and predictable.

The multilateral Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, resulted in decisions on improving the security of nuclear materials in the world.

The regular Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference successfully led to an adoption of the Final Document, which calls for measures to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its regime and related institutions.

Undoubtedly, all these measures are quite helpful, but so far they have not touched upon the principle of mutual nuclear deterrence. The paradox of nuclear deterrence is that it is by nature backward looking—it is aimed at the threats of the past century. Today, however, the possibility of a major armed conflict between the largest world powers and their allies in our increasingly globalized and multipolar world is close to zero.

Nuclear deterrence is impotent in the face of the new threats of the 21st century, namely: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, international terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, and trans-border crime. Moreover, in some cases, nuclear deterrence encourages the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, or impedes deeper cooperation between powers in their struggle against these threats (for example, the joint development of anti-ballistic missile systems.)

So that nuclear deterrence will not get in the way of cooperation between the main players on the global stage, it is necessary to continue negotiations to bring down the militarization level. These negotiations must be based on the minimum sufficiency principle, must strengthen strategic stability by ensuring equal and universal security for all parties, and must exclude the possibility of a first strike due to technical failure, a faulty assessment of intentions of the other party or lack of time for making decisions by the political leadership. The START Treaty meets these needs, but there is a lot yet to be done in this area.

The next stage of nuclear disarmament cannot be just bilateral. Restrictions and confidence measures will be required with regards to the third-party nuclear states. In contrast with the United States, Russia’s geostrategic location makes it reachable by weapons from all nuclear states. This fact cannot be overlooked during any further major nuclear disarmament.

The concept of nuclear deterrence has turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle on the long and hard road to total nuclear disarmament. Everyone knows that there are both supporters and opponents of nuclear disarmament in the United States, Russia and other countries. Although some are simply holding on to the ideological stereotypes of the Cold War, there are many who voice specific and reasonable concerns in relation to this process. Their arguments should not be brushed aside; in fact, they should be taken into account in order to lift the existing barriers to further deep nuclear arms cuts.

In Russia, for example, there is a widely felt sentiment that the nuclear potential of the country is a major attribute of Russia’s status as a world power, without which its foreign policy interests will not be taken seriously—neither by the United States, nor other countries.

We are confident that the status of Russia in the world will mostly be defined by its level of economic modernization, improved living standards, social and political rights and freedoms of its population, and scientific and cultural developments. Unfortunately, while such measures as the projection of force and its direct application are used in international relations, Russia will have to maintain a relatively high level of military readiness and nuclear potential to protect itself and its allies and defend its legitimate interests.

Thus, the way to nuclear disarmament is through the building of mutual trust and the strengthening of international security and stability. The Obama Administration has reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to multilateral action. This commitment includes: ensuring international security and strengthening its legal framework and existing institutions; the supremacy of diplomacy in resolving complicated controversial issues; and a partnership with Russia based on the principle of equality. It is crucial that these principles are realized in practice in the foreign policy of the United States and its allies.

These principles are equally relevant for anti-missile defense, ordinary weapons and non-nuclear strategic delivery vehicles, as well as militarization plans for outer space. But these and other areas of arms reduction will require extra far-reaching, trust-boosting measures. In the longer term, we believe that a world without nuclear weapons does not equal the world as it is just without the weapons. An international system built on substantially different principles and institutions is needed. A world free of nuclear weapons should not become one where other weapons of mass destruction, conventional armed forces, state-of-the-art non-nuclear weapons and systems based on new physical principles are used for waging wars.

This new world must also consider the role played by local conflicts as well as large-scale wars. Now, smaller countries regard nuclear weapons as a way to balance out the huge dominance of the leading powers. This is indeed one of the motivations behind nuclear proliferation at the regional level, which increases the threat of nuclear terrorism. The removal of such threats will require robust international mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of all types of conflicts.

That is why implementation of the strategic goal of nuclear disarmament is only possible with a serious overhaul of the international system in general.

Without doubt, it would help to resolve other key issues of the 21st century, such as those related to the global economy, energy supply, the environment, climate change, demographics, epidemics, trans-border crimes and religious and ethnical extremism.In this context, nuclear disarmament is not an end in itself; rather, it is one of the most important prerequisites for reorganizing the international community literally on a more civilized basis and in accordance with the needs of the new century.

The writer has been Head of the Government of the Russian Federation (1998-1999), Foreign Minister (1996-1998), Member of the Academy of Sciences, Member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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Default The nuclear balance....

The nuclear balance between India & Pakistan
By
Afshain Afzal

Washington Post, quoting non-government analysts, reported on January 31, 2011, that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal now totals more than 100 deployed weapons, a doubling of its stockpile over the past several years.

It also claimed that the Pakistanis have significantly accelerated production of uranium and plutonium for bombs and developed new weapons to deliver them. New Delhi and Tel Aviv must offer thanks to the daily that it helped them in their joint plot against Pakistan. Intentional or unintentional, what ever the case may be, Washington Post has questioned the peacefulness of Pakistani nuclear programme by blaming Pakistan of having edged ahead of India with over 100 deployed nuclear weapons. In fact, Washington Post has acted on the directions of Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Indian intelligence mafia that it has confirmed the blame of New Delhi despite the fact that there is no proofs either about the claim that Pakistan has made any further addition to its nuclear arsenal in the recent years or its nuclear programme is for some other purpose than to meet its growing energy demands. If we recall, last year, Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor also claimed that Pakistan’s nuclear assets had surpassed the limits of deterrence and that Islamabad’s capabilities needed to be verified, after that New Delhi could think about reviewing its own nuclear strategy. Without going into the details, it is, in fact, western countries, which most of the time mislead New Delhi not only about Pakistan but also about China and other countries about increase of their capabilities from maximum level of deterrence.
The question arises, why US or any other country would pose Pakistan more powerful than India, despite the fact that it is an open secret that Washington and other western countries have very long term objective in and with India. The interest shown by the western nations, especially US in Indian economy and their plans to support Indian development programmes with provision of high tech defence and nuclear equipment worth billions of dollars speaks of Washington long term policy for Indian Ocean. One wonders when India has its own signal interception units including facilities at Embassies and Consulates, Radio Interception Units, setups of Intelligence, G installations as well as stations in other countries why it should accept intelligence inputs and later dictations from other countries. New Delhi cannot deny the fact that never any hostile move was ever intercepted by its personnel operating in India and elsewhere. No doubt, it is CIA and other western agencies which had been feeding self-engineered intelligence inputs on the basis of the activities of its own agents in the target countries, interpreting as activities sponsored by target governments.

Interestingly, despite the fact that top Indian scientist A P J Kalam claimed that the test of the hydrogen bomb in 1998 was a success, there are reports that a lot of discussions are taking place among Indian nuclear scientists that it might need another test to validate the thermonuclear device. Washington has reportedly promised India to help her in developing additional nuclear weapons. There are unconfirmed reports that Washington is also planning to shift portions of its aging nuclear arsenal in India. It is important to mention here that the instead of making efforts to denuclearize and clear the world from nuclear weapons, the western nations are providing opportunities to countries to come into competition with other countries. Plans have been unearthed where some Arab countries having alliance with US are also being encouraged to have their own nuclear facilities. It has become a matter of routine that unfounded blames are leveled on Pakistan that it is politically fragile. It has been pointed out by Washington Post that US administration fears of proliferation or possible terrorist attempts to seize Pakistan’s nuclear materials but probably it is forgetting that US highly secure Pentagon had been successfully targeted by certain American nationals that resulted in killing of over 300 US officers in a single attempt. US cannot claim to be terrorist free country? There are more chances that the nuclear weapons of US are taken over by the terrorists than that of Pakistan. Then why black propaganda is carried out that Washington fears proliferation or possible terrorist attempts to seize Pakistan’s nuclear materials. Washington, Israel and some western countries are trying to enhance India’s nuclear capabilities so that it can counter China and Pakistan but if Allah forbid the nuclear race in South Asia starts whole responsibility would fall on US. No doubt, all the countries of the world have right to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. It is generally believed that US recent attractive offers to India as well as Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is in favour of India but it is other way round.

In fact, US could not find resources to monitor Indian nuclear and missile programmes but in the garb of cooperation Washington has got a golden opportunity to send its watch dog tentacles inside India. Interestingly, US firms are also openly recruiting India youth to collect information from various nuclear power installations. It is important to mention here that US has plans to bring into effect a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and endorse a ban on enrichment and reprocessing equipment to India. No doubt, in the pursuit to become more powerful than Pakistan India has tied its hands in the shape of secret agreements. There is no doubt, that US is slowly and gradually curbing Indian nuclear weapons programme and will also not allow to carryout development in the field of nuclear science. India is using west to cap Pakistan nuclear programme and enhance its nuclear capabilities but so far it has only compromised its sovereignty and credibility in the eyes of old friends. The speculative reports by National Maritime Foundation, Institute of Science and International Security and Federation of American Scientists are without proofs. In the past, such organizations in collaboration with western intelligence agencies leveled serious allegations on Iraq and Afghanistan for possession of fissile material and Weapons of Mass Destruction but despite mass killings and invasions not even single evidence could be traced.

Although, Wikileaks are mere an attempt to divert the war crimes and human rights violations of US and its allies in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere but the revelation by Wikileaks and the statements of Indian leaders like Rahul Gandhi that Hindu militant organization Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS) was a thousand times more dangerous than the Al-Qaida put a question mark on India’s security. One wonders how India is safe to be allowed to carryout nuclear development and Pakistan is not? The fact cannot be denied that India has larger quantity of stockpiles of fissile materials that can be used for the development of nuclear weapons. Washington, instead of helping Pakistan to balance the situation, further enhanced New Delhi’s capability by striking US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. On the contrary, the US administration has disapproved similar deal with Pakistan. Islamabad is rightly suspicions that the US, Israel and many western countries aim to destroy its nuclear programme and are favouring India for its own long term objective in the region. In the present scenario, international community as well as United Nations needs to be vigilant that proliferation of nuclear weapons does not take place and Washington does not attempt to transfer its nuclear weapons or nuclear fissile materials to India.

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Default Pak-China nuclear cooperation....

Pak-China nuclear cooperation
By
Sobea Tabbasum


China has announced to give two more nuclear reactors at Chashma to extend its exports as one reactor is completed and the other is on the way of completion.

This export is going to face some criticism especially by US and India that how china export nuclear reactor to Pakistan that is NNWS according to NPT and not under full safeguard of IAEA. Along with that this export is against the obligation and guidelines of NSG of 46 states. China’s stand on these questions is that this deal is the continuation of the agreements of 1980s when china neither join NPT nor NSG and this export is linked with the 2003 export of nuclear reactor to Pakistan. So, the obligations NSG cannot apply on this deal China did not need to get waiver of NSG.

First of all it is condemned on the basis of the obligations of Nuclear Supplier group that materials and technology designed specifically for nuclear use including fissile materials, nuclear reactors and equipment, and reprocessing and enrichment equipment (part I) needed to get comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and Pakistan is not under the full safeguards of IAEA and not the signatory of NPT.

It is a fact that Pakistan is not the signatory of NPT but on the other side there are other states that did not signed NPT but getting fuel from the signatory of NPT and members of NSG as; India got nuclear fuel from Russia in January 2001 when 32 of 34 NSG members were against it .US is going to give nuclear supply to Israel and nuclear safety of previous reactors. I want to compare Pak-China nuclear deal with Indo-US Nuclear deal as importers (Pakistan and India) are non nuclear weapons states according to NPT and exporters China and US) are the signature of NPT and members of NSG. Both importers are not under the full safeguards on IAEA but India got exception as a waiver in NSG in 2008.Indo-US nuclear deal contradict with the waiver of NSG as; the nuclear deal of 2008 between US and India presents a picture of improvement of Indian nukes both qualitatively and quantitatively as “The assurance of nuclear fuel supply from the US and the NSG would free India’s existing capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for its nuclear weapons program…Under the deal, India shall…have the capability to produce 50 warheads a year.” Along with that India is allowed to reprocess the spent fuel from the imported nuclear reactor and can convert it into the fuel for its fast breeder reactor, and this would not come under IAEA safeguards.

Qualitative improvement can be done as; Indo-US nuclear deal did not have any provision that shows that India will give up its right to nuclear testing. Indian scientists had been given an access to advance US nuclear technologies under the IAEA safeguards. India conducted a long term negotiations with the countries of NSG and in 2008 got the exception that no need of comprehensive safeguards by IAEA. When we look at the origin of NSG, it was created after the nuclear test of India in 1974, when India diverted the fuel to its weapon program. If India can be given exception in this era then why not Pakistan as in the case of Pak-China nuclear cooperation Pakistan always use imported reactor from china for peaceful purposes. The clauses of agreement signed on September 15, 1986 between Foreign Minister of Pakistan Yaqub Khan and his Chinese counterpart in the presence of Chinese Premier and PAEC chairperson Dr. Munir A. Khan at Beijing showed that, China would construct; four nuclear plants in Pakistan named; Chashma 1, 2, 3 and 4 by 2011. But for this cooperation in this era critics says that Pakistan’s domestic instability and its past role spreading nuclear arms technology demands that China’s nuclear plans there in Pakistan at least come under strict international safeguards. But with a glance on previous cooperation between two states Pakistan and China, we find out that the reactors provided by China to Pakistan is under the safeguard and now two more reactors are the continuation of the export of 1980s agreement and it is under safeguard of IAEA as; Chashma pressurized water reactor (300 MW) is Under IAEA safeguards, fueled by low-enriched uranium; no known connection to weapons program.

US demanded the terms and exact draft of export from china in a way to decide that whether it is for peaceful or explosive purpose and expected that china will announce its initiative in NSG meeting taken place on June 24–25, 2010 in New Zealand. US is going to pressurize china not to export these reactors on multilateral forum not bilaterally because it did not want to lose china’s support in sanctioning against Iran and North Korea in UN and its economic partnership. No expected conclusion was being made in this regard because the Chinese initiative was not the formal agenda of that meeting. India had a clear position its non-proliferation efforts and get waiver but Pakistan earned a bad image previously. Now while looking at the point that weather the waiver in NSG is needed for Pakistan or not there are two options that if Pakistan go for the waiver then its previous record named A.Q Khan case can bring doubt in the minds of NSG and they must object it but on the other hand if it succeeded to get the waiver then this can open the way for Pakistan to export reactors and technology from 46 supplier states as India is going to get from Japan, France and so on after 2008.

Factor of reciprocity of international law presents that when a power is going to conduct cooperation with a state in the region, then the rival of that state must have to cooperate in a way to balance the gap within the region. While looking at the benefits of this supply china is getting not only economic benefits but on one side it is exporting old reactors to Pakistan and new ones to the other importing states. On Pakistan side it is not beneficial to us to import readymade reactors but the need is to get technology and reactors should be made here in Pakistan. India adopted this tact and now it is not only the importer but also an exported in a way an export the nuclear technology to smaller states as Myanmar. Pakistan is needed to be farsighted in this regard if it wants to be developed state and earn a name not as a importer but as a exporter.

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Default Iran is not a nuclear threat...

Iran is not a nuclear threat
By
Scott Horton

Politicians, lobbyists, and propagandists have spent nearly two decades pushing the lie that Iran poses a nuclear weapons threat to the United States and Israel. After a brief respite in the intensity of the wolf cries over the past two years, the neoconservative movement has decided to relaunch the “Must Bomb Iran” brand.

The fact that Iran is not and has not been a nuclear threat to either nation is rendered irrelevant by a narrative of universal “concern” about its nuclear program.

US media distortions

In mid-August, for example, after The New York Times quite uncharacteristically ran a piece diminishing the supposed danger of Iranian nukes, the story was misrepresented in newspapers and on TV stations across the country in the most frightening terms. As MSNBC’s news reader put it that afternoon: “Intelligence sources say Iran is only one year away from a nuclear bomb!”

On August 13, on Fox News, former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton implicitly urged Israel to attack Iran’s new light-water reactor at Bushehr before it began “functioning,” the implication being that the reactor represented some sort of dire threat. But the facts are not on Mr. Bolton’s side. The Bushehr reactor is not useful for producing weapons-grade plutonium, and the Russians have a deal to keep all the waste themselves.

On September 6, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a new paper on the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement which reported that the agency has “continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran to any military or other special purpose.”

Yet despite the IAEA report and clear assertions to the contrary, news articles that followed were dishonest to the extreme, interpreting this clean bill of health as just another wisp of smoke indicating nuclear fire in a horrifying near-future.

A Washington Post article published the very same day led the way with the aggressive and misleading headline “UN Report: Iran stockpiling nuclear materials,” “shorthanding” the facts right out of the narrative. The facts are that Iran’s terrifying nuclear “stockpile” is a small amount of uranium enriched to industrial grade levels for use in its domestic energy and medical isotope programs, all of it “safeguarded” by the IAEA.
More sensational claims

If the smokescreen wasn’t thick enough, late last week a group of Marxist holy warrior exiles called the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq, working with the very same neoconservatives who sponsored Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress – which manufactured so much of the propaganda that convinced the American people to support the invasion of that country – accused the Iranian government of building a secret nuclear enrichment facility buried deep in tunnels near Qazvin.

Headlines once again blared in total negligence and without verification that here indeed was, an official told Fox News, proof that Iran has a “hidden, secret nuclear weapons program.’” TV news anchors on every channel furiously mopped sweat from their brows, hearts-a-tremor. When will the forces of good rise to stop this evil?!

Yet even US officials quickly admitted that they’ve known about these tunnels for years. “[T]here’s no reason at this point to think it’s nuclear,” one US official said – a quote that appeared in Fox’s article, but only after five paragraphs of breathless allegations. All day long, top-of-the-hour news updates on TV and radio let the false impression stand.

IAEA inspectors have had open access to the gas conversion facility at Isfahan, the enrichment facility at Natanz, and the new lightwater reactor at Bushehr, as well as the secondary enrichment facility under construction at Qom.

An ignored clean bill of health


The September 6 IAEA report confirming for the zillionth time the non-diversion of nuclear material should be the last word on the subject until the next time they say the same thing: Iran, a long-time signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is not in violation of its Safeguards Agreement.
So what’s all the hubbub about Iran’s “nuclear defiance” and “danger”?

The IAEA’s latest report does note that Iran has “not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” Indeed, the agency’s frequent mentions of Iran’s “lack of full cooperation” is a big reason why US media reports portray Iran in ominous terms.

But here, too, US media frequently miss the point. Never mind that 118 nations around the world have signed a statement criticizing the IAEA’s “peaceful activities” conclusion as a departure from standard verification language. More broadly, Iran’s “lack of full cooperation” by itself is an outcome of Western bullying and propaganda.
Real reason for lack of cooperation

The US and the UN, acting upon no legitimate authority whatsoever, have demanded that Iran submit to an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which would allow endless inspections on issues not directly related to Iran’s use of nuclear materials. They have also demanded that Iran cease all uranium enrichment and submit to an endless regime of questions based mostly on the “alleged studies” documents, which several sources have said are forgeries posing as a pilfered laptop of a dead Iranian nuclear scientist. [Editor's note: The original version of this article misstated an implication of the Additional Protocol.]

These separate, UN Security Council-mandated investigations have even demanded blueprints for Shahab 3 missiles – a subject far removed from hexafluoride gas or any legitimate IAEA function. In 2003, Iran voluntarily agreed to the extra burden of the unratified Additional Protocol during “good faith negotiations” with the so-called “E-3,” Britain, France, and Germany, acting on behalf of the US. When those negotiations broke down, Iran withdrew in 2006.

With these details left out of the discussion, the impression is left that Iran is refusing to abide by international law, when in fact, it is completely within its NPT obligations.

An outrageous standard

Meanwhile, Washington continues to apply to Iran the outrageous standard it used in the run-up to the Iraq war: an unfriendly nation must “prove” it doesn’t have dangerous weapons or a secret program to make them – or potentially face military action.

“Proving a negative” is, to say the least, a difficult obligation to meet: You say you haven’t read Webster’s Dictionary cover to cover? Prove it!

The bottom line is that Iran is still within its unalienable rights to peaceful nuclear technology under the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement – a point even Tehran’s fiercest critics (grudgingly) acknowledge. The only issues it is defying are the illegitimate sanctions and demands of the US and UN, which themselves defy logic and sense.
Journalists’ ethical obligation

It is far past time for the members of the American media to get their act together and begin asking serious follow-up questions of the politicians, “experts,” and lobbyists they interview on the subject of Iran’s nuclear program.

Many of these same journalists still have the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis on their hands from the months they spent continuously and uncritically parroting the lies, half-truths, and distortions of agenda-driven Iraqi dissidents and their neocon champions who pushed us into the Iraq war.

Perhaps this is their shot at redemption.

Scott Horton is host of Antiwar Radio on the Liberty Radio Network and assistant editor at Antiwar.com.

Courtesy: Christian Science Monitor
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