The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics

The Star · #1 Thursday, January 15, 2009

By Erol yayBökE

The miliTary is undeniably the most popular institu-
tion in Turkey. Seen as the protectors of Atatürk’s legacy and
famously non-corrupt, the Turkish military challenges the
belief that people enjoy less democratic freedoms in countries where
militaries are strong. Decades of harsh military dictatorships in coun-
tries such as Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina have given politically
involved militaries worldwide a well-deserved negative image. The
Turkish military is a rare exception to this norm. For over 80 years,
it has established a reputation as the protector of secularism and an
advocate for democracy. It has never wished to govern the country,
but rather to “guide Turkey on a steady course toward social progress
and the embrace of universal ideals.”
Ironically, this goal requires
that it play an intricate role in Turkish public life, in effect meaning
that Turkey is not yet a true democracy.
The military currently faces a dilemma. Accession to the European
Union (EU) would be the culmination of Kemalism and high-ranking
military offcials have shown undeniable commitment towards that
goal. The public will undoubtedly rely on the military for stability
and perseverance in this time of transformation. According to Bilkent
University professor Ersel Aydınlı, the military knows that it has a
“unique responsibility to carry the country to the end of this road.”

If Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the military will most likely
become a European-style military with little involvement in politics,
because at that point EU institutions will be responsible for holding
Turkish politicians accountable for their actions. But, as Aydınlı notes,
the military will not scale back its duties without the perception that
the EU is completely committed to Turkish membership.
Few, if
any, military leaders believe this commitment currently exists. Un-
derstanding the short-term threats posed by Islamic radicalism and
Kurdish separatism, among other things, the military is unwilling to
risk instability without a stronger signal of EU support.
Turkey still faces many threats, not the least of which is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism within its borders. In
addition, Kurdish militants threaten territorial
sovereignty and are gaining political strength in
neighboring Iraq. Tension with Greece continues—
over its support of Kurdish terrorists, the division
of Cyprus and disputes over the Greek Islands off
the Turkish coast, to name a few. Syria, Iraq, and
Iran, historically volatile Islamic countries, line the
southern border and pose the threat of supporting
terrorism and harboring violent Kurdish separat-
ists. Additionally, some Armenian radicals seek to
avenge past horrors. Former Turkish Foreign Minis-
ter Ismail Cem points out that “due to its geography
and strategic importance, Turkey is a country that
will almost always have security issues.”
For the
Turkish military today, weakness is not an option.

a miliTary unlikE any oThEr

Political influence
Turkish children are chosen at a young age for
military school and are educated in
modern facilities with highly skilled teachers.

Often these schools are
better equipped than their public
counterparts. Young officers-to-
be train tirelessly, not only in the
principles of battle, but also on the
teachings of Atatürk, the founder of
modern Turkey. It is an honor for
almost all of them to serve as protec-
tors of Atatürk’s legacy, a duty that is not taken lightly. Many soldiers feel that withou
their service a modern, secular Turkey would ceas
to exist. These patriotic attitudes reinforce positiv
public opinion of the military and have allowed th
military to enhance its infuence.
Military service is required of all Turkish men,
giving Turkey one of the largest standing armies in
he world. Although some, including author Ste-
phen Kinzer, argue that conscription is detrimental
o the development of the country and that young
Turks would be better served in higher education
nd/or work,

the size of the military is deliberately
ntimidating. Unlike its European counterparts
oday, the military also plays an active role in de-
iding Turkey’s future. After Atatürk’s death and
he unsuccessful Democratic Party government of
he 1950s, the military stepped in for the frst time
o overthrow a democratically elected government
o ensure the continuity of Kemalist practices. The
military would seize power again in 1971 and 1980,
ach time returning it to civilian hands—although not before modifying the constitution to guarantee
its ability to infuence politics.

In order to understand the institutional reforms
requested by the EU, we must frst examine how
and why the military gained signifcant infuence
over the civilian government. Only then can we
evaluate the potential impact of reform on the mili-
tary and Turkish society as a whole.
Realizing the need for order within the ranks,
early Kemalist military commanders centralized
power “by maintaining a strong hierarchy and lim-
iting the channels of civilian-military interaction.”
Their goal was a strong force that would maintain
composure even as civilian leaders foundered. This
was accomplished with the help of the High Mili-
tary Council (HMC), an advisory body of generals
that still regularly presents the National Military
Strategic Concept to the government.

The hmC
speaks as a unifed and rational voice to the often
politically divided civilian government. Established in the “post-coup constitution of
1961,” the National Security Council (NSC) is the most obvious way the military
keeps “footholds in institutions
that in most democratic countries
would be entirely run by civil-
ians.”
For example, the United
states national security Council
consists solely of civilians and is
only advised by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of staff. after 1961,
its Turkish counterpart, however,
had seven civilian and four military members, a combination that was tweaked after
subsequent coups and constitutional changes. The
1982 constitution allowed for fve civilian and fve
military members, with the civilian president most
often siding with the military, meaning that this
“civilian” institution was heavily influenced by
the military.
The 1970s were turbulent years for Turkey. Rising
leftist radicalism and ideological battles by Turkish
youth against the government almost caused a civil
war and eventually resulted in the coup of 1980.

in response to these concerns, the military closely
supervised education, radio, and television. The
result, as is often the case in Turkey, was stability
and peace at the expense of full democracy.
The military has historically intervened in
Turkish politics to address gaps left by corruption,
inadequacy, or a perceived threat to the Kemalist
order. In fact, I would argue that it does not enjoy
its role as government “watchdog,” and is willing
to step aside in the presence of strong, secular civil-ian leadership. This became evident following the
military coup of 1980 and the rise of Turgut Özal.
When Özal, of Kurdish descent, was elected prime
minister in 1983, the military immediately tried to
exert its power over his new Anavatan (Motherland)
Party.

A staunch secularist, Özal transformed the
Turkish economy and fostered good relations with
the United States without the guidance of gener-
als. He also actively supported the coalition forces,
against the will of the military, in the Gulf War of
the early 1990s.

With vast public support as prime
minister and later as Turkey’s eighth president,
he listened to, but was not overly infuenced by,
the opinions of military leaders. Rather than being
angry about its loss of power, the military seemed
content to let Özal govern with little intervention
until his death in 1993.
Turkey became unstable once again following
Özal’s death. A series of short-lived governments, Turkey became unstable once again following
Özal’s death. A series of short-lived governments,characterized by shaky coali-
tions and rampant corruption,
finally culminated with the
election of necmettin erbakan
as prime minister. A radical
Islamist, Erbakan began con-
solidating his power almost im-
mediately and made no secret
of his fundamentalist agenda,
giving the military an incentive
to intervene.

It had mistakenly
supported secularist Tansu Çiller, the politician who
ultimately made a deal with Erbakan that allowed
him to become Prime minister. in return, erbakan
quieted corruption charges against Çiller.

Eager to
correct this mistake, the generals used the NSC to
force Erbakan and Çiller out of power in 1998, banning
Erbakan’s Refah (Welfare) Party and banishing them
both to political obscurity.

This action was welcomed
by Kemalists and many of Erbakan’s former sup-
porters who had become wary of his extreme Islamic
views. Although the methods used to oust him have
been criticized, once again, the military had stepped
in when civilian rule had failed.

Interestingly, this continual dependence on the
military for stability has bred complacency and al-
lowed voters to take risks on Islamic parties. Turks
tend to vote for Islamic parties on the basis of their
social agendas even though they may not necessar-
ily agree with their fundamentalism, as was the case
with Refah. The public knows that if such a radically
Islamic political entity gets too powerful, the mili-
tary will step in and ensure that the secular order
reigns supreme. Turkish voters have traditionally
relied on the military for support and stability that could vanish, if accession is still uncertain, with the
fulfllment of EU reforms.

The Star · #2 Thursday, January 15, 2009

by Yayböke, Erol

civil-Military relations
The start of formal negotiations for EU accession
in October 2005 was a bittersweet notion for the
military. Although joining the EU is undoubtedly
the culmination of a modernization and Western-
ization process that started with Atatürk, the acces-
sion process requires dramatic changes in Turkey’s
political structure, including lessening the infuence
of the military. Although the military is willing to
make these changes in the name of membership, it
is unwilling to do so without some confdence in
future eu support.
One of the main problems with proposed EU
reforms is that they are vague and open to interpre-
tation. The political conditions of the Copenhagen
Criteria
are as follows: “Membership requires
that the candidate country has achieved stability of institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights
and respect for and protection
of minorities.”
all accession
countries, including the most
recent entrants, have unique
characteristics; however, in
Turkey’s case its differences
may be disqualifying. Turkey could be treated as an exception with more strin-
gent accession guidelines that more geographically
“European” countries would not necessarily have
to deal with.
Nevertheless, the military remains vigilant in its
pursuit of the EU. Against what many Europeans,
and indeed many Turks, believe, the military is one
of the biggest advocates of accession. In addition,
former Minister Cem argues that in the over 60 NSC
meetings he attended, the military has never voiced
opposition to the idea.

Within reason, it is willing
to discuss lessening certain controls—including
civilian control of military budgets and military
judiciary reform among other things—for the sake
of furthering negotiations.

According to the European Commission, “Turkey
has made good progress in reforming civil-military
relations” since 2002.

However, the NSC remains
one of the prime targets for European criticism. Cur-
rently composed of seven civilian and fve military
members, it is chaired by a non-voting civilian.
While secret meetings still raise transparency issues,
regular press conferences keep the public vaguely
informed of some of the issues discussed. Although it has become the symbol of military interference in
civilian affairs, in reality, its “function is exagger-
ated in Turkish public opinion”
and by European
observers. The role of the NSC is to discuss and
make decisions over issues of national security
that are then presented to the government.

dr.
Aydınlı points out that the true infuential power
lies with the HMC, where four-star generals meet
directly with the Prime Minister and his staff at
least twice a year.

Policies are determined during
these meetings and it is here, not in the NSC, that
tension over policy arises. Due to the importance
Europeans place on the NSC despite its limited role,
the military is open to its reform.
another point of concern for the eu has been
the lack of civilian oversight over military budgets.
According to the European Commission, new laws
that came into effect in early 2005 “have the poten-
tial to improve budgetary transparency concerning
military and defense expenditures,”
but have not
yet done so. Additionally, civilian auditors have
been authorized to audit those expenditures and
report back to the Parliament. However, the military remains frmly opposed to
certain issues, such as ethnic diversity in the ranks,
due to fears that reforms will inhibit its ability to
help Turkey traverse these times of change.

The
military is proud of being the protector of Atatürk’s
legacy, and believes it must avoid the participation
of ethnic minorities, namely the Kurds, in order to
maintain this integrity and identity. According to
Aydınlı, it has tried to reach out to conservative
Muslims, hoping to erase the radically secular
image some of its leaders mistakenly perpetuated
after the ousting of Erbakan in 1998;

no such ef-
fort has been made to reach out to minorities. The
military fears recognition of minority groups would
threaten cohesion and expose the isolated troops to
deep divisions in Turkish society. Perhaps aware
that this is a very sensitive subject, the EU has not
called for great reform. the underlying ProbleM
military reform is one of many concerns the eu has
regarding Turkey. Of the 146-page 2005 Progress
Report published by the European Commission, less
than three pages focus on civil-military issues. This
has not been a signifcant area of concern because of
a high level of military cooperation up to this point.
There could come a time, however, when the mili-
tary ceases to cooperate. Although it is committed
to accession to the EU, the military understands its
role in Turkey’s stabilization and if any part of the
reform process—whether military, governmental, or economic—threatens the secular establishment
of modern Turkey based on Kemalist principles, it
will intervene.
The biggest internal dilemma for the military
today with regards to EU accession is the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism. With secular façades and
rhetoric geared towards garnering support from
the EU, parties based in fundamentalist Islam are
attempting, in some cases successfully, to gain
power in Turkish politics. With EU accession a pos-
sibility and the military’s reluctance to be seen as
the barrier to this goal, generals have been forced to
watch from a distance as Islamism, albeit of a more
moderate type, takes root. In the past it was the
military’s job to step in and ensure that the secular
status quo was maintained. Future pressure from
the EU could further curb its infuence, at which
point the military will have to make some diffcult
decisions regarding its role as stabilizer versus its
commitment to the European dream. ThE islamic funDamEnTalisT movEmEnT:
ThE rolE of rEligious ParTiEs
The recent success of islamic parties in Turkish
politics raises a troubling dilemma for those inter-
ested in protecting the secular nature of the state.
Religious freedom is widely viewed as a pillar of
democracy and Turkey’s efforts to control Islam,
such as managing mosques to limit the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism, are seen as undemocratic
by many observers. The principle of separation of
religion and state is arguably the least negotiable
of Atatürk’s teachings and vehemently protected
by the Kemalist military. As Turkey looks towards
Europe for its long-term economic and political
future, it must also guard against secular threats
presented by political Islam in the short-term. Despite attempted controls, fundamentalist
Islamic parties have had remarkable success at the
ballet box in the last two decades, to the dismay of
the military and other Kemalists. Public statements
made by current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan and other AKP (Justice and Development
Party) offcials declare allegiance to the accession
process, although it is uncertain what the goals of
the party and its leader truly are with regards to
Islam. If Prime Minister Erdoğan indeed wishes
to create an Islamic state based on Islamic laws,
as many people fear he does,

his pro-accession
speeches amount to empty rhetoric. If he adheres
to the path of moderate Islam while protecting
the secular principles on which the country was founded, Turkey may have a chance to be a success-
ful EU member and an example to its neighbors. In
the meantime, the military must watch the process
unfold and be prepared to defend the secular status
quo if necessary. Paradoxically, such an interven-
tion would be detrimental to the future of Turkish-
eu relations, but necessary if Turkey is to maintain
its progress towards Westernization.
the rise and fall of refah
The story of Islam in modern Turkish politics
starts well before Refah’s surprising frst-place fn-
ish in the 1995 elections. The military, and indeed
many government offcials, felt threatened by the
increasing support gained by leftist parties in the
1970s, resulting in the coup of 1971 during which
many leftist party leaders were imprisoned. Re-
ligious conservatives, viewed at the time as less
dangerous than the leftists, had already begun
organizing politically and were not affected by the
coup.

Among them was Necmettin Erbakan, a
political fgure rapidly gaining popularity among
the religious right. Fearing a Marxist revolution
and disturbed by the student revolts in the US and
Europe around that time, Kemalist military leaders
chose to support Erbakan and his new Milli Savcilar
Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP) against a
secular but liberal suleyman demirel in the elec-
tions of 1973.

Although he would lose to Demirel,
Erbakan’s dynamic public speaking ability and his
appeal to conservative Muslims quickly made him
a household name. A fundamentalist Sunni Muslim, Erbakan was
again used by Kemalists as a “counterweight to
. . radical ideologies that were gaining strength in
Turkey” in 1980.

In an effort to stop leftist radical-
ism, the military supported a radical Islamist whose
MSP was blatantly anti-West and promised to cre-
ate “a country which would be fully industrialized
through economic cooperation with the Muslim
world, the prerequisite of which was the return
to Islam as the basis of social organization.”
The
military’s attempt to choose the “lesser of two evils”
not only went against its Kemalist principles but
would also soon come back to haunt it.
The fall of the Soviet Union and decline in world-
wide leftist radicalism meant that the time was right
for Erbakan to take center stage. Candidates from
his new Refah Party
began winning rural munici-
pal elections as early as 1984 and burst into national
prominence with impressive city mayoral victories
in 1991. This local success carried over into 1994
when Refah candidates Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and
Melih Gökçek became mayors of Turkey’s two larg- est cities and previous secular strongholds, Istanbul
and Ankara, respectively.

islamic Party success
was no longer just a rural phenomenon. The 1994
victories set the stage for the 1995 parliamentary
elections when Erbakan would take on a fractured
collection of secular politicians from the dyP (True
Path) and Anavatan (Motherland, ANAP) parties.
Garnering 21.8 percent of the total votes,

refah
fnished in frst place and formed an uneasy coali-
tion with corruption-plagued DYP leader Tansu
Çiller even after she had arguably run the most
vehemently anti-Islamist campaign.

How was this radical Islamic party able to gain so
much support so quickly? By the mid-1990s, Turks
were frustrated with the instability and corruption
associated with the secular politicians of the time.
The Refah platform resonated with the general
Turkish public, emphasizing morals and a return
to traditional family values. The party appealed
to recent rural-urban migrants who suffered from
high unemployment and were starving for the
“just order” promised by Refah.

It was also able
to organize at the grassroots level and truly show compassion for the “ordinary Turk,” something
Mesut Yılmaz of ANAP and Çiller of DYP were
strangely incapable of doing. Refah won the 1995
election by a slim margin, but its victory indicated
that Islamic parties (or at least their social agendas)
had the potential for widespread appeal.
The military began to worry about Refah in the
late 1980s, but not until Refah came to power did
its discontent become obvious. As protectors of
Atatürk’s reforms, it had reason to worry. Erbakan
was precisely the radical it had feared through-
out the 1970s and 1980s, just in a fundamentalist
Islamic, rather than leftist, form. In addition to
wanting to make Turkey more open to Islam, his
comments refected a desire to create an Islamic
state. In speeches leading up to the 1995 election, he
openly proclaimed that he would “work for a just
order, to liberate Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and
Jerusalem,” later stating his intention to create “an
Islamic United Nations, an Islamic NATO and an
Islamic version of the EU.”
At the time Turkey was
not an offcial candidate for membership in the EU,
but it is safe to say that he was generally opposed
to any cooperation with the West.
Erbakan threatened to reverse secular reforms Erbakan threatened to reverse secular reforms
and align Turkey with its Muslim neighbors to the
south, distancing it from the Europe-centric future
envisioned by Atatürk. Even though a majority of
Turks were shocked by the success of the Refah
Party, the inability of secular politicians to cooper-
ate against a common enemy, preferring instead
to vie for power amongst themselves, left the door
open for Erbakan. Many who voted for him on the
basis of his social agenda were later turned off by his
overly Islamic rhetoric. Secularism was ultimately
more important to Turks than social policy and Er-
bakan’s quest for “worldwide Muslim solidarity”

was disconcerting at best. The Turkish population
faced a problem it could not solve on its own and
once again, it was time for the military to intervene
on behalf of an immature voting population.
Inspired by frequent public outbursts against
Erbakan’s Islamism and annoyed by his reluctance
to change course despite pressure from the NSC, the
military began publicly releasing the problems it,
and subsequently many Turkish citizens, had with
him.

Although the mili-
tary never directly asked
for his resignation, the
pressure eventually be-
came overwhelming and
after less than a year in
offce, Erbakan resigned
in what has been dubbed
Turkey’s frst post-mod-
ern “soft coup.”
refah was officially banned in early 1998 for “[using]
religion for political purposes, [promoting] civil
unrest and [seeking] to launch a theocratic state.”

Interestingly, this decision was upheld by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights that unanimously
ruled in 2003 that “‘there had been no violation’
of the European Convention on Human Rights,”

validating the military’s efforts.

The Star · #3 Thursday, January 15, 2009

by Yayböke, Erol

Erdoğan’s aK Party
Current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s
form of Islamism started gaining popularity in
Turkey soon after the Fazilet Party, for all practical
purposes the reincarnation of Refah, was similarly
banned from Turkish politics in 2001,

a move
welcomed by secularists but widely condemned
by international observers.

His AK (Justice) Party
became the frst single-party ruling government
in over a decade after a comprehensive victory in
the November 2002 elections. A self-proclaimed
religious moderate, Erdoğan claims that his party
is fully committed to seeking membership in the
EU. He has gained the backing of several European
governments and many secular Turks who believe
that his stated commitment to Western principles,
among them democracy and laicism, takes prece-
dence over any fundamentalist Islamic aspirations
he may personally have.
In reality, he is striking a delicate balance between
religious fundamentalism and Westernization. The
military is closely monitoring him and has voiced
its limited approval of Erdoğan’s government,
mostly on the basis of its EU goals. As long as he
remains focused on that goal both in statement and
in practice, the military will keep its distance. The
generals know that intervention at this point is not
only unnecessary, but could lead to the disqualif-
cation of Turkey as a candidate country altogether.
On the other hand, they are even more unwilling
to give up on Atatürk’s principles. If Erdoğan does
cross over into religious radicalism, the military will
undoubtedly step in as a stabilizing force to protect the secular status quo.
Educated in a religious
imam-hatip school as a
child, Erdoğan started his
political career as a mem-
ber of the refah Party in
the early 1980s. He be-
came the mayor of istan-
bul, Turkey’s largest and
most metropolitan city,
on the refah ticket in 1994
and was widely praised by his supporters and critics for making the centu-
ries-old city “cleaner and greener.”
Erdoğan was a
rising star in the Islamic movement until the chaos
that struck his party in the late 1990s. The banning
of Refah left him still in power but with an uncertain
political future, a predicament complicated by his
arrest and conviction in 1998 for “inciting religious
hatred.”
After his release from prison, Erdoğan reentered
politics by creating the AK party out of the ashes
of Refah and Fazilet. A shrewd politician, Erdoğan
understood the need for moderation and the con-
sequences of radical religious fundamentalism in
Turkey as seen by his friend Erbakan. Thus his new
party appealed to the more moderate members of
the previous Islamic parties and in turn, moderately
Islamic voters. Offering solutions to the economic
crisis Turkey faced at the time and voicing displea-
sure over how the government handled the 1999
earthquake,
Erdoğan gained popularity as the
2002 elections approached. In addition, he was not
plagued by the corruption scandals of his secular
opponents, mainly Çiller and Yılmaz.
When the votes were counted from the Novem-
ber 2002 election, the AK party had won 363 out of a
possible 550 seats in Parliament, an unprecedented
success for an islamic party in Turkey.

Once again,
voters were willing to overlook his Islamic past and believe his claims to have left his fundamentalist
days behind him; in return they wanted economic
stability and the promise of a non-corrupt govern-
ment. To his credit, the economy has stabilized
under his watch and, with a few minor exceptions,
the AKP has been unmarred by corruption. Since
he took offce in 2003 his AKP has maintained its
EU vision and Turkey is now, albeit with some
other serious issues still to be resolved, on its way
towards membership.

The Star · #4 Thursday, January 15, 2009

by Yayböke, Erol

conclusions
The troubling reality of Turkish politics is that vot-
ers, secular and religious conservative alike, lost
faith in politicians some time ago. Constant bicker-
ing, internal feuds, and corruption scandals plagued
the secular political arena during the 1990s. By the
time the AKP came to power Turks had identifed
the prospect of Islamic fundamentalism as the lesser
of two evils. “Right now, there is no viable option
other than AKP,” commented Philip Kaplan of
the US Embassy in Ankara who follows the cur-
rent administration closely.

Erdoğan knows that
the military will not intervene as long as he stays
focused on the EU, so that is what he has done; he
also realizes that there may come a point when the
military will be unwilling to sacrifce stability in
the name of accession. He walks a fne, albeit very
blurry, line.
With the presidential elect secular parties have precious little time to come up
with a solution. Erdoğan has stated his intention
of running for the six-year post and is currently
one of the frontrunners, a predicament that has the
fragmented secular parties scrambling. “We need a
single party with 50 percent support, not fve parties
with 10 percent support each,” former Prime Minis-
ter and leader of ANAP , Mesut Yılmaz commented
following his decision to reenter politics.

Rahşan
Ecevit, wife of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit,
recently stated that she intends to spearhead a cam-
paign to unite at least six secular political parties to
“form an election block against the AKP.”
despite
undoubtedly pure motives, it is unlikely the parties,
more importantly their leaders, will be able to unite
in such a way given their histories. Hope remains
for them, however, because Erdoğan did not rise
to power by gaining a majority of votes. It was the
fragmentation of secular parties that opened the
door to him and it is the same door that, under a
unifed secular platform, has the ability to curb his
presidential aspirations.ion in May 2007, Whatever the outcome of the 2007 election, it
is my frm belief that an overwhelming majority
of Turkish voters prefer secularism to Islamism.
Erdoğan was elected on the basis of his social
policy and stated allegiance to the West, but if he
steps over the line he can expect action, and not
just from the military. On May 17, 2006, a radical
Islamic lawyer burst into a Council of State chamber
and shot fve judges, one of whom died.

He was
protesting a court ruling, also criticized by Erdoğan,
to uphold the secular headscarf law. The violence
incited stern comments from President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer who warned that “no one will be
able to overthrow the secular regime,” saying that
the shooting was “indeed an attack on the secular
republic.”
Over 40,000 people gathered the next
day to show support for the secular establishment,
some even calling the tragedy “the September 11
of the Turkish Republic.”
Whatever the outcome,
the shooting and resulting public outrage sent an
important message of secular unity and discontent
to Erdoğan and the AKP. in contrast to Western beliefs, not all islam in
Turkey is radical. In fact, most Muslim sects try to
distance themselves from violence, a task made dif-
fcult by media portrayals of Islamic extremism in
the greater Middle East. Extremism must be differ-
entiated from moderation, the latter predominating
amongst Turkey’s Muslims. Secularism, and Kemal-
ism for that matter, is not inherently incompatible
with Islam. Turkish secularism is designed to limit
the existence of radical fundamentalists in politics.
Many Kemalists are Muslims just as many EU poli-
ticians are Christians and are offended when their
religion is associated with extremism and terrorism.
Most are culturally Muslim, preferring to align
themselves with Islam out of tradition and family
heritage.

Turks use their beliefs as the foundation
of a value system, not as the only law with which
to govern society.
Accession to the EU is undoubtedly the culmina-
tion of Atatürk’s dream of a Westernized Turkey,
but would he have been willing to risk the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism in pursuit of this goal?
Westernization was his prize, a principle inherently
incompatible with the ideals of a fundamentalist Islamic state. The only institution that will ensure
the perpetuation of secularism is the military, and it
must stay actively involved in the accession process
until the end, at which point it can fnally loosen
the reigns. The EU must commit fully to Turkey’s
membership or be satisfied with the military’s
involvement in the transition process. Without
that commitment, further reform of the military in pursuit of the long-term goal of EU accession will
only result in the short-term rise of fundamentalism
and be detrimental to the secularism and stability
that Turkey enjoys today.
Ultimately, the decision lies to some extent with
Prime Minister Erdoğan. If he chooses to play both
sides, claiming to be completely focused on the EU
accession process while trying to implement fun-
damentalist Islamic policies to appease his radical
constituency, he will fail. The two ideals are inher-
ently incompatible with one another and if he wants
to avoid massive public protests and the possibility
of military involvement, he must choose to align
himself solely with the principles of the modern,
and secular, republic.

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