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Old Thursday, January 29, 2015
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Lightbulb ecology pf bureaucracy

I need help regarding ecology of bureaucracy and bureaucracy of Pakistan as change agent. if anyone have notes or any guideline please help me

if u want to do it, do it rightly or change the path !! ALLAH knws whats in ur mind n heart!!
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Default Bureaucracy of Pakistan as a Change Agent

As a change agent, the person or collective who undertakes the role of promoting and implementing change in an organization is identified. Change agents may be internal, such as executives or staff assigned to oversee the implementation of change, and they can also be external.

In the field of civil administration, one of the enduring legacies of British rule has been The Weberian style of administration-‘Domination or exercising of power instead of service or execution of duty’-based its origins in the colonial administrative system. On the other hand, Pakistan’s administrative machinery’s primary responsibilities were supposed to be citizen-centric, rule-based and apolitical in spirit, where decentralization was expected to be the hallmark at the gross root level to satisfy the needs of the common man. The demanding mission for the civil servants of Pakistan was nation-building and economic sustainability. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s bureaucracy could not succeed.

Bureaucracy in Pakistan
Central Superior Services and Regional Civil Services form the bureaucracy. The CSS exams are open to both men and women. The Federal Civil Service Commission performs and supervises the tests. Pakistan’s bureaucracy is its heir. Pakistan was in an incredibly weak state at the time of the separation of the bureaucracy.

Characteristics of bureaucracy in Pakistan
It is like a pyramid with the greatest bureaucrat with the greatest strength. Every person has a different, specialized purpose. Output is calculated by the nature of the work carried out. A mixture of military officers and police officers. Politically, it’s neutral. Only the most skilled candidates are recruited and promoted; not to family members or friends; everyone has their own set of priorities.

Bureaucracy of Pakistan as Change agent
The bureaucracy worked as a change agent in the following fields:

Health and Sanitation.
Population Control
Betterment of workers and Laborers
Rights of women etc.

It’s no secret that Pakistan wants to invest its education budget better, it is possible that the much-needed reform process is easier said than done. In at least three provinces, struggling against a culture of doctored data, extreme scrutiny from top leaders, an insipid bureaucracy and ‘ghost’ students, donors and education officials are attempting to swim against the tide.

Although it’s no secret that Pakistan wants to invest its education budget better, it is possible that the much-needed reform process is easier said than done. In at least three provinces, struggling against a culture of doctored data, extreme scrutiny from top leaders, an insipid bureaucracy and ‘ghost’ students, donors and education officials are attempting to swim against the tide.

Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) service delivery has seen radical changes in the six-odd decades since Pakistan’s independence, oscillating between a centralized mode of management and fledgling attempts at decentralization. Shifts in the national polity have been mirrored in the architecture for WSS to varying degrees.

In the 1970s, engineering departments such as works and services, irrigation and Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) were created to specialize in deep drilling and implement complicated schemes to provide services to large populations quickly through improved access to piped water. However, a smaller role also lay with the Local Government and Rural Development (LG&RD) departments, albeit with miniscule budgets for providing lower-cost, simpler technologies, such as hand pumps, predominantly in rural areas. While PHEDs were dedicated to the sector and recognized as technical leaders, the LG&RD departments were thought to be more responsive to the communities they served and had a wider range of functions.

Bureaucratic restructuring has been more specifically put on the agenda since 1999. For this reason, a variety of committees have been created within the government.

Such political policies, in particular the Devolution Programme, have far-reaching consequences for the framework of bureaucracy. These reforms may, conceptually, be classified as addressing three elements given below.

Reforms to strengthen oversight and transparency for bureaucracy: The Devolution of Power Strategy (2000) of the Musharraf system, operationalized by local government ordinances (2001) in all four provinces, is a far-reaching reform that has the clear goal of strengthening district-level bureaucratic transparency.

First, the regional line offices, which were only indirectly accountable to the provincial political tier, were placed under the jurisdiction of elected nazims at district level as a result of this programme. This has greatly empowered the local-level elected tier, at least on paper, and created a new mode of transparency for the provincial line department.

Second, by stripping the current District Coordination Officer (DCO) office of the Executive Magistracy, Tax and Law and Order duties, the consolidation of authority in the hands of the former Deputy Commissioner (DC) was diluted. “Only the management and communication roles aligned with the old DC office” are preserved in the current DCO office on paper. In addition, the DCO, under the new structure, the head of the district, reports directly to the elected Nazis rather than to the provincial secretaries. For two factors, bureaucratic transparency is anticipated to improve under the new structure.

Third, local level bureaucrats report directly to elected politicians at the municipal level, which is intended to reduce the expense of surveillance and information. Second, at the local level, political transparency is projected to improve because the current structure has taken democracy closer to the voters in “an electoral context, with the electorate per elected official being much smaller at the district and union level than at the higher level of the state.”

In brief, devolution is supposed to increase the responsibility of politicians for the public, which, in turn, is expected to increase the incentives of local politicians to both stick to growth priorities and track bureaucratic efficiency. Equally significantly, the willingness of legislators to keep the provincial administration accountable is projected to improve by lowering the expense of politicians overseeing the devolution of the provincial bureaucracy.

A variety of socioeconomic, political and structural barriers, listed below, continue to mute the capacity of lawmakers to keep the bureaucracy accountable, however.

In comparison, these impediments often tend to silence the electoral responsibility of district officials, which, in essence, decreases their incentives to both stick to growth goals and keep the bureaucrats accountable if they diverge from these goals.

Next, the military’s choice to conduct non-party and indirect elections at the local level seems to have reproduced old hierarchies of clientelists within the district government.

It appears that the willingness of local level lawmakers to keep the provincial bureaucrat accountable is muted by the retention by provincial secretariats of substantial powers that limit the district government’s autonomous functioning vis-à-vis the bureaucracy of the provincial line. For example, under the new structure, most DCOs and EDOs continue to be part of the federal and regional cadres, and their provincial secretariats take all decisions on promotions and transfers.

It is necessary to note that the bureaucracy is just a delivery chain in the broader scheme of things, especially for pro-poor reform. Even if efforts are fruitful in developing a professional and rules-based productive bureaucracy (either by design or a magic wand), however the aims and priorities of the state remain anti-poor, it can also yield an inferior result as far as pro-poor reform is concerned as those policies can be more successfully enforced by an effective anti-poor bureaucracy. Any form of bureaucratic reform would thus have to be part of Pakistan’s pro-poor political and economic reform.
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