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I appeared in '14 and qualified but couldn't get allocated due to my own blunders in interview. Previously I'd Arabic, Geographic, Punjabi & International Law. This US History is chose for my last appearance. This is indeed a good subject. I've studied couple of books on this subject and gone through Yale University Lectures on YouTube (link's attached below). Additional information from Internet, Papers, Monthly mags is always quite handy. Please go through this forum. There's mountains of treasure here. Just spend more time in threads relevant to your optional combination. Would like to hear form you. :-)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shTB...EBE077F9257558
Will You Recommend any specific book for USA History.? Which will be enough for this subject.?
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Will You Recommend any specific book for USA History.? Which will be enough for this subject.?
I've studied couple of books (US History By Jahangir World Times) on this subject and gone through Yale University Lectures on YouTube (link's attached below). Additional information from Internet, Papers, Monthly mags is always quite handy.

Yale University US Histoery Lectures: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shTB...EBE077F9257558
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Default The liberal-left divide reshaping American politics

The liberal-left divide reshaping American politics

It has been almost a year since the catastrophic election of Donald Trump. In his first year in office, the president has governed as cruelly and ineptly as his critics predicted. But while anti-Trump sentiment has never been more fierce and widespread, his political opponents are more divided than ever. And this faultline – which has parallels in Britain with divisions among the Labour party – could, if left unaddressed, compromise efforts to resist and defeat Trumpism.

Roughly speaking, these two sides could be characterised as the “populist wing” and the “establishment wing” of the Democratic party, but even this terminology is a point of controversy between the feuding sides. The party’s left wing, for example, wants to call the conflict the “left-liberal divide”. Loyalist Democrats want to play down the divide, calling for unity by insisting that Democrats are all members of “the left” (if those calling for unity are younger, millennial types), or that they are all “liberals” (if they are older, Clinton-era types). The right, meanwhile, does not understand the divide, continuing to believe in a monolithic “radical left” filled with “radical liberals”. This leads to the funny situation, as one commentator noted, in which members of both the left and the right reach for the same “I made it through college without becoming a liberal” T-shirt.

The present conflict surfaced, as many intra-party feuds do, during a presidential primary. But unlike past internal conflicts, this one is sticking around. Centrist John Kerry supporters, for example, did not take potshots at insurgent Howard Dean supporters deep into 2005. This year, however, a full ecosystem – replete with duelling podcasts, magazines and candidates – has kept the divide alive. Skirmishes are popping up, like clockwork, every few weeks; from February’s bitterly contested election of a new Democratic National Committee chair, to leftist scepticism about potential 2020 Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris; from the launching of the Clinton-fawning website Verrit to the latest harangue from the liberal-bashing podcast Chapo Trap House.

Discussing a resolution to this conflict is difficult, because even calls for “resolution” can be interpreted as ideological statements. Wanting the Democratic party to survive and unify can be taken as an endorsement of the establishment, because the quickest path to intra-party peace is for the conflict’s leftwing instigators to get in line. Meanwhile, treating the intraparty divide as substantive – arguing that there is, in fact, a significant difference between, say, “Medicare for All” and “Obamacare” – can annoy liberals who believe that the so-called “divide” has been manufactured by a few disgruntled purists.

To resolve our intra-party conflict, we must first understand it. I believe the two sides’ concerns can be grouped into three divides: the first over party loyalty, the second over how to win elections, and the third over the gap between Democrats and Republicans. Each divide may not be relevant to every partisan in the conflict, but most partisans have divided over at least one of these three.

The divide over party loyalty

Liberals accuse leftwingers of not being loyal to the party in general elections. This began with the vilification of leftwing third-party voters, such as Ralph Nader voters in 2000 and Jill Stein voters in 2016. What made this past election special is that accusations of disloyalty were launched at a Democratic primary challenger. Hillary Clinton supporters feel that Bernie Sanders attacked Clinton excessively during the primary, stayed in the primary too long, and did not do enough to support her in the general election. Many loyal Democrats around the country have analogous feelings about leftwing rebels in the party generally: they think criticisms should be kept inside the family, and that it is important to be a “team player” in order to win elections and pass legislation. Some may call these loyal Democrats boring conformists, but from their perspective, it is party loyalists, not insurgent critics, who staff the party booth at the county fair and knock on doors every year to help get Democrats elected.

Leftists, on the other hand, believe this “disloyalty” accusation is bunk. First, they think establishment-wing leaders follow what the political blogger Jonathan Schwartz has called “the iron law of institutions”, which says that “the people who control institutions care first and foremost about their power within the institution rather than the power of the institution itself”. If party leaders were loyal to the party, leftwingers believe, then they would have learned from recent electoral losses and shaken the party up, even if it meant stepping aside themselves to make room for fresh faces and new ideas.

Second, insurgent leftwingers care less about catering to the dwindling group of grassroots party loyalists around the country, and more about activating the masses of non-voters and independents who are not yet loyal to any party. That is why they are less concerned about candidates, like Sanders, who are not technically Democrats. They see them not as selfish traitors, but rather as opportunities to build the party’s base.

Loyalty to the party generally is often bound up in loyalty to party leaders. The party’s liberal wing tends to get excited about party leaders’ personalities, and is more likely to share, say, Obama or Hillary memes, watch West Wing fantasies about party staffers and follow the path of rising stars. This loyalty extends to the wider network tied to the party, too, such as liberal-leaning news anchors and commentators, and party-aligned Hollywood stars such as Meryl Streep.

Leftwingers think this level of loyalty is bizarre, especially when it comes to politicians they believe do not deserve it. Leftwingers are generally less likely to express loyalty to leaders, and more likely to pledge themselves to issue campaigns that bubble up from extra-party institutions, such as labour unions or racial justice and environmental groups. They respond to liberal attacks of “Why aren’t you knocking on doors in the general election?” with “Why aren’t you joining the Fight for $15?” (a national grassroots campaign for fairer wages led by fast-food workers). Leftwingers believe liberals cannot think for themselves on issues – that they wait to get the go-ahead from the party establishment before they offer any support. To leftwingers, the liberals’ shorter-term issues, such as the Russia investigation, are just distractions unless they are embedded in more fundamental issue campaigns.

Establishment Democrats often see leftwingers’ enthusiasm for disjointed issue campaigns over the party platform as further evidence that they do not understand “how real politics works”. As Slate writer Stephen Metcalf describes: “I see a social movement left that protests then goes home; and a Democratic party that stays on and does the hard, boring work.” Loyal Democrats see their friends forming phone-banks to urge members of Congress to oppose Republican attacks on Obamacare, and wonder why there are not more leftwingers pitching in. To loyal Democrats, either you call yourself a Democrat, be a team player and move issues forward as part of a concerted, directed party strategy … or you believe in the power of, to use one common liberal phrase, “Bernie’s magic elves”, who will mysteriously and effortlessly accomplish all the hidden work that it takes to make policy goals a reality.

Leftwingers, on the other hand, believe liberals have delusions of their own: namely that party politicians will naturally push important issues forward without any prodding. Party loyalists, they believe, fail to see that without popular agitation, party priorities are set by powerful interests. Leftwingers, they insist, are team players, but their teams are outside groups and issues, and they put in the work earlier in the policy process than establishment Democrats.

This divide over party loyalty played out earlier this year in a skirmish over Jon Ossoff’s candidacy in a special congressional election in Georgia. Ossoff did not come out strongly for any issues that weren’t dictated by party leadership, but he was a loyal Democrat and would have been a reliable Democratic vote in Congress. His campaign was powered in large part by teams of suburban Atlanta moms – grassroots party loyalists who earnestly cared about resisting Trump. Liberals poured passion into the campaign while leftwingers criticised his bland message. When Ossoff lost, many loyalists viewed it as another example of the left not getting on board for a critical team project. Leftwingers, meanwhile, saw it as evidence that the party was still failing to understand the issues that really mattered to voters.

The divide over strategy


The divide over what we are trying to win is coupled with a divide over how we win. The first part of this strategic divide is over what policies a losing party should adopt to win back power. Liberals’ go-to strategy is often thus: if you are losing, tack your policies to the centre to win; once you win back power, you can enact what you want.

Liberals believe that the left too often chooses ideological purity over victory. They think leftwingers are not serious about power: if populist leaders, they argue, ever had to actually lead the party – if they had to win elections and pass legislation – they too would be forced to be more pragmatic. Many establishment Democrats buy into the Republican talking point that the US is a centre-right country, and that Democrats need to adjust their strategy to that reality.

Leftwingers have the inverse policy strategy: if you are losing, you need a more differentiated, passionate policy vision to win. The writer Adam Johnson points to how Jeremy Corbyn succeeded with this strategy: “Corbyn’s campaign caught fire because he offered a clear moral vision of justice … they call it ‘ideology’ … But ideology is simply pragmatism over a longer timetable.”

Leftwingers like Johnson believe liberals have been conned by the right into playing on their rhetorical turf. When Democrats couch their proposals in Republican rhetoric – such as when they refer to Russian interference as “communist infiltration” or pitch social welfare programs as “helping entrepreneurs” – they, in the left’s mind, commit the double error of appearing like inauthentic Diet Republicans and diluting the power of the Democrats’ own potentially inspiring ideals. At their most sceptical, leftwingers wonder whether Democratic leaders are tacking to the centre not simply as an electoral strategy, but because they do not believe in leftwing ideas in the first place. These leftwingers point to examples of times when Democrats had power and still did not advance their stated ideals in what leftwingers considered to be a sufficiently ambitious manner.

In short, the party’s liberal wing believes winning leads to idealism, whereas the party’s left wing believes idealism leads to winning.

The divide over the gap between Democrats and Republicans

Perhaps the root of these first two divides is a third divide: how much difference leftwingers and liberals believe there is between Democrats and Republicans.

Party loyalists believe the gap between the two parties is huge. The Republican party is so egregiously horrible, they argue, that it is imperative to remain loyal to our only hope of stopping them: the Democratic party. This viewpoint is captured in a recent Democratic Campaign Coordinating Committee sign reading “Democrats 2018: I mean, have you seen the other guys?” This belief explains why liberals tend to focus on the outrages of the “other guys” and downplay the left-liberal divide: given the constant threat of Republican power, any internal differences are miniscule. What’s more, the threat of Republican power, liberals point out, is especially acute to marginalised communities: whereas privileged idealists can afford to say “it has to get worse before it gets better,” immigrants at risk of deportation, black people at risk of police brutality and gay couples at risk of having their rights rolled back do not have the same luxury.

Leftwingers, on the other hand, see the gap between Democrats and Republicans as smaller. They like to point out examples of silent bipartisanship: the complicity of Democrats in the disastrous war in Iraq and the racist war on drugs, for example, or the Obama administration’s continuation of Bush-era, corporate-driven education reform. They criticise party loyalists for letting Democratic leaders steer them towards formerly Republican positions, such as when some Democratic loyalists began criticising administration leakers such as Chelsea Manning – a figure they would have lionised if she had committed her leaks while Bush was president.

Behind this divide is a failure to see eye-to-eye over certain larger narratives – narratives that leftwingers talk about more than liberals do. The left often situates both parties within broader conceptual frameworks, such as neoliberalism, corporate power and imperialism. To defeat these larger, nefarious societal structures and historical trends, leftwingers argue, we must identify them and prepare a plan to conquer them – a task more difficult than just defeating the Republicans at the ballot box.

Many liberals, meanwhile, either have not thought about, do not believe in, or do not prioritise addressing these forces. Some have even made fun of leftwingers for talking too much about “neoliberalism” – a phrase many centrists believe has no meaning, but that leftwingers insist is analytically useful. (Ironically, this is the same dynamic at play as when conservatives snarkily dismiss phrases such as “white supremacy” and “patriarchy” as being meaningless, despite the insistence by both leftists and liberals that you could fill an entire library with books explaining each phrase’s depth of meaning.)

From divides to tribes

These divisions may have started the left-liberal conflict, but it has been sustained by the fact that both sides are developing into integrated political tribes. As social psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues, political tribalism begins with shared intuitions: we first feel what is politically right, then later muster arguments to support our intuitions. When people who share some intuitions about politics find each other and discover they share other intuitions, they begin to form political communities to collaborate on mustering arguments for their bundles of shared intuitions. Out of these political communities emerge leaders and institutions. The tribal formation is complete when these communities establish a unified tribal narrative – complete with stories of the past, present and future; heroes and villains; and direction for what members should be doing.

Today’s left wing of the party emerged as a bundle of intuitions about the Democratic establishment: scepticism of the Clintons; concern about the Obama administration’s response to the financial crisis and wars in the Middle East; and curiosity as to why working-class issues have been less trumpeted by the party in recent decades than they might have been in the past. In recent years, leaders and institutions emerged to articulate these intuitions: media ventures such as Jacobin, the Intercept and Chapo Trap House; politicians such as Keith Ellison, Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders; and organisations fighting for causes such as a $15 minimum wage, Medicare for All and a ban on fracking. A narrative has coalesced of a party that has been corrupted by corporate campaign donations; that is complicit in conservatism’s rise, through its capitulation to Reaganomics and Bush-era militarism; that has displaced its working-class base to make room for a professional, managerial class; and, most damningly, has replaced its democracy-enhancing New Deal ambitions with a minimalist grab-bag of meritocracy-enhancing, technocratic band-aids.

The loyalist wing of the party has had a tribe-building process, too – one likely accelerated by the party rebels’ rise. They started out with a different bundle of political intuitions: more trust for leaders like Obama and Clinton; more credit given to what Democrats were able to accomplish in the age of conservative ascendance; more inspiration taken from the racial and gender diversity of party leadership; and more appreciation for the progressive causes the party has begun to articulate over the past decades. A network of party-friendly institutions, journalists and leaders, old and new, has emerged to articulate and defend these liberal intuitions: media entities such as MSNBC and Slate; the DNC itself; the leaders and staffers of the Obama administration and Clinton campaigns; mainstream liberal thinktanks; and writers such as the economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, and Clara Jeffery, editor of Mother Jones magazine. A narrative has emerged to unify this wing as well: a story that casts the Democratic party as the entity that has overcome unprecedented Republican attacks to give voice to and fight for the interests of marginalised people in American politics.

These political tribes build a network of trust between their individual members and the complexities of national politics. As individuals, we cannot know everything about national politics, but we can collect trustworthy people who do know about different areas of politics. Take Elizabeth Warren, for example: leftwingers believe she shares their deep politics regarding Wall Street, so they look to her when they want to know, say, if a recent regulation is effective or toothless. Or take Barack Obama’s foreign policy: many liberals are less critical of it than leftwingers are, because they trust that Obama is similar, deep down, to them, and therefore believe his decisions would be similar to the decisions they would make if they were privy to his information. Trust explains why each side is preoccupied with showing how different surface-level moves by national figures are windows into some alien – or familiar – deep politics: it validates their trust or distrust in each side’s establishment or counter-establishment.

These political tribes have their benefits. They help draw people into politics, bring people together and give members purpose. But political tribalism can also be hazardous. At its worst, it creates enemies out of neighbours, turning complex people into “sell-outs” or “purists”. Tribes trick us into thinking that political participation is about being well-versed in tribal rhetoric – say, being able to list the correct takes on past inter-tribal skirmishes – rather than about pursuing tangible goals. They encourage confirmatory, self-validating thought, rather than the exploratory thought that helps our politics stay aligned with reality. The focus that comes with tribalism can lapse into myopia, such as when some liberals can see Trump’s wickedness regarding immigration so clearly, but were unable to support immigration activists protesting Obama; or when some leftwingers can see the corporate corruption of Democrats so clearly, but fail to articulate the massive gap in corruption between the two parties.

A final danger of political tribalism – one specific to the intra-party divide – is that it is a danger to the coalition-building required to gain power through electoral politics. If a party coalition is divided against itself come election day, it may not stand. And if the coalition loses, both tribes lose. And with each passing of month of Trump’s presidency, the stakes get higher.

Resolving the conflict

So, who is right? Fortunately, a peace process need not declare one side’s narrative as supreme. However, it does require each side to come to terms, at least a bit, with the best insights of the other side.

The liberals’ best insight is that today’s Republican party is an exceptionally dangerous political organisation. It denies catastrophic climate change, is an almost-pure vessel for the corporate takeover of public power, has based its electoral coalition on aligning with white ethnic nationalism and authoritarian theocracy, and has instigated disastrous decision after disastrous decision over the past decades.

Democratic party leaders over the past decades may have been cowardly in the face of Republican cruelty but they were, for the most part, not the instigators of the most callous developments in modern American politics. Winning general elections against the Republican party matters – and putting in the work to defeat them at the ballot box is a responsibility of all progressives.

The leftwingers’ best insight is that the end-goal of electoral politics is not winning; it is the advancement of certain programmes and policies. As anyone who has watched the conservative ascendancy within the Republican party knows, internal criticism of party leaders is what makes leaders listen. As Frederick Douglass said: “Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.”

A productive peace process for the intraparty war would merge these insights, advancing a practice that would help defeat the Republican party while keeping Democratic leaders on their toes. You could call this practice “vigorous critical loyalty”. Vigorous critical loyalty would work by separating the times for vigorous party loyalty and the times for vigorous internal criticism. A Democrat practising vigorous critical loyalty would, near the general election or a critical vote in Congress, demonstrate vigorous loyalty to the party, mustering support for the Democratic candidate or bill while holding criticism for later. But during a primary campaign, and during ordinary legislative time, a vigorous critical loyalist would fight vigorously for her ideals, unafraid of criticising party leaders, supporting primary challengers, and advancing outside issue campaigns.

For this to work, both sides need to give a little. Liberals need to accept that primary challenges to beloved party leaders are not only legitimate, but desirable, in order to keep the party aligned with its people. Liberals also need to accept that outside issue campaigns are legitimate. If an important issue – such as immigrant rights and universal health care – is having a difficult time breaking through to the party, interrupting speeches and writing harsh critiques of party stars becomes necessary. Liberals should balance their loyalty to party figures with respect for this difficult, messy and effective work of pushing peripheral issues on to the national stage.

Leftwingers, on the other hand, first need to bring their passion into mainstream party projects – especially general election campaigns. They should supplement their respect for the ideological activists pushing important issues into the mainstream with respect for the loyal, grassroots Democrats who make sure there are enough Democratic votes in Congress to make any policy matter. If leftwingers are asking liberals to respect the distinction between leftwingers and liberals, they should return the favour by respecting the distinction between liberals and their Republican adversaries – and act on that distinction by taking seriously the role the Democratic party has played as a bulwark against the extremes of Republican power.

Second, leftwingers need to understand that the way to gain the respect of the other half of the party is to not just say they “would have won”, but rather to actually win. The biggest problem with the Sanders campaign is the same problem that the Clinton campaign had: it lost. In turn, the biggest asset of the Sanders campaign is that it almost won. Obama was able to change the party because he won. The Fight for $15 was able to change the party because it has won in cities and states across the country. A rebellious vision gains followers when it shows it can win.

In sum, an ideal Democratic party would arbitrate internal divides through a flurry of vigorous issue campaigns and primary challenges during ordinary time and then, during general election time and critical Congressional votes, rapidly unify to win.

This would move our conflicts away from neverending shadow-boxing and toward resolution in the court of public opinion. Primaries, for example, will help resolve the strategy divide, by showing whether “pragmatism” or “idealism” wins in general elections, as candidates of different persuasions win primaries and test their pragmatist/idealist orientation in general elections. Issue campaigns, meanwhile, will show the extent to which the party has been corrupted by nefarious structural forces. One need not endlessly discuss whether this or that politician is a “neoliberal shill” if you can resolve the question by launching issue campaigns that dramatise these larger forces at play and see whether said politician supports the campaign. If they do, they may be worthy of more trust. If they do not, they may be worthy of a primary challenge.

And finally, by agreeing from the start that everyone, no matter their level of criticism during ordinary time, is fully on board to support the party when general election time comes, concerns about party loyalty are reduced. All intraparty fights are tolerated – and even encouraged – because everyone can trust that we will be unified when it counts.

Vigorous critical loyalty presumes that people can change, and that there is a potential to re-integrate the left and liberal tribes. As issue campaigns gain support from current party leaders and improbable primary challengers become party leaders, party sceptics become more loyal, while party loyalists start showing loyalty to leaders and issues formerly seen as heretical.

Most importantly, vigorous critical loyalty could help rebuild trust. Primary challengers that win become closer to the people they represent. To have an issue emerge from a trusted outside group and then have that issue enter the mainstream of the party is to build loyalists’ trust in that outside group while building populists’ trust in the party.

This is how two tribes could eventually merge into one without either side compromising on their ideals and loyalties. It may seem like a longshot. But I take hope from a point that Washington Post assistant editor Elizabeth Bruenig raised at a talk earlier this year: “You don’t argue with people who are nothing like you … you argue with people who are almost like you … [Arguing] is a pretty good sign of the possibility of coalition.”

https://www.theguardian.com/
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I've studied couple of books (US History By Jahangir World Times) on this subject and gone through Yale University Lectures on YouTube (link's attached below). Additional information from Internet, Papers, Monthly mags is always quite handy.

Yale University US Histoery Lectures: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shTB...EBE077F9257558
You have JWT book in Pdf format? Actually someone posted it Chapter wise on this forum in pdf format... But I could not download Chapter 17-20 Now that post has been removed or that person has left this forum. I need these chapters...
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You have JWT book in Pdf format? Actually someone posted it Chapter wise on this forum in pdf format... But I could not download Chapter 17-20 Now that post has been removed or that person has left this forum. I need these chapters...
Sorry, I do not have it in PDF. Only available in hard copy.
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Default US will eradicate terrorism, with or without Pakistan: Tillerson

US will eradicate terrorism, with or without Pakistan: Tillerson

WASHINGTON: US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has said that he did not visit Islamabad earlier this week to lecture or coerce Pakistanis but he did tell them that Washington is determined to eradicate terrorism from the region with their support or “in a different way”.

“And that’s not a threat. It’s just a matter of fact. We have to deal with the conditions on the ground. And as you know, the entire South Asia strategy is a conditions-based strategy,” he said.

Mr Tillerson said the message he delivered to Pakistan during the visit was: “Here’s what we need for Pakistan to do. We’re asking you to do this; we’re not demanding anything. You’re a sovereign country. You’ll decide what you want to do.”

On Thursday evening, Secretary Tillerson reviewed his seven-day visit to Europe, the Middle East and South Asia with the State Department press corps from Geneva, also highlighting key points of his talks in Islamabad on Tuesday. He said he had offered to help Pakistan resolve its disputes with India, a suggestion that may irk New Delhi, which opposes any third-party mediations with Pakistan.

“That would be a complete mischaracterisation of the meeting,” said the top US diplomat when a journalist asked him if it would be accurate to say that he received a message of defiance from the Pakistanis who told him, “We will not be coerced”.

But he acknowledged that he told them Washington would implement its new strategy with or without Islamabad because “this is what we think is necessary. And if you don’t want to do that, don’t feel you can do it, we’ll adjust our tactics and our strategies to achieve the same objective a different way”.

Says he offered to help Pakistan resolve its disputes with India

Secretary Tillerson said he viewed US-Pakistan ties as “a respectful relationship” but, “we have some very legitimate tasks, some very legitimate concerns that we need their help addressing. I said to them, ‘You can do it or you can decide not to do it. And if you decide you don’t want to do it, just let us know. We’ll adjust our plans accordingly and we’ll deal with it ourselves’ ”.

Another journalist referred to Indian media reports that Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed was not on a list of 75 terrorists that the US team handed over to Pakistani officials in Islamabad on Tuesday. The journalist also referred to a Pakistani media report that none of the 75 terrorists on the US list were Pakistanis and asked Secretary Tillerson to comment on both reports.

The secretary ignored the two points, saying instead that he had “a very healthy exchange of information on terrorists” with the Pakistanis. “We have provided them specific asks, beyond just names of individuals. We’ve provided them specific asks,” he said. “But we’ve also invited greater sharing from them as well. So we expect to receive information from them that will be useful.”

The United States, he said, was mainly interested in specific information about the location and movements of these terrorists, instead of indulging in the dispute whether they were based in Pakistan or Afghanistan. “As you know, the Pakistan-Afghan border is quite porous; in fact, it’s ill-defined. And so we’re less concerned about are they in Pakistani territory, in Afghanistan territory, or — as we are obtaining information so that we can eliminate them,” he said.

Mr Tillerson said he also explained President Donald Trump’s new strategy for South Asia in his discussions with Afghans, Pakistanis and Indian leaders, which requires the involvement of regional players — particularly India and Pakistan — for restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

“Pakistan is a key partner for the stability of the region. We have a long history of positive partnership with Pakistan, but Pakistan must do more to eradicate militants and terrorists operating within its country,” he said.

“The people of Pakistan have much to gain from a stable, peaceful Afghanistan, and a region that denies safe haven to terrorists. This was my principal message to Prime Minister (Shahid Khaqan) Abbasi, Chief of Army Staff (Gen Qamar) Bajwa, and the Pakistani leadership.”

He rejected the suggestion that he was lecturing Islamabad from Delhi and Kabul, which irritated Pakistanis. “I would not have characterised my direct discussions with them as lecturing at all. It was a very good and open exchange,” he said.

“In fact, we probably listened 80 per cent of the time and we talked 20 per cent. And it was important to me, because I have not engaged with Pakistani leadership previously. And so my objective was to listen a lot, to hear their perspective.”

The meetings in Islamabad, he added, provided both sides to share their views.

“We put our points forward. We put our expectations forward in no uncertain terms. There has been significant engagement prior to my visit, and there’ll be further engagement in the future, as we work through how we want to… exchange information and achieve the objective of eliminating these terrorist organisations, wherever they may be located.”

Published in Dawn, October 28th, 2017
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Don't expect war with North Korea to be gentlemanly

It is a mistake to imagine that any potential war with North Korea will be like a gentlemanly game of chess, in which each side takes turns and the understandings for offence and defence are robust. This misperception is particularly evident in two areas.

First, it is assumed that the missile defences currently bristling around South Korea and Japan will protect them from short, medium and long-range intercontinental missiles sent from North Korea. The hopes in this area are pinned on remarkable achievements of these systems tracking and destroying missiles.

The well-touted examples in this area include the Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Defence (THAAD) systems against medium-range missiles, which have successful interception rates of 83 percent and 100 percent, respectively. The short-range missile defence systems, such as the Patriot, also appears to have improved greatly in recent times.

Although these figures sound impressive, they are spoiled by a number of considerations. First, although the success rate for hitting short and medium-range missiles appears good, the success rate for destroying intercontinental missiles is only just about 50 percent.

Second, most of the testing is conducted in near perfect conditions, in which one target is carefully tracked and destroyed. Third, the scale of the deployment is small. That is, with the American Ground-based Midcourse Defence system against intercontinental missiles, only 44 interceptors have been deployed. With the THAAD, only one battery (with 48 interceptor missiles) has been deployed in South Korea, although this has been supplemented with 16 batteries of Patriot missiles (each with 16 launchers).

Although supported by other anti-missile technologies, these ones will be the forefront of trying to stop, at best guess, 200 missile launchers and between 600 to 1000 short-range missiles and maybe 100 other medium and long-range missiles coming in from North Korea.

It can be expected that North Korea would fire most of these with great speed, deception and strategy, to attack, overpower and trick the missile defences. This attack would be nothing like the near perfect field conditions that most missile testing is currently conducted.


North's chemical and biological weapon stockpile
The second misperception is that although missiles may be the preferred delivery system for nuclear weapons, this is not the case for the other weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical and biological weapons that North Korea may possess.

The base problem here is that although the international community agreed to prohibit both chemical and biological weapons as methods of warfare in 1925 and then updated these prohibitions for bioweapons in 1972 and chemical weapons in 1993, it is not at all clear that North Korea considers itself bound by these considerations. That is, although North Korea signatory to the 1925 agreement, it is not a signatory to 1993 convention, and although it has adhered to the 1972 convention, it has fallen far behind the rudimentary expectations in this area.

In short, be sceptical about what the missile defences can actually achieve, expect chemical weapons to be part of the mix and don't be surprised if bioweapons were also thrown in.

Of chemical weapons, the strongest evidence of what they possess is the assassination of Kim Jong-nam with VX gas in Malaysia. This proof followed decades of speculation that North Korea was manufacturing chemical weapons.

Current South Korean estimates suggest that the North has an existing stockpile of between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tonnes of chemical weapons (pdf). Although chemical weapons can also be delivered by missile, plane or human hands, it is likely that the North Korean ones would be delivered by the 5,400 rocket launchers and 4,400 artillery pieces that they are believed to possess.

Although some analysts argue that Kim Jong-un's highly publicised official visits to seemingly unimportant pesticide factories and other laboratories in North Korea signal the existence of a covert bioweapons programme, our knowledge in this area is nothing more than guesswork.

Although it appears likely that North Korea has been developing bioweapons since the 1960s (pdf), and probably has understanding of about 13 types of biological weapons (including plague, anthrax, cholera and smallpox), there is no unambiguous evidence suggesting a large scale, advanced and successful bioweapons programme and production in North Korea.

There are currently black holes of knowledge with regards to whether North Korea have successfully weaponised biological material and passed the barriers that stopped others; whether they have effective delivery systems (which could be missiles, drones, planes and/or human agents) and whether they have defence measures to ensure that any pathogens do not backlash against their own population.

However, this scarcity of information within a country shrouded in secrecy, which has continually surprised the international community with advances in nuclear and missile technology, should not, under any circumstances, be taken as proof that they do not possess effective bioweapons.

In short, there aren't fully effective defences established to protect South Korea, Japan or other countries in case North Korea decides to go to war.
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Default New approaches being used with Pakistan, India over Afghan issue: US

New approaches being used with Pakistan, India over Afghan issue: US

WASHINGTON: The United States is working on new approaches with India and Pakistan for promoting stability and reconciliation in Afghanis*tan, says the State Department.

The State Department’s annual report on its financial priorities for the new fiscal year highlights this as a key ingredient of new US strategy for South Asia that President Donald Trump announced on Aug 21.

“Our approach to South Asia, and specifically Afghanistan, means new approaches with India and Pakistan to deny safe havens to terrorist organisations,” says State Department Inspector General Steve A. Linick.

And main purpose behind this new approach is to “create the conditions for reconciliation with the Taliban and a process that supports the Afghan government in providing security for their own people,” Mr Linick adds.

The report identifies the most serious management and performance challenges facing the State Department and assesses the department’s progress in addressing those challenges.

This year’s report details ongoing difficulties in monitoring and overseeing the antiterrorism assistance programme in Pakistan. The report points out that the State Department has no staff in Pakistan responsible for verifying satisfactory contractor performance or monitoring whether required reports are submitted. Furthermore, the bureau had not adopted a meaningful way to measure progress toward programme goals.

The report notes that difficulty in obtaining visas from Pakistan is a contributing factor in the State Department’s flawed oversight and monitoring of the antiterrorism assistance programme there. It also underlines the measures the State Department could take to improve oversight, including developing and implementing procedures to verify compliance with contract reporting requirements.

The report also identifies ways that the State Department’s own practices contributed to problems, notwithstanding the fact that oversight personnel could not be located in Pakistan. For example, the Contracting Offer waived - without formally modifying the terms of the contract - many reporting requirements that would have allowed the State Department to verify satisfactory contractor performance.

The report urges the State Department to develop and implement procedures to confirm compliance with contract reporting requirements. It also recommends that, in situations where the operating environment warrants a contract modification, State Department personnel with oversight responsibility should execute such modifications in line with appropriate guidelines.

The report notes that the challenges associated with contingency environments are not limited to those pertaining to contracts and grants.

The report also notes that the US mission’s security policies restricting staff travel in country, made it difficult to meet with Pakistani contacts and audiences; this, in some cases, impeded operations or programme implementation.

Published in Dawn, November 28th, 2017
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Default Trump signs bill that includes $700m reimbursement for Pakistan

Trump signs bill that includes $700m reimbursement for Pakistan
WASHINGTON: US President Donald Trump has signed into law a $700 billion defence bill that includes up to $700 million to reimburse Pakistan for supporting US military operations in Afghanistan.

President Trump put his signature on this sweeping defence policy bill on Tuesday, which also authorises additional spending on missile defence programmes to counter North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons threat.

The US Congress passed the National Defence Authorisation Act 2018 early last month, allowing up to $700m in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) for Pakistan as well. But half of this amount has been withheld and can only be released if the US secretary of defence certifies that Pakistan is taking demonstrable steps for curbing the Haqqani network.

Two successive US defence secretaries — Ashton Carter and James Mattis — refused to give such a certification, preventing the administration to release the funds set aside for Pakistan in the two previous budgets.

The bill, signed into law on Tuesday, includes the restriction attached by Congress and so far there’s no indication that Secretary Mattis will issue the required certification for Pakistan.

The law also requires the Pentagon to monitor Washing*ton’s security assistance to Pakistan and ensure that the country does not use it to support militant groups.

An earlier version of the bill asked the defence secretary to certify that Pakistan had taken steps to demonstrate its commitment to prevent the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba from using Pakistani territory as a safe haven and for fundraising or recruiting efforts.

But when the US House of Representatives and the Senate released their joint version of the 2018 National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA), they deleted Lashkar-e-Taiba from the list and focused only on the Haqqani network.

This was the first indication that the United States could show leniency in Pakistan’s disputes with India if Islamabad agrees to help it out in Afghanistan.

The law in its present form also seeks a declaration from the US defence secretary that Pakistan is working with Afghanistan to restrict the movement of militants along the Afghan border, and has shown progress in arresting and prosecuting senior leaders and mid-level operatives of the Haqqani network.

The previous version also sought a similar declaration for Lashkar-e-Taiba, but is not there in the present law.

The NDAA 2018 also expresses concern about the alleged persecution of various political or religious groups in Pakistan, including Christians, Hindus, Ahmadis, Sindhis, Hazaras and the Baloch.

It urges the secretary of defence to ensure that Pakistan will not use any assistance provided by the United States to persecute minority groups.

Published in Dawn, December 14th, 2017
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Default Calling Pakistan's Bluff: The Right Way to Stop the Taliban

Calling Pakistan's Bluff: The Right Way to Stop the Taliban

As the Donald Trump administration has reviewed its plans to manage the war in Afghanistan, the question of troop levels has dominated discussions of U.S. policy. Washington is on track to modestly increase the number of military personnel deployed to Afghanistan, a stop-gap measure indicating that the United States’ presence in the country is unlikely to end soon. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, to whom the president has delegated decisionmaking on the Afghan war, has promised a new strategy by the end of July.

If that strategy is to lead to progress in Afghanistan, the United States must rethink its approach to neighboring Pakistan, whose active and passive support for terrorist groups such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network undermines Afghanistan’s stability. Whether one believes—as many do—that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is directly funneling weapons and money to these groups, it is clear that the Taliban is better equipped, funded and more operationally efficient today than ever before and that senior Pakistani military leaders are well versed in how to support such groups covertly. Evidence of the ISI’s direct support for the militants is thin, but it is through the ISI that these groups, which have targeted American, Afghan, and coalition forces, survive and operate.

The United States has given Pakistan billions of dollars in military and civilian aid despite this duplicity, ostensibly in exchange for Pakistan’s cooperation on counterterrorism and its support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan (neither of which Pakistan has fully delivered). Out of fear of losing this cooperation and American access to transportation routes into Afghanistan, Washington has kept up its support, enabling the Pakistani officials in charge of their country’s double game in Afghanistan and indirectly funding Islamabad’s support for militants.

The United States should offer to reward Pakistan if it pursues the insurgent groups.

How should the United States deal with this problem? Although the Barack Obama administration became increasingly critical of Pakistan over its time in office, its strategy amounted to a quiet tolerance of the country's double dealing. The Trump administration’s approach remains unclear, but there are signs that it will assume a more adversarial stance. Such an approach would be a mistake, since any attempt to manage the war in Afghanistan without addressing the role and concerns of Pakistan is bound to fail. It would also seriously hinder the United States’ efforts to deal with Pakistan on a range of other important issues, including its expanding nuclear program.

Some observers, such as the former U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and the political scientist Moeed Yusuf, have argued that the United States must address Pakistan’s insecurities with respect to India to gain its cooperation in Afghanistan. Others, such as the scholar Christine Fair, have advocated a much harder-edged approach, calling for the United States to break ties and isolate Pakistan if it does not stop supporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.

These analysts are right that Pakistan’s double game must end if insurgent groups in Afghanistan are ever to put down their arms. But there is a better way to achieve that outcome than by bowing to Pakistan’s irrational fears of encirclement by India or by putting U.S.-Pakistani relations on a collision course.

The United States should covertly and overtly attack the insurgent groups that threaten its interests across Pakistan, without apology or concern for the fallout in the U.S.–Pakistani relationship. At the same time, Washington should restrict its military aid to Pakistan until the country goes after the terrorists it has historically protected, including those who target India. To balance these actions, which would damage the Pakistani military’s status and ability to lead, the United States should offer to reward Islamabad if it pursues the insurgent groups. Washington should promise to provide the Pakistani military not just with the kinds of counterterrorism equipment it currently supplies, but also with conventional weaponry—such as the attack helicopters, armed unmanned vehicles, artillery, and other pieces of equipment Pakistan has long sought. This combination of carrots and sticks has been considered but never pursued by previous administrations. It would help eliminate the militants’ safe haven and preserve bilateral ties by addressing Pakistan’s fear of India, which is what has led the country to back terrorist groups in the first place.

ELIMINATING SAFE HAVENS

More aggressively hunting down the insurgent groups Pakistan protects would have a number of benefits. It would show Pakistan that the United States’ tolerance of its duplicity is over and that Pakistan must do more to bring insurgents to heel. It would also degrade the groups that have killed U.S., NATO, and Afghan soldiers and civilians. Islamabad has historically tolerated U.S. strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a mountainous region in Pakistan’s northwest. Washington should step up its efforts there, and it should also pursue terrorists in the other parts of Pakistan where they operate with impunity, such as Baluchistan, Karachi, and the southern Punjab. The militants’ safe haven in those areas has helped them make a dramatic resurgence in Afghanistan without repercussions for their safety in Pakistan. Eliminating the insurgents’ safe havens and stabilizing Afghanistan requires both aggressive action and diplomacy.

Next, the United States should restrict its military assistance to Pakistan until it shows that it is willing to target insurgent groups beyond the ones it considers internal threats (such as the Pakistani Taliban). That would put more pressure on Pakistan’s military to change course. The Pakistani army and air force particularly rely on American equipment and cash reimbursements for their counterinsurgency operations. Reducing U.S. support would have swift effects, as would eliminating the provision of irreplaceable American hardware. (The United States should continue to provide unconditional civilian aid to Pakistan’s poor, who should not be made to suffer for their leaders’ choices.)


The demise of Pakistani-backed insurgents would improve India’s security more than Pakistan’s conventional gains would undermine it.


But Pakistan won’t give up its militant habit simply as a result of U.S. opposition or increased military action, because it deems the insurgents essential to its national security. Indeed, Islamabad would probably respond to more American operations within Pakistan much as it did to the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden: by denying that it knew terrorists were operating on Pakistani soil and decrying the United States’ violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The Pakistani army is particularly likely to lash out. To preserve its reputation as Pakistan’s protector, it would likely threaten to attack U.S. forces and push Pakistan’s civilian leaders to break ties with Washington. Restricting U.S. military aid, meanwhile, would lead to reduced counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Islamabad and encourage Pakistan to work more closely with the militaries of U.S. rivals, including China, Russia, and Iran. It could also lead Pakistan to unleash its proxies in Afghanistan, India, or further afield.

The United States should hedge against those outcomes by offering up front to restore and broaden its military aid to Pakistan if it takes action against the insurgent groups. By offering Pakistan conventional military aid in exchange for its cooperation, U.S. officials would increase its leaders’ confidence that they can defend their country against what they see as its primary threat—India—without recourse to terrorist groups.

THE NECESSARY BALANCE


Opponents of this approach may argue that it would be naïve to rely on Pakistan to take action against the insurgents and that providing the country with conventional military aid could destabilize the region and alienate India. But this kind of quid pro quo is the most realistic way to prevent the breakdown in ties that the aggressive U.S. pursuit of terrorists throughout Pakistan would produce—and it is an approach that has not been seriously attempted since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, turning up the pressure on Pakistan without promising to address its insecurities would be a recipe for disaster: it could permanently derail the bilateral relationship, leaving the U.S. without insight into or influence over an important partner in the fight against international terrorism. What’s more, although the United States must deal with Pakistan’s deceit forcefully, neither it nor the rest of the world can afford to let the country—with its rapidly growing nuclear arsenal and historical support for terrorists and nuclear proliferation—become a pariah state outside of global rules and norms.

India would strenuously object if the United States provided more conventional military aid to Pakistan. U.S. officials could weather its displeasure, however, so long as they invest enough diplomatic effort and remind New Delhi that the demise of Pakistani-backed insurgents would improve India’s security more than Pakistan’s conventional gains would undermine it. After all, those militants pose a more immediate threat to India than the Pakistani military does.

The drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan on a pre-announced timeline during Obama’s presidency led the Pakistanis to believe that they would be left on their own to manage the consequences of Afghanistan’s instability and India’s increased influence there. Together with the United States’ growing military support for India, this situation deepened Islamabad’s perceived need to support its insurgent proxies—the opposite of the outcome the United States seeks in Afghanistan and the region. This does not justify Pakistan’s harboring of militants responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians and soldiers. But it does show the way to a better approach: one in which the United States works to find a balance with Pakistan while bringing its double game to the end it deserves.

Source: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
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