Kerry Lugar Bill
 

Hi friends i am a new member in dis forum and i want ur opinion about the karry lugar bill ,its conditions are very tough and with this UNITED STATES have an access with the nuclear weapons of PAKISTAN and any national of PAKISTAN which has a relation with them. So all the senior members i want to know ur comments about it.Thanks

@Sumaira
 

Since you mentioned it is harsh on Pakistan. Could you please post the main clauses of this bill so we can form an opinion.

Regards

Kerry-Lugar Bill: still seeking control over Pakistan



Wednesday, May 06, 2009
Shireen M Mazari

This column was going to be a continuation of the issue of Madressahs and the origin of Pakistan's suicide bombers, and why a non-military fast track approach is required by galvanising Pakistani resources, but that will have to wait for another week. The much awaited (in some Pakistani quarters) Kerry Lugar Bill has now been presented and it certainly moves away from the ridiculous Howard Berman Bill that was presented to the House of Representatives. However, once again, we are seeing the doublespeak so aptly describes by fellow columnist Anjum Niaz. At the end of the day, what may emerge in the Congressional consensus is a mix of the two bills, and the final shape will depend on how effective the Indian lobby has been and how critical the US regards our national submission to Indian interests. Be that as it may, the Kerry Lugar Bill (KLB) itself is problematic, even though it appears angelic compared to the Berman Bill – although the amounts and time lines are similar - $1.5 billion per year authorised for five years and a similar amount advocated for the following five years! The KLB delinks security or military assistance from non-military assistance but has conditionalities attached to both.

In terms of security, the assistance is on a year-by-year basis, and the US president has to certify that Pakistan's security forces – that is the military which effectively means the army – are making concerted efforts to prevent Al Qaeda and "other terrorist groups" from operating in Pakistani territory! Given how even the loss of over a thousand security personnel has failed to convince the US that our military is doing its best under trying circumstances, the US continues to put forward the mantra of "do more", such certification would put our security forces under US pressure and "control" for a decade at least. And for what? For weapons systems that we have done without adequately for many decades. As for getting US training in counter terrorism, that is a laugh given how inadequate the US itself has proven to be – whether it was Vietnam, Latin America, Iraq or Afghanistan.

There is also the required certification that the military is preventing Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan from where attacks against Afghanistan can be launched – as if the whole burden on preventing cross-border movement and attacks is the responsibility of the Pakistan army, not of the NATO forces or Afghan military! Once again, the US continues to focus on a military-centric approach and has a punitive policy towards the Pakistan military.

The latter is reflected also in another requirement relating to security assistance: the US president has to certify that our security forces are not interfering in the political and judicial processes of Pakistan. While all Pakistanis wish to see this, is it the place of the US to dictate this as a conditionality? What has this got to do with military aid and fighting "terrorism"?

To add further insult to the state of Pakistan, the US secretary of state, after consulting the secretary of defence and the director of national intelligence will also be submitting to Congress an annual report on the "progress" of Pakistan's security forces. The "progress" is not defined categorically so it could include demands for revelations of our nuclear assets locations, security systems and so on also. Is our military so desperate for US weapons that we will compromise our nuclear assets? Already there is concern over the "sensitive" briefing allegedly given to US and some European diplomats relating to our nuclear assets. How far will we go just for dollars and some weapons systems that we do not really need? And what if "progress" also refers to cuts in our nuclear weapons' spending – something that the Zardari government has already begun to time "coincidentally" with his US visit, although some of us had written about this danger many months earlier!

Then there is a very ominous phrase relating to the presidential evaluation and that is a reference to the roles of "Pakistan local, regional and national institutions". Does regional here offer an indirect intrusion of India somewhere or does it merely mean provincial institutions – and which institutions?

Even with non-security or civilian assistance, there are conditionalities which are highly intrusive and relate to democracy, independent judiciary, rule of law and so on. All laudable, but why should we need US supervision or intervention financially on these counts? After all, on these issues, it is not money that is needed but political commitment and internal reforms which the senior judiciary has already initiated. Incidentally, on one count the US has understood the Pakistani penchant for bowing before dollars: the KLB also provides a regular $5 million for the US ambassador to Pakistan to provide "critical need development or humanitarian assistance" – an open-ended provision for buying loyalties and providing the US ambassador in Islamabad with more interventionist powers within Pakistan's domestic polity.

As for the democracy agenda, what happens if the Pakistani people elect a group or party that is anathema to the US and its interests? Will they do with our democracy what they did to Allende and Chile and what they are doing to Hamas? As for rule of law, if the US was seriously interested in this, it would come clean on the "Disappeared People" issue and close Guantanamo Bay.

Ironically, Kerry while introducing the Bill, kept referring to the US positive experience during the earthquake when the US provided humanitarian assistance. But he has forgotten that it took many critiques in the Pakistani press for the NATO transport planes and helicopters present in Afghanistan to be galvanised into playing a humanitarian role – while resource-limited Cuba and our friend Turkey gave immediately and without any publicity-seeking dramas.

The point that needs to be considered is: what are the long term costs of the US assistance to Pakistan and can we do without it? Certainly, if our leadership tightened its belt, cut out its foreign trips and perks and privileges, and actually governed effectively, our resources could be generated from within. Let the parliamentarians, most of who are economically prosperous, refuse to take their bloated pay and perks packages and redirect them towards education and health in their areas. Let the wheat and sugar mafias and smugglers be apprehended and so on. And let the military continue to rely on its indigenous weapons systems and nuclear deterrence.

As for fighting terrorism and extremism, the military is only a last option with tremendous negative long term fallout – especially as long as we are seen to be doing US bidding or acting under US pressure. We now face a threat not only from the militant extremists from within us, but also from the US. Yes, the writ of the state has to be asserted, but there has to be a political road map and a holistic approach not the military being sent in to fight in a political vacuum – simply because the US and its many apologists in Pakistan and in foreign-funded NGOs abroad, have decreed so.

The US leadership with its multiple histrionics, beginning with Obama, has made its negative Pakistan agenda clear: it is eventually seeking control of our nuclear assets and we are playing into their hands. On the one hand, the militants are threatening the fabric of Pakistani society and on the other hand the US is creating violent dissensions within Pakistan not only amongst civil society but also between the military and civilian structures. It knows that unless it destroys the military institution, it cannot achieve its goal of targeting out nuclear assets. So, it is demanding a role for the military which will undermine its morale, bring it into conflict with its own people and create further unrest.

Bangladesh, the various military actions in Balochistan and the murder of Akbar Bugti should be important reminders of the costs of military operations against one's own people. We have terrorist courts and paramilitary forces – isolate the militants by providing security and justice for the locals and bringing the terrorists to face the law – not simply creating more IDPs. After all, how many will we kill through military power? Militaries are never a solution to political problems and where the civilian government has lost its writ it should declare an emergency and move to re-establish it. Of course, if our leaders actually took time off from their foreign forays to visit their own troubled areas, it could offer solace and support to those caught in the military-militant crossfire. As for the US agenda, what part is still not clear to our rulers?



The writer is a defence analyst. Email: [email]callstr@hotmail.com[/email]

Courtesy:The News

The following is the text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the Senate on Thursday, Sept 24, 2009. It will now go to the House of Representatives and if passed without amendments, will be sent to President Barack Obama for signing into law:

[B]S.1707[/B]

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

[B]SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.[/B]

[B](a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance:[/B] For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

[B](b) Limitation on Arms Transfers:[/B] For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

[B](c) Certification:[/B] The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

[B](d) Certain Payments:[/B] (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

[B](e) Waiver:[/B] (1) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

[B](f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined:[/B] In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

[B]SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.[/B]

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010:

[B](1) IN GENERAL[/B] - For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following:

(A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

[B](2) PURPOSES OF FUND[/B]: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

[B](3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY:[/B]

(A) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

[B]SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE
[/B]
[B](a) Requirements:[/B] (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

[B](b) Waiver:[/B] 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

[B](c) Application to Certain Activities-[/B] Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

[B](d) Definitions-[/B] In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

[B]TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.
[/B]

[B](a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report-[/B] Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

[B](b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report:[/B]

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT:

(A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

[B](c) Security-related Assistance Plan- [/B]Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

[B]SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.[/B]

[B](a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- [/B]Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available;

(2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification;

(3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act;

(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program;

(5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds;

(6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any;

(7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act;

(8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103;

(9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000;

(10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6);

(11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism;

(12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise;

(13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program;

(14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and

(15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

[B](b) Government Accountability Office Reports: [/B]

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act


These are some of the most important parts of the bill
For the complete version, kindly visit the Library of Congress at the following link
[url]http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.962.ES:[/url]

The Price of Aid by Anees Jailani (DAWN)
 

ON Sept 24, the US Senate unanimously passed the revised version of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, titled the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009, which triples non-military aid to Pakistan to $1.5bn per annum. An identical version of the bill, pending in the House of Representatives, is expected to be passed soon.

If passed without amendments, it will be sent to President Barack Obama for signing into law. The announcement in this regard was made by the US president during his address to a meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan at the UN headquarters in New York.

The government must be rejoicing and claiming the US Senate’s approval as a major victory and proof of the international community’s confidence in the present set-up. But they won’t point out that Section 203 of the act says that “for

fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the US secretary of state, under the direction of the president, makes a certification” to the appropriate congressional committees that:

“The Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

“The Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as:

“Ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries;

“Preventing Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and

“Strengthening counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and

“The security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.”

The above makes it quite clear what the international community is thinking about Pakistan, its government — including the army — and its people. The first presumption is that Pakistan is involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons-related materials. It has never been proven in a court of law, but the presumption now is part of US law.

The second presumption is that Pakistan is somehow involved in sponsoring terrorism, and it thus needs prompting from the US government to put a stop to it. As if this were not enough, there is an implication that Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies are involved in aiding terrorist groups, including those that are conducting attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, and against the territory or people of neighbouring countries, which obviously means India.

India’s ‘favourite organisations’ are specifically mentioned, namely Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, and Pakistan is prohibited from letting them operate in its territory, including carrying out cross-border attacks into India. To sprinkle salt on the policymakers’ wounds, the law further requires the closure of terrorist camps in Fata and dismantling terrorist bases in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke. The latter clearly implies that bases in these places exist and that they should be removed.

The message for the security forces of Pakistan is loud and clear. They must not “materially” and substantially subvert the political or judicial processes. Who can certify whether these forces are “materially” subverting the political or judicial processes?

One may agree with all the above objectives. But, at the same time, one wonders what direction the country’s sovereignty has taken. It is totally an internal matter whether Pakistan’s security forces subvert its political or judicial processes. All may oppose this, but does it make sense for foreign powers to dictate to another country how its political and judicial system should function?

This is the price that a country like Pakistan has to pay for taking aid from others. Either it says no, or signs on the dotted line with a wide grin on its face, as if this was the best thing that has happened to the country since independence.

The above refers only to one section of the Kerry-Lugar Bill. It contains many other restrictions, including placing limitations on arms transfers; requiring that all assistance can only be provided to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan; submission of a Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report within 45 days of the date of enactment of the act; development of a comprehensive inter-agency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close terrorist safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organisations in the region and elsewhere to implement effective counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including Fata, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan and parts of Punjab; and the submission of monitoring reports.

Thank God, Kerry and Lugar did not think of getting the name of Pakistan changed!

[email]aJ@Jillani.org[/email]

US signed a military pact with India in July 2009.This agreement entitled India to get sophisticated weapons from US but with conditions??? Under the terms of the deal, the US would be allowed to conduct "end-use monitoring," meaning it would conduct regular assessments of India's military policies to verify that weapons systems are being used for their intended purposes. It also allowed US to annually inspect the military hardware purchased from US. Before this, almost couple of years ago, US had increased Military aid to India ,at that time , Pakistan also made diplomatic efforts to get the same assistance but we could not convince US. Interestingly this was projected as diplomatic failure of Pakistan Government.

What I want to convey is that no foreign Govt. grant unconditional aid. Even International development institutions provide loan with strict terms and conditions. (SBP autonomy that exclude it from control of Govt is a condition from IMF).Last year Zardari faced heavy criticism on returning empty handed from US and now when he managed to get an aid package he is being charged of compromising the sovereignty of state. These are double standard.

In this aid package there is no strict condition for non military aid. The dawn has in its editorial has commented on the bill as under

[quote][B]The aid is meant predominantly for social development, capacity-building and democracy-related projects. However, the bill also authorises “such sums as are necessary” for military assistance to Pakistan and it was this aspect that caused some in Congress to baulk at approving without conditions. But it appears that the sting in those conditions has been removed; earlier versions of the bill made direct references to A.Q. Khan and India, whereas the final conditions include Pakistan’s cooperation in dismantling nuclear supply networks and combating terrorist groups and ensuring that the security forces do not subvert the judicial and political processes in the country. These do not appear to be unduly onerous or unfair[/B]. [/quote]


I don’t maintain that this Govt is flawless, what I believe is that a worst democracy is much better than dictatorship. We have reached to this level only due to power thrust of Generals. Had the political process been allowed to function, we would have been living in much better conditions.

Democracy is a blessing. If sitting Govt do not perform well, it would be voted out in the next term. But what would happen if a general comes to rescue? Government has a mandate to complete its 5 year but some invisible hands are striving to destabilize it with the help of a well sponsored media campaign. It would be very unfortunate if democracy is derailed again.

Kerry-Lugar Bill
 

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Distortions and delusions

By Irfan Husain

Saturday, 03 Oct, 2009 | 02:22 AM PST |


National Geographic aired a programme about the 9/11 conspiracies the other evening. While it did not cover any new ground, it did painstakingly demolish many of the idiotic theories that have been doing the rounds for the last eight years.

What struck me most about the TV documentary was the ease with which a rumour can be spread compared with the time and expertise it takes to expose it as a lie. Literally millions continue to believe that the Twin Towers were actually brought down by thousands of explosive charges planted inside the building and not by the airliners that crashed into them. It took a crew of experts who brought down a building to demonstrate how ridiculous the conspiracy theory really is.

The camera took us to a condemned structure that was scheduled to be demolished, and then showed the team wiring up the place with explosives. The number and location of demolition charges had been precisely calculated in advance, and it took two days to place them, even though it was a three-storied structure. The Twin Towers, by contrast, were skyscrapers that would have taken weeks to wire up. To imagine that this could have been done secretly is to live at the very top of cloud cuckoo land.

One 9/11 conspiracy theory that became a favourite on the Internet the day after the attack was that all Jewish workers had escaped the carnage as they had been warned of the attacks, and therefore did not come to work that fateful day. This is supposed to prove the Mossad connection with the atrocity. However, nobody ever says how they jumped to this conclusion as employment records in the US do not mention religion. And yet there are millions of people who continue to believe this particular urban myth.

Just as these crackpot theories continue to do the rounds in cyberspace, all kinds of outrageous claims are made on TV and go unchallenged. Recently in Pakistan, a number of newspaper and TV reports claimed that the US embassy in Islamabad was about to get 1,000 Marines, apart from hiring the services of Blackwater, the private security outfit that has won infamy for its actions in Iraq.

Suddenly, talking heads across TV screens in Pakistan were nodding in unison. Nobody mentioned that Blackwater had changed its name to Xe. And certainly, no print or electronic journalist took the trouble to check with American diplomats. In fact, even when the embassy issued a clarification that no battalions of Marines were about to storm Islamabad, many continue to insist that there’s going to be a surge in their existing number. Perfectly reasonable people believe the embassy will be transformed into a bastion, and that Pakistani installations will be at risk.

Even though a few dissenting voices challenge these distortions, it is hard to rebut a falsehood on TV, given the format of talk shows. By allowing equal time to participants, the person with an axe to grind can throw any number of verbal grenades without the need to prove their veracity. But anybody trying to demolish these lies immediately runs into the time barrier. The reality is that on camera, it is harder to establish the truth than it is to concoct or repeat a few lies.

Another example of the media distorting reality is the Kerry-Lugar Bill. This legislation, recently voted into law by the US Congress, is a major triumph for Pakistan. But the way it has been dissected by our ‘experts,’ it would seem that it’s a dubious bit of rubbish dragged in by the cat. Pundits have examined it for caveats and restrictions, and continue to smell a ***.

For years, the Pakistani chattering classes have been bemoaning the fact that Americans have helped Pakistani governments when they have been run by generals. This, they rightly argue, has helped the perpetuation of military rule, pointing to Zia and Musharraf as prime examples of American largesse handed over to dictators. But here we have an unprecedented infusion of assistance to sustainable development and democratic institutions, and there are few cheers for those who have worked to put this package together and get it approved by Congress.

Nobody hands out $1.5bn annually over five years unless it’s in their interest. Clearly, Americans would like to see a stable Pakistan that does not provide a safe haven for jihadis. But surely this is what we want too. So why this reluctance to acknowledge a convergence of interests?

In a sense, our relations with the US have become hostage to a virulent media that seems hell-bent on bashing Washington at every turn. Over the years, I have opposed American policies in many parts of the world. But I recognise that the US has global interests and can be a force for good.

So who is whipping up this anti-American sentiment? A lot of the blame must be placed at the White House gate. The blank cheque to Israel is the source of much anger. The invasion of Iraq fuels some of the fury. Avoidable civilian deaths in Afghanistan are another cause. In Pakistan itself, the drone attacks that have killed so many Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders have also caused considerable collateral damage.

But there’s more to it than these policies and perceptions. In the current venom-laden environment, it is clear that ordinary Pakistanis are being manipulated by cynical groups. Unfortunately, our media is more accustomed to pandering to existing prejudices than challenging them. So if anti-West sentiments are the flavour of the day, TV channels are happy to fan the flames to improve their ratings.

Currently, the religious right, the liberal left and the military establishment are riding the same anti-American bandwagon. The mullahs tacitly support the Taliban and what they stand for; the left hates the US more than it does the Taliban; and the army is sick of being told by Washington that it isn’t doing enough. By amplifying these anti-West feelings through the media, our generals can tell Americans that they cannot act take tougher action against the militants in Fata as it would inflame public sentiment and might destabilise the government.


While we tend to get very emotional about distant Muslim causes, our own problems need urgent attention. Poverty, disease and illiteracy are all pressing concerns that successive governments have failed to tackle. Thus far, the excuse for this neglect has been the lack of resources. Now, however, the Kerry-Lugar bill gives us an opportunity to invest in our people. Let’s not blow this chance.
irfan.husain***********

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And then we had the following going on in the Senate...

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[B]Senators blast Kerry-Lugar Bill[/B]



[B]Saturday, October 03, 2009[/B]
ISLAMABAD: As the opposition in the Senate on Friday raised strong objections to the strings attached to the Kerry-Lugar Bill, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani assured the Upper House that the foreign minister would brief the Senate on the issue as soon as the US president accords consent to the bill.

PML-N Senator Syed Zafar Ali Shah had raised the Kerry-Lugar Bill issue and demanded the government’s clarification. Addressing the Senate, the prime minister sought cooperation from the opposition to meet the grim challenges of power shortage, law and order and economic recession. “We need the support of the political leadership to overcome these challenges,” he said.

The prime minister said as a result of the government’s prudent and effective policy, terrorists were now surrendering and the government did not have enough place to hold them as 3,000 had surrendered and 2,000 more would surrender shortly.

He said today the entire nation feels satisfied that the Malakand operation was the right decision. “I pay tribute to the whole nation, parliament, the political leadership and the Army. We cannot win this war without the support of the masses.” The prime minister said economy was showing signs of recovery as the government had taken stringent fiscal measures and today the country’s foreign exchange reserves stood at $14.7 billion. He underlined the need for a consensus economic policy to ensure sustainable economic progress.

Referring to the energy crisis, he said overcoming the power shortage was also a major priority area of the government. He assured the nation that it would be eliminated soon and there would be no load-shedding next summer. He reiterated the government’s commitment to utilise all available resources to overcome the power crisis and to give immediate relief to the people.

The prime minister informed the Senate that issues relating to the Thar coal project had been resolved amicably after which the government has set up the Thar Coal Energy Development Board under the chairmanship of the Sindh chief minister. The minister for water and power will be the deputy chairman of the board. He said the Planning Commission had signed an agreement with a private party to set up 3,000 MW plant in Thar, which will be completed in three years.

He said Thar had proven reserves of 1.83 trillion tonnes of coal, among the biggest in the world but unfortunately these had not yet been exploited. Meanwhile, senators, while declared the US threats of attacking Quetta as ‘totally unacceptable’. The senators from the opposition as well as the treasury benches expressed serious concern over reports of US threats to attack Quetta. “Attack on Quetta will be considered as attack on Pakistan’s mainland,” Senator Mian Raza Rabbani said while calling for discussion on the issue.

Rabbani said parliament should give a clear message to the United States that conditions attached to the Kerry-Lugar Bill would not be acceptable to the Pakistani nation. “This is a serious issue and should be debated in the house,” he said.

Senator Hasil Bizenjo, while speaking on a point of order, lamented the federal government did not take parliament and the nation into confidence on drone attacks and was now silent when the US officials were hurling threats to attack Quetta.

He said the US ambassador to Afghanistan was called to a meeting in the United States where the issue was discussed and the presence of the Taliban Shura in Quetta was reported. Bizenjo feared it would be a much bigger human tragedy than the IDPs of Malakand. “If Quetta comes under attack, then even Islamabad will not be safe from the US attacks,” he said.

Leader of the Opposition Senator Wasim Sajjad said the Kerry-Lugar Bill and the conditions it carried were a direct attack on Pakistan’s independence and sovereignty. “We should give a clear message to President Obama that he should rethink the bill and send it back to Congress for amendment,” Wasim Sajjad said.

Maulana Muhammad Khan Shirani of the JUI-F feared the attack on Quetta would open up a new front at a time when the Pakistani forces were already engaged in Swat and the tribal areas.

Senator Raja Zafarul Haq was of the view that the Kerry-Lugar Bill was aimed at increasing the US interference in Pakistan, saying the document should be sent back to Congress for reconsideration. He said the issues of Kashmir and India’s interference in Balochistan were raised during the meeting of the premiers of the two countries at Sharam el-Sheikh but the same were ignored during recent meetings between the two foreign ministers.

Senator Kulsoom Parveen of the Balochistan National Party (BNP) said the US would not need Pakistan’s permission to attack Quetta. She said Pakistan’s intelligence agencies should themselves arrest Mullah Umar and hand him over to the US if he was present in Quetta.

Senator Ishaq Dar of the PML-N said conditions under the Kerry-Lugar bill were not acceptable. Leader of the House Senator Nayyar Bukhari said the Kerry-Lugar Bill had been approved by the US Congress and not by Pakistan’s parliament. “The Pakistani government will accept what is in the national interests and what is best for the country,” he said.

In his brief response to points of order, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Nawabzada Malik Amad Khan said the reports of attack on Quetta were just speculation, saying there were many ways of intelligence-sharing between Pakistan and the United States. He maintained Kashmir was a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy and there could be no U-turn or backing out of it.

Senators blast Kerry-Lugar Bill

We have seen some strong arguments from the proponents and the opponents of the bill. Some of the points/questions that come to my mind are

Yes we need economic aid for development but is this a fair bargain?
I believe we have not been provided any aid by Friends of Pakistan so far in order to weaken our bargaining position in accepting Kerry-Lugar Bill.

As front line state in War against Terror, Pakistan deserves more. Pakistan has suffered more than this bill promises in terms of monetary losses and human lives. Owing to our success in recent counterinsurgency operations in Swat, Pak Army has demonstrated its resolve and effectiveness compared to incompetence of US-ISAF forces in Afghanistan. We are doing the job and should be in a better bargaining position. They need us from what I understand since we have the heart to go out there and fight when NATO forces argue who should go in the field and encounter Taliban.

Giving so much leverage to US especially when they seem to be at the end of their Afghan adventure does not sound like a great idea. As [B]Saleeqa Batool[/B] quoted one of the conditions from [B]DAWN Editorial[/B]

[HTML]Pakistan’s cooperation in dismantling nuclear supply networks and combating terrorist groups and ensuring that the security forces do not subvert the judicial and political processes in the country[/HTML]

The word cooperation will include all that we have been denying them so far. Substituting A.Q.Khan's name with 'anyone involved in proliferation activities' gives them the required scope.

Who will be the judge that security forces do not subvert judicial and political processes?US? From what I know they have always been hand in glove with all our military dictators. I might be unduly surprised at this since they have been micro-managing us for decades but this document definitely gives this apprehension a legal cover. And surrendering everything for just a meagre $1.5 billion a year. Whats that compared to what Zardari has been asking for $100 billion.

I don't blame Americans for ruining us every time they need our services. They are looking out for their interests. As a Pakistani I expect more from my democratically elected government especially the guys watching out for our interests in Washington. Just look at the 'Muridke' condition, I mean how does an Indian demand make it into a bill intended to help us. Where are our lobbyists?

The Kerry-Lugar Bill: details and conditions
 

Saturday, September 26, 2009
News Desk

WASHINGTON: The following is the text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the Senate on Thursday, Sept 24, 2009. It will now go to the House of Representatives and if passed without amendments, will be sent to President Barack Obama for signing into law:

S.1707

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Certain Payments: (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE

(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC.